Booming Airline Interior Sector Consolidates
Booming Airline Interior Sector Consolidates Recently in Aircraft Interiors International‘s 2015 Showcase Edition, Jon Lundberg and Ben Bettell of Counterpoint Market Intelligence recently reviewed the state of the airline cabin interiors industry, a $10.5bn market sector, that they forecast will expand faster than others sectors. They note that the civil airliner industry is seeing a period of strong growth with build rates reaching record levels. Consequently the supply chain is benefiting, with many sectors achieving impressive growth. The airline interiors sector is also benefiting from cabin upgrades due to strong competition between airlines to compete on the quality of their passenger experience. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tvnVRoGcJ1w Even in the short haul sector airlines are investing. In June 2014 Keith Williams, British Airways’ executive chairman, said: The short-haul landscape has changed enormously in recent years. To stay competitive and keep offering customers choice, great fares and great service, we are giving our cabins a radical makeover. There will be a new look, but the traditional British Airways’ comfort, elegance and value will remain. The need to provide passengers with restricted mobility more equitable facilities is also important: Another reason for this is simply to reduce weight. Meanwhile, Aerossurance previously looked at top end helicopter VVIP interiors in September. Airbus Helicopters has been developing a new cabin fit for the EC225 using a more comfortable Fischer seat with open headrests, which we had the chance to view a few months ago at the Airbus facility in Aberdeen. Counterpoint forecast that the compound annual growth rate for the interior sector will be 5.5% over the next 10 years (compared to 3.7% for engine parts and 2.7% for aerostructures). There has also been a lot of consolidation in the sector too, with Counterpoint highlighting two rapidly growing companies:: B/E Aerospace has acquired 23 other interior companies since 1987 (three this year alone: Emteq, Wasp and Fischer) Zodiac Aerospace had acquired 17 companies since 1992 (including Greenpoint Technologies this summer) Counterpoint argue there is still a role to play for smaller companies, but they will have to convince their customers of their financial stability and long term prospects. UPDATE December 2014: As a further illustration of the growth in this sector: Zodiac seat delays underscore broader constraint in supply chain, affecting Boeing 787 deliveries. Airbus deliveries have also been affected: A380 delays come as galley engineering constraint is apparent. One reason for the slight delay in the delivery of the first A350XWB is said to have been to similar Buyer Furnished Equipment (BFE) issues. One way to shorten time to market is collaboration and slicker certification: Airframers, suppliers collaborate to shorten lead times for seats: Consumer technology changes every six to 12 months, but the lead times required for bringing new aircraft seats with inflight entertainment systems to market can actually take years due to a variety of factors, including the lengthy and convoluted process for clearing Head Injury Criterion (HIC) certification. The result is that, by the time an aircraft enters revenue service, its integrated IFE/seats can look and feel somewhat outdated to passengers. Now the seat makers, IFE vendors and airframers including Airbus and Boeing are working together as part of a new Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) aircraft seat committee to streamline testing and make certification easier. This in turn will help the industry keep pace with the rapidly changing consumer environment, and better support airframers’ ramp-up...
