Roselawn Accident: ATR72 N401AM 31 October 1994
Roselawn Accident: ATR72 N401AM 31 October 1994 On 31 October 1994, 68 people died when an American Eagle ATR72, operated by Simmons Airlines, flying from Indianapolis to Chicago O’Hare, crashed near Roselawn, Indiana due to a loss of control after icing while holding. The aircraft was in a holding pattern and descending to a newly assigned altitude of 8,000 feet when the initial roll excursion occurred. https://youtu.be/0UdE8_PP_ik The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigation was published in two volumes: Volume I of this report explains the crash of American Eagle flight 4184, an ATR 72 airplane during a rapid descent after an uncommanded roll excursion. The safety issues discussed in the report focused on communicating hazardous weather information to flightcrews, Federal regulations on aircraft icing and icing certification requirements, the monitoring of aircraft airworthiness, and flightcrew training for unusual events/attitudes. Safety recommendations concerning these issues were addressed to the Federal Aviation Administration, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, and AMR Eagle. Volume II contains the comments of the Bureau Enquetes-Accidents on the Safety Board’s draft of the accident report. For those keen to analyse past accidents this accident is interesting because of prior incidents after icing with the ATR-42 and ATR-72. See the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Lessons Learnt discussion on this accident: There was disagreement between the NTSB and the FAA regarding whether Roselawn should have been foreseeable based on these previous incidents of roll instability in severe icing conditions. The five incidents involving the ATR-42 were: Mosinee, Wisconsin, December 22, 1988 Indian Ocean, April 17, 1991 Brecon, South Wales, United Kingdom, August 11, 1991 Newark, New Jersey, March 4, 1993 Burlington, Massachusetts, January 28, 1994 The FAA contended that the Roselawn accident was not foreseeable because: a) The roll anomalies in all of the pre-Roselawn ATR-42 incidents were induced by a stall, not by an aileron hinge moment anomaly as occurred during the Roselawn ATR-42 accident b) Unlike the Roselawn accident there was no evidence of higher than normal control wheel forces in the pre-Roselawn incidents One other source is Stephen Fredrick’s 1996 account, Unheeded Warning (Amazon.com / Amazon.co.uk). Fredrick was at the time an American Eagle ATR-72 pilot. In part it is the story of a whistle-blower and a couple of chapters suffer from the author’s closeness to the accident, but well worth a read. The accident anniversary is being marked today. UPDATE Just a few days later the FAA issued a final rule that addresses freezing rain and Roselawn recommendations! Other Safety Resources We have published other articles on icing including: De-Iced Drama: a Norwegian Air Shuttle Boeing 737-800 came close to stalling as a result of a blocked elevator. Canadian Mining Air Accident (Cessna 208B Caravan): where a cold soaked aircraft took off over gross weight due to accumulated ice from a previous flight. Cessna Citation Excel Controls Freeze due to leaking water. Breaking the Chain: X-31 Lessons Learned: where an experimental NASA aircraft was lost after pitot tube icing. ATP Serious Incident – Temporary LOC In Icing Conditions in Norway. ATR72 Control Problems in Severe Icing, Norway, 14 November 2016 The NTSB gave a presentation on icing in 2011. Icing conditions (ground and in flight) was the topic for a European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) conference in 2013. For expert advice you can trust on aviation certification and safety matters, contact Aerossurance at enquiries@aerossurance.com Follow us on LinkedIn and on Twitter @Aerossurance for our latest updates....
