EC155 / Light Aircraft Mid Air Collision: All Survive
EC155 / Light Aircraft Mid Air Collision: All Survive (Airbus EC155B1 F-HEGT of Héli Sécurité and Nord 1203 III F-AYVV) On 8 February 2024 Airbus EC155B1 F-HEGT of Héli Sécurité and vintage single engine piston Nord 1203 III F-AYVV collided in mid air over Montmélian, Savoie. Both aircraft were damaged, but remained controllable. Their pilots managed to land, in a field for the helicopter and at Albertville aerodrome for the aeroplane. Le Bureau d’enquêtes et d’analyses pour la sécurité de l’aviation civile (BEA) issued their safety investigation report in December 2024. The Accident Flights The dark blue helicopter, flown by a single pilot (3000 hours total time) accompanied by a ‘safety pilot’ (400 hours), was transporting six passengers from Chambéry airport to the Courchevel mountain airfield. The aeroplane (white with red wing tips and propeller hub) was making a local post-maintenance check flight with a pilot (23,000 hours total time) accompanied by a mechanic to record engine parameters. The 1957 built aircraft was not equipped with, nor was it required to have, a transponder. Both aircraft were operating under Visual Flight Rules (VFR) in Class G uncontrolled airspace and were on converging flight paths in the Albertville valley at the, same altitude with a closing speed of c 280 kt. The helicopter crew described good visibility but heavy cloud cover. Despite both pilots monitoring the same radio frequency, neither was aware of the other’s presence until moments before the collision. The BEA recount: At 11:45:53, the two pilots on board the helicopter perceived F-AYVV coming towards them, at the same altitude. The pilot flying sharply turned right while pitching down while the aeroplane continued in a straight line. The aeroplane pilot who saw the helicopter at the last moment, did not have the time to carry out an evasive action. At 11:45:55, the tips of the helicopter’s [12.6 m diameter] main rotor blades came into contact with the aeroplane’s left fairing and made a cut in the root of the left wing, between the leading edge and the main spar (see Figure 1, point ❶). The helicopter pilot started an emergency descent, reducing the speed to 80 kt. While searching for an obstacle-free area for landing, he transmitted a distress message by radio and activated the emergency locator transmitter. He landed in a field less than three minutes later (point ❷). The helicopter’s landing gear sank into soft ground by c 10 cm. The damage was limited to the tips of two of the five main rotor blades, a notch on the trailing edge of one blade and blade rubbing marks the fenestron fairing that probably occurred during the landing. After checking the controllability, the Nord [pilot initiated a descent, returning to Albertville aerodrome, landing five minutes later. Cuts were found cut on the left-hand side of the engine cowling and the left-hand wing leading edge down to the spar. The left-hand wing fuel tank was torn and the he left-hand aileron control rod was severed. BEA Analysis The collision took place in Class G uncontrolled airspace, not covered by a Flight Information Service (FIS), in a mountainous area. In this class of airspace, neither a transponder or radio calls are mandatory. Maintaining separation is based on the ‘see and avoid‘ principle. See and avoid relies on flight crew monitoring...
