Hanging on the Telephone… HEMS Wirestrike
Hanging on the Telephone… HEMS Wirestrike (Rega Airbus H145 HB-ZQM) On 1 August 2019 Rega HEMS Airbus Helicopters H145 (BK117D2) HB-ZQM departed the Rega base in St. Gallen at 1830 for a tasking in Walzenhausen on the Austrian border. On board were a pilot, a paramedic / Technical Crew Member (TCM) and doctor. History of the Flight The Swiss Safety Investigation Board (SUST) explain in their safety investigation report (issued 24 August 2020 in German) that: During the flight, the pilot and the TCM analysed the obstacle situation at the planned location with the help of the on-board navigation device and the Electronic Flight Bag (EFB). They registered electricity and telephone lines that reached a height of less than 25 m above ground. An employee of the ground-based rescue service was at the scene and instructed the crew on the landing. During the approach, which took place in the direction of a fork in the road (see point 1), the crew sighted the telephone line. When the helicopter was on its final approach, the rotor downdraft (downwash) the lid of a grit container… The crew noticed this, whereupon the pilot aborted the approach and started a slow reverse flight. He then hovered the helicopter at a safe distance until the rescue worker on the ground, who had been informed accordingly by the pilot via radio, had secured the lid. In this phase, the pilot assessed the cable situation at the slightly higher road curve (see point 2) and came to the conclusion that the telephone line seemed to span the meadow diagonally behind the curve. The second approach then took place at the fork in the road (point 1). The pilot briefly touched down the helicopter on the road, but found that the landing area was too steep and that the helicopter had therefore tilted too far back around its transverse axis to be able to switch off the engines. He immediately took off the helicopter and headed for the slightly higher road curve (point 2), where the road was a little less inclined. During this maneuver, the TCM observed the slope rising to the left of the helicopter as well the display of the rear view camera on the multifunction screen. Shortly before touchdown, in the direction of flight of the helicopter, a main rotor blade touched the telephone line running across the curve of the road, whereupon it was cut. The doctor who was sitting in the cabin noticed this at the same time as the pilot, who at that moment saw a black cable in front of him in the lower right corner. Since the pilot noticed neither vibrations nor any impairment of the control system, he flew the helicopter to an open landing site in the Rhine plain about 1.4 km to the northwest and landed there without any further incident. The Safety Investigation and Analysis Examination of the helicopter revealed “traces of wear from black rubber” near the tip of a main rotor blade. There was no evidence of blade structural damage or any other damage to the helicopter. The helicopter was released to service subsequently. The investigators note that: Telephone lines, which often run parallel to streets in order to simplify maintenance work on the line, generally do not reach a height of 25 m above ground. For this reason, such lines are not entered in the official and generally...
read moreGust Lock Gaff: King Air A90 Runway Excursion
Gust Lock Gaff: King Air A90 Runway Excursion On 23 June 2016 a Beechcraft King Air A90 aerial survey aircraft suffered a runway excursion during a take off attempt at Hannover Airport. The German Federal Bureau of Aircraft Accident Investigation (BFU) explain in their safety investigation report (dated 10 March 2020, but issued August 2020) explain that the Belgian owned aircraft, whose registration is not recorded by the BFU, was chartered to a Danish aerial survey company. Onboard that day were a pilot and a camera system operator. During taxi the pilot had noted it was “unusually difficult to control the direction of the aircraft” but not so bad as to cause concern. At about 0828 hrs, the pilot received the clearance from the tower controller to enter runway 09L. He stated that about 1 min later he received take-off clearance and set engine takeoff power. He had paid attention to the two engines building up their take-off rotation speed uniformly. During the take-off run he had noticed a change in direction towards the left and tried to keep the aircraft on the runway centreline by using the right rudder pedal. He had pushed it up to the mechanical stop. The mounting of the right rudder pedal fractured in the process. The aircraft could no longer be controlled. It veered left off runway 09L with a speed of about 30 kt… It came to a stop on the grass next to the runway. [The aircraft] had yawed by approximately 70°. The Safety Investigation The King Air A90 has a Gust Lock System for use if the aircraft is parked for longer periods of time to prevent damage to the control surfaces due to movements caused by wind. The Pilot Operating Handbook says: Positive locking of the rudder, elevator and aileron control surfaces, and engine controls (power levers, propeller levers, and