Twisted Firestarters
Twisted Firestarters in this article we look at wo occasions a helicopter has triggered a bush fire. In the first the helicopter succumbed to the flames. In the other case the helicopter fled the scene and the environment suffered. Robinson R44 Northern Territory, 22 June 2022 This R44 was conducting a geophysical survey north of Alice Springs. The survey involved landing every 1 km to collect data. On board were the pilot and a survey field technician. According to the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) occurrence brief: At about 1000 local time, the pilot landed in an area of spinifex grass and the field technician disembarked the helicopter to carry out their survey tasks. The technician reported that, after setting up the equipment, they looked up and noticed flames under the helicopter. It was reported that the helicopter’s engine bay was positioned close to an area of dry spinifex and the heat from the engine’s exhaust ignited the grass. The ensuing fire spread very quickly, engulfing the helicopter. The pilot vacated the aircraft and sustained minor burns to their leg while attempting to retrieve a satellite phone on board. The helicopter was destroyed. The ATSB noted they were aware 5 occurrences in the preceding 10 years where a Robinson helicopter has been destroyed by grass fire. The R22 and R44 Pilot Operating Handbooks contain a warning: Do not land in tall dry grass. The exhaust is low to the ground and very hot; a grass fire may be ignited. Australian Army NH Industries NH90 (MRH-90 Taipan), Namadgi National Park, Australian Capital Territory, 27 January 2020 The military NH90 was supporting local civil authorities when it landed in the Orroral Valley within teh national park so crew members could ‘disembark for a short break‘. However a landing light caused a grass fire. The aircraft suffered significant damage but took off and flew back to Canberra. It landed safely and in “little over an hour…Defence public affairs was directed to start developing a holding statement and talking points.” The grass fire had however developed into what was capital city Canberra’s “most serious” bushfire threat since 2003 that consumed more than 7,900 hectares. Critical to the fire’s rapid development was the failure of the helicopter crew to raise the alarm for c45 minutes (i.e. until they landed). A lack of precise information sowed confusion as fire crews were dispatched to different parts of the national park in attempt to locate and extinguish the blaze. The title of the article is a reminder of your nan’s favourite 1990s bad boy, The Prodigy‘s Keith Flint. We will remain alert to any opportunity to reference Skin or PJ Harvey in future titles. Safety Resources The European Safety Promotion Network Rotorcraft (ESPN-R) has a helicopter safety discussion group on LinkedIn. You may also find these Aerossurance articles of interest: South Korean Fire-Fighting Helicopter Tail Rotor Strike on Fuel Bowser S-76A++ Rotor Brake Fire USAF RC-135V Rivet Joint Oxygen Fire C-130 Fireball Due to Modification Error Competitive Behaviour’ and a Fire-Fighting Aircraft Stall Short Sling Stings Speedy Squirrel: Tail Rotor Strike Fire-Fighting in Réunion Wayward Window: Fatal Loss of a Fire-Fighting Helicopter in NZ Helicopter Tail Rotor Strike from Firefighting Bucket Maintenance Issues in Fire-Fighting S-61A Accident Korean Kamov Ka-32T Fire-Fighting Water Impact and Underwater Egress Fatal Accident Firefighting AW139 Loss...
