Offshore Passenger Fatality 2 July 2014: CHC Medevac Norway
Offshore Passenger Fatality 2 July 2014: CHC Medevac Norway In an unusual and tragic occurrence, the Norwegian press have reported that an ill offshore worker being medevaced to shore on 2 July 2014 died after apparently being able to exit the CHC H225 helicopter in flight. The patient was being transferred form the Statoil Troll A platform to Bergen, when it is reported that: …the man was reportedly able to come out of the helicopter at an altitude of about 600 metres and fell into the sea, only a few kilometres from land, at about 8:45am. Details are limited and investigations are underway. UPDATE 25 April 2015: The Petroleum Safety Authority reported: In 2014, there was one fatal incident in connection with transporting a mentally unstable person. The patient was medically cleared for transport ashore by SAR helicopter by a doctor and nurse, but jumped out of an emergency exit/window at a height of 2,000 feet roughly 10 minutes before landing. Aerossurance has extensive offshore helicopter safety, flight operations, SAR and accident analysis experience. For aviation advice you can trust, contact us at: enquiries@aerossurance.com Follow us on LinkedIn and on Twitter @Aerossurance for our latest...
read moreMilitary Mid Air Collisions
Military Mid Air Collisions One recent accident in Germany and the release of a Service Inquiry into a UK Mid Air Collision (MAC) highlight the importance of managing MAC risk. The UK Military Aviation Authority (MAA) consider MAC to be one of the highest risk hazards in military aviation (as discussed in para 5a of their 2012-2013 Annual Report and highlighted in their first annual report, for 2010-2011). In fact, of the five 2* Operating Duty Holders in the UK military (three RAF, one RN and one Army), four consider it to be their ‘top risk’. Between 2008 and 2012, the MAA report that 48% of all Airproxes in the UK, examined by the UK Airprox Board, involved military aircraft. Definition of an Airprox (ICAO Doc 4444: PANS-ATM): An Airprox is a situation in which, in the opinion of a pilot or air traffic services personnel, the distance between aircraft as well as their relative positions and speed have been such that the safety of the aircraft involved may have been compromised. Tornadoes, Moray Firth, Scotland – July 2012 One sad illustration of the devastating consequences of MAC, can be found in the Service Inquiry (SI) published on 30 June 2014 into the MAC involving Panavia Tornado GR4s ZD743 and ZD812 over the Moray Firth in Scotland on 3 July 2012. The two aircraft, both from Operational Conversion Unit XV(R) Squadron based at nearby RAF Lossiemouth, were operating independently as ABBOT 2 and ASTON 1 and collided at 920ft above the sea in Class G airspace. Three of the four crew perished. The survivor, injured during ejection, was recovered by RAF 202 Squadron Westland Sea King HAR3 after 75 minutes in 12ºC water, wearing flying coveralls (but not an immersion suit). While the associated text is relatively heavily redacted it is clear that his core temperature had dropped to a critical level. The report highlights that UK military sea survival regulation and RAF survival policy were out of date. The continued lack of automatically activating 406MHz beacons for fast jet aircrew is another point raised (even though the international agreement to only monitor for 406MHz using the COSPAS-SARSAT satellite system was made in 2000 with 8 years 4 months notice of the 2009 implementation). A number of other observations relate to the Search and Rescue activity. On the eve of the report’s release, the press were focusing on the procurement of a Collision Warning System (CWS) for the Tornado fleet. The BBC observing: The 300-page report is particularly critical of the processes within the MoD, which meant that procurement of a collision warning system for the Tornado fleet was repeatedly delayed, deferred and at one point deleted. This is no great surprise as it has been a matter of long running interest in parliament and the subject of discussion in past MAA Annual Reports. The report does however examine this saga in critical detail. However, a CWS such as ACAS2 (already fitted to the BAE Systems Hawk T2), is only a final line of defence. Other hardware defences were found wanting. The local military Secondary Surveillance Radar (SSR) was unavailable due to scheduled maintenance and one aircraft had an unserviceable Radar Homing & Warning Receiver (RHWR). While unrelated, the SI also highlighted short comings in the safeguarding of the SSR and navaids. The SI identifies ‘procedural drift’ in the air weapons range procedures and practices as another contributory factor...
