Aerossurance Commits to the Armed Forces Corporate Covenant
Aerossurance Commits to the Armed Forces Corporate Covenant Aerossurance is proud to have committed to support the armed forces community by being a signatory of the Armed Forces Corporate Covenant. The two key principles are: No member of the armed forces community should face disadvantage in the provision of public and commercial services compared to any other citizen In some circumstances special treatment may be appropriate, especially for the injured or bereaved We have registered our signed commitments, which are publically available on the gov.uk website. Armed Forces Day 2015 is Saturday 27 June. Aerossurance is currently working under contract to the Military Aviation Authority (MAA) 0n a Health and Usage Monitoring System (HUMS) maintenance credit project. We have also recently completed airworthiness technical evaluation, audit and contract / Invitation To Tender support projects with a major defence contractor. For full details of our defence services see: Aerossurance – Defence For practical advice and technical support on military air safety, airworthiness and regulation, contact us at: enquiries@aerossurance.com Follow us on LinkedIn for our latest...
read moreAerossurance Will be Attending Heli-Expo 2015
Aerossurance Will be Attending Heli-Expo 2015 Aerossurance will be attending the helicopter industry’s biggest annual gathering, Heli-Expo, in Orlando, Florida in early March. Heli-Expo is organised annually by the Helicopter Association International (HAI) and is expected to attract in the region of 20,000 attendees. We will be in Orlando 28 February – 7 March, participating in several industry meetings, gathering news of the latest developments in the industry, seeing existing & potential customers plus many old friends from across the industry. Aerossurance has extensive expertise across helicopter design, airworthiness, operations, safety and contracting of aviation services. To meet up with us at Heli-Expo, contact us at: enquiries@aerossurance.com Follow us on LinkedIn for our latest updates....
read moreBreaking the Chain: X-31 Lessons Learned
Breaking the Chain: X-31 Lessons Learned On 19 January 1995 an X-31 experimental aircraft was making a fairly routine test flight from the NASA Dryden Flight Research Centre (now known as the the Armstrong Flight Research Centre) at Edwards Air Force Base. Suddenly the chase plane pilot makes the following radio calls: NASA One, We have an ejection!! We have an ejection!! The aircraft is descending over the North base area… I have a chute… The pilot’s out of the seat and the chute is good… This accident is valuable accident case study, particularly because NASA produced a candid video on the accident and its lessons. The X-31 Enhanced Fighter Maneuverability Programme The programme consisted of two Rockwell-Messerschmitt-Bölkow-Blohm X-31 Enhanced Fighter Maneuverability (EFM) aircraft, the first of which made its first flight in 1990. Rockwell is now part of Boeing and MBB part of Airbus. The aim of the X-31 was to demonstrate the value of in-flight thrust vectoring coupled with advanced flight control systems, to allow close-in air combat at very high angles of attack. Three thrust vectoring paddles were used to direct the exhaust flow to provide control in pitch and yaw. Movable forward canards and (eventually) with fixed aft strakes were fitted to further enhance pitch control. The X-31 was the only US X-plane programme that was an international collaborative effort (between the US and Germany). It also unique in that it supported two separate test programs during its life, one run largely by NASA and the other by the US Navy. The X-31 Accident The loss of the first X-31 (BuNo 164584) came at the end of a highly successful NASA test campaign. The flight was fitted with a different pitot tube (a Kiel probe), one that was unheated (as were research F-104 probes previously). The 43 minute flight was nearing its conclusion when ice began forming in the pitot tube. This caused erroneous airspeed data to be sent to the aircraft’s flight control computers. The result was a series of sudden, uncontrollable oscillations in all axes. As the aircraft pitched to 90 degrees angle of attack German pilot Karl-Heinz Lang was forced to eject. NASA subsequently noted that: Because the experimental pitot tube did not have a functional heater, X-31 mission rules prohibited flights in any type of precipitation or in the clouds. They did not, however, include a separate stipulation specifically prohibiting flight during potential icing conditions, despite simulations that had showed icing of the pitot static system could lead to loss of control under certain circumstances. Additionally, the experimental probe installed on the X-31 was more susceptible to icing – a fact discovered through wind tunnel research performed after the accident. Information had been distributed among crew and engineers explaining the pitot tube change, but no formal closed-loop system (an internal system of checks and balances) had been in place to ensure that everyone had read and understood the change – in retrospect, a critical lapse in communication procedures. The second X-31 went on to fly at that summer’s Paris Air Show and continued flying until 2003 in subsequent test programmes. The more details on the programme see: Flying Beyond the Stall Sharing The Lessons After the accident, NASA produced a candid 39 minute documentary that reviewed the accident. This is now available online: Former Center Director Ken Szalai said in the opening remarks of one 2004 safety workshop at Dryden...