read moreBoeing 737 Automation Related Descent Below Cleared Altitude – ATSB Report
Boeing 737 Automation Related Descent Below Cleared Altitude – ATSB Report The Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) has issued a report on an automation related occurrence: On 17 October 2012, a Boeing 737-838 aircraft, registered VH-VXB and operated by Qantas Airways Limited (Qantas), was conducting a flight from Adelaide, South Australia to Canberra, Australian Capital Territory… As the aircraft approached 8,000 ft, ATC provided a descent clearance to 7,000 ft and also cleared the aircraft for the approach. As the aircraft approached [approach fix] HONEY it descended below the 7,000 ft altitude clearance limit. After being alerted to this by ATC, the flight crew climbed the aircraft back to 7,000 ft and continued the approach to land. The ATSB found that, as the aircraft approached 8,000 ft, the auto-flight system vertical mode changed from a flight management computer-derived and managed vertical navigation mode into the vertical speed mode. This was followed by a number of automated, but unnoticed, and crew-initiated changes in the aircraft’s auto-flight system vertical mode. The combination of auto-flight system mode changes and the management of the airspeed during the descent resulted in a high workload environment where the 7,000 ft altitude clearance limit was overlooked by the flight crew. The ATSB also found that, on receipt of the approach clearance, the Qantas RNAV (RNP) approach procedures allowed the flight crew to remove the current limiting altitude from the auto-flight system’s Mode Control Panel (MCP) and set the decision altitude. Application of this procedure by the flight crew removed the last automated safety system available to them to prevent descent through the current altitude limitation, well before the aircraft was established on the approach. ATSB identified these contributing factors: The crew’s focus on managing the increase in the aircraft’s speed due to the high-speed descent and a reducing tailwind, combined with unintended mode changes in the aircraft’s automatic flight system, resulted in a high workload environment. Due to the workload associated with managing the high airspeed, the flight crew did not identify that the flight management computer-derived VNAV PTH mode had disengaged, which permitted the aircraft to descend below the calculated profile. The company’s Required Navigation Performance approach procedure allowed the flight crew to set the approach minimum altitude in the auto-flight system prior to commencing the approach. This did not ensure the altitude alerting system reflected the assigned altitude limit of 7,000 ft and removed the defence of that alert when the flight crew did not identify the disengagement of the flight management computer-derived VNAV PTH mode. [Safety issue] The high workload and removal of the assigned 7,000 ft limit from the altitude alerting system led to the flight crew’s loss of awareness of the descent clearance limitation. This loss of awareness, when combined with the high rate of descent, resulted in the aircraft descending below the descent clearance limit. Following this occurrence ATSB report that: Qantas changed their RNAV (RNP) approach procedures to only allow the altitude on the MCP to be changed from the current limiting altitude once the aircraft was within 2 NM (4 km) of commencing the approach. The ATSB has highlighted these safety lessons: The importance of paying continuous attention to active and armed auto-flight modes The need to continually monitor descent profiles and airspace limitations, irrespective of the expectation...
read moreEASA HUMS Research Developments
EASA HUMS / VHM Research Developments The European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) has been funding some innovative research into Health and Usage Monitoring Systems (HUMS) / Vibration Health Monitoring (VHM). EASA.2012.OP.13 VHM Recently, Cranfield University‘s Matt Greaves presented to the International Society of Air Safety Investigators (ISASI) annual conference on one EASA research project (EASA.2012.OP.13 VHM). His paper was entitled: Towards the next generation of HUMS sensor. At the beginning of the research 12 accident investigation reports were selected from 413 candidate reports for study. These covered a range of Sikorsky and Airbus Helicopters (nee Eurocopter) products of the 1960s onwards: SA330J 9M-SSC in 1980 (Main Gear Box [MGB] epicyclic failure) S-61N G-ASNL in 1983 (MGB failure) AS332L1 LN-OPG in 1997 (High Speed Shaft Failure) S-76A+ G-BJVX in 2001 (Main Rotor Blade [MRB] failure) S-61N G-BBHM in 2002 (Engine Oil Fire/Structural Failure) S-61N C-FHHD in 2002 (MGB failure after oil loss and fire) AS332L2 G-JSAR in 2003 (Accessory Gear Box [AGB] failure) AS332L G-PUMI in 2006 (Main Rotor Spindle crack) AS332L2 G-CHCF in 2007 (Freewheel Unit [FWU] failure) S-92A C-GZCH in 2009 (MGB failure after oil loss) AS332L2 G-REDL in 2009 (MGB epicyclic failure) EC225s G-REDW/G-CHCN in 2012 (MGB shaft failure) The investigations into the 2010 accidents to AS332L2 B-HRN in 2010 (a FWU failure) and AgustaWestland AW139 B-MHJ (a Tail Rotor Blade [TRB] failure) were on-going at the time and so were not included in the analysis. Fault tree analysis (FTA) was performed on each of the 12 selected case studies. The key failure modes identified : Small corrosion pits as triggers of cracks Small