read moreOPITO Compressed Air Emergency Breathing System (CA-EBS) Initial Deployment Training Standard
OPITO Compressed Air Emergency Breathing System (CA-EBS) Initial Deployment Training Standard OPITO has issued a standard for Compressed Air Emergency Breathing System (CA-EBS) Initial Deployment Training, to support the initial introduction of Category A Emergency Breathing System (EBS) following the a UK Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) Review, which resulted in the CAP1145 report. To successfully complete this 1.5 hour ‘dry’ training, delegates must able to: Explain the fundamental differences between re-breather and compressed air systems (technology and use) Explain the rationale and use of CA-EBS in helicopter emergencies Explain the hazards associated with CA-EBS Demonstrate a pre-flight inspection of the life jacket and CA-EBS Demonstrate donning the life jacket with CA-EBS correctly, including ‘buddy check’ Demonstrate an emergency deployment of the CA-EBS in a dry environment UPDATE 1 July 2014 Step Change in Safety issued a further update: The approval and certification of the new CAT A EBS and the MK 50 Lifejacket is progressing and expected within the next few days. This is a credit to the great work that the HSSG EBS Workgroup has done in collaboration with Survitec Group. OPITO have pulled out all the stops and developed and issued the training standard in record time. Their approach has been one of pragmatic support and as a result has offered considerable flexibility in how we, as an industry, can meet the challenge of training everyone to use the new EBS equipment. In the next few days we will issue support material to member companies to provide them the necessary information as we move into the next critical phase of training and deployment. The new dual chamber Mk 50 lifejacket, from UK company Survitec, is to be approved by the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) and the EBS is to be approved by CAA in accordance with the Category A specification in CAP1034. Aerossurance has discussed the Category A EBS previously here and the recent Oil & Gas UK’s annual aviation seminar here. UPDATE July 2014 Step Change in Safety issued a further update that detailed the system’s performance and further roll-out plans. UPDATE 1 September 2014 Energy Voice interviews Step Change in Safety team leader Les Linklater. UPDATE 1 November 2014 OPITO has commenced their periodic review of the 3 day Basic Offshore Safety Induction and Emergency Training (BOSIET) and the 1 day Further Offshore Emergency Training (FOET) courses. Its within these that most HUET training is delivered. Among the issues being considered are: These are international standard but the CA-EBS is mandatory in the UK only, how to keep the standard generic worldwide? In-water CA-EBS training has potential health risks, how to prevent accidents from happening during training? In-water CA-EBS training might conflict with local laws and regulations, how to make sure that the training stays within local legislation? UPDATE 14 December 2014: Further CA-EBS options have now been approved. UPDATE 24 December 2015: UK BOSIET/FOET Cat-A EBS HUET Update UPDATE 24 January 2016: CAP1145 Helicopter Water Impact Survivability Statistics – A Critique UPDATE 25 January 2016: OPITO has issued an update that the ‘interim’ standard will be introduced across the UK on 15 February 2016. They have provided two sets of FAQs: Oil and gas workforce – BOSIET FAQs Training Providers – BOSIET FAQs UPDATE 20 September 2016: The UK CAA today briefed the Oil and Gas UK Aviation Seminar the following: UPDATE 26 September 2017: ASD-STAN prEN 4856 for Rotorcraft — Emergency Breathing Systems (EBS) — Requirements, testing and marking has been issued. This will then become a full European Standard (EN) via CEN and be incorporated in...
