R44 Oil & Gas Accident – Alcohol, Flight Following, ELTs
R44 Oil & Gas Accident – Alcohol, Flight Following, ELTs The Transportation Safety Board (TSB) have reported on an unusual helicopter accident in Alberta, Canada on 27 January 2013, that has important lessons on pilot supervision, flight following and emergency location. Operator & Pilot Background Robinson R44 C-GOCM was operated by Gemini Helicopters, headquartered at Grande Prairie, Alberta, who operated a fleet of 20 helicopters for charter and to support ‘production services’. ‘Production services’ means providing flying production operatives to tend to dispersed oil wells and pipelines. In April 2013 Gemini Helicopters bought Airborne Energy Solutions from Nabors Canada and saw its fleet expand to 67 aircraft. The new company traded as OpsMobile at the time this article was written. Gemini had previously had a non-fatal R44 accident about a year earlier (C-FGBX). The pilot on the day of the accident was in his mid 30s and TSB reports he had been employed by the Company since May 2011, and had approximately 2200 hours of flying time, with 2100 hours on the R44. Flights on the Afternoon of the Accident Early in the afternoon of 27 January 2013 the helicopter lefts its base at the Horse Facility gas plant camp and made a couple of flights to production facilities then according to the TSB: …then at 1450, the helicopter made an unauthorized flight to a roadside security gate. After 3 approaches, the helicopter landed at 1510. At 1545, the pilot was observed to be staggering and smelling of alcohol. On being questioned, the pilot uttered some derogatory remarks. The pilot and an unauthorized passenger from the security gate then boarded the helicopter. The helicopter departed at 1554 to a compressor site, landing 8 minutes later. The helicopter was left running while work was done at the site by the pilot. It departed at 1611, and was flown low along the Berland River before landing and shutting down at a remote cabin at 1630. Forty-eight minutes later, at 1718, the helicopter lifted off and flew to the location of the security gate, where it made several low passes and turns. The aircraft landed at the gate at 1731, and the passenger disembarked 2 minutes later. The helicopter took off at 1735 and was observed to be flying erratically during departure. It broke up in flight over a wooded area 5 minutes later. The Structural Failure TSB found nothing to indicate airframe failure or system malfunction prior to the in-flight breakup. They considered the main rotor blade damage found was consistent with the pilot manipulating the flight controls such that a main rotor blade struck the right side of the cabin. TSB also note the aircraft was fitted with a bubble window under a Supplemental Type Certificate which introduced a never-exceed speed (VNE) limit of 100 knots. Analysis shows the aircraft was flying at up to 126 knots. Alcohol As mentioned above, witnesses reported seeing the pilot acting in an erratic way and smelling of alcohol, though no apparent attempt was made to intervene. TSB did establish that the evening before, the pilot had left the camp and “to pick up a case of beer”. It is believed he consumed “3 or 4 beers” that evening. TSB were not able to conclusively identify if the pilot consumed any further alcohol that night or on the day of the accident. An empty wine bottle and an empty liquor bottle were found at the cabin,...