machining defects as triggers of cracks Sub-surface cracks Possible spalling of gears/ bearings Material defects/ manufacturing anomalies Galling of studs/ bolts Wear due to load variations/ movements Fracture/ rupture under overload Deformation under overload of bearing rollers/ raceways/ gear teeth/ shafts/ splines Internal residual hoop/ tension/ torsion/ compression/ buckling stresses Permanent distortion (creep) of casings Seizure of roller bearing Improper coating of hardmetal (carbide grains size, porosity, coating thickness, etc) Lamination of the hard metal coating Defective bonding between hard metal and coating The Cranfield University analysis showed that while these occurrences showed some similarities there were no consistent patterns. Hence it was decided to concentrate on the most serious, the epicyclic failure on G-REDL. The project the looked to test alternative sensor technologies. However the MGB epicyclic stage is a challenging location for mounting sensors because of: Rotation Oil Faraday cage Large rotating metallic components Temperature Vibration levels Difficulties transferring power Limited Space Risk of damage to gears A number of design constraints were imposed: No mechanical signal connection (e.g. slip rings) – wireless only Limited space (of the order of 1 cm at most) Useful operating temperature range -10˚C to +130˚C Sensor weight below 10g Tolerant of gearbox mineral oil Powered inside MGB without a battery Guaranteed attachment, or no risk from sensor if detached Having considered various options he trial focused on acoustic emission (AE) sensor technology. AE is misnamed technology because, as Greaves points out, it is ‘Neither acoustic nor emitted’. AE was previously trialled but abandoned in UK Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) research in the 1990s. However, Greaves explains that: AE measurement is the capture of high frequency (hundreds of kilohertz) surface stress waves that are produced in structures by applied forces. The potential of this technology has increased dramatically...
read moreUS Vehicle Regulator in Firing Line
US Vehicle Regulator in Firing Line The US National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) has been criticized by politicians and safety advocates this week for its handling of critical safety defects with the air bags on millions of vehicles. It is reported that: The faulty air bags can explode with too much force and spray shrapnel at occupants, a problem that has been linked to four deaths and numerous injuries. On Monday 20 October 2014, the agency issued recalls for 4.8 million vehicles with defective air bags initiators made by Japanese supplier Takata, who, since June have been investigating the effect of humidity on their product. By the end of the week this recall was expanded to 7.8 million vehicles made by BMW, Chrysler, Ford, General Motors, Honda, Mazda, Mitsubishi, Nissan, Subaru and Toyota. However, there have been a long history of regional and nation recalls for similar problems. The longevity of this saga begs questions on the effectiveness of NHTSA, the sharing of safety data between manufacturers, their safety management systems and the culture of both industry and regulator. A dedicated vehicle recall site maintained by the NHTSA, Safercar.gov, has not been functioning at times during the week because of overwhelming demand. However, those drivers who did get to access the site would have been confused. After one announcement, the NHSTA webpage was accompanied by an incomplete list of vehicles but they mistakenly included 14 models equipped with other airbags. This year in the US, more than 50 million vehicles, one fifth of all vehicles on US roads, have been recalled for a variety of problems. Aerossurance has previously reported on safety lessons from the high profile recalls due to ignition switch failures on GM vehicles. The US House Energy and Commerce Committee will be looking further into the air bag initiators and the role of the NHSTA, an agency that has been without a head since January, in the coming week. UPDATE 19 November 2014: It is reported a former NTSB Board member, Mark Rosekind, is to be nominated to head the agency. UPDATE 21 February 2015: NHTSA fines Takata for not cooperating in probe of exploding air bags UPDATE 9 April 2015: US Safety Agency May Reopen Jeep Fire Investigation UPDATE 9 April 2015: NHTSA chief plans auto CEO summit At that 28 April 2015 event Rosekind also will unveil a two-year strategy with short-, medium- and long-term goals to improve the safety agency’s performance. UPDATE 10 April 2015: NHTSA plans summit to promote culture of auto safety UPDATE 21 October 2015: NHTSA is to hold a public meeting 22 October 2015 to help decide whether to take control of the record-setting recall covering 23.4 million Takata air bags in nearly 20 million vehicles built by 11 major automakers. UPDATE 29 August 2016: The New York Times discuss A Cheaper Airbag, and Takata’s Road to a Deadly Crisis, suggesting that Takata won business in the 1990s by under cutting the the competition with an allegedly inferior propellant. In an unrelated development, a Takata delivery vehicle suffered a fatal explosion in Texas. For advice you can trust on on design assurance, safety investigation, SMS, safety culture & regulation, contact us at enquiries@aerossurance.com Follow us on LinkedIn and on Twitter @Aerossurance for our latest updates....