read moreCHC Sikorsky S-92A Seat Slide Surprise(s)
CHC Sikorsky S-92A Seat Slide Surprise(s): (LN-OQE 2010 and LN-OQG 2013) On 1 April 2010, at 500 ft on approach to an offshore installation, the Aircraft Commander of Sikorsky S-92A LN-OQE of CHC Helikopter Service found his seat had become detached. The Accident Investigation Board Norway (AIBN), now the Norwegian Safety Investigation Authority (NSIA), published their safety investigation report, in Norwegian only, on 15 April 2015 (a disappointingly excessive 5 year and one similar incident later). The Incident Flight The helicopter was being flown by the Co-Pilot as ‘Pilot Flying‘. Just before reviewing the Pre-Landing Checklist for landing on the Gullfaks B offshore installation, the Aircraft Commander, the ‘Pilot Monitoring‘, was adjusting his seat to the forward position for landing when it came loose from its mounting rails. He grabbed the grab handles in the ceiling [believed to be the handhold above the windscreen] and then had to hold on to them to prevent the seat from falling off the rails with the consequent risk that the control sticks (collective and cyclic) could be blocked or pinched. The Aircraft Commander told the Co-Pilot he could not let go and made it clear the Pilot Flying “was now on his own with regard to the maneuvering”. The Co-Pilot was able to make an uneventful landing on Gullfaks B without further problems. A week later CHC issued “Information to Crew (ITC) 80 – 07.05.2010” that stated that the incident involved a potential for the flight controls to be blocked. The company noted that the incident ended well because the crew remained calm in a difficult situation. The Co-Pilot informed the AIBN that… …the weather was as good as it could be in the North Sea, and that the approach was otherwise unproblematic and obstacle-free After landing offshore the pilots attempted to refit the commander’s seat onto its mounting rails (presumably to certify under an Aircraft Commanders’ Part-145 145.A.30(j) authorisation). However, they discovered that the forward slide stop was missing. Significantly, they also found the co-pilot’s seat was missing its rear slide stop. Safety Investigation LN-OQE had been in for a maintenance check less than a week before. A Nose Landing Gear(NLG) Hinge Inspection had been performed, which necessitated removal of the pilots’ seats. On these Martin-Baker High Comfort Crew Seats both the locking brackets (slide stop, P/N MBCS13711) and locking pins (quick release pin) must be attached to the mounting rails after the seats have been put in place. After performing the NLG Hinge Inspection, the seats were reinstalled, but: the locking brackets for both were omitted on the commander’s seat the front and rear locking pins were omitted on the co-pilot’s the rear locking pin was missing (though the front pin was fitted) There is no comment on where the omitted items were. Two days after the incident, CHC issued Maintenance Alert Notice TI-016, requiring inspection of the pilot seats in all of the company’s S-92 helicopters before the next flight to ensure that locking pins and locking brackets were installed. No similar defects were found on any of the other helicopters. However, one helicopter was missing a slide stop, but here the locking bolts were in place so that, according to CHC, the seat could not have come off the rails. In its internal investigation, CHC identified several factors that contributed to...
read moreAW109SP Helicopter Air Ambulance Mountain Landing Accident Utah
AW109SP Helicopter Air Ambulance Mountain Landing Accident Utah (Intermountain Life Flight N631HC) On 8 October 2024, Leonardo AW109SP GrandNew N631HC, a helicopter air ambulance of Intermountain Life Flight, landed hard during a night call out to attend a patient at >10,000 ft amsl in a mountainous region of Utah. The landing gear collapsed and the belly was damaged. One of the three occupants suffered a minor injury. The US National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) issued a sparse safety investigation report on 8 April 2025. The report is mostly based on the pilot’s detailed statement. The Accident At about 03:30 the pilot, who was going to operate the aircraft single pilot, was called by Comm-Center (CC) asking if he would accept a flight into the High Uintahs wilderness area “for a patient in the woods”, noting that the Summit SAR team, a ground SAR team was still to reach the casualty. The pilot was told that another operator, AirMed “had turned this flight down due to smoke and visibility” and the Department of Public Safety (DPS) “did not want to respond at this time”. This appears to be case of helicopter shopping where the tasking agency calls several operators. A positive is that the pilot was told others had declined, providing context to inform their decision making and encourage critical thinking The downside is this can put pressure on the pilot as they may perceive they are the ‘last hope’ for a casualty until dawn. The pilot, who had 5127 hours total time, 1105 hours at night and 170 on type, reported that: Conditions were some clouds in the sky, Zero moon illumination as the moon had set at approximately 2207hrs. After receiving the initial details he examined ForeFlight, and… …looked at fuel requirements and not knowing if I would need to search for their location elected to add fuel to ensure I had a loiter time if needed. I knew that minimum fuel to complete the flight from the scene area to IMED in Murray, Utah was 150kg which included my reserve. The crew went to the aircraft, and the pilot completed a pre-flight risk assessment selecting: Night Shift Flight between 2-6 am Unfamiliar destination Technical flight The first three are self evident but its unclear what the last relates to. I added my fuel and added more than I had planned by mistake (due to I’ve never topped off the aircraft at Logan and when at IMED it is usually 410 when fuel is about to spill out the fuel port). Prudently the pilot… …mentioned to the crew about the possibility of reduced visibility and that we would take it slow with that consideration and then we departed. Enroute to the destination it was brought up in discussion why we were being called and I mentioned that Airmed had turned down for visibility (thought I had mentioned that before), DPS said that they would wait till sunrise. The next comment in the pilot’s statement indicates that by this point of the flight the crew no longer expected to search for the casualty, presumably because the ground SAR party had now reached them and passed a landing site location. It was mentioned that the altitude of the LZ was approximately at 9300’. I noted the temperature @ 11º since we...
