Ingestible Stomach Acid-Powered Health Monitoring Pill
Ingestible Stomach Acid-Powered Health Monitoring Pill When Aerossurance normally discusses Health Monitoring technology its typically the monitoring for failures in engines and helicopter gear boxes. A new development moves health monitoring into a new realm that offers exciting possibilities to human fatigue and alertness researchers. Researchers from MIT and Brigham and Women’s Hospital in Boston, Massachusetts designed a high-tech health monitoring pill can be swallowed by humans. It has an energy harvesting galvanic cell that runs on the acidic fluids in the stomach using zinc and copper electrodes, eliminating the risk of using battery power. Giovanni Traverso, a research affiliate at the Koch Institute for Integrative Cancer Research explained: We need to come up with ways to power these ingestible systems for a long time. We see the GI [Gastrointestinal] tract as providing a really unique opportunity to house new systems for drug delivery and sensing, and fundamental to these systems is how they are powered. It is reported that: The pill is small—about 40 millimeters long and 12 millimeters in diameter—though researchers hope to shrink it to a third of that size in the next prototype, as well as add other types of sensors and tweak it for long-term monitoring of vital signs. The device delivered an average power of 0.23 μW mm−2 of electrode area. …the device generated enough power to allow the transmitter to send a signal every 12 seconds to a base station two meters away. Once the device moved to the less acidic small intestine—it took an average of six days to travel the digestive tract—the amount of power fell to only 1/100 of what it produced in the stomach, though researchers hope to find a way to harness the power there as well. It is also reported that: Scientists have explored other techniques for powering ingestible electronics, but many of these methods are not well suited to these devices. One technique they tried was harvesting energy from the body’s heat. But they couldn’t generate enough of a thermal gradient in the gut to make this work. And because these capsules cannot easily be anchored to a moving surface, it has been challenging to harvest energy from vibrations. A study that tested the device on pigs was published recently in Nature Biomedical Engineering. Lead author Phillip Nadeau said in the statement: You could have a self-powered pill that would monitor your vital signs from inside for a couple of weeks, and you don’t even have to think about it. It just sits there making measurements and transmitting them to your phone. While such a device offers exciting possibilities for medical diagnosis, albeit with data privacy concerns, it also offers new ways to research human performance and alertness. British Airways have filed a patent to use such devices as part of a program to help reduce jet lag by optimising meal and rest times. See also our article: Maintenance Personnel Fatigue and Alertness UPDATE 17 August 2017: Discussing earlier technology: Army researchers hope device can improve safety for airborne soldiers Aerossurance has extensive air safety, operations, airworthiness, human factors, aviation regulation and safety analysis experience. For practical aviation advice you can trust, contact us at: enquiries@aerossurance.com Follow us on LinkedIn and on Twitter @Aerossurance for our latest...
read morePerception and Fatigue: RCAF CH124 Sea King Engine Failure
Perception and Fatigue: RCAF CH124 Sea King Engine Shutdown The Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) have reported on an incident during training of a new Maintenance Test Pilot (MTP) that lead to an engine failure on Sikorsky CH124 Sea King CH12428 on 11 May 2015 over the Strait of Juan de Fuca, South of Victoria, British Columbia. During the conduct of the number one engine manual throttle topping check, the MTP Trainee inadvertently bumped the manual throttle slightly forward and had to re-establish hand position on the manual throttle lever. The investigation determined that the AC [Aircraft Commander] misinterpreted the motion of the MTP Trainee gaining a better grip on the manual throttle control lever as the MTP Trainee closing the manual throttle. This perception error led to a cascade of subsequent events, which began with the act of lowering the collective and resulted in engine failure. They go on to say that: Fatigue was identified as a significant contributing factor leading to the perception error. The Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) is currently in the process of implementing a Fatigue Risk Management System (FRMS), which will be a multi-layered approach to preventing fatigue and managing fatigue-related risk. Full implementation of the RCAF FRMS is anticipated for mid-2017. Fatigue-modelling capability and FRMS are being developed as components of the RCAF Mission Acceptance / Launch Authorization (MALA) risk management tool. Although not directly causal to this occurrence, collateral findings and recommendations were also made regarding Aircraft Operating Instruction procedures and cautions for operating the manual throttle. The RCAF provide no further information on how the fatigue occurred or the specific engine damage. Safety Resources Embraer ERJ 170 FMS Error & Fatigue Maintenance Personnel Fatigue and Alertness Fatigued Flight Test Crew Superjet 100 Crosswind Accident UPDATE 4 August: 2018: US HEMS EC135 Dual Engine Failure: 7 July 2018 UPDATE 3 July 2020: Fatigue Featured in Anchorage Alaska Air Ambulance Accident UPDATE 26 September 2020: Fatal Fatigue: US Night Air Ambulance Helicopter LOC-I Accident UPDATE 9 April 2022: SAR Seat Slip Smash (RCAF CH149 Leonardo Cormorant LOC-I) Aerossurance is pleased to be supporting the annual Chartered Institute of Ergonomics & Human Factors’ (CIEHF) Human Factors in Aviation Safety Conference for the third year running. This year the conference takes place 13 to 14 November 2017 at the Hilton London Gatwick Airport, UK with the theme: How do we improve human performance in today’s aviation business? Aerossurance has extensive air safety, operations, airworthiness, human factors, aviation regulation and safety analysis experience. For practical aviation advice you can trust, contact us at: enquiries@aerossurance.com Follow us on LinkedIn and on Twitter @Aerossurance for our latest...
