AW189 Progress
AW189 Progress Bristow expect to commence revenue flying in Norwich with the AgustaWestland AW189 during July 2014 according to Bristow VP Operations and Managing Director of Bristow Helicopters Limited, Mike Imlach, quoted by Aviation Week & Space Technology. UPDATE: Later on the 17 July 2014, Bristow issued the following press statement: Bristow announced today that it has been certified [sic] to fly the much anticipated new generation AgustaWestland AW189 helicopter. The company is due to commence flights with its first two new AW189 aircraft from its base at Norwich shortly, servicing the Southern North Sea. Bristow has a further four of the aircraft on order for oil and gas operations. In the press release, Mike Imlach, says: We’re excited to be the launch customer for what is a superb aircraft and an important addition to our fleet. Bristow has worked closely with AgustaWestland throughout the aircraft’s development and the result is an aircraft of the highest technical specification with state of the art safety technology which will enable us to offer our clients the best possible capabilities. We look forward to commencing operations with the aircraft in the coming weeks. UPDATE: On 22 July 2014 Bristow issued a press release: The first commercial flight of the much-anticipated new generation AgustaWestland AW189 helicopter took place on July 21, 2014, as Bristow flew eight passengers out to the Cygnus field in the Southern North Sea (SNS). The aircraft is the first of two AW189s to be stationed at Bristow’s Norwich base and is dedicated to GDF SUEZ E&P UK Ltd for transport between Norwich and the operator’s Cygnus field 120 nautical miles away. The new aircraft is expected to complete one return flight each weekday with the potential to increase the service to three daily flights as the Cygnus field develops through the drilling, hook-up and commissioning, and later operational phases. Cygnus is the largest gas discovery in the SNS in the last 25 years. First gas is expected in late 2015. According to AW&ST, the Bristow also expects to take delivery of two SAR configured AW189s, the first of 11 oderered, to commence initial SAR training in September/October 2014. The SAR aircraft are being assembled at the AW plant in Yeovil. At Farnbough International Air Show, AW held a handover ceremony for the first AW189 helicopter to its Asia-Pacific launch customer Weststar Aviation Services. Weststar is the first operator to choose to benefit from the commonality in design across the family of helicopters of 6.5t AW139, with a fleet of 34 in-service or on order, the 4.5t AW169, with 2 on order, and the 8.3t AW189, with four ordered in February 2014. The company started operating the AW139 in late 2010, and has recently surpassed 50,000 hours with the type. According to Flight International: “To cater for the [oil and gas] industry’s burgeoning operational needs, we aim to expand our fleet to 100 helicopters in the next five years,” sais Weststar chief executive General Tan Sri Muhammad Ismail Jamaluddin. Weststar started its first operation outside of Malaysia, in Mauritania in 2013 for Tullow Oil with two AW139s. The company now also operates in Morroco and Thailand. However, the company has put a planned expansion into Iraq on hold. The company’s oil & gas clients include Petronas Carigali, ExxonMobil, Carigali Hess, CPOC, Talisman, Petrofac, Newfield, TOTAL, KPOC, Lundin, WesternGeco, Hess, Shell, Tullow Oil, Mubadala Petroleum, CGG Veritas,...
