Inspection UAS Collides with PNG LNG Export Jetty
Inspection UAS Collides with ExxonMobil PNG LNG Export Jetty (Applus DJI Matrice 210 RTK) On 14 November 2019 a DJI Matrice 210 RTK Unmanned Air System (UAS) / drone / Remotely Powered Aircraft (RPA) operated by inspection company Applus Wokman, was being used to inspect of the underside of the jetty of the PNG LNG ExxonMobil Marine Terminal near Port Moresby, Papua New Guinea. The 6.14 kg quadcopter UAS collided with one of the jetty’s pylons and fell into the sea and was damaged beyond repair by the seawater. The Papua New Guinea (PNG) Accident Investigation Commission (AIC) explain in their safety investigation report that Applus had been contracted by ExxonMobil PNG to conduct aerial inspections, of both the jetty and marine navigational aids during November 2019. Applus had been issued a Civil Aviation Safety Authority PNG (CASA PNG) Part 101.202(3) Instrument of Approval on 22 May 2019. The flight was being conducted from a pilot boat near the jetty by a UAS remote pilot and a technical assistant from Applus, each with their own remote control and monitor. The pilot did not have a PNG RPA [Remotely Piloted Aircraft] pilot licence, nor was it required under PNG CAR Part 101. The pilot was a Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) Australia licenced RPA pilot and…had over 400 hours on RPA operations [86 on type]. The Matrice 210 RTK UAS was fitted with an upper gimble mounted camera and an integral First-Person Vision (FPV) camera. The day before they had operated from the deck of the vessel but on the day of the accident they had relocated to the air-conditioned wheelhouse “to prevent the monitors from overheating” (outside air temperature was 27.3 °C). [T]he wind speed was 3.3 knots from the South West. [T]he pilot boat was positioned about 100 meters from the shoreline. The coxswain reported that the boat could not be brought closer..because the tide was low… The coxswain…was concentrating on the maneuvering the boat to keep it in a steady position, safe from the low tide depth. The [UAS] pilot also stated that immediately prior to the collision, he had lost his line of sight with the RPA because the pilot boat was being rocked and swayed due to the local conditions at the time. He subsequently stopped manoeuvring the RPA and started moving from his starboard (right) side position to the centre forward position in an attempt to re-establish line of sight. However, when he regained visual contact with the RPA, it had already collided with one of the pylons. The pilot mentioned that when he was moving positions, he may have inadvertently moved one of the remote-control sticks. According to the telemetry data, the RPA was positioned less than half a meter, from the northern side of the pylon, about 5.5 ft above mean sea level (AMSL) when the remote-control sticks were momentarily in the neutral position before the right control stick suddenly shifted fully to the right. The data recording ended less than half a second later. Blank data followed after that point which signifies the collision and subsequent drop and submersion of the aircraft into the sea. The total flight time was 61 seconds. AIC Safety Investigation and Analysis [R]ecords of operator’s maintenance and pre-flight checks (including flight and function tests) were reviewed. The investigation did not find any indication of malfunction of the power systems and sensors that could have affected...