read moreHazardous Hangar Hovertaxi
Hazardous Hangar Hovertaxi The pilot of Robinson R44 N804DF decided to hover-taxi into a hangar in Spofford, Texas because, as he told the US National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB): …convective activity was approaching the airport and he did not have ground-handling equipment (wheels) to move the helicopter. While that might be considered reckless by some, emboldened by successfully manoeuvring into the hangar: The following morning [on 19 February 2017], he attempted to hover-taxi out of the hangar for a positioning flight…. Our regular readers will no doubt be anticipating what happened next: …but the main rotor blade struck the top of the hangar door when the helicopter was about three-quarters of the way out of the hangar. Subsequently, the helicopter spun and rolled over onto its left side. The pilot suffered minor injuries. The aircraft was written off. Unsurprisingly, the NTSB determined the probable cause as: The pilot’s decision to hover-taxi out of the hangar and his subsequent failure to maintain clearance from the hangar. Of particular concern is this was not a private aircraft but one operated by an air tour operator from whom a higher standard of airmanship, risk assessment and judgement should be expected.. Ground handling wheels come as standard with a new R44 (which retail from around $500k). After-market ground handling wheels are availed for c$2k. There is only one type of hangar it is acceptable to land ‘in’: UPDATE 21 August 2021: Air Methods AS350B3 Night CFIT in Snow during a 3-minute positioning flight UPDATE 9 October 2021: Gazelle Caught Out Jumping a Fence UPDATE 30 October 2021: RLC B407 Reverses into Sister Ship at GOM Heliport UPDATE 5 March 2022: Taxiing AW139 Blade Strike on Maintenance Stand Aerossurance is pleased to be supporting the annual Chartered Institute of Ergonomics & Human Factors’ (CIEHF) Human Factors in Aviation Safety Conference for the third year running. This year the conference takes place 13 to 14 November 2017 at the Hilton London Gatwick Airport, UK with the theme: How do we improve human performance in today’s aviation business? Aerossurance has extensive air safety, operations, airworthiness, human factors, aviation regulation and safety analysis experience. For practical aviation advice you can trust, contact us at: enquiries@aerossurance.com Follow us on LinkedIn and on Twitter @Aerossurance for our latest...