read moreTurbomeca Arrano Sole Engine for Airbus Helicopters X4 (H160)
Turbomeca Arrano Sole Engine for Airbus Helicopters X4 (H160) Airbus Helicopters have announced they have selected the Turbomeca (Safran) Arrano as the sole engine for their new medium helicopter the X4 (UPDATE: to be named the H160). Airbus has also dropped the option of the Pratt & Whitney Canada PW210E (a development of the PW210S in the Sikorsky S-76D). In a press release Airbus Helicopters stated: At the conclusion of this preliminary phase, and founded upon a comprehensive market assessment, Airbus Helicopters has decided to amend the product positioning, consequently necessitating a significant engine power increase. Multiple scenarios have been studied with both engine manufacturers. Airbus Helicopters and Pratt & Whitney Canada have decided not to pursue a growth version of the PW210E engine for the X4 Program. Nevertheless, Pratt & Whitney Canada will continue to provide support until completion of the initial phase. It can be concluded that at least one prototype will still be PW210E equipped. The X4 The X4, the anticipated 5-6t replacement for the AS365N Dauphin / EC155 family, was announced at the Paris Air Show in June 2011, but Airbus Helicopters has been relatively tight lipped on the design. While the latest new offering in the medium helicopter sector is the S-76D, a long awaited derivative of the S-76 line, it is reasonable to expect a major design target will have been to offer a competitive advantage over the very popular AgustaWestland AW139 (which has recently achieved over 1 million flying hours). One possible advantage may be a lower D value for operation from more confined helidecks. An additional market challenge has been the emergence of the new super-medium category of helicopters such as the Airbus Helicopters’ own EC175, AgustaWestland AW189 and Bell 525. However, some have speculated that the power increase means the X4 will have a higher max take off mass than previously expected. In February 2014 it was reported that: An avionics iron bird, dubbed “Helicopter Zero,” has entered its test campaign. The aircraft will use the company’s Blue Edge blades, which feature a hockey stick-shaped leading edge at the outer tip, designed to reduce the noise generated by blade-vortex interaction (BVI), the pulsating sound created when the tip of a rotor blade hits the vortex shed by the tip of the preceding blade. The aim is to reduce noise by up to five dB. The blades—in development since 2007—have completed 150 flying hours fitted to an EC155 testbed flying out of Airbus’ facility at Marignane, near Marseille. On 10 December 2014, Airbus Helicopters’ CEO Guillaume Faury confirmed that they had “powered on” the first X4 prototype a few days earlier. The X4 is expected to fly during 2015 with a mock-up being unveiled at Heli-Expo in Orlando on 3 March 2015. X4 entry into service is expected in 2017/2018. While the X4 was originally touted to introduce some radically new cockpit technology and fly-by-wire controls (as planned for the B525) after three years in service, it is now reported that Airbus Helicopters intends to focus on the use of their Helionix avionics suite, that has recently entered service on the EC175 and EC145T2 after an admittedly painful development process. This will also give some commonality for operators using multiple types, in the same way that AgustaWestland are marketing a family concept with the AW169/AW139/AW189. The Arrano The Arrano (‘eagle’ in...