read moreT-Bolt Trouble: Unrecorded Maintenance on US HEMS BK117C2/H145 and Loss of TR Pitch Control
T-Bolt Trouble: Unrecorded Maintenance on US HEMS BK117C2/H145 and Loss of Tail Rotor Pitch Control (Metro Aviation N191LL) On 6 March 2024 Metro Aviation Airbus BK117C2 / H145 helicopter air ambulance N191LL was damaged at Purdue University Airport (LAF), West Lafayette, Indiana. The three occupants were uninjured. On 24 April 2025 the US National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) released their safety investigation report, in a creditable 14 months. The Accident Flight The pilot reported that, while in a hover taxi to accelerate for takeoff, he felt a force against his feet from the pedals. The helicopter yawed to the right, so he applied full left pedal, but when the pedal was depressed, there was no resistance and no effect on the helicopter’s yaw. The helicopter landed hard came to rest and rest upright, with damage to “the fuselage, tailboom, vertical fin, horizontal stabilizer, tail rotor assembly, and one main rotor blade”. The Safety Investigation – The Accident Sequence The T-bolt and its attachment bolts, which connect the pitch change bellcrank to the pitch change slider was found to have become disconnected. Investigators concluded that the T-bolt attachment bolts had been installed but not torqued and lock wired, allowing them to back out while rotors running. Once the attachment bolts backed out, the T-bolt also backed out resulting in a loss of tail rotor pitch control. The T-bolt then likely impacted and damaged a tail rotor blade. The subsequent imbalance led to the overload separation of the upper vertical fin. One attachment bolt was found on the ramp after the accident, and the other was “lodged into a honeycomb panel at the aft-lower area of the fuselage, adjacent to the fuel cell.” The Safety Investigation – The Maintenance History During maintenance a few days prior, the T-bolt and its attachment bolts were removed by a mechanic at the direction of a lead mechanic to facilitate troubleshooting of adjacent components for the tail rotor control system. As the T-bolt’s removal was temporary and quick, the mechanic crucially choose not to record the removal in the Work Order’s Discrepancy Sheet. The T-bolt attachment bolts were then subsequently temporarily installed “finger-tight’ by a second mechanic to assist a third mechanic who was installing the tail rotor blade mounting forks and pitch change links. According to the NTSB “the first mechanic [sic] was tasked to another company helicopter shortly after”. The NTSB state that “while he stated he relayed to the other mechanics that the T-bolt attachment bolts were finger-tight, no one followed up on the installation of the T-bolt attachment bolts”. This part of the NTSB report is rather ambiguous but it seems likely the NTSB mean the mechanic tasked to another job was the second mechanic, who reinstalled the bolts finger tight, rather than the first mechanic who did the unrecorded removal. Without a maintenance discrepancy entry for the removal of the T-bolt, there was no open task to verify T-bolt installation was complete. Furthermore, no one identified that lock wire was missing from these bolts during the final checks before the helicopter was released to service. NTSB Probable Cause The failure of maintenance personnel to properly install the tail rotor pitch change slider attachment hardware (T-bolt), which led to the disconnection of the pitch change slider, a loss of tail rotor control, and subsequent...