read moreEC120 Underslung Load Accident 26 September 2013 – Report
EC120 Underslung Load Accident 26 September 2013 – Report Airbus Helicopters EC120B, SE-JHH, operated by Kallax Flyg, was engaged in a reindeer herding approximately 85 km north of Kiruna, in Northern Sweden on 26 September 2013. The customer requested a broken 350kg quad bike be moved to a nearby village. This was left to the end of the flying programme to when the aircraft had burnt off fuel. The helicopter took off with the quad attached to a 12-metre cable and 4-metre straps. The functioning of the cargo hook was checked. Following take-off the helicopter turned downwind to avoid terrain but started to settle, resulting in the load hitting the ground. The load was dragged as the pilot flared to cushion the landing and the helicopter hit the ground, rolling over. The three people on board escaped without any serious injuries. The Swedish Accident Investigation Board (Statens Haverikommission [SHK]) published their final report on 11 June 2014. The SHK concludes that the complexity of the task was underestimated. The Board further concludes that a misinterpretation of the wind direction and angle of the terrain may have contributed. The Board also postulated that the pilot may not have ‘pickled’ (released) the load because of a focus on flying the helicopters as it settled. SHK recommends the Swedish Transport Agency (STA) ensures that: Operators engaging in flight with sling loads conduct practical exercises of simulated emergency release in their training. Aerossurance observes that impromptu tasking is an immediate warning sign of a potential increase in risk and that risk is often highest at the start and at the finish of a series of tasks. Aviation Safety Network entry is here. Aerossurance has recently reported an underslung load accident in Australia here. UPDATE 4 February 2017: Unexpected Load: AS350B3 USL / External Cargo Accident in Norway UPDATE 12 November 2017: Unexpected Load: B407 USL / External Cargo Accident in PNG UPDATE 3 June 2018: Helicopter Wildlife Netting Accidents In May 2018 the NTSB published two reports into accidents involving helicopters attempting to carry out wildlife net captures. UPDATE 28 July 2018: Wayward Window: Fatal Loss of a Fire-Fighting Helicopter in NZ UPDATE 21 October 2018: Fallacy of ‘Training Out’ Error: Japanese AS332L1 Dropped Load UPDATE 1 December 2018: Helicopter Tail Rotor Strike from Firefighting Bucket UPDATE 20 December 2019: Helicopter External Sling Load Operation Occurrences in New Zealand UPDATE 11 April 2020: Bear Paws Claw Reindeer Herding Bell 206 UPDATE 28 June 2020: Maintenance Issues in Fire-Fighting S-61A Accident UPDATE 26 July 2020: Impromptu Landing – Unseen Cable UPDATE 7 September 2020: Shocking Accident: Two Workers Electrocuted During HESLO UPDATE 31 October 2020: Loss of Control During HESLO Construction Task: BEA Highlight Wellbeing / Personal Readiness UPDATE 2 April 2021: Windscreen Rain Refraction: Mountain Mine Site HESLO CFIT UPDATE 12 June 2021: HESLO Dynamic Rollover in Alaska UPDATE 28 August 2021: Ditching after Blade Strike During HESLO from a Ship UPDATE 4 September 2021: Dynamic Rollover During HESLO at Gusty Mountain Site UPDATE 25 September 2021: Fuel Starvation During Powerline HESLO UPDATE 1 January 2022: Snagged Sling Line Pulled into Main Rotor During HESLO Shutdown UPDATE 18 March 2023: HESLO AS350 Fatal Accident Positioning with an Unloaded Long Line UPDATE 5 August 2023: A Concrete Case of Commercial Pressure: Fatal Swiss HESLO Accident Aerossurance has extensive HESLO, helicopter flight operations, safety and contracting experience. For practical aviation advice you can trust, contact us at: enquiries@aerossurance.com Follow us on LinkedIn and on Twitter @Aerossurance for our latest...