read moreGo Around Flap Overspeed and Altitude Exceedance – ATSB Report
Go Around Flap Overspeed and Altitude Exceedance – ATSB Report The Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) has issued a report on an occurrence during a go around: On 3 September 2012, an Airbus A321, registered VH-VWY and being operated by Jetstar Airways, was being flown on a scheduled passenger flight from Melbourne, Victoria to Cairns, Queensland. During a visual approach to runway 15 at Cairns, the aircraft drifted slightly high on profile and the captain instructed the first officer, who was the pilot flying, to go around. During the go-around, to 2,700 ft, exceeding the 2,000 ft limit assigned by air traffic control. The ATSB found that the first officer had a low level of expectancy of, and was not mentally prepared for, a go-around. Although the initial steps in the go-around procedure were implemented effectively, the first officer’s attention focussed on airspeed management and they did not retard the thrust levers from the take-off go-around detent to the climb detent at an appropriate point during the go-around. Consequently, the aircraft’s auto-thrust system was not activated to reduce the amount of thrust. After the initial breakdown in applying the go-around procedure, the crew experienced a high workload, which significantly limited their capacity to resolve the situation. The ATSB found that this occurrence had similar features to many previous go-around occurrences. In summary, all-engine go-arounds in modern air transport aircraft are often a challenging task when there is a requirement to level-off at a low altitude, and many pilots have had limited preparation for such tasks. Following this and a number of related occurrences, Jetstar Airways included ‘unscripted’ go‑arounds in its recurrent training sessions. One of these sessions also emphasised the importance of moving the thrust levers to the climb detent without delay. In August 2013, as a result of a detailed review of similar go-around occurrences, the French Bureau d’Enquêtes et d’Analyses pour la sécurité de l’aviation civile (BEA) issued a series of recommendations about go-around issues to the European Aviation Safety Agency. ATSB Analysis The ATSB identified these contributory factors: The first officer had a low level of expectancy that a go-around would be required and they were not mentally prepared to conduct the go-around manoeuvre. After conducting the initial steps of the go-around procedure, the first officer’s attention focussed on airspeed management and they did not retard the thrust levers to the climb detent in order to reduce thrust. After the initial breakdown in applying the go-around procedure, the crew was experiencing a high workload, which significantly limited their capacity to resolve the situation. When moving the flap selector to position 1, the captain paused at position 2 for a significant time period while they completed other tasks. Other factors that increased risk were: All-engine go-arounds in modern air transport aircraft are often a challenging task when there is a requirement to level-off at a low altitude, and many pilots have had limited preparation for this task. (Safety issue) Due to a limited amount of sleep in the previous 24 hours, the captain was probably experiencing a level of fatigue that has been demonstrated to have an influence on performance. ATSB Safety Message A go-around with all aircraft systems available to the crew is a normal but infrequently flown, dynamic manoeuvre, requiring a very methodical series of actions on...
read moreUK MAA NPA for RPAS
UK Military Aviation Authority Notice of Proposed Amendment on Remotely Piloted Air Systems The UK MAA has issued an NPA as part of the consultation on a change to the MAA Regulatory Publications (MRPs) to cover the better integration of RPAS. The MAA introduce the NPA as follows: The aim of the review of RPAS regulations is to ‘normalise’ the regulation of RPAS in the MAA Regulatory Publications (MRP) in order to create a more proportionate regulatory regime. The scope of the review is to address the accuracy, relevancy and coherency of extant regulation. Particular attention has been paid to the utility of implementing a classification framework for the regulation of RPAS and of determining the regulations which would be appropriate/applicable to each classification based on a determination of the likely Risk to Life (RtL) posed. Where duplication, omission, incoherence, ambiguity or unnecessary regulatory requirements were identified in the MRP, the relevant RAs [Regulatory Articles] have been amended, consolidated or new regulation introduced. The classification framework, which is considers both weight and both aggravating and mitigating factors is of particular note: The NPA can be found here: npa_14_14_combined. It is open for comment until 26 November 2014. UPDATE: The final results went live on 19 January 2015: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/new-regulations-for-remotely-piloted-air-systems-rpas-go-live Aerossurance has experience in UAS/RPAS going back to the mid 1990s. If you want to discuss their safety, technical, operational and regulatory issues, contact Aerossurance at: enquiries@aerossurance.com Follow us on LinkedIn for our latest updates. ...