read moreSuper Puma Epicyclic Gear Health Monitoring Background
Super Puma Epicyclic Gear Health Monitoring Background The investigation into loss of CHC Helikopter Service Airbus Helicopters EC225/H225 LN-OJF on 29 April 2016 has created interest in the health monitoring on the type’s epicyclic planet gears. This article draws on a the most recent Accident Investigation Board Norway (AIBN – the Statens Havarikommisjon for Transport [SHT] in Norwegian) 102 page preliminary report on the LN-OJF accident, issued on 28 April 2017. AIBN say that LN-OJF suffered a second stage planet gear fatigue failure which… …had its origin in the surface of the upper outer gear race of the planet gear. It started at the surface and propagated sub-surface with a shallow angle into the bulk material, turning towards the web of the gear teeth and the final through-thickness fracture. This had similarities to the Bond G-REDL AS332L2 Super Puma accident on 1 April 2009 in the UK (the AS332L2 being the previous member of the Super Puma family). Aerossurance examined the wider aspects of the accident in our feature: EC225 LN-OJF Norway Accident Investigation Timeline We discussed the particular component that failed in our article: Super Puma Second Stage Planet Gear Background Readers wishing to understand the wider gearbox architecture are advised to read Aerossurance’s article: EC225 Main Rotor Head and Main Gear Box (MGB) Design In this article we look at the oil debris health monitoring and vibration health monitoring matters in more detail. The EC225 Main Gearbox Magnetic Chip Detection (MCD) Health Monitoring The EC225 is fitted with an MCD system designed to detect and retain chips of ferrous debris from gears, bearings etc. The AIBN state that Airbus Helicopters has confirmed to them that this system is “the primary method of detecting planet gear bearing degradation” and relies on “the gears shedding metallic debris before failure”. This is typically in the form of a mechanism known as spalling. Spalling is one of the most common bearing failure modes. The AIBN explain that: For the EC 225 LP, the mast bearing chip detector, the epicyclic module chip detector and the sump chip detector are connected to a flight crew warning circuit. Thus, a visual warning to the flight crew is provided when one particle of sufficient size or a sufficient cumulative quantity of particles, bridge the axial gap of the magnetic plug. The oil cooler chip detector is not connected to any warning system [and so is known magnetic plug / mag plug] and must be inspected visually [periodically]. Changes after the G-REDL Accident A number of actions were taken after the 2009 G-REDL accident: Removal of the epicyclic module magnets. The oil collector plates under the epicyclic module of the EC225 and the AS332L2 had been designed with a ring of magnets to catch particles coming from the epicyclic module and falling into the lower gears. The AIBN say that in the case of G-REDL “It was thought that these magnets prevented particles from entering the chip detectors and thus reduced the efficiency of the chip detection system”. However, they were never checked when gear material was found 36 flying hours before the G-REDL accident as the debris was misidentified (see below). Recommended connection of the epicyclic module chip detector to the crew warning circuit for AS332L2 (thus matching the EC225 design). Standardised reduction of chip detectors visual inspection intervals. Revised removal criteria for the MGB following collection of particles. At the time of LN-OJF accident, the criteria for MGB removal was accumulation of 50mm²...
read moreHelicopter Ops and Safety – Gulf Of Mexico 2016 Update
Helicopter Ops and Safety – Gulf of Mexico 2016 Update The Helicopter Safety Advisory Conference (HSAC) has been publishing data on the Gulf of Mexico (‘GOM’) offshore helicopter fleet and its safety since 1995. We have looked at their 2014 and 2015 reports previously. Now we examine their 2016 data. Helicopter Operations: GOM Fleet Data HSAC report that flying activity continues to decline, with just under 196k flying hours in 2016 (14% down on the 228k in 2015 and vs 298k in 2014 and 410k in the peak year of 2007). The fleet is now 344 helicopters (only slightly down on the 346 in 2015 but vs 415 in 2014). Flying hours, passenger numbers and flights have dropped by 38%, 34% and 41% respectively over the last 5 years. This is indicative of the economic decline in the small ageing coastal fields and delayed investment in deepwater exploration and production due to the drop in oil price from mid-2014 onwards. The number of operators remain unchanged from 2015 at 10 (vs 13 in 2014). The big three are Bristow, ERA and PHI, with RLC strong in the single engine sector. The number single engine helicopters grew slightly by 9 to 188 but is down 32% over 5 years. The light twin fleet grew by 2 to 39 but is down 32% over 5 years. However average utilisation also fell: Single engine – 631 flying hours with an average 19 minute sector length (vs 711 flying hours and 19 mins in 2015) Light twin – 290 flying hours with an average 19 minute sector length (vs 460 flying hours and 19 mins in 2015) The medium twin fleet dropped from 80 to 69 (38% lower than 5 years ago). The number of heavy twins (mainly Sikorsky S-92As) has risen by 70% last 5 years to 48 but are 2 less than the peak in 2015. Their average