read more‘Freedom to speak up?’ in the NHS: independent review
Sir Robert Francis QC is to chair an independent review into creating an open and honest reporting culture in the National Health Service (NHS). It has been announced that the review will: …provide independent advice and recommendations to ensure that: NHS workers can raise concerns in the public interest with confidence that they will not suffer detriment as a result appropriate action is taken when concerns are raised by NHS workers where NHS whistleblowers are mistreated, those mistreating them will be held to account. It will also consider independent mediation and appeal mechanisms. Aerossurance welcomes the initiative, but does think it is perhaps unfortunate that the emphasis is on whistleblowing, the most extreme form of safety reporting, rather than routine, open and cooperative reporting. Francis, a barrister specialising in medical negligence, previously chaired the Mid Staffordshire Inquiry into what have been described as ‘appalling’ standard of patient care at one the 260 NHS Trusts between 2005 and 2009 that is thought to be responsible for hundreds of deaths. Francis has been described as ‘formidable’ and ‘forensically exceptional’ by solicitors who have hired him. The Guardian has commented that Francis’ new report: …needs to be short and punchy. It will only help change culture if everyone in the NHS can read and understand it; plain English, not lawyerly circumlocution, is required. The NHS not only works in an a sector where there are large risk of human error resulting in fatalities but it is also the world’s fifth largest employer. UPDATE 11 Feb 2015: The report is published. It recommends: A “Freedom to Speak Up Guardian” to be appointed in every NHS trust to support staff, particularly junior members. A national independent officer to help guardians when cases are going wrong. A new support scheme to help NHS staff who have found themselves out of a job as a result of raising concerns. Processes established at all trusts to make sure concerns are heard and investigated properly The Chief Executive of the NHS responded: As a nation we can rightly be proud of the fact that NHS care is now the safest it has ever been. But as I’ve sat down and listened hard to whistleblowers over the past year, it’s blindingly obvious that the NHS has been missing a huge opportunity to learn and improve the care we offer to patients and the way we treat our staff. These important proposals – particularly for a new national office of the whistleblower – will provide clear new safeguards and signal a decisive change in culture in every part of the health service. UPDATE 16 July 2015: The Secretary of State for Health Jeremy Hunt announced that the recommendations will be taken forward as part of a package of patient safety improvements, releasing the report Learning not Blaming. For expert advice on safety reporting and safety culture development, contact Aerossurance at enquiries@aerossurance.com Follow us on LinkedIn for our latest updates and on Twitter...
read moreFour 2014 Helicopter Accidents (Australia, Norway & Alaska)
Four 2014 Helicopter Accidents (Australia, Norway & Alaska) Alaska (1): R44 N392GP On 28 May 2014, piston engined Robinson R44 helicopter N392GP, operated by survey company Global Positioning Services Inc, crashed while conducting underslung (HESLO) load training at Chugiak, Alaska. The pilot was the sole person on-board and died in the accident. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) have issued a preliminary report. After impact, there was a post crash fire. The R44 has a history of post impact fires. Robinson introduced a Service Bulletin in 2012 to replace the original aluminium fuel tanks with more impact‑resistant bladder‑type fuel tanks. Although Robinson recommend that this SB is embodied, in most countries it only has legal force when an Airworthiness Directive (AD) is adopted. In the US, the NTSB have recommended this (SB) be made mandatory. As yet the US regulator, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has chosen not to issue an AD, but simply ‘recommend’ this SB. The Australian accident investigation agency, the Australia Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB), who have investigated several R44 accidents with catastrophic post-crash fires has also recommended that operators embody the SB. The regulator in Europe, the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), disagrees with the FAA and does believe that the original tanks result in an ‘unsafe condition’ and issued an Airworthiness Directive earlier this year, applicable in all EASA Member States. UPDATE: the probable cause was added 9 August 2017: The pilot’s loss of control of the helicopter due to impairment or incapacitation from a sudden, acute cardiac event. Alaska (2): R44 N74713 Another R44 helicopter, N74713, operated by Quicksilver, crashed in northern Alaska near Coldfoot (population 10 and a truck stop on the Dalton Highway from Fairbanks to Prudhoe Bay), on 18 June 2014, as described subsequently in local press reports and a very brief NTSB database entry. The helicopter rolled on landing and there were no injuries. The helicopter was carrying a team of geologists from the Alaska Division of Geological and Geophysical Surveys (DGGS) that was making the trip to examine frozen debris lobes, slow moving landslides occurring in permafrost, that are threatening the Dalton Highway, the North Slope Haul Road. UPDATE: the probable cause was added 14 August 2014: The pilot’s failure to maintain adequate main rotor rpm while maneuvering at a low altitude, which resulted in an emergency landing on uneven terrain. The pilot included very reflective recommendations in the accident report form: Coincidentally the DGGS’s parent department, Alaska Department of Natural Resources, has just put out a notice for helicopter contractor to provide heli-borne geophysical surveys for two areas in interior and southern Alaska, with tenders due by 2 July 2014. Coldfoot has a small private airstrip, at which there was an accident to a DHC-3T Turbine Otter in 2011, that landed on soft ground. Australia: Bell 206L3 VH-NKW The Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) has commenced an investigation into a collision with terrain involving Bell 206L3, VH-NKW, at the Scotia 3D Seismic Camp, near Taroom, Queensland, on 20 June 2014. The helicopter was operated by MI Helicopters. While conducting sling load (HESLO) operations, the load became tangled. The pilot reportedly attempted to land, but at about 10 ft above ground level, the line pulled tight. The pilot was unable to release the line (aka ‘pickle the load’) and the helicopter collided with the terrain. The pilot received minor injuries and the aircraft was substantially damaged....