read moreHeliOffshore Launch
HeliOffshore Launch HeliOffshore, whose foundation we discussed in June, was launched today in London. HeliOffshore have issued the following press release: Oct. 21, 2014 – London – Five major helicopter operators today officially announced a new industry association – HeliOffshore – for The new association was introduced at a launch event at its offices in London. Founded by five major helicopter operators, HeliOffshore will use cross-industry cooperation as a platform for enhancing the industry’s overall strong safety record sharing best practices, developing and applying advanced technology, and encouraging common global flight standards. Gretchen Haskins, who was selected as HeliOffshore’s chief executive last month, said the association is open to any group with a stake in offshore helicopter flight. She said that membership is expected to include customers of helicopter services, aircraft manufacturers, service providers, technology companies, staff and passenger organisations, and government and research institutions. Mrs. Haskins said: “HeliOffshore will work to achieve the highest levels of safety, in the air and on the ground. We want to deliver real safety benefits for the people who depend on the industry to get to and from their offshore workplaces, the crews who fly the helicopters and the teams who maintain them.” UK AviatiAvincison Minister Robert Goodwill joined representatives of HeliOffshore founding members – Avincis, Bristow Group, CHC Helicopter, Era and PHI Inc. – and several dozen others at today’s announcement. Afterward, the association conducted its inaugural safety workshop. HeliOffshore grew out of a joint initiative by helicopter operators that started more than a year ago, to further enhance offshore flight safety in the North Sea, as well as from work by the European Helicopter Operators Committee. While its origins are regional, HeliOffshore’s objectives are global. “The industry will continue to compete vigorously on commercial issues, but safety is not a competitive factor,” said Mrs. Haskins. “The best way to continually improve safety standards is through cooperation.” HeliOffshore initially will focus on six priority areas, all of which were discussed in today’s workshop: Automation Pilot monitoring Stabilised approaches Accident survivability Application of health and usage monitoring systems (HUMS) Information exchange Mrs. Haskins is an internationally recognized expert in human factors of safety, and has an extensive record of leadership in raising aviation safety performance by increasing partnership within the global aviation safety community. The former group director of the U.K. Civil Aviation Authority’s Safety Regulation Group and group director of safety at NATS, the main air-navigation service provider in the United Kingdom, Mrs. Haskins is a longtime champion of initiatives that improve frontline operational safety. She has also advised NATO (the North American Treaty Organisation) on human performance and critical safety systems. William E. Chiles, who recently retired as president and CEO of Bristow after distinguished service to the industry, is the first chairman of HeliOffshore’s board of directors, which includes James Drummond, Avincis; Bill Amelio, CHC; Chris Bradshaw, ERA, and Al Gonsoulin, PHI. UPDATE 22 October 2014: EnergyVoice coverage. UPDATE January 2015: HeliOffshore have issued two brief videos where Chairman, Bill Chiles, and CEO, Gretchen Haskins, talk about HeliOffshore and the opportunities ahead: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2MYBbAYVTJw&feature=player_embedded https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EzJWZ39CvA8&feature=player_embedded Aerossurance is an Aberdeen based aviation consultancy, with extensive experience of offshore helicopter operations. Follow us on LinkedIn and on Twitter @Aerossurance for our latest...