read moreKorean Kamov Ka-32T Fire-Fighting Water Impact and Underwater Egress Fatal Accident
Korean Kamov Ka-32T Fire-Fighting Water Impact and Underwater Egress Fatal Accident (KFS HL9419) On 1 December 2018, Korea Forest Service (KFS) Aviation Headquarters Kamov Ka-32T HL9419 impacted the Han River in Seoul, South Korea during an approach to uplift water for fire-fighting operations. An aircrewman was killed but the two pilots escaped with minor injuries. The 80-page Korean Aviation and Railway Accident Investigation Board (ARAIB) safety investigation report was published on 28 December 2020 (in Korean only). The Accident Flight The 11 t helicopter, based at Gimpo Airport on 15 minute stand-by, was equipped with a Simplex Model 326 Fire Attack 2972 litre external tank and dual snorkel system. It was tasked to put out a fire on Mount Youngchuk in eastern Seoul. The fire was reported at 10:42 and the helicopter was airborne at 10:55, arriving over the fire at 11:08. The fire was at the edge of the outer Seoul P-73B prohibited airspace. Tracer is authorised as a warning to unauthorised aircraft in P-73B whereas lethal force is authorised in P-73A. This therefore also required liaison with the RoKAF Master Control and Reporting Center (MCRC). The crew were unable to identify a small reservoir, suggested by their control room, near Sahmyook University at 11.11. They then tried a site at Wangsukcheon at 11.15 but the water level was too low for the snorkels to work successfully. The commander decided to proceed to the Han River, near the Gangdong Bridge. Visibility was good (>10 km), the wind was from the south-east at 2-3kts, and air temperature 7-8℃. ARAIB explain that the KFS procedure for a water uplift is first to conduct a high and low level reconnaissance. This was not done, nor was there a briefing prior to the approach. The KFS approach procedure is to pass through 100 ft at 50 km/h (25 knots) and at a decent rate below 2 m/s (400 fpm), as shown in this video. The rate of descent during this approach was however 5.7 m/s (1120 fpm) at 100ft and although the rate of descent slowed, impact was still at 3.2 m/s (630 fpm). The commander (5006 hours total time and 1182 on type) was Pilot Flying (PF) and the co-pilot (2223 hours total time and 1182 on type) was Pilot Monitoring (PM). However, investigators say that both flight crew were concentrating on radio communications, so they failed to recognise the excessive descent rate and proximity to the river’s surface. The radalt low height warning was set at 20 m and triggered 6 seconds before impact. Underwater Escape – Survivability Issues The aircraft was not equipped with an Emergency Flotation System (EFS). All the crew had completed Helicopter Underwater Escape Training (HUET). They were issued Switlik life jackets and had a 3000 psi HEED3 Compressed Air Emergency Breathing System (CA-EBS). Both pilots were unable to activate their door release and both escaped through the right-hand bubble window that had been smashed by the right-hand mirror that was twisted backwards on impact. The c0-pilot initially struggled to release his harness, used his HEED bottle and escaped ‘towards the light’. The investigators confirmed that scheduled maintenance jettison tests had been conducted previously and successfully passed within the activation force requirements. The ARAIB postulate that after the water impact the crew may have been confused at how the emergency door mechanism worked. The KA-32T does not seem to be equipped with push out windows, as is the norm for offshore helicopters to aid underwater escape. The...
read moreA Short Flight to Disaster: A109 Mountain CFIT in Marginal Weather
A Short Flight to Disaster: Agusta A109 Mountain CFIT in Marginal Weather (N109W) On 19 November 2016 Agusta A109A II N109W was destroyed in a Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT) accident at Monte Rho, near Varese, Italy at c 2950ft AMSL. One of the three occupants was killed and the other two seriously injured. Italy’s Agenzia Nazionale per la Sicurezza del Volo (ANSV) released its safety investigation report, in Italian only, on 21 December 2020. At the time of the accident, the weather in the area were characterized by ANSV as “poor visibility and cloud-covered peaks”. The Accident Flight The US registered aircraft was registered to a trustee company in Delaware, US, however the ANSV describe it as being operated non-commercially by Execavia Ltd (registered in Valletta, Malta), although the ‘user’ of the helicopter was BG Air SA based in Lugano, Switzerland. The pilot was a 57-year-old Italian with a PPL(H) issued by ENAC and CPL(H) issued by FAA, and 4400 hours of flight time. The pilot and a female passenger (seated in the front left seat) arrived in Lugano from Caiolo, Italy at c14:00 Local Time. A male passenger boarded and the aircraft departed at 14:12 Local Time, heading south, having filed a VFR flight plan. Lugano TWR confirmed that the N109W was the only known traffic present in the area and once at Visual Reporting Point “S” they were instructed to change to the frequency of the Milan FIC. ANSV comment that at that time “the weather conditions did not seem critical” but while flying over Lake Lugano the pilot noted a relatively low cloud ceiling. In particular, towards the southern edge of the lake, at the limit of the Lugano CTR, towards the VRP “S”, there was low haze, which made it difficult to see the terrain. Consequently, in order not to be forced to fly at a very low altitude, he had decided to “aim for a hill, crossing which I would have had the whole Po Valley in front of me”. Since there were clouds on the sides of the aforementioned hill [Moute Rho], he decided to aim for the top of the same. However, the helicopter’s rate of climb as insufficient and the helicopter contacted trees on the mountain, first with the tail and then the main rotor. The pilot…did not feel a big impact, but a series of many small impacts up to the final impact with the ground. The surviving passenger…immediately after taking off…started reading a newspaper; after a few minutes, he heard a bang, realizing the helicopter had crashed. The fuselage came to rest on its left-hand side less than 5 minutes after take off. No Emergency Locator Transmitter (ELT) signal was detected (investigators found the ELT turned off but could not determine if that occurred upon rescue or before the flight). Rescuers were informed of the accident by a mobile phone call from the pilot. The adverse weather and approaching darkness hampered the rescue operation and rescuers did not arrive on-site until 18:30 Local Time. ANSV Analysis Investigators found an AV-MAP EKP V unit in the helicopter. This is a non-certified GPS mapping tool “usable only as a support for VFR navigation, not replacing the official documentation” or “on-board instrumentation”. The helicopter was unfortunately not equipped with a Terrain Avoidance and Warning System (TAWS) but the radalt low height warning was set at 200 ft. The ANSV comment that radar data showed: …an almost constant climb rate and horizontal speed. Taking into...