read moreManaging Interruptions: HEMS Call-Out During Engine Rinse
Managing Interruptions: HEMS Call-Out During Engine Rinse – Panel Lost (ANWB Airbus EC135T2+ PH-MAA) On 7 February 2022 air ambulance Airbus Helicopters EC135T2+ PH-MAA of ANWB Medical Air Assistance suffered the in flight loss of an engine inspection panel shortly after departure from Groningen Airport. According to the Dutch Safety Board (DSB) safety investigation (issued in March 2023), the operator conducts an engine rinse “every 5 flying hours / 3 days, or after flights over sea and/or a polluted environment”. This involves the aircraft commander in the cockpit and a second person operating the necessary ground support equipment. The investigators explain that: The procedure required the engine cowlings of the EC135T2+ to be opened in order to access the compressor rinse connection and to be closed after the rinsing procedure was completed. The…procedure also stipulated a plan in case of a Helicopter Emergency Medical Service (HEMS) scramble during the rinsing procedure. In this case a call-out did indeed interrupted the task. Shortly after take off… …the pilot heard a noise and suspected the helicopter had struck a bird. Another ANWB EC135T2+ had indeed suffered a bird strike on 14 January 2021. Investigators note that: There were no indications or warnings in the cockpit of a helicopter system malfunction and the commander decided to continue the flight. However shortly after the call out was cancelled anyway and the helicopter proceeded to return to base. Only after landing was an engine inspection panel found to be missing. The investigators conclude It is likely that the right engine cowling was not properly closed after the engine compressor rinsing procedure was interrupted by a HEMS scramble. Consequently, as a result of aerodynamic overload, it departed the helicopter during the flight. Our Observations It is good that the operator’s engine rinse procedure reportedly considered the task could be interrupted by a call-out. A lazy analysis would be to simply conclude there was a ‘failure to follow procedures’. That is lazy because: the DSB don’t actually describe what was expected in the event of an interruption it fails to recognise that by their very nature interruptions and distractions break and disrupt procedural flow. For this specific task one advantage is that it needs two people, so there are two people who can be used to cross-check key steps to return the aircraft for flight (e.g. disconnecting GSE, securing panels etc). Safety Resources The European Safety Promotion Network Rotorcraft (ESPN-R) has a helicopter safety discussion group on LinkedIn. You may also find these Aerossurance articles of interest: After Landing this HEMS Helicopter Suddenly Started to Slide Towards it’s Hangar… Human Factors of Dash 8 Panel Loss EC120 Forgotten Walkaround Distracted Dynamic Rollover US HEMS EC135P1 Dual Engine Failure: 7 July 2018 Dusk Duck: Birdstrike During Air Ambulance Flight Limitations of See and Avoid: Four Die in HEMS Helicopter / PA-28 Mid Air Collision EC135P2 Spatial Disorientation Accident HESLO EC135 LOC-I & Water Impact: Hook Confusion after Personnel Change Air Ambulance Helicopter Fell From Kathmandu Hospital Helipad (Video) Air Ambulance B407 Hospital Helipad Deck Edge Tail Strike During Shallow Approach US Air Ambulance Helicopter Hospital Heliport Tail Strike Air Methods AS350B3 Air Ambulance Tucson Tail Strike NTSB on LA A109S Rooftop Hospital Helipad Landing Accident Helicopter Destroyed in Hover Taxi Accident Air Ambulance Helicopter Downed by Fencing FOD Ambulance / Air...
read moreHESLO AS350 Fatal Accident Positioning with an Unloaded Long Line
HESLO H125 / AS350B3e N755AE Fatal Accident Positioning with an Unloaded Long Line On 29 July 2020, Airbus Helicopters H125 / AS350B3e N755AE of St Louis Helicopter was destroyed, and the two occupants killed, in an accident near Pioche, Nevada. According to the US National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) safety investigation report (issued 16 March 2023) the helicopter had landed on a mountain ridge (at an elevation of c 6,741 ft AMSL) during a survey prior to Helicopter External Sling Load Operations (HESLO) schedule for that day to move equipment to a mobile phone cell tower site. The accident flight was to be a c3 minute flight down from the ridge to a fuel truck to refuel (the fuel truck had been unable to drive any closer to the work site). On board were the pilot (owner of the company and who had 12,500 hours of total flight time) and a passenger. A witness reported that…a cable that was laid out on the ground in front of the helicopter. The pilot stated to him that the cable was 70 feet long. The witness left the pilot and passenger at the helicopter and drove away; shortly thereafter, he received a phone call about smoke in the vicinity and learned that the helicopter had crashed. The helicopter came to rest on its right side in heavily wooded terrain c 630 m from the fuel truck.. The aircraft was equipped with a Crash Resistant Fuel System (CRFS). This suffered some impact damage, but there was no evidence of any fuel loss. Examination…revealed that the long line was entangled with the tail rotor, which had separated from the helicopter. One tail rotor blade remained attached to the tail rotor; the other blade was not located. The tail boom was broken off and partially attached at the lower aft bulkhead by control cables. The tail cone/vertical fin assembly was found about 365 ft from the main wreckage and exhibited evidence of cable abrasion. The engine data recorder…indicated that the engine was placed in flight, then reduced to idle near the end of the recording. During this sequence, the main rotor speed decayed below that necessary to maintain lift. Examination of the flight controls and engine, as well as review of recorded engine data, revealed no evidence of mechanical anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. The helicopter was equipped with an Appareo Vision 1000 cockpit video recording device. The removable memory SD card was found to be blank. When the internal memory card was downloaded it contained data from 25 January 2020, 6 months earlier. Appareo identified several electrical system reasons this may not have occurred (including the circuit breaker being open). However: A return trip to the accident helicopter at the wreckage facility was attempted, however due to COVID-19 travel restrictions, and other factors, it was not conducted… So we are sadly none the wiser on this failure. NTSB conclude that… …it is likely that the pilot failed to achieve adequate clearance between the long line and terrain before descending downhill toward the fuel truck, which resulted in the helicopter’s long line, becoming entangled with the tail rotor, and a subsequent loss of helicopter control. Remarkably there is no comment on whether the longline was weighted or not. While an unweighted long line could...