read moreCrises – Failure of Conventional Responses
Crises – Failure of Conventional Responses After a major accident, as well as the emergency response to deal with the immediate casualties (a subject Aerossurance examined in May 2014), there is usually a need to deal with the resulting crisis. This is typically either a crisis of confidence in, or an adverse affect on, the organisation or organisations involved. Dr Ian Mitroff, Professor Emeritus at the USC Marshall School of Business at the University of Southern California, has identified 16 patterns that are common in crises. A poor performance or response in relation to any of these elements can deepen the crisis. 1) Uncertainty At the beginning of a crisis there is often a lot of uncertainty both on what has happened and what needs to be done. This is frequently evident after air accidents and similar events where evidence is either unavailable, quarantined or in the hands of accident investigators. Poor organisations hide from public view at this stage, awaiting clarity and certainty but actually creating a vacuum that is filled by the speculation of others. A recent poor example was the loss of MH370 which was widely regarded as a classic of poor response (PR week and MediaFirst). It contrast after the recent loss of the Virgin Galactic SpaceShipTwo, Sir Richard Branson was on site, engaging publically the next day and setting a dignified and concerned tone. His performance after the 2007 Greyrigg train derailment (an accident that was caused by rail deficiencies not by his companies train) is often regarded as a classic. Branson cut short a holiday to attend the site in Cumbria immediately and makes clear that Virgin care about ‘people’ and ‘safety’ above ‘profit’. He was able to show human empathy and avoided getting into a ‘blame game’ (see below). Notice his control during the interview. Another example held up as an impressive handling of a crisis was British Midland’s Sir Michael Bishop after the 1989 Kegworth accident. MediaFirst have published an insightful analysis of his actions here. It is noticeable that Bishop was on duty for the night of the 1967 Stockport Argonaut disaster, an accident that had a major influence on airliner survivability and on the exchange of safety data, and his experiences influenced his widely praised actions after Kegworth. 2) Trial By Image The footage of flames, smokes, wreckage or victims is repeatedly used by the media. Images of the disintegration of Space Shuttles Challenger and Columbia ironically represented those disasters as did the wreckage of MV Herald of Free Enterprise. In the later case, within 8 months of the 1987 accident, the operator Townsend Thoersen, whose origins went back to 1929, was rebranded by recent new owners P&O and her sister ships renamed. However, if an organisation issues images, they should be aware that they will be critically viewed, as this image below, purporting to show the scale of an emergency response was examined: 3) Objectivity is a Turnoff While it is logical to use data to refute speculation and to put a crisis in context, often when organisations attempt to counter speculation they are seen as uncaring or overly calculating when they use statistics (such as 5 year rolling accident rates – no matter how good). This is particularly when contrasted with highly personal accounts of tragedy. 4) The Court of Public Opinion Mitroff suggests that whereas in court you are innocent until...
read moreRoselawn Accident: ATR72 N401AM 31 October 1994
Roselawn Accident: ATR72 N401AM 31 October 1994 On 31 October 1994, 68 people died when an American Eagle ATR72, operated by Simmons Airlines, flying from Indianapolis to Chicago O’Hare, crashed near Roselawn, Indiana due to a loss of control after icing while holding. The aircraft was in a holding pattern and descending to a newly assigned altitude of 8,000 feet when the initial roll excursion occurred. https://youtu.be/0UdE8_PP_ik The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigation was published in two volumes: Volume I of this report explains the crash of American Eagle flight 4184, an ATR 72 airplane during a rapid descent after an uncommanded roll excursion. The safety issues discussed in the report focused on communicating hazardous weather information to flightcrews, Federal regulations on aircraft icing and icing certification requirements, the monitoring of aircraft airworthiness, and flightcrew training for unusual events/attitudes. Safety recommendations concerning these issues were addressed to the Federal Aviation Administration, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, and AMR Eagle. Volume II contains the comments of the Bureau Enquetes-Accidents on the Safety Board’s draft of the accident report. For those keen to analyse past accidents this accident is interesting because of prior incidents after icing with the ATR-42 and ATR-72. See the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Lessons Learnt discussion on this accident: There was disagreement between the NTSB and the FAA regarding whether Roselawn should have been foreseeable based on these previous incidents of roll instability in severe icing conditions. The five incidents involving the ATR-42 were: Mosinee, Wisconsin, December 22, 1988 Indian Ocean, April 17, 1991 Brecon, South Wales, United Kingdom, August 11, 1991 Newark, New Jersey, March 4, 1993 Burlington, Massachusetts, January 28, 1994 The FAA contended that the Roselawn accident was