utilisation also fell: Medium twin – 577 flying hours with an average 34 minute sector length (vs 606 flying hours and 33 mins in 2015) Heavy twin – 554 flying hours with an average 35 minute sector length (vs 715 flying hours and 35 mins in 2015) The medium / heavy twin usage per aircraft is considerably less that the average for the UK North Sea fleet, partly due to the greater use of pooled aircraft to meet sole use contracts in Europe. The decline in medium and heavy usage suggests that similar arrangements at some of the larger bases could result in cost savings. Helicopter Safety GOM HSAC say there were no accidents in 2016 (vs 3 non-fatal accidents in 2015 [though the NTSB reported 4, as we noted last year] and 4 accidents in 2014, 1 fatal). This is only the 4th fatality free year in their 33 years of data. Consequently, according to HSAC: The 2016 accident rate was 0 (vs 1.31 per 100k flying hours in 2015 and 1.35 in 2014) Note: The 2015 rate would be 1.73 per 100k flying hours if all 4 occurrences listed by the NTSB are included. The 2016 fatal accident rate was 0 (vs 0 in 2015 and 0.34 per 100k flying hours in 2014). 2017 however is not as rosy with 3 accidents so far, 2 fatal: 6 February 2017 Bell 206B N978RH of Republic Helicopters ,which crashed into water near Galveston while returning from an oil tanker with the loss of 1 of the 3 persons on board, notably at night (see our article Deadly Delay). UPDATE 11 December 2017: The NTSB determined the probable cause as: “The pilot’s failure to recognize the flight had encountered instrument meteorological conditions at night, which resulted in an unrecognized descent and collision with water.” 27 February 2017 Bell 407 N1371 of Westwind...
read moreAvoiding Mid Air Collisions: 5 Seconds to Impact
Avoiding Mid Air Collisions (MACs): 5 Seconds to Impact The UK Airprox Board (UKAB) has released a video with tips for pilots on preventing mid air collisions. The Airprox Board explain that: Every year there’s an increase in Airprox as spring and summer arrives. On average, statistics show one mid-air collision occurs for every 60 Airprox incidents in UK airspace. An Airprox is a situation in which, in the opinion of a pilot or air traffic services personnel, the distance between aircraft as well as their relative positions and speed have been such that the safety of the aircraft involved may have been compromised. So much can happen in a matter of seconds: Research shows that in normal circumstances the average pilot needs anything from nine to 12.5 seconds from spotting another aircraft to processing the closure geometry and manoeuvring to avoid a potential collision in a controlled manner. You may only have 5 seconds or so between the eye detecting an aircraft head-on and impact. MAC Prevention: 6 Themes There are six themes from previous incidents that the Board say: “can help cut the risks if pilots apply them every time they fly” (click on the image for more details): The UK Airprox Board The role of the UK Airprox Board is to assess reported Airprox to enhance air safety. To emphasise both the scope of its work and its independence, UKAB is sponsored jointly, and funded equally, by the UK Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) and the UK Military Aviation Authority (MAA). Other MAC Safety Resources The UK CAA provides further guidance in Safety Sense Leaflet 13 – Collision Avoidance. The US National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) have issued a Safety Alert on MACs: Prevent Midair Collisions: Don’t Depend on Vision Alone Aerossurance has previously published: Military Mid Air Collisions Military Airprox in Sweden Mid Air Collision Typhoon & Learjet 35 USMC CH-53E Readiness Crisis and Mid Air Collision Catastrophe Back in 1991 the then Bureau of Air Safety Investigation (BASI), now the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) published: Limitations of the See-and-Avoid Principle The European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) has published this research report: EASA.2011.07 Scoping improvements to ‘see and avoid’ for General Aviation UPDATE 2 July 2017: North Sea S-92A Helicopter Airprox Feb 2017 UPDATE 30 August 2017: NTSB: Do We See and Avoid or Avoid Seeing? UPDATE 24 November 2018: AAIB Highlight Electronic Conspicuity and the Limitations of See and Avoid after MAC (Cessna 152 G-WACG and Guimbal Cabri G2 G-JAMM) UPDATE 30 December 2018: Fatal Biplane/Helicopter Mid Air Collision in Spain, 30 December 2017 UPDATE 25 January 2019: Airbus Helicopters AS350B3 I-EDIC engaged in heli-skiing and Jodel D.140E Mousquetaire IV F-PMGV collided in mid air over the Rutor Glacier in Italy. Eight of the nine persons on board the two aircraft died. UPDATE 2 February 2019: A319 / Cougar Airprox at MRS: ATC Busy, Failed Transponder and Helicopter Filtered From Radar UPDATE 16 February 2019: Merlin Night Airprox: Systemic Issues UPDATE 18 March 2019: UK CAA has launched a call for evidence on proposals for the wider roll-out of Electronic Conspicuity in the UK (CAP1776). UPDATE 19 April 2019: Enabling ADS-B OUT for General Aviation gathers pace says NATS NATS, the CAA and EUROCONTROL worked with EASA to draft standard modification CS‑SC005a, and a significant number of aircraft owners with ADS-B capable transponders can now take advantage of it, with the view that the more aircraft that are electronically conspicuous to...
