NTSB Probable Causes and Bad Apples (and the Bad Apple Index)
The captain’s failure to adequately brief and execute the nonprecision approach and the first officer’s and flight engineer’s failure to effectively monitor and cross-check the captain’s execution of the approach.
Some contributors rightly felt this simplistically blamed the crew (i.e. taking a ‘bad apple’ ‘old view’ of human error) rather than explained the accident. Others pointed out the accident was 20 years ago and investigators take a more sophisticated approach today. So we decided to look at the full NTSB air accident reports issued since the start of 2016:
- AAR1601: The Probable Cause was: “the pilot’s conduct…” (see Aircraft accident Embraer EMB-500 Phenom 100 N100EQ)
- AAR1602: The Probable Cause was: “the captain’s inability” (see Delta MD-88 Accident at La Guardia 5 March 2015)
- AAR1603: The Probable Cause was: “the flight crew’s mismanagement…” (see Execuflight Hawker 700 N237WR Akron Accident: Casual Compliance)
- AAR1701‘s Probable Cause, after a lot of debate in the public hearing, was “(1) preflight hydraulic check, which depleted hydraulic pressure… and (2) lack of salient alerting…” but the pilot’s actions were determined to be contributory (see Crashworthiness and a Fiery Frisco US HEMS Accident)
- AAR1702: The Probable Cause was: “(1) the pilot’s decision to…and (2) the company culture…” (see All Aboard CFIT: Alaskan Sightseeing Fatal Flight)
- AAR1703: The Probable Cause was: “the pilot’s pattern of poor decision-making…” (see Balloon accident Kubicek BB85Z N2469L)
- AAR1801: The Probable Cause was: “the failure of the high-pressure turbine (HPT) stage 2 disk…” (see Uncontained CF6-80 Failure: American B767-300 28 Oct 2016)
- AAR1802: The Probable Cause was: “the flight crew’s decision to continue the VFR flight into deteriorating visibility and their failure to perform an immediate escape maneuver after entry into IMC…” (see Operator & FAA Shortcomings in Alaskan Accident)
That’s a 5.5 out of 8 bad apple index as far as we are concerned! In the NTSB Board debate over the one case (AAR1701) where the Probable Cause was not crew actions (or inactions), Board member Robert Sumwalt, who has recently been sworn in as NTSB Chairman, objected to the original draft Probable Cause saying:
This pilot did not do what he was supposed to do. But if we dig deeper — and that’s what really bothers me about the original probable cause is that it is saying that the pilot screwed up… To put the pilot as the primary factor of the probable cause is just wrong, because it points to the last person who made the last mistake. I think we need to dig deeper to get to the root cause of this.
So while the concept of Probable Cause is enshrined in US law, perhaps we will see a change of interpretation in future. Certainly the Contributory Factors identified by the NTSB are often better indications of what caused an accident than the official Probable Causes.
Note: This is an update of an article originally published on LinkedIn by Aerossurance’s Andy Evans.
UPDATE 7 March 2019: AAR1901: The Probable Cause was: “the jammed condition of the airplane’s right elevator…” However “Contributing to the survivability of the accident was the captain’s timely and appropriate decision to reject the takeoff, the check airman’s disciplined adherence to standard operating procedures….”.
If we score this as -1 ‘bad apples’, because of the mention of positive crew performance, this takes our bad apple index to 4.5 out of 9. UPDATE 19 June 2019: Discussed by NTSB further here: Why we care when things go right
UPDATE 30 March 2019: AAR1902: The Probable Cause was: “The pilot-in-command’s attempt to salvage an unstabilized visual approach, which resulted in an aerodynamic stall at low altitude”.
This takes the bad apple index to 5.5 out of 10.
James Reason, Professor Emeritus, University of Manchester wrote in his classic 1997 classic Managing the Risks of Organizational Accidents that among some of the problems with managing human errors are:
- Focusing on the active failures (of people) not the latent conditions
- Not being informed by current human factors thinking regarding error and accident causation
Human error is not itself a cause, but merely the start of a human factors investigation, as explained by Sidney Dekker in The Field Guide to Understanding Human Error – A Review (discussed in our 2006 book review The Field Guide to Understanding Human Error presented to the RAeS).
Aerossurance sponsored the 9th European Society of Air Safety Investigators (ESASI) Regional Seminar in Riga, Latvia 23 and 24 May 2018.
Aerossurance is pleased to be both sponsoring and presenting at a Royal Aeronautical Society (RAeS) Human Factors Group: Engineering seminar Maintenance Error: Are we learning? to be held on 9 May 2019 at Cranfield University.