read moreAudits Highlighted Risk Assessment Weaknesses Prior to Ro-Ro Fatality
Audits Highlighted Risk Assessment Weaknesses Prior to Ro-Ro Fatality Audits highlighted weaknesses in risk assessments prior to a fatal accident on a ro-ro ship. The accident sadly highlights the importance of an effective Safety Management System (SMS) that includes effective risk assessments & procedures and prompt follow-up to audits. The UK Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) issued their report on 16 July 2014 into the fatal crushing injury to an able seaman on British registered ro-ro cargo ship, Tyrusland in Tripoli, Libya on 15 May 2013. This was the fourth accident in less than a year involving UK registered ships managed by Imperial Ship Management. Two of the accidents were fatal. The key safety issues identified were: Tyrusland’s crew and its embarked team of vehicle drivers did not have a safe system of work for the cargo handling operations which they were conducting. A risk assessment for deck operations existed but did not properly identify the hazards associated with the work being conducted. In particular, the danger of a crewmember being unsighted by a fork-lift driver while in the path of a moving container had not been addressed. The absence of a safe system of work or a thorough risk assessment meant that a dangerous condition emerged where ship’s crew were routinely operating in close proximity to moving vehicles without the necessary safeguards in force. Prior to the accident, weaknesses in the ship’s organisation had been identified in an internal audit by the company and a UK flag state audit by the Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA). However, the investigation identified that the company had not given a sufficiently high priority to management actions to address the identified shortcomings. In addition, the MCA’s follow-up action regarding non-conformities could have been more effective. UPDATE 30 March 2015: Another maritime investigation report that highlights weak risk assessment is the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) report on a serious injury on-board the Shell NWS Class LNG tanker Northwest Stormpetrel on 8 November 2014. This incident resulted in an Improvement notice from the Australian Maritime Safety Authority (AMSA). Shell’s own safety investigation identified a number of safety actions: Focus areas identified for better risk awareness included joining ship briefings, familiarisation, work site assessments, personal protective equipment and audits. The development of effective risk assessments, their review and using them for work planning and toolbox talks were also identified. An increased focus on permits to work, particularly for invasive and pressurised systems, and the completion and verification of permits were other identified focus areas. Checking for defective equipment and better reporting through training were also noted. UPDATE 22 May 2015: The US National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) reported on the grounding in bad weather of the ice-class mobile offshore drilling unit (MODU) Kulluk, on Sitkalidak Island, near Kodiak Island, Alaska, on 31 December 2012. The Kulluk, owned by Shell Offshore and operated by Noble Drilling, had been undertow by the ice-class anchor-handling tow supply vessel Aiviq. They had departed Captains Bay near Unalaska, Alaska, 10 days earlier for the Seattle, Washington for maintenance and repairs. The NTSB determined that the probable cause was: Shell’s inadequate assessment of the risk for its planned tow of the Kulluk, resulting in implementation of a tow plan insufficient to mitigate that risk. UPDATE 1 September 2017: The Danish MAIB have published their report on the loss of two supply vessels being towed for breaking. The...
read moreRetreating Blade Stall Incident: HEMS BK117B2 VH-VSA
Retreating Blade Stall Incident: HEMS BK117B2 VH-VSA During a patient transfer in Australia, an Emergency Medical Service Airbus Helicopters BK 117 dropped 4,000 ft after a loss of control in the cruise. The recently issued Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) investigation report highlights the phenomena of retreating blade stall. The Incident On 15 February 2013, BK117B2 VH-VSA, operated by Australian Helicopters, was conducting a trauma patient recovery flight from Port Pirie to Adelaide Hospitals in South Australia. On board were the pilot, a crewman, two medical personnel and one patient. On reaching the cruise altitude of 5,000 ft, light to moderate turbulence and a tailwind of about 15 kts were noted, while at a cruise speed of 115 kts (5 kts below the never exceed speed). Shortly after, the helicopter suffered a violent, uncommand, nose-up