UK Airborne Anti-Pollution Assets
UK Airborne Anti-Pollution Assets The UK Maritime and Coastguard Agency issued this video in 2011 on their anti-pollution airborne dispersant spraying and surveillance assets. The video describes their two sesnor equipped surveillance aircraft. It goes onto show their airborne dispersant spray capability being demonstrated in Lyme Bay, using both a small Cessna Caravan II and a Lockheed Electra, doing runs at 300ft and then 50ft. The MCA’s fixed wing contract is held by RVL Group. The elderly Electras were withdrawn in 2013. UK company Oil Spill Response Limited (OSRL) provide a global aviation aerial dispersant service. UPDATE 26 April 2016: OSRL has commissioned its first UK based 727 dispersant aircraft with a TERSUS dispersant system. UPDATE 12 July 2016: OSRL’s first 727, G-OSRA, operated by 2Excel, was displayed at Farnborough International Airshow in July 2016. It has since been joined by G-OSRB. UPDATE 14 September 2016: Both OSRL 727s were in action for an exercise off the Isle of Wight today. 2Excel explain: In 2014, EASA ruled that for an aircraft spraying system, oil spill dispersant liquids are to be classified as ‘flammable fluids’. The FAA soon aligned with EASA, and as a result any system entering service now has to meet the stringent regulation set out by these agencies. TERSUS, the system on the B727, was designed and built from scratch by 2Excel’s EASA Part21J & G design and production organization Leading Edge. Awarded an EASA STC in 2016, TERSUS is the only aerial dispersant system in the world that complies with the new EASA and FAA regulations. Spraying is done at 150ft. UPDATE 17 August 2020: OSRL and 2Excel sign a contract with the MCA. UPDATE 18 August 2020: 2Excel have modified the 727s to enable flight in known icing conditions with spray booms fitted. For expert advice you can trust on contracting for, design & conversion of and operation of special mission aircraft, contact us at enquiries@aerossurance.com Follow us on LinkedIn and on Twitter @Aerossurance for our latest updates. ...
read moreBristow Invests £3.2mn in Tool Control
Bristow Invests £3.2mn in Tool Control Energy Voice reports that Bristow Group has introduced the latest Snap-on Industrial Automated Tool Control (ATC) system to its maintenance operations as part of the company’s commitment to safety by reducing the risk of Foreign Object Debris (FOD) being introduced during maintenance. Jeremy Cresswell reports: The ATC Box is fitted with hi-tech camera technology which captures images of its contents, allowing the system to identify whether tools are present or not. This information is then displayed on a screen on top of the tool kit so that a maintenance engineer is constantly aware of the location of each tool. Tools are automatically issued and returned without user input and the activity from each toolbox is streamed across the company network giving administrators real time visibility of all tooling activity. At a cost of £3.2million Bristow has introduced the technology to the company’s bases in Europe and the US Gulf of Mexico and is in the process of rolling it out across all of its bases across the globe. This builds on an initiative pioneered at their Aberdeen base in 2009. All three Aberdeen based helicopter operators have introduced ‘company tools’ and some form of enhanced tool control. However in the UK it is still common for aircraft maintenance personnel to supply their own tool kits and to rely only on company issued specialist tools. This makes it far harder to identify when tools are lost. In one famous example, during a hangar tour a senior manager at an airline picked a tool box at random and asked to see the owner to verify that all the tools were accounted for. To everyone’s general embarrassment it was found the engineer who owned the tool box had passed away several years earlier… UPDATE 28 May 2016: From Australia Rotor Blade Tool Control FOD Incident UPDATE 12 February 2017: Flying Control FOD: Screwdriver Found in C208 Controls Aerossurance has extensive air safety, airworthiness, maintenance human factors and safety analysis experience. For practical aviation advice you can trust, contact us at: enquiries@aerossurance.com Follow us on LinkedIn and on Twitter @Aerossurance for our latest updates. ...