read moreDash 8 Tail Strike: Weakness in Stabilised Approach Procedures
Dash 8 Tail Strike: Weakness in Stabilised Approach Procedures The Canadian Transportation Safety Board (TSB) has released their final report on a heavy landing and tail strike that occurred to Porter Airlines Bombardier Dash 8 Q400 C-GLQO landing at Sault Ste. Marie Airport on 26 May 2013. The aircraft landed hard and the tail of the aircraft contacted the runway resulting in significant damage but no injuries. Their report highlights a weakness in the operators stabilised approach procedures. The Commander was Pilot Monitoring (PM). The First Officer was Pilot Flying (PF). The FO had 134 hours on type and during line training, training captains had identified: …several areas requiring improvement amongst them pitch/power management during approaches and “the elimination of large power changes to chase speed in descent”. The TSB describe how: The aircraft descended through 500 feet AGL at 127 KIAS (Vref+6) on the extended center line of the runway, the captain made the “stabilized” call which was acknowledged by the first officer. Shortly afterwards the aircraft began to drift above the glidepath, the first officer applied pitch down inputs and the airspeed increased, however, the aircraft continued to drift above the glidepath nearing the 3.5 degrees angle. The first officer reduced engine power from 13% to 5% (flight idle) and pitched the nose down slightly, the airspeed began to decay rapidly and the rate of descent increased. The captain focused on the visual did not notice the power change, the accelerating rate of descent and decreasing airspeed. Descending through 90 feet AGL the airspeed dropped below Vref, descending through 40 feet AGL over the runway threshold the airspeed had decayed to 116 KIAS (Vref-5) and the aircraft had descended below the 2.5 degrees approach angle. The captain noticed that the aircraft was too low and the rate of descent had increased to 900 fpm and called for power. The first officer increased the pitch angle, then applied power just as the aircraft touched down at a recorded 7.3 degrees nose up (the TSB made the annotation that due to the sampling interval the actual attitude might have peaked at a higher angle) and +3.05G. 7.3 degrees nose up with gear fully or near fully compressed is consistent with a tail strike. The TSB report that: As the aircraft passed through approximately 90 feet HAT, the airspeed dropped below VREF and continued to decrease. At the same time, the vertical speed was increasing above -800 fpm and the aircraft was drifting below the ideal 3° PAPI glide path. The PM did not notice the increased rate of descent, most likely because he was monitoring the visual approach out the window at this point and not the aircraft instruments. As a result, no call-out for a go-around, as required by the company SOP, was made by the PM when the airspeed dropped below VREF. Continuing the approach when an aircraft does not meet the criteria for a stabilized approach is cited by the Flight Safety Foundation as being a contributing factor in 66% of approach and landing accidents and serious incidents. Neither crew member identified that the airspeed had dropped below VREF; the flight no longer met the requirements of a stabilized approach, and an overshoot was required. The TSB concluded that the “stabilized” call at 500 feet was justified as all stabilized approach criteria laid out in the...
read moreRadar for Wave Height Measurement
Radar for Wave Height Measurement The EnRoute Wave Height Measurement Problem In 2011 Canadian Transportation Safety Board (TSB) issued their investigation into a S-92A accident offshore Canada in 2009, in which 17 people died and one passenger, Robert Decker, survived. Additionally this accident was subject to a public inquiry. The Hon Robert Wells QC’s Offshore Helicopter Safety Inquiry (OSHSI) focused more on some of the survivability and wider safety issues. In advance of Transport Canada rulemaking as recommended by TSB, Canadian industry voluntarily stopped flying to installations with wave heights measuring in excess of six meters (equivalent to the certified ditching capability of an S-92A with a five bag floatation system). This action was several years in advance of the UK Civil Aviation Authority (CAA), who announced their intent in their February 2014 CAP1145 report (‘Safety review of offshore public transport helicopter operations in support of the exploitation of oil and gas’). Off Newfoundland, wave height is determined by wave-rider buoys off St Johns and close to the offshore installations. The wave height in between is not however measured. Aerossurance has previously reported on challenges of wave height monitoring in the UK. The HF Radar Research As early as 1955 peaks in high frequency radio wave echoes had been identified as due to ocean waves. Studies in the 1970s showed that surface currents, surface winds and surface waves could be derived from radar data. The Canada-Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore Petroleum Board (C-NLOPB), the local offshore industry regulator, contracted research organisation C-CORE, formerly the Centre for Cold Ocean Resource Engineering, to examine if HF radar could be used to determine en-route wave height, and give near real-time knowledge of the sea state all the way from St John’s to the offshore installations. The C-NLOPB briefed the UK Helicopter Safety Research Management Committee (HSRMC) in May 2013 (view the 3.5Mb presentation here). However, in March 2014 it was reported at a meeting of the local Helicopter Operations Safety Committee (HOSC) that: The C-CORE HF Radar Technology Report was presented to Operators [i.e. oil companies] in November 2013; it was decided by Operators to pursue other technology at this time. The alternatives were not articulated at that time. It however remained a controversial matter locally: CBC: Monitoring of waves needs to improve, offshore workers say. Aerossurance is an Aberdeen based aviation consultancy. For expert advice on offshore helicopter design, operations, survivability and safety, contact us at enquiries@aerossurance.com Follow us on LinkedIn for our latest updates. ...