pitch and rolled left before descending. ATSB report: The pilot instinctively applied full forward cyclic control, but using both hands given the severity of the pitch-up, in an attempt to regain control but was unable to arrest the continuing nose-up pitch. At about 70° nose-up the helicopter rolled left through approximately 120° and commenced a steep descent. On seeing the ground through the windscreen, the pilot applied full rearward cyclic, which resulted in the helicopter pulling out of its now near vertical nose-down attitude and levelling off at about 1,000 ft (about 800 ft above ground level). No injuries were reported and the helicopter sustained minor damage the horizontal stabiliser end plates. These were struck by the main rotor blades, which themselves were undamaged. The ATSB found no mechanical or system faults that would explain the incident. ATSB Analysis In their analysis ATSB comment: The helicopter was close to the maximum take-off weight and its centre of gravity close to the rear limit of the allowable envelope at the time of the occurrence. The helicopter’s cabin configuration and the number of people on board increased the zero fuel weight so that the maximum fuel load for the flight was limited to 390 kg. In consideration of the available fuel, the pilot selected an initial cruise altitude of 5,000 ft and remained below the cloud base in visual flight conditions. The selected cruise speed of 115 kt was close to the calculated never exceed speed (VNE) for the conditions of 120 kt. In combination, the high all-up weight and speed required greater collective pitch, or main rotor blade angle. This placed the blades closer to their stalling angle of attack. The cruise altitude of 5,000 ft resulted in operation at a moderately high density altitude and in areas of moderate turbulence. These conditions, coupled with the effect of the already-discussed high all-up weight are known to be conducive to the onset of retreating blade stall at high speed. The uncommanded nose-up pitch and subsequent roll in the direction of the retreating blade indicated that retreating blade stall took place. The pilot’s instinctive attempt to lower the nose with cyclic, rather than the correct action of lowering the collective to reduce the blade angles and therefore angle of attack, would have worsened the stall and delayed recovery. The subsequent ability to recover from the left roll and descent by applying rear cyclic, which also increases the angle of attack, indicated that the helicopter was no longer experiencing retreating blade stall. In the event, the...
read moreAW139 Global Fleet Passes 1 Million Hour Milestone
AW139 Global Fleet Passes 1 Million Hour Milestone AgustaWestland has announced that its popular medium helicopter, the AW139, has now achieved 1 million hours of service experience since it entered service in 2003. The AW139 fleet leader has now flown more than 9,300 hours, so another milestone is likely to be passed this autumn. AW reports that 650 AW139s are in service, with an order backlog over another 120. The type has 200 customers in over 60 nations. AW claim a 56% share of the medium helicopter market in the last five years. In April 2014 it was announced that that CHC had flown more that 100,000 hours on the type. Gulf Helicopters and Weststar Aviation Services have both achieved more than 50,000 flying hours. In that period, according to Aviation Safety Network, there have been six confirmed fatal accidents (only one, in Brazil, with an apparent airworthiness cause). Interestingly 3 involved SAR operations. UPDATE 11 Oct 2015: See our article on the G-LBAL accident. Date Reg Operator Fatalities Location 02-JUN-2008 A6-BBB Abu Dhabi Aviation 6 off Abu Dhabi, UAE 21-JAN-2010 EC-KYR Salvamento Marítimo (INAER) (SAR) 3 Mediterranean Sea, off Almería, Spain 23-FEB-2011 516 South Korean Coast Guard (SAR) 5 ca 93 km W of Jeju, S Korea 17-AUG-2011 G-110011 Beijing Municipal Public Security Bureau (SAR) 4 Miyun, Beijing, China 19-AUG-2011 PR-SEK Senior Táxi Aéreo 4 Campos Basin, off Macaé, Brazil 13-MAR-2014 G-LBAL Haughey Air 4 Near Gillingham, Norfolk, UK UPDATE 22 December 2017: The AW139 fleet globally has now exceeded 2 million hours. With the AW139 fleet leader having exceeded 12,000 hours, nearly 900 units are today in service out of over 1000 ordered by more than 300 customers in 80 countries. The second million was achieved in only 2.5 years. Aerossurance has first hand experience of the AW139 and its operation and extensive air safety, helicopter design, airworthiness, operations and accident analysis experience. For aviation advice you can trust, contact us at: enquiries@aerossurance.com Follow us on LinkedIn and on Twitter @Aerossurance for our latest...