read moreAll Aboard CFIT: Alaskan Sightseeing Fatal Flight and Safety Culture
Aboard CFIT: Alaskan Sightseeing Fatal Flight and Safety Culture (Promech Air DHC-3 Otter N270PA) A Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT) accident in Alaska provides a case study of a pathological safety culture, with management and peer pressure, compounded by poorly thought out contracting and scheduling by a cruise line which meant aircraft were making high risk flights in poor weather. The Accident Flight A turbine powered de Havilland DHC-3 Otter floatplane, N270PA, operated by Promech Air, impacted mountainous terrain in the Misty Fjords National Monument near Ketchikan, Alaska at around 12:15 Local Time on 25 June 2015. All 9 persons on board died. The flight was an on-demand sightseeing flight that had departed at about 12:07 from Rudyerd Bay and was en route back to the operator’s base at the Ketchikan Harbor Seaplane Base. The 8 passengers were from the Holland America Line cruise ship Westerdam were returning for a so called ‘all onboard time’ of 12:30 (prior to a 13:00 sailing). The flight was sold as a “Cruise/Fly” shore excursion for the cruise ship passengers. In their investigation report US National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) explain that N270PA: …was the third of four Promech-operated float-equipped airplanes that departed at approximate 5-minute intervals from a floating dock in Rudyerd Bay. The accident flight and the two Promech flights that departed before it were carrying cruise-ship passengers who had a 1230 “all aboard” time…. The fourth flight had no passengers but was repositioning to Ketchikan for a tour scheduled at 1230; the accident pilot also had his next tour scheduled for 1230. Promech pilots could choose between the ‘short route’ (about 52 nm, taking typically 25 minutes, primarily over land) and the ‘long route’ (about 63 nm, taking about 30 minutes, primarily over water). The latter is less scenic, but was preferred in poor weather as it allowed safe flight below a low cloud base and offered the ability to perform a precautionary water landing if needed. The pilot of the second Promech flight chose the long, over water, route and the other three the short, overland, route. The Promech General Operations Manual required both the pilot and the flight scheduler jointly agree beforehand that a flight could be conducted safely, this did not occur before the accident flight. Information from multiple sources: …provided evidence that the accident flight encountered deteriorating weather conditions. Further, at the time of the accident, the terrain at the accident site was likely obscured by overcast clouds with visibility restricted in rain and mist. Although the accident pilot had climbed the airplane to an altitude that would have provided safe terrain clearance had he followed the typical short route (which required the flight to pass two nearly identical mountains before turning west)… …the pilot instead deviated from that route and turned the airplane west early (after it passed only the first of the two mountains). Several factors were present during the accident flight that increased the likelihood that the pilot would make a navigational error. Visibility was degraded over the south end of Ella Lake; thus, the pilot may not have been able to clearly distinguish some of the landmarks by which he typically navigated. In addition, the accident pilot was flying the route at a relatively low altitude because of the poor weather conditions, which resulted in his viewing terrain from a...