read moreAS350B3/H125 Bird Strike with Red Kite
AS350B3/H125 Bird Strike with Red Kite On 22 July 2020, Airbus Helicopters AS350B3e / H125 F-HJSC of Société LEI MOA struck a bird while descending to Nîmes-Garons Airport that penetrated the canopy and injured a front seat passenger. The Incident Flight The French Bureau d’Enquêtes et d’Analyses pour la Sécurité de l’Aviation Civile (the BEA) explain in their safety investigation report (issued in December in 2020 in French only and UPDATE 31 March 2021 in English) that the helicopter took off from Annecy Airport with four passengers, for a private flight to Dieulefit, where one of the passenger was dropped off. The flight continued to Nîmes-Garons Airport. The helicopter had been cruising at 6,000 ft AMSL and began its descent towards Nîmes with a ground speed of around 140 kt. The BEA recount that: Passing 1,100 ft in descent, about 5 NM north-east of Nîmes Garons, the helicopter struck a bird which broke through the canopy. The passenger in the front left seat was injured and bleeding profusely. The bird probably struck him in the chest and shards of the canopy cut into his scalp. The pilot, for his part, was not affected…[and] assessed the helicopter’s flying qualities and decided to continue to destination. He then reassured the injured passenger while optimizing his route in order to reduce the time it took for the passenger to be taken care of by the emergency services on the ground. After impact on the rear bulkhead, the bird lands on the general pitch control. This does not affect the handling of the flight because the level of friction set by the pilot in stabilized flight is high. The pilot declared an emergency, requested medical assistance on arrival and proceeded to make a safe landing at Nîmes-Garons. Safety Investigation The helicopter was fitted with an Appareo Vision 1000 recording system. As in many previous safety investigations, Vision 1000 provided useful data to the investigators. The canopy was pierced on the passenger side, in the immediate vicinity of the central windscreen pillar, to a height of 78 cm and a width of approximately 40 cm. The metal upper part of the windshield pillar shows an impact mark of a few centimeters. This trace is located 20 cm to the left of the central upright (looking from the back to the front). Of note is that: The turbine engine fire handle guard has moved out of its safety position. The pilot indicated that he had not touched it. Fortuitously: The fire handle has not moved. The rear cabin bulkhead and the rear seat backs show biological debris traces. The most important debris of the canopy among those found measures approximately 25 cm. Part 27 helicopter certification standards in Europe and the US, unlike Part 29 for larger helicopters, do not have a birdstrike requirement (discussed further below). The bird was identified as being a red kite. The BEA suggest this weighed c 0.8 kg, though 0.8-1.3 kg is the typical range for these birds. Prior to the accident, the aerodrome operator had carried out an assessment of the avian risk in the vicinity of the aerodrome in accordance with the requirements of European Regulation No.139 / 2014, in particular its Annex IV Part ADR.OPS.B.020 relating to ‘reduced risk of collision with wildlife’. The operator assessed that in the event sector, there is no identified hazard… [and this was]…considered to be an isolated...