read moreTechnology Friend or Foe – Automation in Offshore Helicopter Operations
Technology Friend or Foe – Automation in Offshore Helicopter Operations In London 3-4 July 2014 the Royal Aeronautical Society held a landmark conference on the introduction of automation to offshore helicopters titled: Technology: Friend or Foe? This RAeS conference was triggered by: a CFIT accident on approach to Sumburgh airport in August 2013 (AS332L2 G-WNSB), the issue, a few weeks later, of a Transportation Safety Board (TSB) report into a serious incident where S-92A C-GQCH where the helicopter descended to within 38ft of the sea, the realisation that automation issues were not addressed in detail in the UK Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) North Sea Review, which resulted in the CAP1145 report (the ‘Safety review of offshore public transport helicopter operations in support of the exploitation of oil and gas’). The conference was notable for an impressive range of speakers and a carefully structured programme that set the context of offshore operations, examined key technology, discussed the modern cockpit, operational procedures and finally training & competency. The conference was an ideal opportunity to look back at how automation had been introduced and the critical lessons, including cultural lessons, that need to be learnt. To underscore the importance of the topic, just days after the conference the UK Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB) published their report into a serious incident with EC155 OY-HJJ that suffered a loss of control after departure from a helideck in the North Sea in November 2013. Jim Lyons, who masterminded the conference programme, has produced a detailed summary of the conference. The RAeS Rotorcraft Group are expected to publish a position paper on the topic. See also our article: Commanders: Flying or Monitoring? which follows up on one presentation that discussed an observation about past large UK helicopter accidents. UPDATE 21 October 2015 – Further Resources: A follow up RAeS conference is planned for 6-7 July 2016 (not April 2016 or late July as originally announced). The European Helicopter Safety Team (EHEST) has published: Safety Leaflet HE9 Automation and Flight Path Management At the EHEST Safety Worksop at Helitech in London in October 2015: The UK CAA gave this presentation: Training – Overview of Automation Issues Airbus Helicopters presented: Training – For Automation UPDATE 9 January 2017: HeliOffshore have released a HeliOffshore Automation Guidance document and six videos to demonstrate the offshore helicopter industry’s recommended practice for the use of automation. UPDATE 18 February 2018: Autopilot, Mind Wandering (MW), and the Out Of The Loop (OOTL) Performance Problem. According to researchers from ONERA and CNRS: The OOTL phenomenon has been involved in many accidents in safety-critical industries, as demonstrated by papers and reports that we have reviewed. In the near future, the massive use of automation in everyday systems will reinforce this problem. MW may be closely related to OOTL—both involve removal from the task at hand, perception drop, and understanding problems. More importantly, their relation to vigilance decrement and working memory could be the heart of their interactions. Still, the exact causal link remains to be demonstrated. Far from being anecdotal, such a link would allow OOTL research to use theoretical and experimental understanding accumulated on MW. The large range of MW markers could be used to detect OOTL situations and help us to understand the underlying dynamics. On the other hand, designing systems capable of detecting and countering MW might highlight the reason why we all mind wander. Eventually, the expected outcome is a model of OOTL–MW interactions which could be integrated into...
read more19 July 1989: Sioux City
19 July 1989: Sioux City On 19 July 1989, United Airlines Flight 232, McDonnell Douglas DC-10 N1819U, en-route from Denver to Chicago, suffered an uncontained failure of the number 2 General Electric CF6 engine’s fan disc. This resulted in crippling damage to the aircraft’s hydraulics and flight controls. The crew under Captain Al Haynes managed to control the aircraft by throttle movements and made a crash landing at Sioux City airport in Iowa, which fortuitously was in the middle of an emergency response exercise at the time. Of the 296 people on board, 111 died in the accident but miraculously 185 survived. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) determined that the probable cause was: … the inadequate consideration given to human factors limitations in the inspection and quality control procedures used by United Airlines’ engine overhaul facility which resulted in the failure to detect a fatigue crack originating from a previously undetected metallurgical defect located in a critical area of the stage 1 fan disk that was manufactured by General Electric Aircraft Engines. The subsequent catastrophic disintegration of the disk resulted in the liberation of debris in a pattern of distribution and with energy levels that exceeded the level of protection provided by design features of the hydraulic systems that operate the DC-10’s flight controls. More resources: NTSB summary and report Press coverage of NTSB report FAA Lessons Learnt database Aviation Safety Network database entry Local press reports on the 25th anniversary UPDATE 25 September 2019: Captain Al Haynes sadly passed away aged 87 in August 2019. Aerossurance has extensive air safety, operations, airworthiness, human factors, aviation regulation and safety analysis experience. For practical aviation advice you can trust, contact us at: enquiries@aerossurance.com Follow us on LinkedIn and on Twitter @Aerossurance for our latest...