read moreB206B Freewheel Accidents in Sweden & Canada
B206B Freewheel Accidents in Sweden & Canada Bell 206B registration SE-HOM, operated by Fiskflyg, was engaged in a periodic Operator Proficiency Check in the vicinity of Porjus in Sweden on 8 November 2012, when an accident occurred. The Swedish Accident Investigation Board (Statens Haverikommission [SHK]) published their final report on 3 July 2014. They reported: Shortly after touchdown the helicopter began to vibrate and a heavy scraping sound was heard accompanied by vibrations of a frequency corresponding to the rotor speed. The vibrations continued when the main rotor speed decreased and they then increased sharply, after which the entire main rotor separated from the helicopter and ended up about 10 metres to the left of the helicopter. The helicopter remained upright with no injuries to the two occupants. The SHK concluded that: … the mast had failed due to torsional overload. Furthermore a contaminant was found in the oil system which supplies the free wheel assembly with lubricant. The contaminant was found in a designed restrictor in the oil system. The failed lubrication resulted in a free wheel malfunction. SHK went on to report: It is likely that the free wheel released as intended during previous autorotations, but did not engage when the free turbine speed was to meet the rotor speed at the same time as the rotor geared down. If the speed of the free turbine was significantly higher than that of the rotor when the sprags engaged, possibly faster than normal, an additional dynamic moment arose. The energy that was stored up in the engine and transmission was braked by the inertia of the main rotor, whereby the moment on the mast exceeded the fracture strength. The 1.4 x 4.2 mm debris in the restrictor was considered to be routine ‘build debris’, from when the gear box had last been opened for maintenance, namely: …sealant material that has been used between the cover and the transmission housing. Hence the SHK concluded that: The accident was caused by the design of the freewheel’s lubrication system allowing a contaminant of a size that can occur in a Part-145 shop to block the oil flow to the freewheel. Previous Accident in Canada On 10 January 2013, the Canadian Transportation Safety Board (TSB) reported on very similar, 13 September 2011 accident, to a Wisk-Air operated Bell 206B, C-GDPE. During a training flight: …the student pilot entered a practice 180° autorotation to a planned power recovery. When the student initiated the power recovery, the rotor rpm decreased. The instructor took control and completed an autorotation. The low-rotor-warning horn activated and remained on during the autorotation. The helicopter landed firmly yet not hard enough to activate the emergency locator transmitter. The rotor then struck the tail boom and the mast separated just below the rotor head. The helicopter was then shut down and the crew exited without injuries. While in this case the main rotor remained attached, damage was still very evident: The pitch links were wrapped around the mast in a counter-clockwise direction as viewed from above. The pitch links had failed at the upper end at a point coincident with the end of the internal threads. The main rotor mast had failed below the main rotor attachment splines. In the Canadian case the freewheel lubrication blockage was due to corrosion debris. TSB explain that: The main-rotor transmission oil lubricates the...
read moreDeployable Flight Data Recorders
Deployable Flight Data Recorders The Flight Safety Foundation (FSF) has come out in favour of deployable Flight Data Recorders (FDRs), i.e. a means to deploy a floating capsule containing an FDR from an aircraft with its own Emergency Locator Transmitter. This would then preserve the flight data and provide an automatic ELT independent of the aircraft. The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) is considering the idea for a proposed amendment to ICAO Annex 6. FSF President and CEO Jon Beatty said: Deployable Flight Data Recorders have been around for decades and are in use by the military and in many helicopters. We have the technological capability and with several high profile events, including Air France 447 and Malaysia 370, there is clearly the need for a better way to retrieve the flight data information immediately following an accident. The FSF published several articles about deployable flight data recorders in August 2009 and in April 2012. One example, by DRS, is on use on the Boeing F-18. While Automatically Deployable ELTs (ADELTs) have been widely fitted to offshore helicopters, they have not had a stunning service experience however as the UK Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) recently reported in CAP1144. Alternatively, the FSF proposes that data is ‘deployed virtually’ through a triggered transmission when it is recognised an aircraft is in an unrecoverable state. The FSF advocates these methods to supplement the existing FDRs. The European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) has been progressing a number of allied initiatives to improve the ability locate the existing fixed FDRs, which resulted in an Agency Opinion in May, as part of the legislative process. UPDATE: On 15 September 2014, the US National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) issued the preliminary agenda for a for one-day forum, titled ‘Emerging Flight Data and Locator Technology’, which will be held at the NTSB in Washington on 7 October 2014. UPDATE: The presentations are available here. Aerossurance is an Aberdeen based aviation consultancy, with extensive experience of aviation safety and survivability matters. For aviation advice you can trust, contact us at: enquiries@aerossurance.com Follow us on LinkedIn and on Twitter @Aerossurance for our latest...