read moreOGP Land Transport Safety Recommended Practice
OGP Issue Revised Land Transport Safety Recommended Practice OGP, the International Association of Oil and Gas Producers, has issued a revised recommended practice on land transportation safety. There are improvements throughout, including additional guidance on distracted driving and journey management. New guidance notes are also issued that cover: Vehicle specification and upfitting Bus and coach safety Emergency Response Vehicles Mobile Construction Equipment Download the Recommended Practice here. UPDATE November 2014: OGP is now IOGP. Aerossurance is an Aberdeen based aviation consultancy. For proven expertise on aviation safety & contracting for the oil and gas industry and first hand expertise with the IOGP Aviation Management Guidelines (Publication 390), contact: enquiries@aerossurance.com Follow us on LinkedIn for our latest...
read moreInsights from Bristow CEO at Helitech
Insights from Bristow CEO Jonathan Baliff at Helitech On 14t October 2014 at Helitech in Amsterdam, Jonathan Baliff, discussed an objective of reducing the range of types in the company fleet and an approach of increasing risk sharing with more availability focused contracts with the helicopter manufacturers: We will purchase our aircraft in larger numbers, so we will have fewer types, and we will buy aircraft where there is sharing of availability risk. We will pay for this and there are hundreds of millions of dollars of profit for OEMs that execute this risk sharing through life of the asset. OEMs realise that the real value is in selling razor blades rather than razors. This reflects both the problems in recent years with certain aircraft types being temporarily restricted from operations due to airworthiness problems and the logistic support challenges for other manufacturers as usage of their fleets has increased to cope. However he also commented that the helicopter industry needs to have the equity to cope with any future rise in interest rates or toughening economic conditions. The reason we have $700 million in cash is both to reassure clients that we can survive in tough conditions and so we can take advantage of opportunities in the market. This is particularly relevant as oil prices fall an oil majors look to cut costs. One wonders if this will put pressure on some of the smaller operators and result in more mergers and takeovers (NHV recently merged with Blueway) even though demand remains high. In fact some smaller operators may suffer because demand is high and the larger, better financed operators have big, long term order books, restricting the remaining supply. In the last 5 years Bristow has increased its use of leased helicopters, at a time when the helicopter leasing industry has started to expand rapidly with a host of new players. In turn the big players, such as GECAS, have taken an interest in the sector (GECAS have just announced the purchase of Milestone, having been hinting at interest in the sector before the Singapore Airshow at the start of the year). At the same time as Baliff addressed Helitech, Bristow released a technical financial paper advocating a move from a focus on return on capital to a value added metric which better accounts for the use of leasing and encourages efficient operation with the equity reserve to weather financial storms. UPDATE: Baliff’s full presentation is now here, which started with comments on the Joint Operators Review and the formation of HeliOffshore, (whose foundation Aerossurance discussed in June). Baliff also recently described to Rotor and Wing a way forward he described as the 4 Cs: Clients: the need to be even more focused on their strategic needs Culture: both in relation to the company’s Target Zero culture and its core values Continuity: specifically maintaining the continuity with his predecessor from July 2004 to July 2014, Bill Chiles and what Baliff terms Chiles’ Target Zero “legacy of safety” and also in terms of business continuity in the face of threats such as Ebola Communication: two-way communication internally and externally UPDATE 13 January 2015: Bristow World published an interview with Baliff. UPDATE 22 January 2015: In this article John Briscoe, Bristow’s Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer, comments on the financial outlook: Bristow Takes Long View of Oil Price Slide. Briscoe says: We are not deferring deliveries...