read moreLeonardo Helicopter Obstacle Proximity LIDAR System (OPLS)
AgustaWestland Helicopter Obstacle Proximity LIDAR System (OPLS) Earlier in 2014 AgustaWestland (now Leonardo Helicopters) gained EASA certification of a new laser based obstacle warning safety system to help protect helicopters from main and tail rotor strikes when operating in confined areas and close to obstacles (e.g. around a helideck). Initially available as an option for the AW139, it will be made available for AW169, AW189 and AW101. Such a warning system was one of the proposals in a 2003 UK Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) research paper on managing the risk of tail rotor failures. The Obstacle Proximity LIDAR System (OPLS) uses three independent fixed Laser Imaging Detection and Ranging (LIDAR) sensors, a central computer (a GE MAGIC 1) and a dedicated control panel. It can present a 360º representation of adjacent obstacles (closer than 25m) on the aircraft’s existing Multi-Functional Displays with a two level aural tone as the clearance distance reduces. A detailed presentation given to the Helicopter Safety Research Management Committee (HSRMC) can be found here. UPDATE: the link has been amended after changes to the CAA website. The OPLS system is expected to be of particular value for military, offshore, Search and Rescue (SAR) and Emergency Medical Service (EMS) helicopters. UPDATE 1 June 2016: The AW101s being purchased as part of the NAWSARH SAR project by Norway will be equipped with OPLS. Aerossurance has extensive helicopter safety, design, airworthiness, operations and special mission aircraft experience. For aviation advice you can trust, contact us at: enquiries@aerossurance.com Follow us on LinkedIn and on Twitter @Aerossurance for our latest...
read moreHouse of Lords Inquiry into Civil RPAS
RPAS (or Unmanned Air Vehicle / Systems [UAV/UAS]) are a hot topic internationally at the moment. The House of Lords, the upper house of the British Parliament, is to hold an inquiry into the civil use of remotely piloted aircraft systems (RPAS) in the European Union. Written evidence is sought by Friday 19 September 2014. Public evidence sessions will be held in October and November 2014. The hearings will be held by the un-snazzily titled “Internal Market, Infrastructure and Employment Sub-Committee of the House of Lords European Union Committee”, which for once makes the unmanned community’s acronyms look simplistic. They explain: The European Commission has been discussing since 2012 how to regulate the operations of RPAS in the EU. It published a Communication on 8 April 2014 setting out its ideas on how European industry can become a global leader in the market for this emerging technology. At the same time, it acknowledged that the integration of RPAS into the EU’s airspace must be accompanied by adequate public debate on societal concerns… The Committee will consider whether the Commission has identified the key issues in this debate, and how the EU’s actions can benefit the RPAS industry in Europe in a way that is acceptable to all stakeholders. In its deliberation the Committee will look at wider questions such as the advantages and disadvantages of regulating RPAS at national, EU or international level and the new and innovative ways in which RPAS are likely to be used in the future. Currently, regulation of UAS in the UK is described in the UK Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) CAP722 document. Aerossurance is also aware of progress of work by the UK Military Aviation Authority (MAA), announced last year, to overhaul the regulatory framework military UAS/RPAS, with an Notice of Proposed Amendment (NPA) to the MAA Regulatory Publications (MRPs) likely by year end. Aerossurance has experience in UAS/RPAS going back to the mid 1990s. If you want to discuss their safety, technical, operational and regulatory issues, contact Aerossurance at: enquiries@aerossurance.com Follow us on LinkedIn for our latest updates....