read moreHong Kong Harbour AW139 Ditching – HKCAD Report Issued
Hong Kong Harbour AW139 Ditching – HKCAD Report Issued The Hong Kong Civil Aviation Department (HKCAD) have issued their report into the ditching of AgustaWestland AW139, B-MHJ, operated by Macau based East Asia Airlines Limited (trading as SkyShuttle), in Hong Kong’s Victoria Harbour on 3 July 2010. From the synopsis: The helicopter took off from Sheung Wan / Sky Shuttle Heliport in Hong Kong at 0400 hrs (1200 hrs). Approximately 2 minutes after takeoff, shortly after the crew had completed the post-takeoff checks while climbing on a north-westerly heading at approximately 350 ft Above Mean Sea Level (AMSL) and at about 70 kt Indicated Airspeed (IAS), the tail rotor assembly detached from the helicopter. The commander immediately entered into autorotation and subsequently made a controlled ditching into the harbour. All pilots and passengers were rescued by the nearby vessels. Six of the 11 passengers received treatment for minor injuries. The accident was notified to the Accidents Investigation Division of the Hong Kong Civil Aviation Department (CAD) by the Fire Services Communication Centre (FSCC) of the Fire Services Department (FSD) at 0405 hrs (1205 hrs) on 3 July 2010. The investigation team, comprising a team of CAD Inspectors of Accidents, started the investigation immediately. Two days later, investigators from the Civil Aviation Authority of Macao Special Administrative Region (AACM), Agenzia Nazionale per la Sicurezza del Volo of Italy (ANSV) and AgustaWestland (AW), the aircraft manufacturer joined the investigation team. The investigation team has made two safety recommendations on the AW139 tail rotor blades. They report the causal factors to be: The failure of the White blade was most probably caused by disbond of pitch control arm and the reduction of torsion box stiffness at the blade root radii area, which when associated with manufacturing strap defects at maximum acceptable values in production specification, caused the ILRS to exceed the maximum allowable limit, resulting in matrix delamination onset and then propagation under ILSS and complete failure of the blade. ([Report paragraph] Reference: 3.1.2.2, 3.1.2.3, 3.1.2.4, 3.1.2.5, 3.1.2.6, 3.1.2.10, 3.1.2.11, 3.1.2.12) The reduction in torsion box stiffness at the White blade root radii area was most probably caused by manufacturing quality lapses and the lack of effective way for checking the integrity of the torsion box after production. (Reference: 3.1.2.4, 3.1.2.8) Disbond of the pitch control arm could have been caused by over shimming of elastomeric bearing installation. (Reference: 3.1.2.6) Similar failures are believed to have occurred on the ground to AW139 A7-GHA of Gulf Helicopters in Qatar on 2 May 2011 and, fatally, offshore Brazil on 19 August 2011 (PR-SEK of Senior Taxi Aereo). Aerossurance understands that the report on the Brazilian accident is due to be published later this summer by the Brazilian accident investigation agency CENIPA (although a preliminary report is available online). The emergency flotation system of B-MHJ kept the helicopter afloat for 18 minutes and met the certification requirement of JAR 29.801(d), said CAD, who go on to comment: Although the sea conditions were compatible with the certification of the equipment, the helicopter was significantly out of balance after ditching due to the loss of the tail rotor and the tail fin section and the ingress of water into the cabin through the opening left behind by the lost left-hand nose window transparency. The out of balance condition subsequently resulted in the overload and...
read moreAW189 Progress
AW189 Progress Bristow expect to commence revenue flying in Norwich with the AgustaWestland AW189 during July 2014 according to Bristow VP Operations and Managing Director of Bristow Helicopters Limited, Mike Imlach, quoted by Aviation Week & Space Technology. UPDATE: Later on the 17 July 2014, Bristow issued the following press statement: Bristow announced today that it has been certified [sic] to fly the much anticipated new generation AgustaWestland AW189 helicopter. The company is due to commence flights with its first two new AW189 aircraft from its base at Norwich shortly, servicing the Southern North Sea. Bristow has a further four of the aircraft on order for oil and gas operations. In the press release, Mike Imlach, says: We’re excited to be the launch customer for what is a superb aircraft and an important addition to our fleet. Bristow has worked closely with AgustaWestland throughout the aircraft’s development and the result is an aircraft of the highest technical specification with state of the art safety technology which will enable us to offer our clients the best possible capabilities. We look forward to commencing operations with the aircraft in the coming weeks. UPDATE: On 22 July 2014 Bristow issued a press release: The first commercial flight of the much-anticipated new generation AgustaWestland AW189 helicopter took place on July 21, 2014, as Bristow flew eight passengers out to the Cygnus field in the Southern North Sea (SNS). The aircraft is the first of two AW189s to be stationed at Bristow’s Norwich base and is dedicated to