read moreThree Fatalities When US Air Ambulance Helicopter Struck Goose at Night
Three Fatalities When US Air Ambulance Helicopter Struck Goose at Night (Air Evac B206L3+ N295AE) On 20 January 2024, at 23:23 Local Time, Bell 206L3+ air ambulance N295AE of Air Evac Lifeteam was destroyed in an accident near Hydro, Oklahoma. The three occupants, the pilot, flight nurse, and flight paramedic were all fatally injured. The US National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) stated in their safety investigation report, issued on 19 March 2025, that having dropped off a patient at the Mercy Health Center Heliport, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma: The helicopter was en route back to the crew’s home airfield [Weatherford, Oklahoma] when it encountered a flock of geese during the night flight. The helicopter was in cruise flight about 500-600 ft above ground level and at 110 knots groundspeed when the encounter occurred. The bird strike resulted in an inflight breakup of the helicopter and subsequent impact with terrain. The debris field was about 265 yards long and 455 yards wide. Bird remains were recovered from the area of the cockpit, tail rotor and pitch links. Samples were sent to the Smithsonian Institution’s Feather Identification Laboratory. These were identified as cackling goose (Branta hutchinsii), which until 2004 was treated as a subset of the canada goose family (at which time the four smallest sub-species were reclassified). DNA testing confirmed the remains were consistent with female cackling geese, which have an average mass of 2 kg. At least two birds were involved (as three feet were found within the debris). Following the accident, the operator revised their General Operational Manual and pre flight risk assessment form: They encouraged all pilots to review bird migration tracking websites before flight, increased the recommended cruise altitude to 2,500 ft above ground level in areas of potential bird activity, and moved the recommended approach to land/descent airspeed to around 80-90 knots versus descending at cruise airspeed. Interestingly, despite encouraging use of bird migration data, NTSB also reported that: Preflight mission planning for the flight would likely not have detected a risk for a bird strike. A review of military and civilian bird hazard websites showed that at the time of the accident, the probability of bird strike in that area was deemed to be low. In addition, historic migration data also estimated the probability of a bird strike at the time of the accident as low. Our Safety Observations The actions taken after the accident all appear to be foreseeable safety improvements that have been foreshadowed by prior bird strike accidents. NTSB do however note that to the operator’s credit the helicopter had been modified via a Supplemental Type Certificate to replace the pilot-side windshield with a polycarbonate kit “that offered increased resistance to windshield penetration by a bird strike”. The specific product is not identified but an example can be found here. NTSB do not comment further but the STC windscreens would be unlikely to be cleared for a 2 kg bird like a female crackling goose as even FAR 29.631 for the windscreens of larger rotorcraft is only a 1 kg test requirement. Safety Resources On 3 October 2023, the FAA released Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin (SAIB) AIR-21-17R1 Rotorcraft Bird Strike Protection and Mitigation, to inform pilots about the risk of bird strikes. The European Safety Promotion Network Rotorcraft (ESPN-R) has a helicopter safety discussion...
read moreEngine & Emergency Flotation Failures – Greenland B206L4 Ditching
Engine & Emergency Flotation Failures – Greenland B206L4 Ditching (Sermeq Helicopters OY-HIO) On 28 February 2024 Bell 206L4 OY-HIO Sermeq Helicopters ditched in Tunulliarfik Fjord (the inner section of Skovfjord) near Qaqortoq in southern Greenland. Although the Emergency Flotation System (EFS) was activated, it malfunctioned and the helicopter rolled over. The pilot, the sole occupant, escaped unharmed. Greenland is an autonomous territory within the Kingdom of Denmark and so the Accident Investigation Board (AIB) Denmark (Danish: Havarikommissionen for Civil Luftfart og Jernbane or HCLJ) investigated this accident. They released their safety investigation report on 5 March 2025. The Accident Flight Th helicopter was making a VFR positioning flight from Narsarsuaq (BGBW) to Qaqortoq (BGJH) cruising at 1500 ft when… …the engine chip detector light illuminated on the caution and warning panel, and a few seconds later, the engine low oil pressure light started illuminating. Engine oil pressure indicated zero and indicated oil temperature decreased. Moments after: The N1 (Gas Producer Turbine rotations per minute) indication was zero, and both the engine-out warning light and horn activated. However, the engine still produced power with a normal N2 (Power Turbine rotations per minute) indication. Consequently the pilot selected a narrow sand bar alongside the steep southern cliffs of the fjord and initiated a powered descent. The engine however stopped and the pilot was forced to complete an autorotation, activating the EFS. The helicopter ditched a few meters from the sand bar. While the rotors were still turning the helicopter started slowly rolling onto its left hand side in a water depth of approximately 0.5 m. The helicopter’s fixed Emergency Locator Transmitter (ELT) was mounted just below the instrument panel and fortuitously remained above the waterline. It activated automatically, tiggering the tasking of a Search and Rescue (SAR) helicopter by Joint Arctic Command. At 17:17 an Air Greenland H225 SAR helicopter arrived on scene and located the accident site at 17:29. The pilot, who was wearing “ordinary clothing” and whose legs had gotten wet was found conscious but with a low body temperature, having sat outside in -5 °C for c75 minutes. He was kept in hospital overnight. Safety Investigation – Survivability The investigators note that the SAR operation was “effective and positively impacted the chance of survival in a hostile area”. Though not legally required, in the opinion of the AIB, a survival suit in a hostile area would most likely have reduced the risk of hypothermia. Safety Investigation – Engine Following examination of the Rolls-Royce 250C30 engine the investigators concluded that the engine power loss was due to the following sequence of events: The bearing no. 8 thrust plate anti-rotation tab separated from the thrust plate ringand travelled with the engine oil to the scavenge side of the oil pump. Debris from the anti-rotation tab triggered the engine chip detector light. Parts of the anti-rotation tab got trapped between a scavenge pump gear and the wall of the scavenge pump housing. The oil pressure pump and scavenge pump stopped. The drive shaft coupling from the fuel control gearshaft to the oil pump gearshaft fractured. There was no oil pressure and no N1 indication. The gas producer turbine and power turbine were still running. A stopped scavenge pump resulted in no warm engine oil flowing from the engine to the airframe oil tank, where the engine oil...