read moreFire-Fighting AS350 Hydraulics Accident: Dormant Miswiring
Fire-Fighting AS350 Hydraulics Accident: Dormant Miswiring (Helibravo Airbus AS350B3 D-HAUO) On 31 May 2020, Airbus Helicopters AS350B3 D-HAUO, operated in Portugal by Helibravo – Aviação (leased from Meravo), crashed shortly after uplifting water during a fire-fighting training flight. One of the two occupants received minor injuries and the other was unharmed. Investigators uncovered a latent maintenance error that had inexplicably remained undetected for 16 years, despite numerous opportunities to detect it. The Accident Flight The Portuguese accident investigation agency, GPIAAF, say in their safety investigation report (issued on 23 December 2020) that the training session was the day before the local fire season commenced. The aircraft had recently arrived from Germany (where base maintenance was conducted). Dual controls were temporarily fitted for the instructor seated in the left-hand seat. The removable flight controls allows full aircraft control on its three axis and the engine control as well, however it is not equipped with additional control systems for bucket opening or releasing, hydraulic system cut-off or other specific mission functions, designed only to be controlled by the pilot sitting on the right. The standardisation training was to include several water collections and releases in a mountain training area that the instructor had used twice before that day. This was the first flight together of these two pilots. They only had headsets “as the intercom system of their helmets was not compatible with the aircraft” (for reasons that are not elaborated). The instructor pilot and the pilot had, respectively, a total of 2992 and 2984 hours of flight experience, of which 1451 and 1701 were performed on the type. After 4 successful drops the instructor “decided to take over the aircraft’s controls and demonstrate to the pilot the water scooping and take-off procedure”. With the Bambi Bucket filled with water, while starting the transition flight (from hover), the helicopter initiated a leftward rotation and the instructor pilot tried unsuccessfully to counteract immediately applying RH pedal to maintain the heading. The instructor pilot mentioned that he needed to apply unusual force in the controls and there was no appropriate response from the helicopter. After having made a circular descent of approximately 360º, the bucket was dragged through the vegetation, forcing the helicopter into a deeper nose down attitude and crashed. The underslung bucket was not jettisoned by the right-hand pilot before impact. The helicopter was destroyed by the ground impact that occurred with a significant nose down attitude and on its left side, breaking the front skid cross support, deforming the lower cabin area and cockpit top, injuring the instructor pilot in the head. The main rotor blades were destroyed when touching the ground with high energy… The helicopter came to rest on its side and both crew egressed successfully. AS350 Flying Controls / Hydraulics Background The flight control [is] assisted by a hydraulic system using an engine-driven pump using a flexible drive belt from the engine-to-main rotor gearbox power drive shaf…and three main and one tail rotor hydraulic servo actuators with associated electrically operated warning and emergency systems. Hydraulic accumulators are fitted on each of the three main rotor servo actuators. There is a load compensator accumulator on the tail rotor hydraulic actuator. The hydraulic system is controlled by the “HYD” cut-off switch, mounted on the collective stick of the right-hand seat, and by the HYD TEST switch, mounted on the centre console. The left-hand seat flight controls used by...
read moreSeason’s Greetings from Aerossurance
Aerossurance sends its Season’s Greetings to all its customers, partners, suppliers, colleagues and friends. We wish you all a safe and prosperous 2021! For aviation advice you can trust, contact Aerossurance at: enquiries@aerossurance.com Follow us on LinkedIn and on Twitter @Aerossurance for our latest...