condition levers) is provided by a removable lock assembly consisting of two pins and an elongated U-shaped strap interconnected by a chain. Installation of the control locks is accomplished by inserting the strap over the aligned engine control levers from the copilot’s side; then the aileron-elevator locking pin is inserted through a guide hole in the top of the pilot’s control column assembly, thus locking the control wheels. The rudder pedals are held in the neutral position by the largest of the two pins, which is installed horizontally through the pilot’s rudder pedals. Removal sequence is a reverse of the installation procedure. […] Caution Do not tow aircraft with rudder locks installed, as severe damage to the nose steering linkage can result. […] The manufacture claim that these “…lock a combination of primary flight controls in positions that will preclude taxi…”. The BFU note that (our emphasis added): In the aircraft concerned the safety chain, which normally runs from the control column to the power lever to the pedals was missing. There was no warning flag on the safety pin for the rudder pedals. The original red paint was barely visible. The A90 pre-flight checklist includes: (2) removal of control locks (but doesn’t specify how many), (11) checking propeller control movement and (14) the flying control ‘Free & Correct Movement’ check, verifying the control surface movement including their correct deflections. To complete (11) and (14) the locks have to been removed. The BFU note that also: After engine start-up, the Before Taxi Checklist listed the item Flight Controls –...
read moreHawaiian Air Tour EC130T2 Hard Landing after Power Loss (Part 1)
Hawaiian Air Tour EC130T2 Hard Landing after Power Loss – Part 1 (Blue Hawaiian N11VQ Kauai) On 17 January 2016 Airbus Helicopters EC130T2 N11VQ, operated by Blue Hawaiian Helicopters (an Air Methods subsidiary), crashed near Hanalei, Kauai, Hawaii during a Part 135 air tour flight. The pilot and six passengers were all seriously injured. In this, the first of two articles, we look on why the helicopter crashed. Part 2 looks at the survivability issues. It is estimated that the initial impact was 24g in the vertical axis, 9g in the horizontal axis, and 4g in the lateral axis. The helicopter bounced and then impacted at 19g vertically, 7g horizontally, and 1 g laterally. The Accident Flight The US National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) explain in their safety investigation report (issued 25 August 2020): The pilot reported that, about 25 minutes after departure for the sightseeing flight, the helicopter was about 1/4-mile offshore NW of the Honopu Sea Arch between 1,300 ft and 1,400 ft mean sea level (msl) when he heard the low rotor rpm aural warning horn. NTSB comment that: The first indication of an inflight loss of power was an uncommanded right yaw that occurred at 14:31:31. The first limit indicator (FLI) on the instrument console started to drop rapidly, followed by the GENE (generator) annunciator light illumination. The EC130T2 is powered by a Safran Arriel 2D turboshaft engine with a dual channel FADEC. The pilot entered an autorotation, initiated a 20° right turn turned toward shore and made a distress call. Five seconds later, the ENG P (engine oil pressure) annunciator light illuminated, followed by the FUEL P (fuel pressure) light and the helicopter returned to a nearly-level flight attitude. About 10 seconds later, the helicopter was passing through 600 ft at 85 knots. Rotor rpm had increased to 430. After about 11 seconds, the coastline became discernable and revealed a rocky, unsuitable landing area. The helicopter’s altitude was about 350 ft and the rotor speed was 364 rpm. At 14:32:08, the helicopter had entered a 45° right bank, altitude was 275 ft, airspeed was zero, and the helicopter was maneuvering toward a sandy beach area. About 3 seconds later, the LIMIT (servo limit) light illuminated, the helicopter entered a near-level pitch attitude, airspeed was near zero, and rotor speed was around 200 rpm. Initial ground impact was at 14:32:13 and the rotorcraft was at rest at 14:32:15. [The pilot] applied the rotor brake to slow the rotor and noted that the engine was not running. The passengers began to exit the helicopter and he pulled the engine fuel cutoff. Six of the seven helicopter occupants were diagnosed on the day of the accident with thoracolumbar compression fractures. The seventh was diagnosed several weeks later. With the exception of the occupant of seat No. 1 (who became paraplegic), the occupants remained neurologically intact. NTSB Safety Investigation Examination of the engine revealed that the main fuel injection pipe between the fuel valve assembly and the injection union was cracked and broken at the injection union B-nut connection. A close view of the fracture surface on the tube portion revealed fractographic ratchet marks and crack arrest marks consistent with reverse bending fatigue fracture initiation at two diametrically opposite positions on the outside surface of the tube. [This] allowed pressurized fuel to escape, reducing fuel flow and pressure to...