read moreWait to Weight & Balance – Lessons from a Loss of Control
Wait to Weight & Balance – Lessons from a PC-12 Loss of Control On take off, pitch control of a Pilatus PC-12 was lost resulting in a series of pitch oscillations and stall warnings. Fortuitously the pilot was able to abort the take off with only damage to one main wheel. The incident could have been avoided if a more rigorous approach had been taken to aircraft loading. The US National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) recently reported on this incident. It involved PC-12 N617BG, operated on a Part 135 commercial on-demand passenger flight by operated as a commercial on-demand passenger flight by FlighTime Business Jets, LLC from Austin-Bergstrom International Airport (AUS), Texas with 9 persons on board on 12 September 2013. The pilot stated: At rotation speed I smoothly and steadily rotated to establish a positive rate of climb to Vx (120 knots). As the aircraft accelerated to 95 knots the airspeed stagnated and a positive rate of climb was not possible. Simultaneously, at 95 knots, the aural STALL WARNING activated accompanied by the STICK SHAKER. This was immediately followed by the STICK PUSHER violently pitching the nose down at the runway. I was able to override the STICK PUSHER to avoid a nose wheel impact on the runway. When I leveled the aircraft at about 20-30 feet AGL, the unaccelerated airspeed was still in the 95 knot range and again the aural STALL WARNING and STICK SHAKER activated. This again was followed by an immediate and violent nose pitch down caused by the STICK PUSHER. I repeated a recovery to level flight and avoided runway contact. The scenario repeated itself once again and the airspeed continued to appear to be stagnant. Again at about 95 knots the aural STALL WARNING and STICK SHAKER activated which was immediately followed by a STICK PUSHER violent downward pitch. Again I recovered from the unusual attitude and avoided runway contact. After this recovery I was able to establish wings level and aborted the takeoff. The company’s FAA Operations Specifications stated that ‘only actual weights’ be used when determining the aircraft weight and balance. Irrespective of regulation, the use of actual weights for smaller aircraft is good practice recognised in industry standards: The International Association of Oil & Gas Producers (IOGP), formerly better known as OGP, recommends the use of actual weights for aeroplanes below 5,700kg and helicopters in para 9.4.1 of their Aviation Management Guidelines (Publication 390). The Flight Safety Foundation’s award winning Basic Aviation Risk Standard (BARS) for contracted air operations requires the use of actual weights for aircraft of less than 30 passengers (Control 6.1). The NTSB explain that: The pilot’s weight and center of gravity graphical plot for the incident flight did not take into account carry-on items/baggage [and] showed a CG of about 239 inches and a weight of 10,369 lbs. However, the FAA reported to the NTSB that: …about 490 lbs of carry-on items were not included in the weight and balance for the incident flight. The items consisted of a small ice chest and food that weighed about 60 lbs and four ice chests and boxes of food that weighed about 430 lbs. The actual passenger weights obtained for the flight was 2,031 lbs, which was obtained from passenger interviews. A weight and center of gravity plot showed that the incident flight was about...
read moreAerossurance Joins HeliOffshore
Aerossurance Joins HeliOffshore HeliOffshore is a global safety-focused organisation formed by major offshore helicopter operators. They state: We enable helicopter operators to develop, share and apply best practices, create and use advanced technology, and advocate for harmonised flight standards. HeliOffshore is dedicated to achieving the highest levels of safety, in the air and on the ground. Its activities will benefit the millions of oil and gas workers who depend upon the industry to get them to work and back home safely, as well as the crews who fly the helicopters and the teams who maintain them. Aerossurance first covered the plan to evolve the former European Helicopter Operators’ Committee (EHOC) into HeliOffshore last June. In October the five founding members Avincis (now Babcock), Bristow Group, CHC Helicopter, Era and PHI Inc launched HeliOffshore in London (which we covered here). The CEO of HeliOffshore is Gretchen Haskins, the former Group Director Safety Regulation of the UK Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) and Group Director of Safety at NATS. Bill Chiles, the former CEO of Bristow, who was awarded the Flight Safety Foundation‘s Laura Taber Barbour Air Safety Award last year, is the first chairman of HeliOffshore’s board. As a result of the UK Joint Operators Review started in 2013 by Avincis, Bristow and CHC, plus reviews of the data, and consultation with stakeholders, these areas formed the initial focus for the HeliOffshore (all areas that Aerossurance has published past articles): Automation Pilot monitoring Stabilised approaches Accident survivability Application of health and usage monitoring systems (HUMS) Information exchange Aerossurance is an Aberdeen based aviation consultancy, with extensive experience of offshore helicopter operations. Follow us on LinkedIn and on Twitter @Aerossurance for our latest updates....