read moreWrong Deck Landings
Wrong Deck Landings Occasionally, offshore helicopters do land on the wrong offshore installation. On 26 August 2014 the media picked up an such an event that occurred a few days earlier involving a Sikorsky S-92A. So is it a big deal? Well, yes and no! There are good reasons to avoid landing on a deck that is not standing by for an arriving aircraft. These range from the lack of fire cover, the unknown pitch, roll and heave on vessels, cranes may be operating adding to the collision risk, radio silence procedures may be on force on the installation (e.g. when explosives charges are being prepared) and so on. Of course if the deck is open and expecting an aircraft, then there is the risk of a second helicopter, which is actually heading for the right deck! While landing on the wrong deck does increase risk, in practice, with many similar installations in close proximity and various human factor challenges, misidentifications do occur a few times every year in the UK sector alone. Each needs an appropriate investigation to identify any systemic improvements, but few in reality actually deserve press headlines. We are not in the position offer further informed comment on last week’s occurrence. We can however share the story of an investigation we conducted overseas after a wrong deck landing: Our oil and gas customer had two mobile jack-up drilling rigs on contract from the same drilling company, at different sites in the same field. Although a few miles apart, they were just a few degrees different in heading from the airport onshore. The rigs were of the same type. They were both painted in the drilling company’s standard colour scheme and had similar multi word names. The equally similar rig callsigns were listed one after the other in the database of the aircraft’s navigation system. Due to the wind direction that day, the approach was also in a direction that meant visibility of the rig and deck markings was dramatically reduced and the helideck crew would have had a limited view of the approach too. Consequently all the ingredients were in place for a simple programming error and confirmation bias… Our customer requested we review the air operator’s investigation when it was complete to ensure there was systemic, preventative learning. They were concerned because the ‘next deck’ was over the median line in a less than friendly neighbouring country, where a wrong deck landing would have been a major diplomatic incident! Perhaps an unintended consequence of this (large) customer taking an interest in the (small) helicopter operator, was that the operator’s investigation was swift and had emphasised ‘who’ made the errors not ‘why’. Consequently, the actions taken consisted of ‘warning letters’ being put in personnel files. Rather than review the operator’s investigation, we therefore had to start from scratch and persuade the operator to focus on WHY (not WHO) and therefore the systemic issues (internal to them and, with our help, externally). To their credit they did and reversed their earlier action, removing the warning letters. For more background, the Health & Safety Executive (HSE) published a research report in 2000. A valuable resource on investigating human error is The Field Guide to Understanding Human Error Paperback by Prof Sidney Dekker, which we highly recommend. UPDATE 27 May 2015: Controls against wrong deck landings (‘Threat 12’) are included in the new Flight...
read moreTaranis
Taranis The UK designed and built Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle (UCAV) demonstrator, the BAE Systems Taranis, first flew on 10 August 2013. Named after the Celtic god of thunder, this £185 million programme, involving BAE Systems, Rolls-Royce, GE Aviation Systems (formerly Smiths), QinetiQ and the Ministry of Defence (MOD). Powered by a modified Rolls-Royce Adour Mk951 turbofan, this Low Observable (LO) platform is the successor to studies that started as part of the Future Offensive Air System (FOAS) study in the mid-late 1990s. BAE Systems have released this interesting promotional video: The first flight was only publically announced six months after it occurred and even then the test site, widely believed to be Woomera, South Australia, was not revealed (UPDATE 11 Nov 2014: until an Australian statement). Woomera was the test site for BAE System’s earlier Mantis UAV demonstrator, which first flew at the Australian desert test range 21 October 2009. Further testing has taken place to demonstrate typical operational scenarios, with the flight test air data boom replaced by stealthy conformal air-data system. UPDATE: More details on the aerodynamic design challenges of Taranis were revealed in August 2014 issue of The Aeronautical Journal, the technical and research journal of the Royal Aeronautical Society (RAeS). More details were briefed at a 2016 RAeS lecture. Aerossurance has experience of UAS/UAV/RPAS design, test, certification and regulatory issues. For aviation advice you can trust, contact us at enquiries@aerossurance.com Follow us on LinkedIn and on Twitter @Aerossurance for our latest updates....
read moreVolcanic Ash…Déjà Vu All Over Again??