read moreAir Ambulance Helicopter Downed by Fencing FOD
Air Ambulance Helicopter Downed by Fencing (Metro Aviation Airbus BK117C2 / H145 N263MH) On 4 July 2020 Metro Aviation air ambulance Airbus Helicopters BK117C2 / H145 N263MH was involved in an accident at Wayne County Airport (KBJJ), Wooster, Ohio. The US National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) explain in their preliminary report that: Surveillance video showed that after lifting off a portable dolly [at c 1357 Local Time], the helicopter…turned right and briefly hovered. As the helicopter began to take off following the hover, it traversed a grassy area adjacent to the ramp about 10 ft above ground level (AGL), where a silt construction fence was obscured by tall grass. As the helicopter overflew, the fence became unsecured and blew up and into the main and tail rotor system. The crew then performed a forced landing, which resulted in substantial damage to the fuselage, tailboom, and tail rotor blades. The two pilots, flight nurse and flight paramedic were uninjured. At the time of the accident, there were no notices to airmen (NOTAMs) for the construction fence and the presence of the fence was not contained within any publications or notices available to pilots. UPDATE 23 February 2022: Extra information is released in the NTSB Public Docket: According to the pilots, the construction in the area of the fencing had started about 2 months prior to the accident and that coincided with the installation of the fence. One of the pilots stated that he had inspected the fence himself and remembered the bottom being buried in the ground about 4 to 6 inches and attached to wooden stakes with staples and nails. He said, regarding the silt fence, that he “never imagined it would come out at that altitude.” The second pilot stated: …he did not remember seeing the construction fencing prior to the accident, but he had flown over that area many times, he just did not take notice of it as a factor. He stated that upon liftoff and forward movement, he saw it balloon a split second before it blew up into the air and became tangled in the blades. He stated that orange barriers are also located on the airport that would normally be filled with water, but they would leak and blow around, which is why they elected to fly over the grass. UPDATE 18 March 2022: NTSB Probable Cause The NTSB Probable Cause is a rather bland and simplistic statement of the circumstances of the accident: The entanglement of construction fencing into the main rotor system, which necessitated a forced landing that resulted in substantial damage to the helicopter. Operators Safety Actions The operator stated they had done the following: Safety Resources FOD and an AS350B3 Accident Landing on a Yacht in Bergen Impromptu Landing – Unseen Cable Pilot Goose(d) Surprised and Crashed Rotor Blade Tool Control FOD Incident Ambulance / Air Ambulance Collision S-92A Collision with Obstacle while Taxying Helideck Safety Alerts: Refuelling Hoses and Obstructions UPDATE 13 September 2020: Hawaiian Air Tour EC130T2 Hard Landing after Power Loss (Part 1) UPDATE 20 September 2020: Hanging on the Telephone… HEMS Wirestrike UPDATE 19 December 2020: Helicopter Destroyed in Hover Taxi Accident UPDATE 23 January 2021: US Air Ambulance Near Miss with Zip Wire and High ROD Impact at High Density Altitude UPDATE 31 January 2021: Fatal US Helicopter Air Ambulance Accident: One Engine was Failing but Serviceable Engine Shutdown UPDATE 13 March 2021: S-76A++ Rotor Brake...