read moreAsiana B777 Accident at SFO 6 July 2013
Asiana Accident at San Francisco 6 July 2013 (Asiana Flight 214, Boeing 777 HL7742) There are a host of human factors, automation, crashworthiness, survivability and emergency response lessons from this 2013 accident. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) held a Board Meeting in Washington on 24 June 2014 to finalise their conclusions on this landing accident to Asiana Flight 214, Boeing 777 HL7742 at San Francisco International Airport. Acting Chairman’s Opening Statement IIC Opening Presentation – Bill English, Investigator-in-Charge Operational Factors Presentation – Roger Cox, Operations Group Chairman Human Performance Presentation – Dr. William Bramble, Senior Human Performance Investigator Survival Factors Presentation – Jason Fedok, Survival Factors Group Chairman Acting Chairman’s Closing Statement A summary can be found here. The full report is here. NTSB Probable Cause: ….the flight crew’s mismanagement of the airplane’s descent during the visual approach, the PF’s unintended deactivation of automatic airspeed control, the flight crew’s inadequate monitoring of airspeed, and the flight crew’s delayed execution of a go-around after they became aware that the airplane was below acceptable glidepath and airspeed tolerances. Contributing to the accident were (1) the complexities of the autothrottle and autopilot flight director systems that were inadequately described in Boeing’s documentation and Asiana’s pilot training, which increased the likelihood of mode error; (2) the flight crew’s nonstandard communication and coordination regarding the use of the autothrottle and autopilot flight director systems; (3) the PF’s inadequate training on the planning and execution of visual approaches; (4) the PM/instructor pilot’s inadequate supervision of the PF; and (5) flight crew fatigue, which likely degraded their performance. Aviation Week & Space Technology highlighted one significant recommendation, the call for a special certification review, a rare measure for an in-service aircraft. Immediately after the accident there was speculation on the influence of national culture: Could Malcolm Gladwell’s Theory of Cockpit Culture Apply to Asiana Crash?. This was based on the discussion in Malcolm Gladwell‘s book Outliers on the 1997 Korean Air B747 accident in Guam. This logic was rapidly debunked: Culturalism, Gladwell, and Airplane Crashes. There is also a view on the traps investigators fall into: A careful listener will note the presenter falls into his own first trap at 2:16! Other Safety Resources Investigation into Jet Airways B777 VT-JEK Serious Incident at Heathrow Singapore Airlines B777 41t Fuel Discrepancy Incident B777 in Autoland Mode Left Runway When Another Aircraft Interfered With the Localiser Signal Forgotten Fasteners – Serious Incidents UPDATE 6 February 2020: Emirates B777 Runway Impact During Attempted Go-Around, 3 August 2016, Dubai: Accident Report UPDATE 3 July 2020: Fatigue Featured in Anchorage Alaska Air Ambulance Accident UPDATE 3 July 2020: New surveillance, eyewitness footage of Asiana Flight 214 crash released The clips, obtained by The Desk…include a previously-unknown eyewitness video shot by a crane operator moments after the jet crashed on runway 28L. In the video, the operator could be heard describing the incident as it unfolded to a nearby worker. Aerossurance has extensive air safety, flight operations, airworthiness, human factors, survivability, aviation regulation and safety analysis experience. For practical aviation advice you can trust, contact us at: enquiries@aerossurance.com Follow us on LinkedIn and on Twitter @Aerossurance for our latest...