read moreMaintenance Human Factors in Finnish F406 Landing Gear Collapse
Maintenance Human Factors in Finnish F406 Landing Gear Collapse (Lapin Tilauslento F406 Caravan II OH-OTL) The collapse of a landing gear leg on landing was linked to the mispositioned pivot pin during prior maintenance. This was not detected during an independent inspection or a functional check. Finnish safety investigators discuss the associated maintenance human factors and inadequacies in the type’s maintenance instructions. The Accident Flight A Reims (now ASI) F406 Caravan II, OH-OTL, operated by Lapin Tilauslento Oy, departed for a routine night cargo flight from Rovaniemi to Oulu on 3 October 2016. The Finnish Safety Investigation Authority (SIAF, the Onnettomuustutkintakeskus) describe in their investigation report that: When the landing gear was retracted, the GEAR UNLOCKED warning light and the HYD PRESS ON indicator for the hydraulic system remained on. At the pilot-in-command’s request, the co-pilot selected gear back down, and the three green lights indicating that the gear was down and locked illuminated normally. The HYD PRESS ON indicator and GEAR UNLOCKED warning were also extinguished as usual. …procedures directly applicable to this malfunction were not found, but the pilots decided to follow the procedure for cases where the HYD PRESS ON light remained on continuously. The procedure assisted in isolating the fault to the landing gear system, but the exact nature of the malfunction was not clear. The pilots took the actions as instructed, except that the point ”landing gear switch – rapidly recycle” was omitted, since the gear was already extended and the indicator lights showed that it was down and locked. The crew continued the short flight with the gear down. …the landing run was normal at first. When the plane had decelerated to a speed of about 60 kt, the pilot-in-command started braking, at which time the right main landing gear collapsed and the aircraft tilted to the right. The aircraft was “significantly damaged” in the area between the right propeller and the inner right hand flap. The two crew were uninjured and the runway was closed for 3 hours while the aircraft was moved using pneumatic lifting bags and a transport platform. The Maintenance History The Onnettomuustutkintakeskus say: Immediately before the accident flight, the aircraft had been subjected to phase 20 and phase 21 inspections of both main landing gears, for which the gear must be removed. The Licenced Aircraft Engineer who performed the task had gained his licence in 1979, held an EASA Part 66 B1/B2 License… …but was carrying out this particular maintenance action for the first time. According to his own report he was alert, and the maintenance environment and the tools used were appropriate and suitable for the task. He did not feel as being under a time pressure. The landing gear casing has two, removable Pivot Pins, fore and aft, completing the trunnion around which the landing gear rotates when it is retracted. The Pivot Pins are secured by Pins inserted through holes in the casing and the Pivot Pins. The investigators explain that: When the right landing gear was installed, the forward pivot pin was left too far forward so that the securing pin supposed to go through it was eventually behind the whole pivot pin. As a result of the incorrect installation, nothing prevented the pivot pin from moving forward and out of the gear trunnion. The securing pin was put in place and a safety wire was...
read moreStrictly Scheduled: S-92A Start-Up Incident
Strictly Scheduled: S-92A Start-Up Incident (BHA VH-ZUQ Operating for Inpex at Broome, WA) Under customer induced time pressures, a pilot under going type conversion missed a unique action that was not explicitly allocated in the operator’s procedures. Consequently the main rotor anti-flap stops of Sikorsky S-92A VH-ZUQ, operated by Bristow Australia for oil & gas company Inpex, were damaged during start-up at Broome, Western Australia on 10 November 2016, prior to a flight to an offshore installation. The Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) explain: The flight crew consisted of a pilot flying (PF) in the right crew seat, and pilot monitoring (PM) in the left crew seat. The PM was undergoing conversion training on the S-92A and this was their first flight on the type as a PM having previously flown only as PF. During the start procedure, the flight crew reported feeling abnormal vibrations in the airframe. A member of the ground crew then showed the pilots an anti-flap stop that had broken off the main rotor head. Further inspection revealed that two anti-flap stops had been sheared off the main rotor head during start-up. The anti-flap stop failure was a result of the collective not being lowered at the appropriate point during the start procedure. For engine starts with the rotor brake off, as were normally performed by this operator, the collective must be lowered as part of the start sequence. According to the operator’s standard operating procedures, the PF starts the number 1 engine first, and brings the throttle to idle. When the rotational speed of the main rotor is over 20%, and the hydraulic pressure reaches an appropriate level, the procedures state that the collective is to be moved to the full down position. The PF then starts the number 2 engine. The ATSB identified that times pressures from Inpex, unfamiliarity and a lack of specificity in procedures all contributed. Time Pressures The ATSB say: A series of events resulted in the flight crew having more tasks to complete than originally planned, and less time in which to complete them. This resulted in time pressure on the crew. The crew conscientiously arrived about two hours before the scheduled early afternoon take-off (base instructions required them to report at least 90 minutes in advance). …the PM was required to make a phone call to the company’s flight operations department and the crew were then involved in a discussion regarding the PM’s further training requirements. Additionally as a result of a customer requirement: The flight crew were also required to ‘shadow plan’ and perform the pre-flight inspection on a second aircraft, to ensure the flight could proceed in the event that ZUQ was unable to fly. According to the operator’s daily flying roster, the base pilot-in-command (PIC) [sic i.e the managing pilot at the base] was originally rostered on to be part of the backup crew. However, client obligations on the base prevented the PIC from being available in the event of the backup crew being required. The PF and PM were not aware of this prior to arriving, so they had not given themselves additional time to prepare a second aircraft before departure. Prior to departure, the PF was tasked with pre-flight inspections of ZUQ as well as the backup aircraft, but they were delayed as maintenance activities were...