read moreShocking Accident: Two Workers Electrocuted During HESLO
Shocking Accident: Two Workers Electrocuted During HESLO (Helitrans Pyrinees Airbus AS350B2 EC-MVV) On 20 November 2018 Airbus Helicopters AS350B2 EC-MVV Helitrans Pyrinees was engaged in a Helicopter External Sling Load Operation (HESLO) connected with the construction of an electrical power line when the load contacted a live electrical cable, resulting in the electrocution and serious injury of two ground personnel. The Accident Flight The Spanish Comisión de Investigación de Accidentes e Incidentes de Aviación Civil (CIAIAC) explain in their safety investigation report (issued in February 2020) that Endesa Distribucion Electrica, had contracted to Sistem Melesur Energia to upgrade a 25 kV overhead line in the Ribera d’Urgellet municipality in the Pyrenees, replacing the old pylons. In turn, they had chartered the Helitrans Pyrinees helicopter to support the transport of concrete for the tower foundations. The helicopter left the La Seu d’Urgell airport at 09:55 for the material staging point about 11 km away, where a 22 m polyester sling with a hook to transport a concrete bucket to the site of a new pylon, 530 m away. The location was mountainous and adjacent to the existing tower, which was still in service. The towers were just 64 cm apart at the closest point and 125 cm apart at the most distant point. The pilot was highly experienced with a total of 10,650 hours of experience, 9,000 on type. The helicopter lifted the bucket at the staging site and then proceeded to the work site. Once it was past the existing power line, it descended while turning left to reach the unloading point… The helicopter hovered perpendicular to the power line, some 12 m above it, leaving a safety buffer between the sling and the power line to keep the sling from breaching the danger zone of the power line. Once the bucket was close to the ground, two operators on the ground unloaded the concrete by actuating the associated mechanism. The concrete was then poured in the foundation for the new tower. Once the concrete was unloaded, the helicopter climbed again and moved backward to gain enough altitude to clear the existing line, and then proceeded to the staging area. After pouring the initial batch of concrete, which lasted until about 11:05, the activity was stopped for a break and also to refuel the helicopter. At around 11:40, the aircraft took off once more to resume the activity. [In] his statement, the pilot noted that when the work began, the weather conditions were good, and that they worsened over the course of the day. In fact, they had discussed stopping, but since there were buckets full of concrete, and they had never before been left full, they decided to continue. It was drizzling at the time of the accident. After several rotations, all of them to the same concrete unloading point, and with the aircraft in place to unload a new batch, the pilot noticed a spark and a flashover. At the same time, he saw that the two operators who were handling the concrete bucket…fell to the ground. The pilot immediately flew to the staging area where, after placing down the concrete bucket and unhooking the sling, he picked up company personnel who could help the two operators on the ground. The two workers were hospitalised with serious injuries. The sling and bucket were found to be scorched but the helicopter was undamaged. The...
read moreSAR AS365N3 Flying Control Disconnect: BFU Investigation
Search and Rescue (SAR) AS365N3 Flying Control Disconnect (BFU Investigation: Northern HeliCopter D-HNHA) On 1 June 2020 Northern HeliCopter Search and Rescue (SAR) Airbus Helicopters AS365N3 D-HNHA was involved in a serious incident at St. Peter-Ording Airfield in Schleswig-Holstein, Germany after a disconnect in the flight control system occurred. The Serious Incident During take-off the helicopter entered a nose-up attitude, the tail contacted the ground and the helicopter touched-down hard according to the German Federal Bureau of Aircraft Accident Investigation (BFU). In their preliminary investigation report (UPDATE and a final report issued in June 2021) the BFU explain that the four person crew were tasked to conduct a SAR mission on what was their second flight of the day: During a shortened procedure, known as Scramble Take-off, the engines were started and the helicopter taxied to runway 07. Among the items omitted in this shortened procedure are hydraulic control checks. According to…the Pilot in Command (PIC), the co-pilot in the right-hand seat, who was also Pilot Flying (PF) during taxi, noticed that the pitch control’s position was unusually far forward and the helicopter needed an exceptional amount of thrust and still taxied slowly. Since there were no warning lights (limit light, caution or warning) and the rotor disc was in “normal” position, they therefore assumed a grinding wheel brake or being wrong about it [i.e. that this was normal] since they had recently been flying a different helicopter type. Once they had reached runway 07, at about 1547 the PF increased thrust and the helicopter began to hover. It immediately began to pitch