read moreMid-Air Collision of Guimbal Cabri G2 9M-HCA & 9M-HCB: Malaysian AAIB Preliminary Report
Mid-Air Collision of Guimbal Cabri G2 9M-HCA & 9M-HCB: Malaysian AAIB Preliminary Report On 8 November 2020 two Guimbal Cabri G2 helicopters (9M-HCA and 9M-HCB) of My Heli Club collided over Taman Melawati, Selangor, Malaysia. 9M-HCB crashed onto the side of a road, fatally injuring both of its occupants. 9M-HCA, although damaged, managed to execute a successful forced landing. Its two survived uninjured. The Accident Flight The Malaysian Air Accident Investigation Bureau (MAAIB) explain in their preliminary report (issued 8 December 2020) that: The occupants of both helicopters were all members of the same local flying club. The pilot of 9M-HCA was its Club President and the passenger an ordinary member while 9M-HCB’s pilot was its Club Captain and Chief Flying Instructor and the passenger a student pilot. …the two helicopters took-off from Sultan Abdul Aziz Shah Airport, Subang (WMSA) [at c1112 Local Time]. The flight plan was filed for 9M-HCA with remarks that it would be ‘Flying In Company With 9M-HCB’. Subsequent RT calls between the helicopters with Subang Ground (121.9 MHz) that morning established that the callsign ‘My Heli Combined’ would be used to identify the pair of helicopters [with 9M-HCB as the lead aircraft]. Both helicopters then proceeded to Genting Sempah via Batu Caves before returning. On the way back, a request was made to operate at Batu Dam for approximately 10 minutes. This was followed-on by another request to operate this time at Klang Gates Dam for approximately 20 minutes. This communication at 1139 was to be the penultimate RT call made by My Heli Combined. At approximately 1145 both helicopters collided with one another. 9M-HCA received damage to it landing skids but was still controllable and the pilot managed to land safely on a nearby school field. 9M-HCB on the other hand severely damaged its main rotor blades and immediately began auto-rotating but crash landed onto a road [hard]shoulder not far away. 9M-HCB descended at a very steep angle [and] came down in a relatively level attitude with the right front quarter of the helicopter taking the brunt of the impact. …the excessive vertical deceleration forces meant it exceeded the design limits of the helicopter skids and also the cabin’s high-energy absorbing, stroking seats. Analyses are still underway to approximate the g-forces involved. 9M-HCB’s fuel tank survived the impact intact. There were no fuel leakages which could have led to a post-impact fire. 9M-HCB’s ELT was activated on impact and a COSPAS-SARSAT ground station in Singapore managed to pick-up the signal. However, KLRCC was only notified 4 hours. KLATCC is investigating reasons behind the delay. Safety Investigation Investigators have examined ADS-B data to understand the conduct of the flight: During transit, their paths maintained a separation of between 50-120m… However, at 1144, for reasons still unknown, the helicopters start to converge and collided a few seconds later. The pilot of 9M-HCA on being alerted by his passenger to the proximity of the other helicopter took evasive action by slamming his cyclic to the right but it was too late. Wreckage reconstruction later indicated that the main rotor blades of 9M-HCB impacted the skids of 9M-HCA. A piece of 9M-HCB’s main rotor blade flew off in flight…. That piece was later recovered and…had split longitudinally from its tip along the plane of the chord line and the upper portion measuring 88 cm in length had separated in flight. ADS-B Data...
read moreHelicopter Ops and Safety – Gulf Of Mexico 2019 Update
Helicopter Ops and Safety – Gulf of Mexico 2019 Update The Helicopter Safety Advisory Conference (HSAC) has been publishing data on the Gulf of Mexico (‘GOM’) offshore helicopter fleet and its safety since 1995. We have looked at their 2014. 2015, 2016, 2017 and 2018 reports previously. Now we examine their 2019 data, dated 28 May 2020 but only released in mid-December 2020. Helicopter Operations: GOM Fleet Data HSAC report that flying activity continues to decline, with just over 163k flying hours in 2019 (11% down on the 182k hours in 2018 and vs 471k in the peak year of 1997). Over the last 10 years it is clear that, in particular, there has been a steady decline in single engine helicopter usage, dropping 59% in that time as older coastal oil fields decline. The fleet dropped to 276 helicopters, from 336 helicopters in 2017 (down 18%). The number of single engine helicopters fell from 176 to 142, down 19%. The light twin fleet dropped from 25 to 20 (20%). The medium twin fleet went from 97 to 83 (14% down). The number of heavy twins fell from 38 to 31 (18%). Again the most pronounced reduction has been in single engine helicopters (a 55% drop in 10 years). Utilisation per aircraft has increased to 592 hours per aircraft (9% up on the previous year). Average sector length had been creeping up, from 22 minutes in 2016, to 23 in 2017 and 25 in 2018. In 2019 it was 24 minutes. The number of operators reduced from 9 to 8 (vs 13 in 2014). The big two are Bristow (who merged with ERA in 2020) and PHI, with RLC strong in the single engine sector. Helicopter Safety GOM Unfortunately, there were two accidents in 2019 both fatal. A Bristow Bell 407, N577AL, operated for Talos Energy, was lost shortly after take off from Galliano, LA on 10 March 