read moreEC135P2+ Air Ambulance Fatal Accident Mississippi 10 March 2025
EC135P2+ Air Ambulance Fatal Accident Mississippi 10 March 2025 (Med-Trans AirCare 3 N835CS) On 10 March 2025 Airbus Helicopters EC135P2+ air ambulance N835CS, operated by Med-Trans Corporation (part of Global Medical Response) as AirCare 3, was destroyed in an accident near Canton, Mississippi. The pilot (who had 10,644 hours total time), the flight paramedic and flight nurse were fatally injured. The US National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) issued a preliminary report on 4 April 2025. The Accident Flight – Preliminary Details The helicopter was repositioning day VFR to its home base, Golden Triangle Regional Airport (GTR), Columbus, Mississippi, after transporting a patient to the St Dominic-Jackson Memorial Hospital Heliport (MS46), Jackson, Mississippi. According to the NTSB: A preliminary review of automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B) data showed the helicopter departed from MS46 and began to climb to the northeast. The helicopter flew over the Ross R. Barnett Reservoir, and the flightpath remained south of the Natchez Trace Parkway. The helicopter eventually reached an altitude of about 2,500 ft above mean sea level (msl). Shortly after the helicopter flew over the Pearl River State Wildlife Management Area, it began to descend. Shortly after the helicopter flew over the Pearl River State Wildlife Management Area, it began to descend. About halfway through the descent, the flight nurse transmitted over the radio to the UMMC MED-COM, “we’ve got a major problem, we are having an emergency landing in a field right now, ops are not good, controls are giving us a lot of trouble, coming in fast.” No further radio transmissions were recorded from the helicopter from either the UMMC MEDCOM or ATC. During the descent, the helicopter turned to the north. It impacted multiple trees just to the south of a flat grass field 1/4 mile southwest of the Turcotte Fish Hatchery. There was a postimpact fire that burned for about 3 hours, due to the remote location. The Turcotte Fish Hatchery manager was inside his truck near the hatchery ponds at the time, 700 yards from the accident site: He heard a “boom” or an “explosion,” which is what first drew his attention to the helicopter. He looked toward the hatchery and saw the helicopter while it was airborne. He…could not recall hearing any engine sound after the “boom,” and the helicopter sound was not noticeable to him. The helicopter… …did not change course and was pointed straight at him before it turned north and descended “at a pretty good rate.” It appeared to him that the pilot was “having trouble controlling” the helicopter. The witness reported that he did not see any smoke or fire from the helicopter. The helicopter was… …descending at a pretty good rate, which he estimated as a 40° to 45° descent angle. He said the helicopter’s estimated nose down attitude was about 30°. He said there was “a little wobble” of the nose from left to right. The helicopter was rolling “just a little bit.” He said the time from the “boom” to helicopter’s impact with the ground spanned no more than about 15 seconds. NTSB report that the helicopter had undergone its most recent inspection 2.7 flying hours before the accident. The NTSB do not comment on what inspection this was. A review of data on FlightAware indicated that the aircraft was on the ground at Key...