read moreInadvertent Fire Bottle Discharge During Maintenance
Inadvertent Fire Bottle Discharge During Maintenance The CHIRP Charitable Trust, who run the UK’s Confidential Human Factors Incident Reporting Programme, has reported on an inadvertent fire bottle discharge incident during maintenance in their Air Transport FEEDBACK Issue 113. The Aircraft was on a heavy maintenance input and several teams were busy working in the flight deck area. Three tasks were being worked simultaneously. Two engineers were assigned to the task of checking the APU [Auxiliary Power Unit] fire bottle squib circuit test. Engineer A, who was in the flight deck, believed that engineer B had disconnected the squib and was set-up to perform the check. Engineer A pulled the fire handle and fired the APU fire bottle which discharged. Engineer B indicated that he did not have the task sheet available as Engineer A had them, despite the fact that one was working in the flight deck the other was at the tail area. There were six people on the intercom system and the flight deck was very busy with a number of activities taking place simultaneously, this resulted in avoidable distractions and poor communication. CHIRP provide the following analysis: Distractions – The engineer lost his train of thought at important stages of the work due to numerous people on the intercom system. Organisational Factors – The company identified that the method of operation (when performing function checks at the end of the check) was not an isolated one and that there was some degree of this being the accepted norm. CHIRP go on to comment: This event highlights some routine HF [Human Factors] related problems. As well as looking at the individual HF errors, the organisation involved has taken steps to ensure there is a more co-ordinated approach to carrying out checks and functions. This applies particularly at busy times – typically towards the end of the maintenance input. While this is an easy mistake to make, it can serve as a lesson to ensure we have put processes and communications in place when carrying out function checks. Safety Resources Aerossurance has previously written about Professor James Reason’s 12 Principles of Error Management. UPDATE 8 April 2020: NTSB Confirms United Airlines Maintenance Error After 12 Years The UK CAA has issued this infographic on distractions: For support on maintenance human factors, preventing maintenance errors and improving maintenance performance you can trust, contact aviation consultancy Aerossurance: enquiries@aerossurance.com Follow us on LinkedIn and on Twitter @Aerossurance for our latest updates. ...
read moreSea State Forecasting – CHIRP
Sea State Forecasting – CHIRP The CHIRP Charitable Trust, who run the UK’s Confidential Human Factors Incident Reporting Programme, today published Air Transport FEEDBACK Issue 113. This included discussion of a report on sea state forecasting in the North Sea. The original report submitted to CHIRP was: Post CAP 1145 [Safety Review Of Offshore Public Transport Helicopter Operations], a sea state limit has been placed stopping CAT [Commercial Air Transport] operations overseas greater than sea state 6, or 6 metres. We reported for duty one hour before flight as requested. There were no managers present despite the knowledge that the weather (sea state) was due to deteriorate during the afternoon. The Met Office website 12:00Z forecast for the sea off the Aberdeen coast showed a maximum wave height of 4.5 metres, the 18:00Z forecast for the sea off the Aberdeen coast showed a maximum wave height of 6.5 metres over the majority of the UK North Sea as far as The Shetland Isles. One of us contacted the Met Office for clarification of the forecast wave height and was told the sea off the coast of Aberdeen would have waves in excess of 6 metres between 14:00Z and 15:00Z. There was a request made for the hourly forecast charts to be faxed to us so we would have the evidence at hand if management challenged us on our decision to stop flying, but they were not willing to send us the information, only give a verbal brief. Crews elected not to depart on flights that would require a return overseas greater than 6 meters. Management accepted crew’s decision when briefed later. Lessons Learned: Crews should not have to rely on verbal conversations with forecasters and hourly forecast should be made available on the Met Office website. It is noticeable, and very encouraging, that while the reporter was concerned that they would need strong evidence to back any decision not to fly, that the management did accept that decision without the hourly data they had requested. CHIRP commented: The Met Office provides forecasts of Significant Wave Height on a briefing system used by offshore helicopter operators called OHWeb. Operators are required to base their planning and operating decisions on the Wave Height forecasts on OHWeb. Since the report to CHIRP was received, the time steps for the forecasts on OHWeb have been increased from 6-hourly to 3-hourly to improve the fidelity and availability of the forecasts. Although the Met Office generate the product in hourly time steps, it was decided that the provision of hourly reports would not be appropriate because they could represent a potential source of pressure on pilots. With hourly forecasts, it could be that some pilots would feel compelled to ‘design’ the flight route around areas of high sea state using successive short term sea state forecasts. Moreover, with high sea states some pilots could have a tendency to await the next forecast with the mission on hold instead of cancelling it, taking a ‘rest’ break, and replanning it thoroughly. Despite the introduction of 3–hourly forecasts there remains the potential for actual sea states to be higher than those forecast; when this occurs the N Sea operators confer over the source, number and reliability of the reports before making a collective decision to operate, postpone or cancel flights....
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