read moreMisjudgement during abrupt helicopter maneuvering
Misjudgement during abrupt helicopter manoeuvring (AS350B3 LN-OVO) The Accident Investigation Board Norway (the Statens Havarikommisjon for Transport) has issued its report into an accident that occurred to Airbus Helicopters AS350B3, LN-OVO, operated by Fonnafly AS, on 27 April 2013. Their report is in Norwegian only. The helicopter was being used to transport personnel participating in the Røldal Freeride 2013 alpine skiing event. The flight started at the Hordatun Hotel, with five persons on board. AIBN report: As the helicopter ascended along the ski slope, a steep 360 degree turn was executed. Near the completion of the turn the helicopter came too low and hit the ground. No one on board were seriously injured. The helicopter was destroyed. Based on this investigation, the SHT is of the opinion that the accident with LN-OVO is a consequence of misjudgement during abrupt manoeuvring at low altitude. AIBN go on to say: Breathalyzer tests carried out by the police indicates that the commander may have been under the influence of alcohol, which, if that was the case, would have influenced negatively on his decisions and performance. Aerossurance understands this turn of phrase was adopted because, for reasons that are unclear, analysis of a blood sample was not subsequently completed. Aerossurance has extensive air safety, operations, SAR, airworthiness, human factors, aviation regulation and safety analysis experience. For practical aviation advice you can trust, contact us at: enquiries@aerossurance.com Follow us on LinkedIn and on Twitter @Aerossurance for our latest updates. TRANSLATE with x English Arabic Hebrew Polish Bulgarian Hindi Portuguese Catalan Hmong Daw Romanian Chinese Simplified Hungarian Russian Chinese Traditional Indonesian Slovak Czech Italian Slovenian Danish Japanese Spanish Dutch Klingon Swedish English Korean Thai Estonian Latvian Turkish Finnish Lithuanian Ukrainian French Malay Urdu German Maltese Vietnamese Greek Norwegian Welsh Haitian Creole Persian TRANSLATE with COPY THE URL BELOW Back EMBED THE SNIPPET BELOW IN YOUR SITE Enable collaborative features and customize widget: Bing Webmaster Portal...
read more737 Descent Below Instrument Approach Minima – HF Lessons
737 Descent below Instrument Approach Minima – HF Lessons Human factors are discussed in the report into an incident in New Zealand. Using the autopilot, the aircraft descended on the glideslope but at decision height (200 feet Above Ground Level) the aircraft was still in cloud and the runway or approach lights were not visible. The captain however did not initiate a go-around, but just as first officer and check captain were about to intervene, the approach lights became visible at about 100 feet AGL and the captain continued for a safe landing. On 26 June 2014, the New Zealand Transport Accident Investigation Commission (TAIC) issued their report into this incident with an Air New Zealand Boeing 737-300, registration ZK-NGH in Christchurch on 29 October 2011. Crew: Captain (Pilot Flying): 68, ATPL, 23,875 hours total, 7,210 hours on type FO: (Pilot Monitoring): 43, ATPL, 8,420 hours total, 2,320 hours on type Check Captain: 49, ATPL, 17,200 hours total, 9,200 hours on type The weather forecast for Christchurch indicated broken cloud ceiling at 1200 feet, rain, visibility of 1500 meters reducing to 200 meters in rain. As the aircraft approached the airport was reporting overcast cloud at 300 feet, runway wet, winds from 020 degrees at 6 knots, visibility of 6000 meters reducing to 2000 meters TAIC state: A pilot not initiating a missed approach when they do not have the required visual reference at decision height is a safety issue. Before reaching the decision height, the captain had failed to respond to two other procedural check calls, and these two failures went unchallenged by the first officer, which is another safety issue. …the captain did not comply fully with the procedures and perform the mandatory missed approach because he was under stress brought on by a combination of factors comprising: the Canterbury earthquakes and their aftershocks, personal health issues and anxiety associated with the route check flight. The captain’s communication style could have been described as minimalistic – not wishing to promote interactive communication. He had a reported reputation within the company for saying little on the flight deck, and the first officer was aware of that reputation. The captain’s communication style and his reputation could well have contributed to the observed breakdown in the communication loop during the approach to Christchurch. It could also explain why the first officer was unwilling to challenge the lack of response to the 1000-feet call.. In this case the first officer should have challenged the captain on two occasions for not making the correct response to the automatic calls generated by the aeroplane systems. The first officer was aware that the captain was being assessed, but he said that this was not an issue as far as he was concerned. However, the psychologist was of the opinion that any first officer faced with the captain’s uncommunicative style, in a similar situation could have found themselves having to determine the boundaries of their involvement. Stepping in too early to take corrective action or waiting too long for the captain to respond to a call may have been resented by the captain or seen by the check captain as interfering with the check process. In other words, because the two pilots were meant to act as a team, the first officer’s performance could be perceived as...