read moreMaintenance Check Flights: Safety Lessons
Maintenance Check Flights: Safety Lessons We look at the safety lessons from three UK Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB) reports into serious incidents during maintenance test flights (the most recent published this month). CL600 N664D ADG Check Flight March 2014 In March 2014 the US registered Bombardier CL600-2B16 required a post-maintenance check flight at Biggin Hill, UK. The check involved deploying the aircraft’s air-driven generator (ADG) and therefore placing the aircraft in an emergency electrical configuration. During the flight, with two crew accompanied by an engineer as an observer, the required check was successfully completed. However, the aircraft was not returned to the normal electrical configuration. As a result the flaps, ground spoilers, anti-skid and nosewheel steering remained disabled. Consequently, on landing, with difficulty the aircraft was stopped approximately 120m from end of the runway (the Landing Distance Available was 1,550m). All four main tyres deflated, causing damage to the left hand wheel and brakes. The AAIB note that the CVR were not promptly deactivated to preserve the recording. The AAIB report highlights a difference in understanding between the flight crew and engineering personnel: The commander observed that the roles of the pilots and the engineer had not been clearly established before takeoff, and the pilots assumed that the engineer would ‘talk through’ what he needed to see once airborne. The commander also observed that the crew should have referred to the Quick Reference Handbook (QRH) for the situation rather than rely on the engineer to guide them. The commander later discovered that the engineer was not expecting to make decisions or inputs during the flight, so a misunderstanding had existed. The engineer described his role as primarily that of an observer, although with the intention of noting any defects or abnormalities that might arise during the flight test. The maintenance organisation internal investigation made several recommendations including: …the requirement for a full briefing to be given to flight crews undertaking a maintenance check flight, irrespective of whether or not the crew declared themselves to be familiar with the procedure. Falcon 2000 CS-DFE Brake Fault Finding November 2009 In November 2009, flight crew were requested by maintenance to carry out high speed taxi trials of a Portuguese registered Dassault Falcon 2000 as part of the troubleshooting process of a braking defect, also at Biggin Hill, UK. Seven accelerate/stop runs were conducted along the main runway, at gradually increasing reject speeds. At the start of the eighth run, the crew felt that a tyre had deflated and brought the aircraft to a stop. ATC radioed that there was a fire under the left wing and all six persons on board safely abandoned the aircraft via the airstair door. The Airport Fire and Rescue Service (AFRS) extinguished the fire. The fire was caused by damage to the brakes from the excessive temperature of the repeated runs, this released hydraulic fluid under pressure, which then ignited. AAIB note that: There were numerous systemic factors relating to the manner in which the operator conducted this test activity which contributed to the incident. Many of these, such as appropriate crew selection, the need for an approved test schedule and a detailed brief and debrief of the test activity with all involved personnel, are common to other recent incidents and accidents involving operators conducting maintenance or customer demonstration check flights. These issues have been highlighted and analysed in detail in the AAIB report...