read moreDeepening Delivery: HeliOffshore 2017 Conference Report
HeliOffshore Conference 2017 Report: Deepening Delivery The offshore helicopter safety association, HeliOffshore held its third conference and AGM in Budapest 13-14 May 2017. The focus was on ‘Deepening Our Delivery’ of improved offshore helicopter safety. The conference was attended by 180 industry leaders from operators, helicopter manufacturers, oil and gas companies, regulators, suppliers and service providers (including, for the third year, Aerossurance). Introduction The conference opened with perspectives on progress to date: HeliOffshore, founded by the 5 largest players in offshore helicopter operations (Babcock, Bristow, CHC, ERA and PHI) in 2014, has grown to almost 100 members. The organisation is implementing a Safety Strategy orientated around the Safety Performance Model endorsed last year. The Safety Performance Model was inspired by the Flight Safety Foundation (FSF) Basic Aviation Risk Standard for Offshore Helicopter Operations (BARS OHO) bow-tie presented at the 2015 conference. The prioritisation has been influenced by the EASA Safety Risk Portfolio for Offshore Helicopters. This year’s format saw shorter presentations and more collaborative workshop sessions. Focus on Value In the opening discussion Steve Hawkes of the International Association of Oil and Gas Producers (IOGP) Aviation Sub Committee revealed that a letter of support for the implementation of the enhanced offshore Helicopter Terrain and Awareness Warning Systems (HTAWS), a major initiative discussed at last year’s conference, was awaiting IOGP Management Committee approval. He went on to state: The entire landscape of our industry must be redesigned towards a new way of doing business, assuring the full potential of safety and operational effectiveness to survive. Safety and Profitability will go hand-in-hand in a strategic well-planned future environment. Andrea Cicero of Babcock Mission Critical Services discussed the potential financial implications of catastrophic accidents. He again discussed HTAWS and how a relatively small investment of c£150k on research had lead to major improvements in warning time that would have been available in past accidents. HeliOffshore has contracted Mark Prior as Project Manager for this important work to address the weaknesses in HTAWS. Dan Rosenthal of the Milestone Aviation Group discussed the efficiency and financial benefits of collaboration across the system in the context of a challenging oil and gas environment. While a modest increase in exploration and production capital expenditure is expected in 2017, this is driven by onshore shale and all analysts expect a further fall in offshore CAPEX this year. Rosenthal also noted that his company alone owned $4.5 billion of helicopters. Tim Rolfe of Bristow discussed progress on the helicopter Evidence Based Training (EBT) element of the Operational Effectiveness Workstream, the subject of the first workshop discussion. Helicopter EBT is a significant shift in training philosophy and is now the subject of an EASA rule-making initiative. There was a pledge to share data to support EBT across a large number of operators. David Balevic of CHC introduced the HeliOffshore System Reliability and Resilience Workstream activity (subject of the second table discussion). Work has been under way to identify ‘action priorities’ by fleet for collaborative work by OEMs and operators. The presentations from this session are available online: Part 1 and Part 2 Human Performance Day 1 continued with a facilitated session on human performance discussing how applying resilience engineering methods can enhance human performance. Safety Intelligence Bristow’s Steve Predmore desribed how the ‘InfoShare’ project has been renamed ‘Safety Intelligence’ to better represent its objective. The project has 3 phases: Rapid alerting of events across the industry Causal and Contextual Information Operational Data (“Big Data”) GE is...
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