read moreCustoms Training Loss of Control While Climbing Away from a Quick Stop
Customs Training LOC-I While Climbing Away from a Quick Stop (CBP Airbus AS350B2 N841BP) On 13 May 2021 Airbus AS350B2 N841BP of US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Air and Marine Operations (AMO) was destroyed in a training Loss of Control – Inflight (LOC-I) accident at Yukon, Oklahoma. Both pilots escaped injury but the aircraft was consumed by a post crash fire. The Accident Flight According to the US National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), who issued their safety investigation report 19 January 2023 the pilot under instruction had been enrolled on CBP’s Initial Pilot Certification course for the AS350B2 at the CBP National Air Training Center (NATC) in Oklahoma City. The student was aged 45, held a CPL and had 1,200 hours total, 620 hours on type. The instructor was 40 and had 6,000 hours total, 1,000 on type. The instructor reported for duty at c11:30 Local Time and started preparing with the student at 12:30 for 2 flights. The aircraft departed at 14:45. The pilot under instruction was in the right hand seat, The flight departed the Will Rogers International Airport (KOKC) and proceeded to the Clarence Page Municipal Airport (KRCE) to conduct training maneuvers. After arrival at KRCE, the flight crew conducted several approaches to the airport including confined area and pinnacle approaches. They then conducted several simulated emergencies, each of which required the helicopter’s hydraulic system to be turned off and then turned back on at the conclusion of the procedure. Readers should note that: The hydraulic system was turned off and on using the hydraulic cut-off switch, an unguarded push-button switch mounted on the end of the pilot’s collective stick. Next… …the flight crew proceeded to conduct a series of “quick stops.” After the third quick stop, the pilot heard a radio call indicating an airplane was on final approach to land on the runway they were using, and the flight instructor indicated that they would clear the runway. The pilot [under instruction] added that he completed a final quick stop and immediately entered a climbing left turn. At this point the pilot under instruction noticed the helicopter was yawing to the left. He was unable to correct that with a pedal input. When the pilot [under instruction] adjusted his grip on the collective, he felt the hydraulic cut-off button with his thumb as he prepared to reduce collective. As he tightened his grip on the collective, “the hydraulics came offline aggravating the left yaw into a hard left spin.” The controls were stiff, and the flight instructor told him to turn the hydraulics back on. The pilot “intentionally pressed the [hydraulic cut-off] button but felt no effect.” He pressed the button a second time, but the hydraulic light on the caution warning panel remained illuminated, so he pressed the button a third time. However the flight instructor stated that during the last quick stop “the helicopter slowed normally but then started a left yaw about 25 ft above ground level”. As the helicopter yawed to c 30° left the instructor “pushed forward on the cyclic to gain airspeed”. Its not clear from the NTSB report if he verbalised that intervention. He stated that “as the aircraft was recovering, the control loads instantly became excessive” and “noticed the hydraulic light on the caution warning panel...