read moreUK CAA HOFO ACAS Rulemaking 2025 & a 2004 Tornado / AS332L Airprox
UK CAA HOFO ACAS Rulemaking 2025 & a 2004 Tornado / AS332L Airprox UK CAA Rulemaking 2025 The UK Civil Aviation Authority (UK CAA) has recently consulted on a general update to the Air Operating Regulations for offshore helicopters (Subpart K: Helicopter Offshore Operations). This included introduction of Aircraft Collision Avoidance System (ACAS) requirements. The UK CAA wrote that: An internal CAA study produced in 2005 cited flight in uncontrolled airspace and mixing of civilian and military air traffic as two of the single largest factors associated with risk bearing Airproxes (during the 2001-2004 study period). The majority of offshore helicopter operations take place off the north-east coast of the UK where both of these factors prevail. It is therefore proposed to add a requirement for ACAS II to the Air Operating Regulations in order to reduce the risk of MAC… Wording similar to the CAT.IDE.A.155 requirement for aeroplanes will be [sic] proposed for addition to SPA.HOFO.160 (new para. (d)) in order to ‘future proof’ the requirement. A two-year period is proposed to allow time for all aircraft to be upgraded and to allow the costs to be spread. In their consultation, UK CAA note: Following a high profile very near miss between a military aircraft and an offshore helicopter in February 2004, all helicopters currently used for UK offshore operations are voluntarily equipped with ACAS, mostly ACAS II. Some aircraft are equipped with ACAS I, about half of which are already scheduled to be upgraded to ACAS II. We will examine that 2004 incident next. RAF Tornado F3 / Bristow AS332L Airprox 5 February 2004 The UK Airprox Board (UKAB) published its analysis of this incident: The RAF Panavia Tornado F3 from RAF Leuchars was tasked as the target aircraft in an exercise and “required to simulate an aircraft flying a 20nm square search pattern between 250-1000ft asl” for two other Tornadoes. The fighter’s… …AI [Airborne Interception] radar [GEC AI.24 Foxhunter] was serviceable and they were squawking with Mode C selected on. They were receiving an Air Defence Information Service (ADIS) from the Control and Reporting Centre (CRC) at RAF Neatishead, Norfolk. The surface wind was westerly at about 35kt, with the 2000ft wind registering at 50kt; the weather was slightly hazy at low level with an in-flight visibility of about 8km and no cloud to affect the flight. The Bristow AS332L was returning to Aberdeen in VMC along the Helicopter Main Route (HMR) 117 from the Auk A installation (then operated by Shell) in the Central North Sea at 09:07. They were receiving a NATS offshore Flight Information Service (FIS) and were squawking the assigned code with Mode C. The helicopter was en route at 1000 ft rather than the more usual 2000 ft because of a 55 knot headwind, as they were entitled to do in Class G airspace. Neither aircraft was equipped with any form of ACAS. Both were operating in uncontrolled Class G airspace, and beyond radar cover at that time (multilateration was not introduced until 2010). Neither NATS nor Neatishead were aware of the other traffic, undermining their ability to provide a useful information service. After about 20 nm on the HMR and approaching 119 nm range from the ADN [Aberdeen North] VOR at 125kt with the autopilot engaged, when the helicopter crew… …suddenly became aware...
read moreAS365 Crewman Dragged from Boat During SAR Training
AS365 Crewman Dragged from Boat During SAR Training (Western Australia Police Air Wing Airbus AS365N3 VH‑WPX) On 29 September 2020 Western Australia Police Air Wing Airbus AS365N3 VH‑WPX was conducting SAR training exercises near Swanbourne, Western Australia. While conducting an exercise with a small vessel, a rescue crewman attached to the hoist cable was pulled overboard and dragged through the water. The crewman was recovered uninjured. The Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) issued their safety investigation report on 22 September 2021. The Day’s Training & Incident Flight The crew commenced duty at 07:00 Local Time at their Jandakot base. They departed at 09:33 for a staging area at Rous Head, Fremantle, landing at about 09:50. The crew for the exercises comprised of the pilot, four tactical flight officers (TFOs) and one TFO instructor. It involved the TFOs rotating through the roles of winch operator, rescue crewman and diver. They conducted the first training exercise of the day at a nearby beach. The following exercises involved training with the 40 ft volunteer rescue vessel, Stacy Hall c 1-2 km offshore Swanbourne. The aim was to conduct an initial vessel winching Operator Proficiency Check for one TFO and recency flights for two other crewmembers. At the time of this incident the three key crew members were: The pilot: joined the Australian Army as a Blackhawk pilot in 2008 and then the WA Police in Sept 2019. They had 3,566 flying hours of experience, 320 on type. The hoist operator: who had served in the WA Police Air Wing since 2010, and had 1,596 hours of experience, including 110 cycles of water winching. The