On 18 August 2014 the Icelandic Met Office (IMO) upgraded the aviation colour code for the Baroarbunga volcano to ‘Orange’ which means that, ‘The volcano shows heightened or escalating unrest with increased potential of eruption’. UPDATE: On 23 August 2014, the morning after this article was published, it was raised to ‘Red’ (‘Eruption is forecast to be imminent with significant emission of ash into the atmosphere likely’), initially stating that there were signs of a sub-glacial eruption but now stating this is on the basis they cannot rule out an eruption. There remain different views on the current situation but seismic events continue (see live updates). While local earthquakes continue the IMO state there are no signs of ongoing volcanic activity, but many will remember the Eyjafjallajökull (E15) volcano disruption of 2010. The European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) has issued a Safety Information Bulletin. The UK Military Aviation Authority (MAA) has issued a Regulatory Notice. The Icelandic Coast Guard has brought their Bombardier Dash 8 Q300 maritime surveillance aircraft (delivered by Field in 2009) back from an EU deployment in the Mediterranean to provide airborne monitoring. The UK Met Office now have an asset they didn’t have in 2010, the Met Office Civil Contingency Aircraft (MOCCA). A pressurised, piston engined Cessna 421C, MOCCA can fly safely into worse ash conditions than a turbine powered aircraft to better map dispersion of ash or smoke from environmental disasters such as the 2005 Buncefield oil depot fire. The necessary modifications were designed by Cranfield Aerospace, and the aircraft operated by special mission specialists DO Systems. Meanwhile, easyJet has been trialling the Norwegian AVOID sensors system for use on their Airbus aircraft (which included generating their own asj cloud), however this equipment is not likely to be in-service until 2015. See David Learmouth’s comments in his Flight International blog here. UPDATE: In this article he also expands on the roles of the European Aviation Crisis Co-ordination Cell (EACCC) was set up following the 2010 event. As Aerossurance has reported previously, the oil and gas industry has also been working on its resilience planning to cope with aviation disruptions for any reason. Europe is now better prepared and will have better data to make sound judgements compared to 2010. For more background see this Institution of Mechanical Engineers (IMechE) paper and this Royal Aeronautical Society (RAeS) paper. Rolls-Royce and Airbus, among others, presented to the British Air Transport Association (BATA) at a seminar in October 2013: Rolls-Royce presentation – note page 7, an assessment of volcanic risk worldwide Airbus presentation If you don’t have a pet volcanologist on tap(!) and want to explore the issues raised, contact us at enquiries@aerossurance.com Follow us on LinkedIn for our latest...
read moreCommanders: Flying or Monitoring?
Commanders: Flying or Monitoring? At a recent Royal Aeronautical Society Conference, one of the speakers, Colin Milne of BALPA, highlighted that in a number of past UK large helicopter accidents involving Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT) or Loss of Control (LOC) the Commander was the Pilot Flying rather than the Pilot Monitoring. While there are circumstances where this is appropriate, for example when the wind direction suits a helideck approach flown from the Commander’s position, as the conference summary points out: …this was contrary to the practice in the airlines where the more experienced pilot assumed the monitoring role – ready to advise corrections or, in extremis, to take control. This also eliminates any reticence a monitoring pilot may have due to the authority gradient in the cockpit. The five accidents quoted were: G-BEON Sikorsky S-61N, British Airways Helicopters, in the sea near St Mary’s Aerodrome, Isles of Scilly on 16 July 1983, 20 fatalities (AAIB Report) – a routine passenger flight from Penzance to the Isles of Scilly – the only non-oil & gas accident cited G-TIGH Aerospatiale AS332L, Bristow Helicopters, the Shell Cormorant Alpha platform, East Shetland Basin on 14 March 1992, 11 fatalities (AAIB Report) G-BLUN Aerospatiale SA365N, CHC, near the Centrica North Morecambe gas platform, Morecambe Bay on 27 December 2006, 7 fatalities (AAIB Report) – strictly in this accident control was transferred to the Commander moments before the accident G-REDU Eurocopter EC225, Bond Offshore Helicopters, near the BP Eastern Trough Area Project (ETAP) Central Production Facility Platform in the North Sea on 18 February 2009, no fatalities (AAIB Report) G-WNSB Eurocopter AS332L2, CHC, 1.5 nm west of Sumburgh Airport, Shetland Islands on 23 August 2013, 4 fatalities (AAIB Special Bulletins) The first anniversary of the G-WNSB accident is on Saturday 23 August 2014. To mark the anniversary, the UK Oil and Gas Chaplaincy and Step Change in Safety have created a memorial film which includes a short Act of Remembrance. Step Change in Safety’s Les Linklater reflects on that accident here. Milne also