read moreHouse of Commons Transport Committee Offshore Helicopter Safety Report
The published at 00.01 am on Tuesday 8 July 2014. In its conclusions the committee say: Helicopter transfer across the North Sea has inherent risks but remains the most practical mode of transport for the offshore oil and gas industry. Five accidents since 2009 have led to a loss of confidence from the offshore work force in helicopter transport that will be difficult to remedy. Industry safety groups and operators have worked to rebuild confidence but more needs to be done. We were disheartened to learn of instances that reflect a “macho bullying culture” in the industry and wish to be reassured that the flawed EBS [Emergency Breathing Systems] safety briefing in not indicative of complacency toward safety. Oil and Gas UK‘s aviation seminar this year specifically looked at rebuilding confidence. The Air Accident Investigation Branch (AAIB) had previously made recommendations on improving the passenger briefing after August 2013 accident off Sumburgh (on 10 April 2014, six survivors from that accident met with Members of the Transport Committee [see Appendix A]). The introduction of new Category A Emergency Breathing Systems , as well as introducing enhanced capacity, will also give the entire workforce a refresher in EBS use. The committee dismissed any concerns with the Super Puma family (which make up some 60% of the UK offshore helicopter fleet). In relation to the UK Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) Review, which resulted in the CAP1145 report, the committee highlight: ….areas of the review that we think require additional work, particularly concerning occurrence reporting, the standardisation of customer requirements and the implementation of seating restrictions. The CAA now needs the co-operation of the oil and gas industry, helicopter operators and EASA to ensure its recommendations are carried through to conclusion. We have called on the DfT to use its influence to ensure EASA has prioritised that important work. There is some slightly unfair criticism of EASA, especially as a considerable number of the recommendations and actions in CAP1145 are based on the work of EASA‘s existing helicopter ditching Rule Making Task RMT.0120 working group and EASA’s Management Board is actually chaired by CAA’s Director Of European And International Strategy. They also comment that the AAIB should keep survivors better informed on the progress of investigations in future. The committee go on to say, heavily influenced by evidence from union BALPA its seems: The CAA review did not look in sufficient detail at two key areas of offshore helicopter operations. The first was the offshore industry’s highly competitive environment. Commercial sensitivities ensure that it is difficult for external reviews to examine the contractual obligations set by industry. The second was the role and effectiveness of the CAA itself. Those who work in the hazardous conditions of the North Sea deserve to know those issues have been properly evaluated. We believe only a full, independent public inquiry would have the resources, remit and power to do this. A flaw in CAP1145, based on a study that CAA have recently publically admitted at two industry seminars was rushed (one might assume in order to be complete before the Transport Committee reported), was always its lack of self reflection on the CAA‘s own performance, organisation and resources. The BBC report that a DfT spokesman said: It is vital that offshore workers are able to operate in a safe environment. We are working closely with the CAA, as the independent regulator, on this critical issue. UPDATE...