not foreseeable because: a) The roll anomalies in all of the pre-Roselawn ATR-42 incidents were induced by a stall, not by an aileron hinge moment anomaly as occurred during the Roselawn ATR-42 accident b) Unlike the Roselawn accident there was no evidence of higher than normal control wheel forces in the pre-Roselawn incidents One other source is Stephen Fredrick’s 1996 account, Unheeded Warning (Amazon.com / Amazon.co.uk). Fredrick was at the time an American Eagle ATR-72 pilot. In part it is the story of a whistle-blower and a couple of chapters suffer from the author’s closeness to the accident, but well worth a read. The accident anniversary is being marked today. UPDATE Just a few days later the FAA issued a final rule that addresses freezing rain and Roselawn recommendations! Other Safety Resources We have published other articles on icing including: De-Iced Drama: a Norwegian Air Shuttle Boeing 737-800 came close to stalling as a result of a blocked elevator. Canadian Mining Air Accident (Cessna 208B Caravan): where a cold soaked aircraft took off over gross weight due to accumulated ice from a previous flight. Cessna Citation Excel Controls Freeze due to leaking water. Breaking the Chain: X-31 Lessons Learned: where an experimental NASA aircraft was lost after pitot tube icing. ATP Serious Incident – Temporary LOC In Icing Conditions in Norway. ATR72 Control Problems in Severe Icing, Norway, 14 November 2016 The NTSB gave a presentation on icing in 2011. Icing conditions (ground and in flight) was the topic for a European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) conference in 2013. For expert advice you can trust on aviation certification and safety matters, contact Aerossurance at enquiries@aerossurance.com Follow us on LinkedIn and on Twitter @Aerossurance for our latest updates....
read moreBoeing 737 Automation Related Descent Below Cleared Altitude – ATSB Report
Boeing 737 Automation Related Descent Below Cleared Altitude – ATSB Report The Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) has issued a report on an automation related occurrence: On 17 October 2012, a Boeing 737-838 aircraft, registered VH-VXB and operated by Qantas Airways Limited (Qantas), was conducting a flight from Adelaide, South Australia to Canberra, Australian Capital Territory… As the aircraft approached 8,000 ft, ATC provided a descent clearance to 7,000 ft and also cleared the aircraft for the approach. As the aircraft approached [approach fix] HONEY it descended below the 7,000 ft altitude clearance limit. After being alerted to this by ATC, the flight crew climbed the aircraft back to 7,000 ft and continued the approach to land. The ATSB found that, as the aircraft approached 8,000 ft, the auto-flight system vertical mode changed from a flight management computer-derived and managed vertical navigation mode into the vertical speed mode. This was followed by a number of automated, but unnoticed, and crew-initiated changes in the aircraft’s auto-flight system vertical mode. The combination of auto-flight system mode changes and the management of the airspeed during the descent resulted in a high workload environment where the 7,000 ft altitude clearance limit was overlooked by the flight crew. The ATSB also found that, on receipt of the approach clearance, the Qantas RNAV (RNP) approach procedures allowed the flight crew to remove the current limiting altitude from the auto-flight system’s Mode Control Panel (MCP) and set the decision altitude. Application of this procedure by the flight crew removed the last automated safety system available to them to prevent descent through the current altitude limitation, well before the aircraft was established on the approach. ATSB identified these contributing factors: The crew’s focus on managing the increase in the aircraft’s speed due to the high-speed descent and a reducing tailwind, combined with unintended mode changes in the aircraft’s automatic flight system, resulted in a high workload environment. Due to the workload associated with managing the high airspeed, the flight crew did not identify that the flight management computer-derived VNAV PTH mode had disengaged, which permitted the aircraft to descend below the calculated profile. The company’s Required Navigation Performance approach procedure allowed the flight crew to set the approach minimum altitude in the auto-flight system prior to commencing the approach. This did not ensure the altitude alerting system reflected the assigned altitude limit of 7,000 ft and removed the defence of that alert when the flight crew did not identify the disengagement of the flight management computer-derived VNAV PTH mode. [Safety issue] The high workload and removal of the assigned 7,000 ft limit from the altitude alerting system led to the flight crew’s loss of awareness of the descent clearance limitation. This loss of awareness, when combined with the high rate of descent, resulted in the aircraft descending below the descent clearance limit. Following this occurrence ATSB report that: Qantas changed their RNAV (RNP) approach procedures to only allow the altitude on the MCP to be changed from the current limiting altitude once the aircraft was within 2 NM (4 km) of commencing the approach. The ATSB has highlighted these safety lessons: The importance of paying continuous attention to active and armed auto-flight modes The need to continually monitor descent profiles and airspace limitations, irrespective of the expectation...