discussed the need for: common operating procedures understanding the Type Certificate Holder’s design philosophy sharing lead customer experiences agreeing common procedures incorporating those procedures for all training providers mandating those procedures. These are matters currently being examined as part of the Joint Operators Review (JOR), which was discussed at Oil & Gas UK’s recent Aviation Seminar. Monitoring Background In 2013 the RAeS ran a specific conference on monitoring. One account of that is here and another here. UK CAA have also set up a microsite ‘Making Monitoring Matter’. Airbus presented their thoughts on monitoring to the European Society of Air Safety Investigators (ESASI) in April 2014. UPDATE 13 November 2014: The Flight Safety Foundation (FSF) issued a study A Practical Guide for Improving Flight Path Monitoring, the final report of the Active Pilot Monitoring Working Group. The working group was created to address the issue of aviation incidents with ineffective monitoring as a factor. Meanwhile the CAA have issued a series of Crew Resource Management (CRM) videos. These include one that features a reconstruction of a helicopter incident where a malfunction forced the crew to divert to an unfamiliar airfield. Autopilot mode confusion during the glideslope capture results in loss of control a breakdown in collective situation awareness. UPDATE 18 September 2016: AAIB: Human Factors and the Identification of Flight Control Malfunctions Aerossurance is an Aberdeen based aviation consultancy. For...
read moreEmbraer ERJ 170 FMS Error & Fatigue
Embraer ERJ 170 FMS Error & Fatigue An error programming the Flight Management System (FMS) on a flight to a zinc mine in the Northern Territory has been highlighted by the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB). ATSB reports that Embraer ERJ170 VH-ANO, operated by Airnorth, was flying from Darwin to the Glencore McArthur River Mine, Northern Territory on 10 January 2013. Shortly after passing navigational waypoint SNOOD, 125nm north-west of McArthur River Mine, the aircraft’s flight path started diverging from its planned track. Air traffic control detected this, advised the crew. The aircraft landed safely at Arthur River Mine. ATSB report that: …while updating the aircraft’s flight management system for the descent into McArthur River Mine, the crew unintentionally omitted entering an intended navigational waypoint that was located 25nm north-west of McArthur River Mine. This omission resulted in the aircraft’s autopilot tracking the aircraft direct to the initial approach fix instead of first tracking to the intended waypoint. The crew’s crosschecking processes were not effective in identifying the data input error. ATSB explain that: The omission of the 25nm waypoint when entering data into the Multifunctional Control Display Unit (MCDU) was almost certainly a skill-based error. Omitting a step in a task is one of the most common types of human error (Reason 2002). There was insufficient information to determine if the omission on this occasion was due to a slip (error of execution) or a lapse (error of memory). A range of conditions may have increased the likelihood of the crew not initially detecting the data input error on this occasion. These included: The crew had flown the sector many times before without any similar problems, and probably had a high degree of expectancy that the programming task had been completed successfully. The crew’s focus of attention was probably on the approach being used, which is something that can vary, rather than the 25nm waypoint, which is always the same. Similarly, when the captain conducted the approach briefing, the focus appeared to be on the approach rather than the flight path to the start of the approach. The waypoint check when passing SNOOD was done soon after updating the FMS flight plan. This may have resulted in the crew having a high level of confidence at that time of the correctness of the waypoints. If there had been a longer delay before passing the next waypoint there may have been an increased level of vigilance associated with the waypoint check. Fatigue / Alertness ATSB also found that, the crew had restricted sleep in the previous 24 hours and so were probably experiencing a level of fatigue that is known to have an effect on human performance and alertness. While the operator’s rostering was consistent with regulations, the ATSB say there were limited processes in place to proactively minimise the risk of fatigue, reporting that: Airnorth advised that since the occurrence, the number of E170 flight crew has been augmented, increasing its rostering flexibility. Furthermore, due to schedule changes, the operator no longer used any roster pattern that resulted in planned rosters with flight crews receiving less than 10 hours time off duty overnight. Although not in response to this occurrence, the Civil Aviation Safety Authority has released revised fatigue management and flight and duty time requirements in Civil Aviation Order (CAO) 48.1 Instrument 2013. These new requirements either require operators to...