up, impacted the ground with the tail and touched down hard with the main landing gear. The crew were uninjured, but the helicopter was ‘”slightly damaged”. Subsequently, the crew determined that forward and backward control inputs via the pitch control did not have any effect on the rotor disc’s position. The engines were shut down while still on the runway. The helicopter was towed back to the operator’s ramp. …the asphalt runway only showed scrub marks of the tail skid. The tail skid, which consisted of composite material, was torn and the metal protection at the end showed scrub marks. There were also isolated scrub marks on the lower tail fin fairing. The Safety Investigation During the subsequent check in the hangar the crew determined that the connection of the left actuator to the swashplate was missing. The missing bolt, two washers, and one crown nut were found on the gear box compartment below. The…actuators are located directly underneath the stationary part of the swashplate. Each working piston of the actuators is fitted with a ball head. A 60 mm x 8 mm threaded bole serves as axis and connection with the swashplate. The bolt is kept in position with a nylon stop crown nut [i.e. castle-headed nyloc nut] and cotter pin. The associated cotter pin was not found. The investigators also noted that the bolt was lubricated. The BFU show a Maintenance Manual illustration that is marked with a torque range and a ‘no lubrication’ symbol. The bolt and the nyloc nut showed traces of wear. The thread on bolt and washer did not show any visible damage. The thread pitches were partially contaminated. When the nyloc nut was twisted on to the bolt it was possible to do so without any effort for the first 3.5 turns. The subsequent 4 turns, until...
read moreAir Ambulance Helicopter Fell From Kathmandu Hospital Helipad (Video)
Air Ambulance Helicopter Fell From Kathmandu Hospital Helipad (Simirik Air Airbus AS350B2 9N-ALR, 30 June 2018) On 30 June 2018 Airbus AS350B2 9N-ALR of Simrik Air, fell from the helipad on top of the 12-storey Grande International Hospital, Kathmandu, Nepal, ending on the hospital roof c3 m below. The helicopter had arrived to collect a patient and medical personnel for a patient transfer flight. The aircraft appears to have lost yaw control while rotors running after landing. The pilot, the sole occupant, received minor injuries. We will update this article when an accident investigation report is published. UPDATE 8 December 2020: NTSB on LA A109S Rooftop Hospital Helipad Landing Accident UPDATE 29 May 2021: Air Ambulance B407 Hospital Helipad Deck Edge Tail Strike During Shallow Approach UPDATE 21 August 2021: Air Methods AS350B3 Night CFIT in Snow UPDATE 23 December 2021: Air Methods AS350B3 Air Ambulance Tucson Tail Strike UPDATE 29 April 2022: US Air Ambulance Helicopter Hospital Heliport Tail Strike UPDATE 21 January 2023: After Landing this HEMS Helicopter Suddenly Started to Slide Towards it’s Hangar… Aerossurance has extensive air safety, flight operations, SAR, HEMS, HESLO, airworthiness, human factors, aviation regulation and safety analysis experience. For practical aviation advice you can trust, contact us at: enquiries@aerossurance.com Follow us on LinkedIn and on Twitter @Aerossurance for our latest...
read moreToo Extreme: Fatal Sky Combat Ace EA300 Aerobatic Accident
Too Extreme: Fatal Sky Combat Ace EA300 Aerobatic Accident (N414MT) On 21 October 2017 Extra EA 300/L N414MT of California Extreme Adventures, doing business as Sky Combat Ace (SCA), impacted the ground near El Capitan Reservoir, near Four Corners, California. The pilot and passenger were fatal injured, the aircraft destroyed and a brush fire triggered. The aircraft had departed Gillespie Field (SEE), El Cajon, San Diego, California in visual meteorological conditions 15 minutes earlier. TV news video Sky Combat Ace The US National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) explain in their safety investigation report (issued 13 July 2020) that this flight was classified as a Part 91 instructional flight but: SCA’s website described itself as an “extreme aviation attraction,” providing a series of aviation-related experiences, which it described as including aerobatics, air combat, and flight training. The accident flight was a 25-minute “Top Gun” experience… SCA provided flights to its passengers by operating as a flight school under the auspices of 14 CFR Part 61 and using flight instructors to provide training. Review of the SCA presence on multiple social media platforms revealed that it both presented itself and was categorized in the “tour” category. SCA are certainly popular looking at their TripAdvisor reviews. One pilot, who was initially the director of training and then director of flight operations, stated that, of about 2,000 customers he had flown for SCA, about 12 to 15 were pilots looking to receive targeted flight training for either upset recovery or a tailwheel endorsements. The other pilot stated that of the 500 customers he had flown, about 6 were pilots seeking tailwheel endorsement training and the others were customers seeking “experience” missions. On arrival customers