read moreDusk Duck: Birdstrike During Air Ambulance Flight
Dusk Duck: Birdstrike During Air Ambulance Flight (Reach H130 N415RX) On 12 December 2022 air ambulance Airbus H130 / EC130T2 N415RX of Reach Air Medical Services was damaged in a birdstrike north west of Yuba City, California. According to the US National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), who issued their safety investigation report uncharacteristically quickly on 9 February 2023: The pilot in the helicopter reported that, during cruise flight [at 1,500 ft AGL] at dusk with night vision goggles on, he encountered a flock of birds at 1,500 ft above ground level. As the pilot initiated a climbing left turn to avoid the birds, he heard a loud bang accompanied by a pain in his left leg. The helicopter then began to vibrate, and the pilot initiated a precautionary landing in a nearby field without further incident. Bird remains were located throughout the pilot side of the cockpit. The helicopter sustained substantial damage to the windshield. Fortuitously the bird struck low on the windscreen rather than at head height and only one bird of the flock struck the helicopter. Neither the pilot nor the two other occupants were injured. Even though part of the bird was recovered, disappointingly the bird species and therefore its likely size, was not recorded by NTSB (other than a photo caption saying ‘duck’). Safety Resources EASA have issued Safety Information Bulletin SIB 2021-07 on Bird Strike Risk Mitigation in Rotorcraft Operations and accompanying safety promotion material. In a presentation on behalf of the Rotorcraft Bird Strike Working Group (RBSWG) to the 11th EASA Rotorcraft Symposium in December 2017 it was revealed that in the US 94% of the current helicopter fleet is made up of types that never needed to meet a bird strike requirement. A helicopter accident (discussed below) and the Hudson A320 ditching, both in January 2009, were likely causes of a big increase in all wildlife strikes reporting across the US helicopter fleet.While fixed wing aircraft predominantly strike birds during take-off and landing, two thirds of rotorcraft strikes occurred during the en route phase (where kinetic energy is highest). Only 8-9% occurred during approach and 9-10% during climb. The presentation went on: The largest single component struck by birds is the windshield with 47% on Part 27 and 40% on Part 29. 84-85% of all bird strikes occurred on components forward of the main rotor mast. This includes the main rotor which experienced 30%-33% of the strikes reported. Not one single record exists for windshield penetration on Part 29 rotorcraft certified to the FAA bird strike airworthiness standard established over 21 years ago. This is statistically significant. For newly manufactured and existing rotorcraft, the RBSWG proposed to use a Risk-Based Safety-Tiered approach that scales the bird strike regulation based on the maximum number of occupants onboard. As the number of occupants increases, so does the risk exposure. They also recommend: Reduce airspeed when practical Increase altitude as quickly as possible and practical Use taxi and landing lights They also say: The location of bird concentrations during seasonal migrations and the local bird nesting and roosting habitats, should be made available to the rotorcraft operator/pilot for preflight planning to minimize the potential for bird strikes. Air carriers and general aviation operators working with the Flight Safety Programs and Flight Service Briefing should identify and publish the known locations and probability of bird concentrations. This information on...
read moreUrgent Exit Required: A Helideck Incident
Urgent Exit Required: A Helideck Incident (Omni Sikorsky S-76C+ PR-SEC) Vessels and mobile installations in the UKCS are currently completing a long anticipated helideck upgrade to introduce the latest Rev 9b of the Helideck Certification Agency (HCA) standard of Helideck Monitoring System (HMS) with deck repeater lights. This serious incident in Brazil is a reminder of why this HMS upgrade is essential. On 28 June 2015, Omni Taxi Aero Sikorsky S-76C+ PR-SEC, under contract to Petrobras, had to make a sudden departure from the deck of pipelaying vessel Kommandor 3000, almost colliding with the vessel’s superstructure, after the vessel had changed heading. The aircraft was undamaged and the occupants unharmed. The helicopter damaged the helideck net. The Incident Brazilian accident investigation agency, the Centro de Investigação e Prevenção de Acidentes Aeronáuticos (CENIPA), explain in their safety investigation report (avaible in Portuguese only) that the offshore helicopter had departed from Macaé Airfield (SBME), RJ at 10:30UTC with two pilots and four passengers onboard. Before landing, the [Kommandor 3000’s] radio operator informed [the helicopter crew of] the wind conditions (080°/17kt), the ship’s heading (351°) and the values of pitch, roll and heave. On that occasion, the first consultation was made on the possibility of changing the bow of the vessel after landing. The aircraft landed at 11:40UTC. The Aircraft Commander was Pilot Flying (PF) and remained at the controls while rotors running on the helideck. The four outbound passengers disembarked and four inbound passengers boarded. During this time, the ship’s radio operator again questioned the crew about the 096° turn to heading, and the [aircraft] captain agreed with the manoeuvre. With the passengers on board, the maneuver was carried out as requested. Thus, the wind, which before landing was incident laterally on the vessel, became a bow relative to the ship, and abeam relative to the aircraft. During the vessel’s turn CENIPA say the wind was 29 knots and the vessel was “struck by a wave”, which caused an “aggressive…pitch-up, propelling the aircraft upward and to the right”. The aircraft skidded across and damaged the deck net. The Aircraft Commander perceived the motion as the start of a dynamic rollover towards the superstructure and so wisely initiated an immediate take off. After losing contact with the helideck surface, the aircraft banked and moved dangerously to the right, passing very close to the main structure of the ship, indicating a risk of collision. Safety Investigation The investigation was hampered because the Honeywell Cockpit Voice and Flight Data Recorder (CVFDR) was not functioning during the incident flight, for reasons that were not determined. The investigators did however discover that 10 minutes prior to the landing, the earlier generation HMS was already displaying a red warning on the vessel’s bridge that at least one motion parameter was outside of limits. Other Occurrences We have previously discussed an accident from February 2014 in Brazil where another Petrobras chartered S-76C+ was damaged landing on a vessel without being warned that the HMS was showing exceedance: Helideck Heave Ho! (BHS Sikorsky S-76C++ PR-CHI). That prior investigation was only released 16 November 2021 (in Portuguese only), far too late to have helped prevent the 2015 near miss. CHC AS332L G-BKZE suffered a rollover on the helideck of drillship West Navion in the North Sea on 10 November 2001. In that...