read moreEASA HUMS Research Developments
EASA HUMS / VHM Research Developments The European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) has been funding some innovative research into Health and Usage Monitoring Systems (HUMS) / Vibration Health Monitoring (VHM). EASA.2012.OP.13 VHM Recently, Cranfield University‘s Matt Greaves presented to the International Society of Air Safety Investigators (ISASI) annual conference on one EASA research project (EASA.2012.OP.13 VHM). His paper was entitled: Towards the next generation of HUMS sensor. At the beginning of the research 12 accident investigation reports were selected from 413 candidate reports for study. These covered a range of Sikorsky and Airbus Helicopters (nee Eurocopter) products of the 1960s onwards: SA330J 9M-SSC in 1980 (Main Gear Box [MGB] epicyclic failure) S-61N G-ASNL in 1983 (MGB failure) AS332L1 LN-OPG in 1997 (High Speed Shaft Failure) S-76A+ G-BJVX in 2001 (Main Rotor Blade [MRB] failure) S-61N G-BBHM in 2002 (Engine Oil Fire/Structural Failure) S-61N C-FHHD in 2002 (MGB failure after oil loss and fire) AS332L2 G-JSAR in 2003 (Accessory Gear Box [AGB] failure) AS332L G-PUMI in 2006 (Main Rotor Spindle crack) AS332L2 G-CHCF in 2007 (Freewheel Unit [FWU] failure) S-92A C-GZCH in 2009 (MGB failure after oil loss) AS332L2 G-REDL in 2009 (MGB epicyclic failure) EC225s G-REDW/G-CHCN in 2012 (MGB shaft failure) The investigations into the 2010 accidents to AS332L2 B-HRN in 2010 (a FWU failure) and AgustaWestland AW139 B-MHJ (a Tail Rotor Blade [TRB] failure) were on-going at the time and so were not included in the analysis. Fault tree analysis (FTA) was performed on each of the 12 selected case studies. The key failure modes identified : Small corrosion pits as triggers of cracks Small machining defects as triggers of cracks Sub-surface cracks Possible spalling of gears/ bearings Material defects/ manufacturing anomalies Galling of studs/ bolts Wear due to load variations/ movements Fracture/ rupture under overload Deformation under overload of bearing rollers/ raceways/ gear teeth/ shafts/ splines Internal residual hoop/ tension/ torsion/ compression/ buckling stresses Permanent distortion (creep) of casings Seizure of roller bearing Improper coating of hardmetal (carbide grains size, porosity, coating thickness, etc) Lamination of the hard metal coating Defective bonding between hard metal and coating The Cranfield University analysis showed that while these occurrences showed some similarities there were no consistent patterns. Hence it was decided to concentrate on the most serious, the epicyclic failure on G-REDL. The project the looked to test alternative sensor technologies. However the MGB epicyclic stage is a challenging location for mounting sensors because of: Rotation Oil Faraday cage Large rotating metallic components Temperature Vibration levels Difficulties transferring power Limited Space Risk of damage to gears A number of design constraints were imposed: No mechanical signal connection (e.g. slip rings) – wireless only Limited space (of the order of 1 cm at most) Useful operating temperature range -10˚C to +130˚C Sensor weight below 10g Tolerant of gearbox mineral oil Powered inside MGB without a battery Guaranteed attachment, or no risk from sensor if detached Having considered various options he trial focused on acoustic emission (AE) sensor technology. AE is misnamed technology because, as Greaves points out, it is ‘Neither acoustic nor emitted’. AE was previously trialled but abandoned in UK Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) research in the 1990s. However, Greaves explains that: AE measurement is the capture of high frequency (hundreds of kilohertz) surface stress waves that are produced in structures by applied forces. The potential of this technology has increased dramatically...