who had booked a flight experience were required to sign a “Participant Agreement Release and Assumption of Risk” waiver and take part in a briefing session. It’s not clear if they were done in this order. The Accident Flight The pilot, who had been hired by SCA in May 2017, had flown around 4290 flying hours in total, 113 in the EA300. The day before he had flown as a commercial passenger to SCA’s Henderson (HND), Nevada base. He slept on the couch in at SCA’s the crew accommodation (all the beds were taken). The NTSB say that: About 1000 on the morning of the accident, the pilot flew a customer on a group combat mission from HND in an Extra 300 airplane. He then flew back to the SEE facility in the accident airplane with the company’s director of marketing. The accident flight was his third flight of the day. The passenger…had had flown with SCA on a similar flight in December 2015 out of SCA’s HND location. NTSB note that: The airplane had g limitations in the aerobatic category of +/-10 g. This limit was only allowed with one person onboard, at a MTOW of 1,808 lbs. In a two-person configuration, the limits were +/-8 g at 1,918 lbs MTOW and +/-6 g at 2,095 lbs MTOW. …the airplane’s weight on the accident flight would have been about 2,061 lbs. According to the president of SCA, g-forces are limited to 6 g with passengers onboard, and airspeed is limited to 180 knots. However, (emphasis added): The “Standards and Syllabus” stated that, in order to minimize wear and tear on the aircraft, all aerobatic flights would “strive” to remain at or...
read moreNTSB Investigation into AW139 Bahamas Night Take Off Accident
NTSB Investigation into AW139 Bahamas Night Take Off Accident (Chris Cline’s Challenger Management AW139 N32CC near Big Grand Cay) On 4 July 2019 at about 0153 Local Time, Leonardo Helicopters AW139 N32CC of Challenger Management LLC, was destroyed when it impacted the Atlantic Ocean, shortly after take off on a Part 91 ‘personal flight’, near Big Grand Cay, Abaco, Bahamas. The 7 persons on board, including US coal billionaire Chris Cline, were killed. Cline took coal mining firm Foresight Energy public in 2014, and sold a controlling stake in 2015 for $1.4 billion. Safety Investigation The investigation was initially under the jurisdiction of the Air Accident Investigation Department (AAID) of the Bahamas. AAID requested delegation of the accident investigation to the US National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), which the NTSB accepted on 9 July 2019. The US NTSB has to date only issued a preliminary report but on 19 August 2020 opened their online public docket. This contains 571 pages of factual evidence (a mix of raw data and working group factual reports), with official no analysis. The NTSB’s so called ‘Probable Cause’ is yet to be determined. We have reviewed and summarised the key public docket documents below. History of the Flight The NTSB explain that: Dark night visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time and an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan was filed for a flight from Walker’s Cay Airport (MYAW), Walker’s Cay, Bahamas, to Fort Lauderdale/Hollywood International Airport (FLL), Fort Lauderdale, Florida. The flight however departed from a private, unapproved helipad on Big Grand Clay in ‘black-hole‘ conditions. These conditions “typically occur over water or over dark, featureless terrain where the only visual stimuli are lights located on and/or near the airport or landing zone”. The island had been owned by Cline since mid-2015 and currently valued at US$29 million. The Island Manager stated to NTSB that Cline had intended to develop the site into a resort “to target big Fortune 500 companies to bring their Board of Directors or employees” and had initiated a construction programme. Cline regularly visited via the AW139, his C208 floatplane or by vessel (the oddly named ‘Dirty Mines‘). Cline, with family and friend had been on the island for a break to celebrate the US public holiday, his daughter and her friend’s college graduation and Cline’s 61st birthday (on 5 July). Sometime very late on 3 July Cline’s daughter and a friend had fallen ill. When asked about their illness the manager replied “he was not sure of the reason, but they were groggy and unresponsive, but their heart was still beating [sic].” The NTSB’s line of questioning indicate they suspect the cause of their illness but it is not otherwise discussed. Cline requested that the helicopter fly in from Fort Lauderdale to convey them to hospital. There appears to have been no liaison with Bahamas ATC for the flight and no liaison with any medical professional is recorded in the public docket before the flight was arranged, although a doctor is mentioned in the cockpit voice recording of the rotors running turnaround. The need for an ambulance to meet the aircraft triggered a crew discussion too about needing to arrange for customs clearance, which appears not to have been considered previously. The NTSB analysis will no doubt examine the flight in relation to local regulations too. The aircraft arrived and was loaded rotors running c 0130-0145. ...