read moreS-92A Offshore Landing Obstacle Strike: CENIPA Report
S-92A Offshore Landing Obstacle Strike: CENIPA Report (BHS S-92A PR-CHR on Sevan Brasil) On 15 April 2017, Sikorsky S-92A PR-CHR of CHC‘s Brazilian Helicopter Services (BHS), under contract to Petrobras, suffered an obstacle strike and hard landing on the Sevan Brasil (SS-86), a Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit (MODU) off Brazil. None of the 21 occupants were injured in this accident, which was dramatically caught on video: Brazilian accident investigation agency CENPIA published their safety investigation report, in Portuguese only, on 3 November 2022, a disappointing 5½ years later. The Accident Flight The offshore helicopter had departed Cabo Frio for the Sevan Brasil under VFR, with two pilots, a cabin attendant and 18 passengers. CENIPA explain that the Aircraft Commander, who had flown 21,307 hours (3.294 on type) was sat in the left hand seat as an instructor & ‘Accredited Examiner’, and Pilot Monitoring (PM). In the right seat was a Pilot in Command Under Instruction (PICUS) who had 5,500 flying hours experience (253 on type) was Pilot Flying (PF). This was the flight crew’s third flight of the day. The Aircraft Commander had been PF for the first two offshore landings as the wind, and therefore the approach direction, favoured an approach best made by the left hand pilot. In fact the Aircraft Commander had made all landings in the previous three days they had flown together too. Sevan Brasil is a relatively novel circular hull MODU with a D23, t15.6 helideck, adequate for helicopters up to the size of the AW101, mounted at c 150 ft above sea level. The octagonal helideck is not mounted tangentially. CENPIA note the chevron marking that indicates the 210° Obstacle Free Sector (OFS) was incorrectly positioned. Though this is not relevant to this accident due to the chosen approach direction. More significantly, the helideck plate for the Sevan Brasil, which the crew consulted before departure, had… …no information regarding the positioning of the chevron, 150º and 210º sector orientations, helideck bow, wind limitations, relative wind, etc. This deficiency is of note because CENIPA also reveal that the flight was due to have been flown by another helicopter company, implying the crew would be less familiar with the installation and more dependent of the plate for their orientation. The investigators highlight that UK CAA CAP 437: Standards for offshore helicopter landing areas, probably the most widely referenced helideck standard, is far more explicit of the data that should be included. CENPA also highlight whip antennas and structure near the helideck were not marked in accordance with guidance in NORMAM 27 (the Brazilian helideck standard). However, CENPIA also commented that the guidance was not explicit about how far from the helideck these markings were necessary. The operator’s Operations Manual states that: The Aircraft Commander should use his judgment and experience in selecting what he considers to be the best profile. Factors such as: aircraft weight; wind speed; turbulence; size of helideck; elevation and orientation helideck; obstructions; available power margins; platform gas burner flames; etc., will influence the takeoff and landing decision-making. The Ops Manual goes on to list factors to consider such as Landing area location and wind direction; Wind strength; Experience level of each pilot; and Missed approach (go-around) profile. In this case it was decided that the PICUS, sat in the right...