read moreIncreasing SAR Use by the Oil & Gas Industry
Increasing SAR Use by the Oil & Gas Industry The oil and gas industry is increasingly contracting commercial Search & Rescue (SAR) helicopters to support offshore exploration work and support offshore safety cases. For example, commercial operator Bristow has provided a SAR service in the UK since 1971 (for both government and oil and gas customers) that has flown more than 44,000 SAR operational hours and over 15,000 SAR missions. They currently also deliver oil and gas SAR operations in Australia, Brazil, Canada (via Cougar – video), Norway (video), Russia, Tanzania and Trinidad. Bond Offshore Helicopters (part of Avincis) operates the so called JIGSAW service for BP in the North Sea (video). CHC meanwhile provide SAR in a number of locations including UK, Ireland and Norway (video 1, and UPDATE Sept 2014 video 2). Meanwhile NHV (video) now provide SAR cover to the Dutch oil and gas association (NOGEPA). There are of course other operators… One of the latest operations to start up is Shell‘s contract with CHC in Broome, Australia with an Airbus Helicopters EC225, announced today. This service is on standby 24-hours a day and is able to respond within 15 minutes during daylight hours and 30 minutes at night. Initially the service will be daytime SAR, with a medevac capability only at night. Medical Rescue Air Ambulance is providing the paramedic SAR crew for the service. As has become common in these circumstances, when the capability is not required for oil and gas activities, it may be tasked by the local authorities to assist with other medevac and SAR needs. CHC Asia Pacific’s Regional Director Nick Mair explained: Early next year, a new, state-of –the- art, all-weather SAR helicopter will enable full, 24-hour search and rescue coverage. This, and the earlier videos, neatly highlight the distinction between a LIMSAR (Limited SAR) capability that is daylight (and fair weather only) and a full AWSAR (All Weather SAR) capability that can also operate at night. Even LIMSAR, is a step beyond simply using a winch equipped helicopter in an emergency. Key aircraft upgrades essential for AWSAR is the addition of a 4-axis autopilot with auto-hover (and ideally a means for the winch operator to ‘trim’ the aircraft position) and a means to aid search such as FLIR (Forward Looking Infa Red) turret with a suitable operator interface and a Night Vision Imaging System (see a recent example certified here). Clearly even for LIMSAR, the helicopter needs to be winch (or ‘hoist’) equipped. For a permanent standby capability of the AWSAR a dual winch is essential to give redundancy. However, to provide a SAR service you need an offshore equipped helicopter with those features and: Extensive SAR, winching & medical equipment A carefully planned SAR cabin fit, with a sea tray (to protect the floor from sea water and bodily fluids), equipment stowage etc External winch lighting (including a Nitesun type search light) Direction finders (and ideally the ability to decode the <50 millisecond periodic burst transmissions from 406MHz beacons) Extra radios including satellite communications when operating at long ranges including, SAR crew intercoms / radios etc Automatic Identification System (AIS) to detect shipping (important when hovering in low visibility at low altitude – a Royal Navy Westland Lynx helicopter was knocked into the sea by an Omani ship in 2001!) Suitable stand-by accommodation and an ops room close to the aircraft with...
read moreNew EASA Structure
A new organisational structure for the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) has been announced and can be found here. This reorganisation follows a decision of the Management Board in May 2014, and follows an extensive consultation, known as the Article 62 review. In the introduction to the paper to the Management Board, a governance body chaired by Mike Smethers (the UK CAA’s Director Of European And International Strategy), EASA states: After 10 years of existence, the Agency completed the foundation of its regulatory system covering its initial scope and the so-called 1st and 2nd extensions…. This being now in place… more attention needs to be paid to supporting Member States and Industry with implementation and to maintaining the regulatory framework, also considering the challenges faced by Member States themselves, in particular as concerns oversight capabilities. Furthermore, the objective to continuously improve safety in economically challenging times implies revising the way the Agency defines its strategic priorities: a more consistent, data-centred, risk based approach should be implemented. Finally, the Agency’s relationship with the Commission, Member States and Industry has always been pivotal to the establishment of a robust and internationally recognised EU aviation system. To further consolidate this relationship, clearer interfaces should be established, by ensuring single points of contact for dedicated domains. The high level structure is below: There are effectively 5 directorates: The Executive Directorate (ED), including Quality/Internal Audit, Legal, and Communications, reporting to EASA Executive Director Patrick Ky. A new Strategy and Safety Management Directorate (SM), to leverage a risk- and performance based, data-centred approach (as previously discussed by Aerossurance here). It will also be responsible for International Cooperation, Technical Training and Safety Promotion (such as the European Strategic Safety Initiative). The Certification Directorate (CT) will be organised in departments in charge of each product category . It will be responsible for all activities related to the Initial and Continuing Airworthiness of type design, Environmental Certification, Operational Suitability, and Design Organisation Approvals (DOA). A Flight Standards Directorate (FS) will be organised in departments in charge of technical domains, such as Production and Maintenance, Air Operations, Aircrew, ATM/ANS and Aerodromes. A Resources and Support Directorate (RS), responsible for finance, IT, HR, etc. Rulemaking, Approvals and pan-European Standardisation activity is now absorbed into the CT & FS directorates. Aerossurance has extensive experience in safety management, with aviation regulations, regulators and the activity of regulation. For advice, contact us at enquiries@aerossurance.com Follow us on LinkedIn for our latest...