read moreFatal Mi-8 Loss of Control – Inflight and Water Impact off Svalbard
Fatal Mi-8AMT Loss of Control – Inflight and Water Impact off Svalbard (RA-22312 of Convers Avia) On 26 October 2017 Mil Mi-8AMT RA-22312 operated by Convers Avia JSC for the Trust Arktikugol coal mining company, impacted the water of Isfjorden, Svalbard. All 8 persons onboard died in the 2°C Arctic waters in an accident that highlights why survivability measures are crucial. From 1961 more than 17000 Mi-8s have been produced making the 13 t helicopter the world’s most produced helicopter type. According to the Svalbard Treaty of 1920, Norway has sovereignty over the Svalbard Archipelago. Signatories of the treaty have the right to exploit the natural resources on the archipelago. The Russian company Trust Arktikugol started mining activities in Barentsburg in 1932. Convers Avia, formed in 1995, is based inTver, NW of Moscow and has a fleet of around 30 helicopters. They received permission in 2011 from the Civil Aviation Authority Norway (CAA-N) to provide helicopter services on behalf of Trust Arktikugol, replacing GazAvia (formerly Spark +), who had suffered an accident in 2008. While Norway is an EASA Member State, EASA rules are not applied to Svalbard, which is outside the EU/EFTA European Economic Area (EEA). The Accident Flight The Accident Investigation Board Norway (AIBN) explain in their safety investigation report that the First Officer was the Pilot Flying and RA-22312 took off from Pyramiden at 14:43:19. They had flown the reverse routing 3.5 hours earlier. The landing site at their destination, Heerodden (also known as Kapp Heer), was built during the 1970s, it is in Class G airspace, approximately 25 m above sea level and 100-150 m from shoreline. It is equipped with a Non-Directional Beacon (NDB), which was operational on the day of the accident and an automatic meteorological station measuring temperature, relative humidity, pressure, wind speed and direction. The day and night minimas for takeoffs and landings were: 450 m visibility vertically, and 5000 m visibility horizontally. Convers Avia helicopter operations on Svalbard are based on visual flight rules (VFR). Both pilots on the RA-22312 were approved for VFR flights only. The helicopter was not equipped with Ground Proximity Warning System (GPWS). According to Convers Avia was this the reason for the limitation on instrument flying given by the Russian Aviation Authority. At 14:46:58 the Heerodden tower officer contacted RA-22312 and informed about the weather conditions at the heliport, where there were snow showers, horizontal visibility 1000 meters and vertical visibility 100 to 120 meters. RA-22312 confirmed this information. At 14:50:01 the Commander requested activation of the “anti-icing system”, whereupon the flight engineer informed that the “anti-icing system” was in “auto mode”. The Commander then requested that all “anti-icing” should be switched on. At 14:54:29 they reported to ATC passing reporting point Bravo and would report next at Alpha. 14:57:10 RA-22312 started the approach to Heerodden and initiated descent from an altitude of approximately 235 meters. At 14:58:59, from an altitude of 145 meters, and with a speed of approximately 200 km/h, RA-22312 climbed back to approximately 200 meters’ altitude. The approach to Heerodden then continued at 200 to 215 meters’ altitude with heading 225 degrees and a somewhat varying speed of between 190 and 210 km/h. 20 km from Barentsburg, at 15:01:22, the First Officer alerted the Commander that they were about to pass “reporting point Alpha”. The Commander then contacted Longyearbyen tower. He reported that RA22312 was “abeam Alpha” and that the next position report would be 5...
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