read moreUK MAA to Integrate EMAR-21 into MRPs
UK MAA to Integrate EMAR-21 into MRPs (Updated: RA 5800 Series Issued August 2016) The UK Military Aviation Authority (MAA) have issued a Regulatory Notice outlining its plans to integrate EMAR-21 (the European Military Airworthiness Requirement Part 21) into the MAA Regulatory Publications (MRP) Design and Modification Engineering (DME) 5000 series. When the MRPs were first issued in 2011, the 5000 series was mostly derived from Defence Standard (DEFSTAN) 05-123. However since 2008 the European Defence Agency (EDA) had been sponsoring the development of a European military requirements broadly equivalent to the civil European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) Part 21 regulations. The UK (both MAA and industry) has been actively engaged in this activity which is seen as having great benefit for future defence procurement projects and should allow design organisations working on both civil and military projects to have more common procedures. EDA is not a rulemaking body like EASA, so the EMARs are not regulations but are simply harmonised requirements. It is the responsibility of each EDA Member State to implement these requirements into their own national military airworthiness regulations. Following preparations that have been underway since April 2013 (involving the MAA, ADS and DE&S Airworthiness Team [DAT]), the MAA have decided to introduce a 5800 series to incorporate EMAR-21, though some existing Regulatory Articles will be retained where they cover material beyond the scope of EMAR-21. An important and welcome development is the planned formal introduction of privileges for design organisations. A programme of briefings is planned, acknowledging that this will be a major change from the DEFSTAN 05-123 based approach. An MAA Notice of Proposed Amendment (NPA) process, in the first quarter of 2015 after the EDA’s Member States have approved the EMAR-21 AMC this autumn. UPDATE 1: The MAA have now issued this NPA on “RA 3100 / 4820 / 4954 / 5101 – Standardization of MAA Approval Policy and Recognition of EASA Part 21 Subpart J Approval”. UPDATE 2: The MAA have also issued a Regulatory Instruction on Invoking Specific Privileges UPDATE 3: MAA/NPA/15/12 was issued on 4 June 2015. As part of the NPA, the MAA has proposed the UK Military Type Certificate Holder (MTCH) shall be the air system Type Airworthiness Authority (TAA) within DE&S. UPDATE 4: There was a further, smaller, second round of of consultation with NPA 16/06 issued on 15 March 2016 on RAs 5212, RA 5219, RA 5401, RA 5502 and RA 5820. UPDATE 5: On 25 August 2016, almost exactly two years after we first discussed this topic online, the MAA issue the following package of Notice of Approved Amendments (NAAs): NAA 16/20: The Design Modification Engineering (DME) RA 5000 Series has undergone a major review, a significant part of which has been to develop the new RA 5800 series based on EMAR 21 Subparts. The RA 5000 Series is henceforth retitled as the Type Airworthiness Engineering (TAE) RA 5000 Series. Note that the RA 5600 and RA 5700 series have not been subject to this review. NAA 16/21: Required to amend RA 5002 and the 5600 and 5700 sub-series to reflect the change in title of the main 5000 series… There are also amendments to cross-references to reflect the re-brigading of the main 5000 series RAs. No changes have been made to the technical content of any of the subject RAs. NAA 16/22: The whole RA has been amended to reflect the improved definition of the responsibilities of the Design Organization (DO) and Co-ordinating Design...
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