read moreUS Vehicle Regulator in Firing Line
US Vehicle Regulator in Firing Line The US National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) has been criticized by politicians and safety advocates this week for its handling of critical safety defects with the air bags on millions of vehicles. It is reported that: The faulty air bags can explode with too much force and spray shrapnel at occupants, a problem that has been linked to four deaths and numerous injuries. On Monday 20 October 2014, the agency issued recalls for 4.8 million vehicles with defective air bags initiators made by Japanese supplier Takata, who, since June have been investigating the effect of humidity on their product. By the end of the week this recall was expanded to 7.8 million vehicles made by BMW, Chrysler, Ford, General Motors, Honda, Mazda, Mitsubishi, Nissan, Subaru and Toyota. However, there have been a long history of regional and nation recalls for similar problems. The longevity of this saga begs questions on the effectiveness of NHTSA, the sharing of safety data between manufacturers, their safety management systems and the culture of both industry and regulator. A dedicated vehicle recall site maintained by the NHTSA, Safercar.gov, has not been functioning at times during the week because of overwhelming demand. However, those drivers who did get to access the site would have been confused. After one announcement, the NHSTA webpage was accompanied by an incomplete list of vehicles but they mistakenly included 14 models equipped with other airbags. This year in the US, more than 50 million vehicles, one fifth of all vehicles on US roads, have been recalled for a variety of problems. Aerossurance has previously reported on safety lessons from the high profile recalls due to ignition switch failures on GM vehicles. The US House Energy and Commerce Committee will be looking further into the air bag initiators and the role of the NHSTA, an agency that has been without a head since January, in the coming week. UPDATE 19 November 2014: It is reported a former NTSB Board member, Mark Rosekind, is to be nominated to head the agency. UPDATE 21 February 2015: NHTSA fines Takata for not cooperating in probe of exploding air bags UPDATE 9 April 2015: US Safety Agency May Reopen Jeep Fire Investigation UPDATE 9 April 2015: NHTSA chief plans auto CEO summit At that 28 April 2015 event Rosekind also will unveil a two-year strategy with short-, medium- and long-term goals to improve the safety agency’s performance. UPDATE 10 April 2015: NHTSA plans summit to promote culture of auto safety UPDATE 21 October 2015: NHTSA is to hold a public meeting 22 October 2015 to help decide whether to take control of the record-setting recall covering 23.4 million Takata air bags in nearly 20 million vehicles built by 11 major automakers. UPDATE 29 August 2016: The New York Times discuss A Cheaper Airbag, and Takata’s Road to a Deadly Crisis, suggesting that Takata won business in the 1990s by under cutting the the competition with an allegedly inferior propellant. In an unrelated development, a Takata delivery vehicle suffered a fatal explosion in Texas. For advice you can trust on on design assurance, safety investigation, SMS, safety culture & regulation, contact us at enquiries@aerossurance.com Follow us on LinkedIn and on Twitter @Aerossurance for our latest updates....