2019. The pilot and single passenger both died. NTSB say: The pilot of the helicopter departed on the flight to transport the passenger to an offshore platform; several minutes before the accident, he transmitted a pilot report describing a cloud ceiling about 700 ft above ground level and 6 statute miles visibility. Onboard data indicated that the helicopter entered a descending left turn from about 300 ft above ground level that continued until the helicopter impacted a marsh. The turn to the north was not consistent with the intended route of flight. The characteristics of the turn as it tightened over the last 25 seconds of the flight (increasing roll, decreasing pitch, and vertical descent rate) are consistent with the pilot experiencing spatial disorientation and loss of control. The restricted visual references resulting from the low cloud ceilings and flight over a body of water that lacked significant contrasting terrain features would have been conducive to the development of spatial disorientation; and the low altitude in which he was flying would have limited his available time to recover. The NTSB Probable Cause was: The pilot’s loss of control during cruise flight as a result of spatial disorientation while operating the helicopter in close proximity to terrain in marginal meteorological conditions. On 7 December 2019 a Panther Helicopters Bell 407, N79LP, with two persons onboard went missing in transit between 2 offshore installations about 25 nm SE of Grand Isle, Louisiana. Communications were reportedly lost 10 mins prior to the expected landing. The wreckage was subsequently discovered by a fishing vessel. Both POB died. Consequently, according to HSAC: The 2019 accident rate was 1.22 per 100k...
read moreHelicopter Destroyed in Hover Taxi Accident
Helicopter Destroyed in Hover Taxi Accident (Private Airbus AS350B N36033, Wolfsberg, Austria) On 20 July 2018 privately owned Airbus Helicopters AS350B N36033 was destroyed while attempting to hover taxi closer to a fuelling station at Wolfsberg airfield in Austria. The pilot suffered a minor leg injury. The Austrian air accident investigation body, the Sicherheitsuntersuchungsstelle des Bundes (SUB) issued their safety investigation report on 15 December 2020 (in German only). They explain that the pilot had departed the Adriatic town of Caorle, Italy at about 04:30 Local Time (approximately 50 minutes before sunrise) and arrived at Wolfsberg at about 06:20. The pilot intended to move the helicopter closer to the fuelling station after discovering the 11 m hose would not reach where the helicopter had landed. This required positioning the helicopter so the main rotor blades were c 4.25 m from the building. At the time the wind was from c 100º and 1-2 knots. After lifting into a 1 m hover there were “excessive pitching movements forwards and backwards” and the helicopter yawed approx 90° to the right. The pilot reported feeling turbulence from the side of the fuelling station building (a 5.2 m x 5.2 m, flat roofed, 3.2 m high building). While the pilot tried to stabilize the helicopter in hovering flight, the helicopter rolled to the right around its longitudinal axis and touched the ground of the unpaved movement area east of the refueling station with the main rotor blades. This indicates a c 50º bank angle. After the main rotor impact on the ground, the helicopter yawed to the left around its vertical axis and came to a standstill in the opposite direction… Fortuitously the helicopter remained upright as the filler cap had been removed on arrival and was in the cabin. The Safety Investigation The investigation revealed that pilot did not hold a valid licence and “there were no records or information available about the pilot’s flying experience”. When hovering in ground effect the air accelerated by the main rotor travels radially out across the ground. However, it can recirculate if there are obstructions, such as a building. The SUB determined the probable cause was: Loss of lateral control during hover in ground effect (HIGE). Probable factors were Excessive control inputs / Flight crew induced oscillations about the helicopter longitudinal axis (PIO) / Lack of corrective action to stop PIO Proximity of obstacles / Formation of ground effect air vortices (IGE) Safety Resources Air Ambulance Helicopter Downed by Fencing FOD Ambulance / Air Ambulance Collision Sécurité Civile EC145 Mountain Rescue Blade Strike Hanging on the Telephone… HEMS Wirestrike Norwegian HEMS Landing Wirestrike Austrian Police EC135P2+ Impacted Glassy Lake B206B Hit by Truck in Forced Landing after 16 Months of Operation with Unairworthy Engine Tragic Texan B206B3 CFIT in Dark Night VMC Fatal B206L3 Cell Phone Discount Distracted CFIT Time Pressures and Take-Off Trim Trouble When Habits Kill – Canadian MD500 Accident EC120 Forgotten Walkaround Fatal R44 Loss of Control Accident: Overweight and Out of Balance Final Report: AS365N3 9M-IGB Fatal Accident Fatal Helicopter / Crane Collision – London Jan 2013 Deadly Dusk Air Ambulance Bird Strike UPDATE 22 December 2020: Mid-Air Collision of Guimbal Cabri G2 9M-HCA & 9M-HCB: Malaysian AAIB Preliminary Report UPDATE 30 December 2020: AS350B3/H125 Bird Strike with Red Kite UPDATE 2 January 2021: A Short Flight to Disaster: A109 Mountain CFIT in Marginal Weather UPDATE 5 February 2021: Inexperienced IIMC over Chesapeake Bay (Guimbal Cabri G2 N572MD): Reduced...
