Passenger Struck by Tail Rotor While Unloading at a Hunting Camp

Passenger Struck by Tail Rotor While Unloading at a Hunting Camp (Heli Explore Airbus AS350BA C-GWMO)

On 21 April 2024, Airbus AS350BA C-GWMO of Heli Explore Inc, was conducting a series of VFR flights from Attawapiskat Airport, Ontario.  These were to various hunting camps in support of the annual ‘Goose Break‘ hunt.  A passenger fatality occurred unload after the 9th flight of the day.  The Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) published their safety investigation report on 12 February 2025.

Heli Explore Airbus AS350BA C-GWMO (Credit: via TSB)

The Accident Flight

The helicopter had picked up one passenger at Attawapiskat Airport for Camp 17 on Akimiski Island, Nunavut, 15 minutes flying away.  The passenger had participated in the loading of the helicopter, under the supervision of a maintenance engineer.  Hunting equipment was being carried in panniers and pods on either side of the helicopter.

The pilot landed facing the northeast, where he could see the trail leading to the camp. He left the engine running and rotors turning and his hands remained on the controls. This technique was often used during ground handling (passenger and cargo loading and off loading) to allow for a swift reaction if the helicopter were to shift or become unstable on the landing area.

An individual on a snowmobile towing a sled arrived to help unload the helicopter. He waited off to the left side of the helicopter, in view of the pilot, until the pilot gave a signal that he could move closer. The pilot told the passenger he could get out of the helicopter and signalled to the snowmobile driver that he could approach the helicopter. The snowmobile and sled were parked near the external cargo basket on the left side, facing the same direction as the helicopter, where it remained throughout the occurrence.

The passenger exited the helicopter and began unloading cargo from the left hand side with the snowmobile driver.

As the passenger completed unloading the cargo pod, the snowmobile driver walked around the front of the helicopter to unload the right-side pod.

Crucially:

Once the passenger emptied the cargo pod, he secured its door and started walking toward the tail of the helicopter.  The snowmobile driver saw that the passenger was approaching the back of the helicopter, and tried to warn him by yelling and gesturing for him to stay away from the back of the helicopter.

The passenger continued along the left side of the tail boom toward the back of the helicopter, past 4 antennas mounted below the tail boom, and past the left-side horizontal stabilizer.  He then ducked under the tail boom, aft of the horizontal stabilizer, but forward of the tail’s vertical fin.

As he crossed to the right side, he was struck by the spinning tail rotor and was fatally injured. The impact caused the tail rotor and most of the tail rotor gearbox to detach from the helicopter.

Safety Investigation

In previous years at Attawapiskat, a person employed by Heli Explore Inc arranged passenger bookings and provided safety briefings to passengers.

This documented that passengers had received a safety briefing, helped as some passengers only spoke Cree and “helped speed up the process of moving many passengers to the various camps”.

However in 2024…

…a new individual from the community was selected to arrange the passenger bookings in Attawapiskat. This individual was not employed by the company, and was not required to give safety briefings. The individual was unaware of the [Operations Manual] requirement to have safety briefing forms signed by the passengers.

No further information is presented on why or how that change occurred.

Given that it had been common practice in previous years for the person booking the flights to give the safety briefing to passengers, the pilot assumed that this had been done.

While on the day of the occurrence, the passenger did not receive a safety briefing, they had had flown by helicopter numerous times and TSB therefore infer they would have been briefed to keep away from the tail rotor previously.

The directions to approach a helicopter were shown on the helicopter’s safety cards, but these were stowed in pockets on the back of the front seats, and the passenger was in the front left seat.

There was a small ‘Danger’ marking on the tail boom, but its location meant it would be most visible to personnel approaching from a distance.

On 31 January 2024, prior to the accident, Airbus Helicopters published SIN No. 3982-S-64 Tail Rotor (available on Airbus World customer data site) to highlight that a ‘high visibility’ (black & white) AS350 tail rotor blades was now available and is the new production aircraft default:

Operator Safety Actions

Following the accident, Heli Explore Inc. required that pilots shut down the engine while disembarking passengers for the remainder of the Goose Break flights during that season.

The company has revised its passenger guidance to provide more information and to warn of the danger of going near the back of a helicopter.

Our Safety Observation

Within an SMS, an effective Management of Change (MOC) process is crucial in making sure there are no omissions when a change is implemented.  Too often though this is a single process that is too bureaucratic and cumbersome to use on small changes or simply documents a change that is already decided.

In this case a change in personnel being used for a task seems to have resulted in an undetected change in the scope of work being delivered and the omission of safety briefings.

Safety Resources

The European Safety Promotion Network Rotorcraft (ESPN-R) has a helicopter safety discussion group on LinkedIn.  You may also find these Aerossurance articles of interest:

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