read moreThat Others May Live – Inadvertent IMC & The Value of Flight Data Monitoring
That Others May Live – Inadvertent IMC & The Value of Flight Data Monitoring Airbus Helicopters have produced a remarkable 15 minute video that describes the lessons from an Inadvertent Instrument Metrological Condition (IIMC) incident during a Helicopter Emergency Medical Service (HEMS) flight in the US, which includes a frank interview with the pilot. That Others May Live Video Inadvertant IMC Such operation in a Degraded Visual Environment (DVE) was the subject of a UK Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) research report in 2003. Analysis by the European Helicopter Safety Analysis Team (EHSAT) shows that the resulting spatial disorientation in IIMC/DVE is a major cause of accidents. Consequently, the French Institut pour l’Amélioration de la Sécurité Aérienne (IASA) developed a video to highlight the threat. Vision 1000 This event, which could so easily have been a fatal accident, would have passed by with no learning if it wasn’t for the data from a small on-board Appareo Vision 1000 unit. Vision 1000 was developed by Appareo with Airbus Helicopters (formerly Eurocopter), and enhances the low cost, lightweight flight data recorder capability of Appareo’s earlier ALERTS system (developed in partnership with Bristow Group), by adding a cockpit camera. Vision 1000 was first introduced in 2009. The unit weighs around 300g, can be retrofitted for less than US$10,000, requires simply a 28V power supply and can record up to two hours of sound and visual images and now in the order of 200 hours of flight data. It has been standard on US produced AS350s for a number of years and Airbus Helicopters have announced it will be standard on all their new production helicopters. Airbus Helicopters Vision 1000 Video: Appareo FDM Brochure Examples: EC135, EC145 UPDATE 5 November 2014: NTSB held a board meeting on a loss of control accident in 2013 to an Alaskan State Trooper AS350B engaged in a search and rescue mission. NTSB made a number of findings and recommendations and again emphasise the value of recorders such as, in this case, the Appareo Vision 1000. UPDATE 10 June 2018: Italian HEMS AW139 Inadvertent IMC Accident We look at the ANSV report on a HEMS helicopter Inadvertent IMC event that ended with an AW139 colliding with a mountain in poor visibility. UPDATE 31 March 2021: Aerossurance has first-hand experience with the development of FDM technology and the implementation & management of FDM programmes. For aviation advice you can trust, contact: enquiries@aerossurance.com Follow us on LinkedIn and on Twitter @Aerossurance for our latest updates. TRANSLATE with x English Arabic Hebrew Polish Bulgarian Hindi Portuguese Catalan Hmong Daw Romanian Chinese Simplified Hungarian Russian Chinese Traditional Indonesian Slovak Czech Italian Slovenian Danish Japanese Spanish Dutch Klingon Swedish English Korean Thai Estonian Latvian Turkish Finnish Lithuanian Ukrainian French Malay Urdu German Maltese Vietnamese Greek Norwegian Welsh Haitian Creole Persian TRANSLATE with COPY THE URL BELOW Back EMBED THE SNIPPET BELOW IN YOUR SITE Enable collaborative features and customize widget: Bing Webmaster Portal...
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