read morePiper PA-30 Twin Comanche Accident After Unapproved Parts Failed
Piper PA-30 Twin Comanche Accident After Unapproved Parts Failed (ZS-ICB) On 29 March 2019, during a training flight to practise asymmetric circuits Piper PA-30 Twin Comanche ZS-ICB of Johannesburg School of Flying was destroyed at Hiltonia-Syferfontein Airport (FASY). The student and instructor escaped with minor injuries. The South African Civil Aviation Authority (SACAA) explain in their safety investigation report (issued 15 October 2020) that: After a successful touch down, the student pilot then applied full power to both engines for take-off, the aircraft accelerated to 80 knots (kts) before rotation. During rotation, the aircraft banked sharply to the right and the instructor took over control and feathered the right-side engine, but it did not respond as expected. The aircraft lost height and impacted the ground with the right-side wing before ground-looping and skidding, facing the opposite direction from which it had initially taken off. The aircraft came to a stop 120m from the edge of RWY 14. Examination of the number 2 (right hand) engine… …revealed that the throttle control cable end fitting was missing. It was later found in the wreckage and it was not the original equipment fitted by the manufacturer. On inspection of the logbooks, it was discovered that the throttle control cable end fitting was fitted on 24 July 2018. The AMO [also] did not follow the manufacturer’s SB 515 issued on 17 January 1977 which states that all Piper PA-30 Twin Commanche with serial numbers 30 – 1 to 30 – 2000 must be installed with a control cable ball joint retainer. The AMO which fitted [the] unapproved throttle control cable end fitting without a ball joint retainer had ceased operation on 31 October 2018. Safety Resources Helicopter Throttle Bracket Left Unsecured After Maintenance FAA Rules Applied: So Misrigged Flying Controls Undetected Critical Maintenance Tasks: EASA Part-M & -145 Change Misassembled Anti-Torque Pedals Cause EC135 Accident EC130B4 Accident: Incorrect TRDS Bearing Installation Fatal $16 Million Maintenance Errors Insecure Pitch Link Fatal R44 Accident Tree Top Autorotation for B206L1 After Loose Fuel Line B-Nut Leaks R44 Force Lands After Improper Repair Aerossurance worked with the Flight Safety Foundation (FSF) to create a Maintenance Observation Program (MOP) requirement for their contractible BARSOHO offshore helicopter Safety Performance Requirements to help learning about routine maintenance and then to initiate safety improvements: Aerossurance can provide practice guidance and specialist support to successfully implement a MOP. Aerossurance was to have run training workshops at the EHA European Rotors VTOL Show and Safety Conference in Cologne in November 2020 on a) Safety Culture and Leadership and b) Contracting Aviation Services: An Introduction to the Basics. Sadly due to COVID-19 the show has been postponed to 2021. Aerossurance has extensive air safety, operations, SAR, airworthiness, human factors, aviation regulation and safety analysis experience. For practical aviation advice you can trust, contact us at: enquiries@aerossurance.com Follow us on LinkedIn and on Twitter @Aerossurance for our latest...
read more
Recent Comments