read more737s in Montana Rail Ravine Plunge
737s in Montana Rail Ravine Plunge In a bizarre rail accident, three Boeing 737 fuselages, being transported from the Spirit AeroSystems Wichita factory to the Boeing assembly line in Seattle, were left at the bottom of a ravine in Montana on 4 July 2014. None of the train’s crew were injured. Of the 90 cars of the BNSF Railway train, 19 derailed, 18 miles east of Superior, Montana. Thirteen of the cars that derailed were carrying freight, mostly aircraft parts with some soybeans and denatured alcohol. Six were empty. The train was carrying six complete 737 fuselages, fuselage panels for the 777 and wing parts for a 747. All six cars with the 737s were derailed, two fuselages were partly submerged in the Clark Fork River. A Boeing spokesman stated they have: …deployed experts to the scene to begin a thorough assessment of the situation. Once we determine the extent of damage we will assess what, if any, impact there will be to production. Spirit has been delivering Next-Generation 737s from Wichita since 1998. The company builds the 737 fuselage, engine struts and nacelles in Wichita and wing components in its Tulsa, Oklahoma facility. Earlier this year, Boeing accelerated 737 production to 42 aircraft each month. Spirit recently delivered their 5,000th 737 Next Generation fuselage. This is not the first time that business continuity and Boeing’s supply chain has been threatened. In June 2011, a BNSF train derailed in Nebraska after being hit by a tornado, damaging 737 fuselages on board (video 1m 40s onwards). On 14 April 2012 an EF-3 tornado struck Spirit’s main factory in Wichita, resulting in 9 days lost production. In that case, Boeing were able to recover, without delaying a delivery. Spirit released the following statement: Spirit AeroSystems has been working closely with our customer since we learned of the incident and continue supporting as needed. The Spirit team’s resolve was tested with an even greater challenge as recently as the 2012 Wichita tornado. We are confident that, working together, we will overcome whatever challenges may be presented. UPDATE 1 In the Puget Sound Business Journal there were two helpful articles on 7 July 2014: Are these Boeing fuselages totaled? That’s a complicated question That 737 train wreck could derail Boeing’s production line in Renton Aerospace eBusiness published this item that will help you consider Aerossurance‘s response time!: When Aerospace News Happens on the Weekend… Flight International comment on 10 July 2014: Boeing studying impact of 737 fuselage derailment UPDATE 2 During week commencing 21 July 2014 personnel from Pacific Steel and Recycling have been breaking up the 737s on site. While other parts appear to have been salvaged )or at least relocated for evaluation) all six 737 fuselages it appears have been scrapped. UPDATE 3 Flight International report that 737 derailment probe ‘suggests’ track alignment issue based on an investigation by Montana Rail Link. Aerossurance has extensive air safety, operations, airworthiness, human factors, aviation regulation and safety analysis experience. For practical aviation advice you can trust, contact us at: enquiries@aerossurance.com Follow us on LinkedIn and on Twitter @Aerossurance for our latest...
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