read moreAfter Landing this HEMS Helicopter Suddenly Started to Slide Towards it’s Hangar…
After Landing this HEMS Helicopter Suddenly Started to Slide Towards it’s Hangar… (ADAC Airbus EC135P2+ at University Hospital Augsburg) On 5 June 2022, shortly after an ADAC Airbus EC135P2+ HEMS helicopter, callsign Christoph 40, landed at its base, an elevated helipad at the University Hospital Augsburg, in Bavaria, the pilot was surprised by the sudden uncommanded movement of the helicopter. The Incident According to the German safety investigation agency, the BFU, who published their report in German only the rooftop hospital landing site has a… …18 m x 18 m final approach and take off area (FATO) / touch down and take off area (TLOF), a helicopter parking area and a 5.24 m x 7.5 m mobile helicopter platform for landing and exiting the helicopter. The site is at an elevation of 58 m. After the landing approach to the marked landing area, [the pilot] manoeuvred the helicopter to the mobile platform to land. The platform was in the outboard position and the hangar doors were closed. The helicopter touched down on the platform with the nose of the fuselage pointing towards the hangar. Before the engine power was reduced, the pilot noticed the platform rolling away in the direction of the closed hangar doors, picked up the helicopter again immediately and then hovered to the parking position. Investigators found the brakes to the mobile helicopter transport platform were not applied. But why?… The Platform This unit had been in use since the heliport opened in 2014 but the BFU report it had proved troublesome in service. It is battery-operated and runs on rails. In its the outer position, the distance from the centre of the turntable on the platform to the hangar doors was about 16 m. The D-value of an EC135 is 12 m, so when centred there is c 10 m of clearance from the doors. The 28 V DC motor has an integral brake. When powered up the brake is released and when power is removed it activates. The brake can also be disengaged to allow the unit to be moved by hand but the brake then should be manually reengaged. Investigators found was that while the helicopter had been airborne on an operational tasking, a hospital technician had been conducting repairs. While they don’t elaborate it appears the unit was left with power disengaged and the brake disengaged. Such platforms are not subject to aviation regulations but fall within health and safety regulations for work equipment. The BFU have expressed concern that ICAO Annex 14 Volume II (Heliports) does not address the safety of these units. Other Similar Incidents The BFU note three prior incidents with mobile helicopter transport platforms: BFU 3X449-96 on 10/11/1996: The platform on which the helicopter was standing began to move after the engines had been started, without the operating speed having been reached. The helicopter collided with a building. BFU 3X012-0/05 on 03/11/2005: When taking off from the transport platform, the helicopter got caught on a protruding wheel, rolled to the left and touched the ground with the main rotor and tail boom. The helicopter remained on the left side, badly damaged. BFU 7X010-0/07 on 08/23/2007: During take-off from the transport platform, the cable from the external power connection briefly got caught on the right skid of the helicopter....
read moreFatal GOM B407 Offshore Take Off Accident: Safety, Helideck & SAR / Emergency Response Questions
Fatal Gulf of Mexico Bell 407 Offshore Take Off Accident: Safety, Helideck & SAR / Emergency Response Questions (RLC N595RL, Walters WD106) In 29 December 2022 Bell 407 N595RL of Rotorcraft Leasing (RLC) crashed on take off from the West Delta 106 (WD106) offshore installation in the Gulf of Mexico (GOM). The pilot and 3 passengers died. On Friday 13 January 2023, the US National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) issued their preliminary report into this offshore helicopter accident. The Accident Flight The helicopter had departed South Lafourche Leonard Miller Jr. Airport (GAO), Galliano, Louisiana with 4 passengers for WD106 on a VFR flight, 51.6 nm SE, at 07:48 Local Time. WD106 is owned by Houston based Walter Oil & Gas Corporation. On its SE corner WD106 has a 24×24 ft square helideck, which gives a 7.3 m D-value. The B407 has a 13 m D-value so this is a small, 0.56D, sub-D deck. It also only had one stairwell. The NTSB report the deck, which was at an elevation of 100 ft, had recently been repainted and the stairwell painted red. It had a perimeter safety net (referred to by NTSB as a ‘skirt’) made of ‘chain-link’ and was marked with 8 perimeter lights (see Figure 3a below), each 8 in (20 cm) tall (current standards on decks of D<16 would limit these lights to 5 cm). The helicopter landed at 08:25 positioned on the helideck facing SE. The 4 passengers disembarked and 3 returning passengers, employed by Island Operating Company, boarded shortly after, having had a handover discussion with the incoming personnel. The NTSB state that: There were no eyewitnesses or surveillance video of the helicopter’s departure from the