rescue crewman: who been with the Air Wing as a helicopter crewman since mid 2018 and had 864 hours, including 74 cycles as a rescue crewman. The weather was overcast with clear visibility. The temperature was about 19°C with wind from the north‑west at 21 km/h (11 kt) gusting to 30 km/h (16 kt). Sea state was forecast to increase to 1.5 to 2 m during the morning. After the first training it was decided only to conduct further operational recency training for the already qualified TFOs due to the sea state. At 11:31, they departed from Rous Head for the third training sortie. During a dummy run to the vessel the winch operator observed that the Stacy Hall was bouncing in the waves, so the crew requested…course and speed changes. …as the rescue crewman was winched clear of the deck, they swung towards the canopy on the forward end of the deck and required the use of their arms to fend off…with the winch operator commenting to the crew that the sequence ‘…was pretty hairy’. Further hoist training with the vessel and a helocast (free drop) / wet hoisting recovery exercise were conducted without issue, before a further return to Rous Head. This suggests relatively low concern about the sea state. At 12:10 the helicopter departed to rendezvous with the Stacy Hall 1-2 km off Swanbourne for the fourth exercise. After take-off, the crew completed fly‑away checks, pre-landing checks, pilot brief and winch checks. The pilot brief confirmed the crew would undertake two hoist cycles to the vessel, which would be travelling on a course of 300° at a speed of 12 kt. The helicopter approached the Stacy Hall and...
read moreFirefighting Bucket Snags Trees During Autorotation
Firefighting Bucket Snags Trees During Autorotation (Valhalla Helicopters Bell 205 C-GRUV) On 19 July 2023, Valhalla Helicopters Bell 205A-1 C-GRUV crashed while conducting firefighting in northern Alberta. The pilot died of his injuries. The Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) published their safety investigation report on 27 February 2025. The Accident Flight At 1803 Local Time, 9 minutes after being tasked, the helicopter departed Haig Lake firebase, Alberta, on a VFR flight to a forest fire located approximately 15 NM northeast of Peace River Aerodrome Alberta. The helicopter had an empty firefighting bucket, a1230 l SEI Industries Bambi Bucket BB2732, on a 150-foot longline. The pilot had 8711 flying hours total time, 3286 on type and a further 2048 on the B212. The helicopter was powered by an Ozark Aeroworks (formerly Honeywell) T5317B. Very shortly after departure, after reaching 1400 ft AGL, the helicopter experienced an engine failure. The helicopter began a 180° turn to the right, to a heading of approximately 025° magnetic, during which it continued to lose altitude. The helicopter then experienced a complete loss of engine power and the pilot began to autorotate into a section of muskeg to the west of his current location. During the subsequent autorotation the water bucket became entangled in trees. The helicopter consequently impacted the ground in a nose-down, left-banked attitude. The main rotor struck the tail boom. The damage indicated low rotor rpm at the time of impact. There was no post-impact fire. The pilot survived the initial impact and was able to egress from the helicopter but later died of his injuries. The Safety Investigation The helicopter was not equipped with a flight data recorder or a cockpit voice recorder. Neither were required by regulation. The helicopter’s Garmin GPSMAP 496 provided the investigation with information about its flight path. A teardown of the T53 engine determined that a failure of the engine air diffuser’s No. 2 bearing support cone brazing resulted in the compressor rotor making contact with the power shaft, resulting in a high level of damage and vibration. The failure of the brazing was due to an undetermined manufacturing defect that created a localized stress concentration that, over time, resulted in the progressive failure of the braze bond. The helicopter was equipped with an Onboard Systems keeperless cargo hook kit rated for loads up to 5000 lbs. Investigators found the longline wrapped around treetops in the vicinity of the impact site. The snagged water bucket resulted in forward momentum being translated to a circular acceleration vector toward the ground, increasing the helicopter’s rate of descent. To counteract this, the pilot likely pulled aft on the cyclic and increased the collective to arrest the descent. With the engine no longer producing power, these actions would have led to a decay in main rotor rpm in the final moments of flight. The main rotor blades slowed to the point that the main rotor rpm would not have been recoverable. As the main rotor slowed, the retreating blade (left side) would have stalled, causing a roll to the left and a pitch forward in the final seconds before impact. For unknown reasons, the pilot did not jettison the external load using either the electrical or the manual release methods at the beginning of the autorotation. The pilot could have...
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