read moreHow To Develop Your Organisation’s Safety Culture
How To Develop Your Organisation’s Safety Culture Last week we highlighted how mindless management actions can destroy an organisation’s safety culture and we explained that building a strong, positive safety culture takes deliberate, concerted and continual effort. But what sort of effort? This week the annual European helicopter expo and conference, Helitech, is being held in Amsterdam. Three years ago we presented on this very topic at the safety seminar at Helitech 2011 in Duxford, UK. Safety Culture – the Key to Safety Performance The term ‘safety culture’ was initially used in the report on the 1986 Chernobyl nuclear accident. While there are many definitions of ‘culture’ and an associated concept of ‘climate’, a safety culture can be conveniently considered to be the product of an organisation’s collective, safety related: values, attitudes, perceptions, social norms and ultimately… patterns of behaviour We think that those patterns behaviours are the most important as they are observable and therefore the strongest manifestation to influence others. As such an organisation’s culture can not evolve simply by management edict but in response to a whole range of factors including: local conditions, past events, the character of leadership and the mood of the workforce Prof. James L. Heskett of Harvard Business School wrote in his 2011 book The Culture Cycle, that effective culture can account for 20-30% of the differential in corporate performance when compared with “culturally unremarkable” competitors. A safety culture reflects the organisation’s actual collective, shared commitment to safety. It not simply what is said about safety but the commitment to safety that is demonstrated by normal behaviour, crucially when problems emerge or hazards are identified. Weaknesses in safety culture are increasingly being identified in accident investigation reports as a critical precursor to accidents. This not because there is necessarily a widespread decline in organisational safety cultures, but because investigators are now looking more closely at organisations, how they function and how the shared culture is influencing individual and team behaviour. One example is the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) report on the loss of a Space Shuttle in 2003. It has been written that: Safety Culture can have a direct impact on safe performance. If someone believes that safety is not really important, even temporarily, then workarounds, cutting corners, or making unsafe decisions or judgements will be the result, especially when there is a small perceived risk rather than an obvious danger. The UK Health & Safety Executive (HSE), the occupational health and safety regulator, issue specific guidance on the consideration of safety culture during inspections. Safety Leadership – the Key to Safety Culture Leadership is a powerful influence on culture. The term ‘leadership’ is sometimes misused. Sometimes as a trendy alternative for ‘senior management’ and occasionally in the Orwellian term ‘thought leadership’ (which was recently labelled “grossly indulgent” in the Forbes list of ‘most annoying business slang’). Leadership is not the same as managing resources and schedules. Here we use leadership to represent an activity that involves: Being visible, Focusing on people, Building trust and ultimately… Influencing other people’s behaviour It is this deliberate, concerted and continual activity that can influence culture, though as we have showed previously, that can be unravelled far more rapidly by poor leadership. Excellent safety leaders realise that safety leadership is not an alternative to safety management but an essential complement. They also have a vision for safety in their organisation. It perhaps goes without saying that safety leaders therefore have a passion for safety. Safety Leaders...
read moreEHEST: New Publications on Technology & SMS
European Helicopter Safety Team (EHEST) Issues New Publications on Technology & SMS EHEST have released two new publications, one on accident reducing technologies and the other on SMS for non-complex operators: The Potential of Technologies to Mitigate Helicopter Accident Factors – An EHEST Study EHEST created a Specialist Team Technology (ST Technology) to assess the potential of existing and emerging technologies to mitigate the top 20 helicopter safety issues identified from EHEST helicopter accident analyses. The team has created a technology matrix that includes 145 technologies, of which 93 have been rated to determine their Technology Readiness Level (TRL) and has published its results in a new report. EHEST report that: There are 15 ‘highly promising’ technologies (that jointly can potentially mitigate 11 of the top 20 safety issues), and 50 that are ‘moderately promising’. Five technologies are highly promising for three or more safety issues. The industry is highly recommended to channel their technological development in line with the results of the study. The regulatory side should find ways to improve safety by adopting the technologies. Researchers and universities are encouraged to concentrate their efforts on developing the lacking technologies and the technologies which have a low Technology Readiness Level. Safety Management Toolkit for Non-Complex Operators EHEST have released the second edition of their Safety Management Toolkit for Non-Complex Operators. It consists of a Safety Management Manual (SMM), a Guidance Document and an Emergency Response Plan. This manual for non-complex helicopter operators is derived from the more comprehensive SMM for complex operators. Although reduced in complexity the non-complex SMM is still fully compliant to the EU and EASA requirements. EHEST Background Launched in November 2006, EHEST brings together helicopter manufacturers, operators, research organisations, regulators, accident investigators and a few military operators from across Europe. EHEST is the helicopter arm of the European Strategic Safety Initiative (ESSI), and also the European component of the International Helicopter Safety Team (IHST). If you want to support the EHEST’s work and learn more about helicopter safety join the EHEST LinkedIn Group. Aerossurance has extensive safety, helicopter design, flight operations, airworthiness and safety analysis experience. For aviation advice you can trust, contact us at: enquiries@aerossurance.com Follow us on LinkedIn and on Twitter @Aerossurance for our latest...
read more
Recent Comments