WD106 helipad; however, there were several individuals who reported hearing the helicopter operating while on the helipad. Although, the NTSB don’t comment, this lack of witnesses is because the helideck was being operated without a Helideck Landing Officer (HLO) & Helideck Assistants (HDAs) and therefore without fire & rescue cover. This sub-standard practice is common on small GOM installations. These individuals noted that the helicopter’s engine continued to run after it landed on the helipad, and that they heard the engine noise increase for takeoff and then the sound of items hitting the platform. They immediately went outside and saw the helicopter fuselage floating inverted in the water with the tail boom separated but adjacent to the fuselage. The landing skids were separated from the fuselage and the emergency skid floats were inflated. Emergency Response Several individuals on the platform then boarded and launched the platform’s emergency escape [freefall enclosed lifeboat] capsule, but the helicopter fuselage sunk before they could render assistance to the four occupants who remained inside the fuselage. It appears the installation had no Fast Rescue Craft, hence deployment of the installations lifeboat, an unsuitable craft for attempting a rescue. The US Coast Guard (USCG) were notified but curiously, despite the NTSB reporting the installation’s crew being aware the helicopter crashed alongside and early social media posts confirming the USCG were aware this was a take off accident, the USCG “searched approximately 180 square miles for 8 hours”. It was announced on 4 January 2023 that the bodies had been recovered. The Safety Investigation NTSB report that: Examination of the helipad revealed the red paint of the...
read moreBlinded by Light, Spanish Customs AS365 Crashed During Night-time Hot Pursuit
Blinded by Light, Spanish Customs AS365 Crashed During Night-time Hot Pursuit (Eliance/SVA Airbus AS365N3 EC-JDQ) On 11 July 2021 Airbus AS365N3 EC-JDQ, operated by Eliance for the Spanish Customs Surveillance Service (Servicio de Vigilancia Aduanera [SVA]) impacted the sea while manoeuvring in pursuit of a smuggler’s boat. The two Fight Crew survived but a Customs Agent was died, having been trapped in the capsized helicopter. The Accident In the safety investigation by the Spanish the Civil Aviation Accident and Incident Investigation Commission (CIAIAC), issued in Spanish in December 2022, the investigators explain that the helicopter left its base at Algeciras, Cadiz at 01:20 for a routine patrol. The Straits of Gibraltar are notorious route for drug smuggling from North Africa. The Aircraft Commander (9,347 hours experience, 4,005 on type and c7,000 hours flying customs flights) was the Pilot Flying (PF). The Co-Pilot (5,935 hours, though only 14.5 on type having joined the operator 2 months earlier with a SAR & HEMS background) was the Pilot Monitoring (PM). The Customs Agent was in the cabin, in the front left seat, at a FLIR equipped work station. The aircraft was operating Night VFR rules. The investigation report makes no mention of Night Vision Imaging Systems (NVIS) googles being used. When they took off, the pilot at the controls the PF set their radalt bug to 300 ft and the other PM had theirs set to 500 ft. When descending below 500 ft the PM would re-set theirs to 100 ft. When they had been flying for approximately five minutes, they heard on the radio that an SVA vessel (Patrol Boat Águila 4 [a 17 m, 50 knot, Rodman 55]), based in the Port of Algeciras, was pursuing a boat and the Customs Agent offered to support them from the air in the chase. The crew of the Patrol Boat answered in the affirmative and provided them with their coordinates. The helicopter crew verified that the Patrol Boat was at a distance of approximately 35 NM to the east and began to move towards the area where the pursuit was taking place. The smugglers were taking a longer route to Spain. Which also meant operating further from cultural (i.e. man-made) lighting ashore. When they were south of Europa Point [site of the Trinity House lighthouse at the southern tip of Gibraltar], heading towards the coordinate point they had been given, they gradually descended from an altitude of 3,500 ft, until they reached the vicinity of the vessels, flying with 70% torque and a speed of 130 kt… When in pursuit of a vessel, the flight crew would turn on the landing lights. These were deployed but not turned on at this point. When slowing below 80 knots the PM armed the emergency flotation system. Crucially: There was a lot of humidity and scattered banks of fog…according to a statement from the PF. When the Customs Agent located the two vessels, using the FLIR surveillance system, he guided the crew with more precision until they positioned themselves close to them. When positioned to the left of the SVA patrol boat they descended “very rapidly” from an altitude of 500 ft to below 100 ft. There is no discussion on the use of any automation, the implication being that the descent was conducted manually. It can be presumed...
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