read moreHeliOffshore Launch
HeliOffshore Launch HeliOffshore, whose foundation we discussed in June, was launched today in London. HeliOffshore have issued the following press release: Oct. 21, 2014 – London – Five major helicopter operators today officially announced a new industry association – HeliOffshore – for The new association was introduced at a launch event at its offices in London. Founded by five major helicopter operators, HeliOffshore will use cross-industry cooperation as a platform for enhancing the industry’s overall strong safety record sharing best practices, developing and applying advanced technology, and encouraging common global flight standards. Gretchen Haskins, who was selected as HeliOffshore’s chief executive last month, said the association is open to any group with a stake in offshore helicopter flight. She said that membership is expected to include customers of helicopter services, aircraft manufacturers, service providers, technology companies, staff and passenger organisations, and government and research institutions. Mrs. Haskins said: “HeliOffshore will work to achieve the highest levels of safety, in the air and on the ground. We want to deliver real safety benefits for the people who depend on the industry to get to and from their offshore workplaces, the crews who fly the helicopters and the teams who maintain them.” UK AviatiAvincison Minister Robert Goodwill joined representatives of HeliOffshore founding members – Avincis, Bristow Group, CHC Helicopter, Era and PHI Inc. – and several dozen others at today’s announcement. Afterward, the association conducted its inaugural safety workshop. HeliOffshore grew out of a joint initiative by helicopter operators that started more than a year ago, to further enhance offshore flight safety in the North Sea, as well as from work by the European Helicopter Operators Committee. While its origins are regional, HeliOffshore’s objectives are global. “The industry will continue to compete vigorously on commercial issues, but safety is not a competitive factor,” said Mrs. Haskins. “The best way to continually improve safety standards is through cooperation.” HeliOffshore initially will focus on six priority areas, all of which were discussed in today’s workshop: Automation Pilot monitoring Stabilised approaches Accident survivability Application of health and usage monitoring systems (HUMS) Information exchange Mrs. Haskins is an internationally recognized expert in human factors of safety, and has an extensive record of leadership in raising aviation safety performance by increasing partnership within the global aviation safety community. The former group director of the U.K. Civil Aviation Authority’s Safety Regulation Group and group director of safety at NATS, the main air-navigation service provider in the United Kingdom, Mrs. Haskins is a longtime champion of initiatives that improve frontline operational safety. She has also advised NATO (the North American Treaty Organisation) on human performance and critical safety systems. William E. Chiles, who recently retired as president and CEO of Bristow after distinguished service to the industry, is the first chairman of HeliOffshore’s board of directors, which includes James Drummond, Avincis; Bill Amelio, CHC; Chris Bradshaw, ERA, and Al Gonsoulin, PHI. UPDATE 22 October 2014: EnergyVoice coverage. UPDATE January 2015: HeliOffshore have issued two brief videos where Chairman, Bill Chiles, and CEO, Gretchen Haskins, talk about HeliOffshore and the opportunities ahead: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2MYBbAYVTJw&feature=player_embedded https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EzJWZ39CvA8&feature=player_embedded Aerossurance is an Aberdeen based aviation consultancy, with extensive experience of offshore helicopter operations. Follow us on LinkedIn and on Twitter @Aerossurance for our latest...
read moreOGP Land Transport Safety Recommended Practice
OGP Issue Revised Land Transport Safety Recommended Practice OGP, the International Association of Oil and Gas Producers, has issued a revised recommended practice on land transportation safety. There are improvements throughout, including additional guidance on distracted driving and journey management. New guidance notes are also issued that cover: Vehicle specification and upfitting Bus and coach safety Emergency Response Vehicles Mobile Construction Equipment Download the Recommended Practice here. UPDATE November 2014: OGP is now IOGP. Aerossurance is an Aberdeen based aviation consultancy. For proven expertise on aviation safety & contracting for the oil and gas industry and first hand expertise with the IOGP Aviation Management Guidelines (Publication 390), contact: enquiries@aerossurance.com Follow us on LinkedIn for our latest...
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