GDF SUEZ E&P UK Ltd for transport between Norwich and the operator’s Cygnus field 120 nautical miles away. The new aircraft is expected to complete one return flight each weekday with the potential to increase the service to three daily flights as the Cygnus field develops through the drilling, hook-up and commissioning, and later operational phases. Cygnus is the largest gas discovery in the SNS in the last 25 years. First gas is expected in late 2015. According to AW&ST, the Bristow also expects to take delivery of two SAR configured AW189s, the first of 11 oderered, to commence initial SAR training in September/October 2014. The SAR aircraft are being assembled at the AW plant in Yeovil. At Farnbough International Air Show, AW held a handover ceremony for the first AW189 helicopter to its Asia-Pacific launch customer Weststar Aviation Services. Weststar is the first operator to choose to benefit from the commonality in design across the family of helicopters of 6.5t AW139, with a fleet of 34 in-service or on order, the 4.5t AW169, with 2 on order, and the 8.3t AW189, with four ordered in February 2014. The company started operating the AW139 in late 2010, and has recently surpassed 50,000 hours with the type. According to Flight International: “To cater for the [oil and gas] industry’s burgeoning operational needs, we aim to expand our fleet to 100 helicopters in the next five years,” sais Weststar chief executive General Tan Sri Muhammad Ismail Jamaluddin. Weststar started its first operation outside of Malaysia, in Mauritania in 2013 for Tullow Oil with two AW139s. The company now also operates in Morroco and Thailand. However, the company has put a planned expansion into Iraq on hold. The company’s oil & gas clients include Petronas Carigali, ExxonMobil, Carigali Hess, CPOC, Talisman, Petrofac, Newfield, TOTAL, KPOC, Lundin, WesternGeco, Hess, Shell, Tullow Oil, Mubadala Petroleum, CGG Veritas,...
read moreAudits Highlighted Risk Assessment Weaknesses Prior to Ro-Ro Fatality
Audits Highlighted Risk Assessment Weaknesses Prior to Ro-Ro Fatality Audits highlighted weaknesses in risk assessments prior to a fatal accident on a ro-ro ship. The accident sadly highlights the importance of an effective Safety Management System (SMS) that includes effective risk assessments & procedures and prompt follow-up to audits. The UK Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) issued their report on 16 July 2014 into the fatal crushing injury to an able seaman on British registered ro-ro cargo ship, Tyrusland in Tripoli, Libya on 15 May 2013. This was the fourth accident in less than a year involving UK registered ships managed by Imperial Ship Management. Two of the accidents were fatal. The key safety issues identified were: Tyrusland’s crew and its embarked team of vehicle drivers did not have a safe system of work for the cargo handling operations which they were conducting. A risk assessment for deck operations existed but did not properly identify the hazards associated with the work being conducted. In particular, the danger of a crewmember being unsighted by a fork-lift driver while in the path of a moving container had not been addressed. The absence of a safe system of work or a thorough risk assessment meant that a dangerous condition emerged where ship’s crew were routinely operating in close proximity to moving vehicles without the necessary safeguards in force. Prior to the accident, weaknesses in the ship’s organisation had been identified in an internal audit by the company and a UK flag state audit by the Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA). However, the investigation identified that the company had not given a sufficiently high priority to management actions to address the identified shortcomings. In addition, the MCA’s follow-up action regarding non-conformities could have been more effective. UPDATE 30 March 2015: Another maritime investigation report that highlights weak risk assessment is the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) report on a serious injury on-board the Shell NWS Class LNG tanker Northwest Stormpetrel on 8 November 2014. This incident resulted in an Improvement notice from the Australian Maritime Safety Authority (AMSA). Shell’s own safety investigation identified a number of safety actions: Focus areas identified for better risk awareness included joining ship briefings, familiarisation, work site assessments, personal protective equipment and audits. The development of effective risk assessments, their review and using them for work planning and toolbox talks were also identified. An increased focus on permits to work, particularly for invasive and pressurised systems, and the completion and verification of permits were other identified focus areas. Checking for defective equipment and better reporting through training were also noted. UPDATE 22 May 2015: The US National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) reported on the grounding in bad weather of the ice-class mobile offshore drilling unit (MODU) Kulluk, on Sitkalidak Island, near Kodiak Island, Alaska, on 31 December 2012. The Kulluk, owned by Shell Offshore and operated by Noble Drilling, had been undertow by the ice-class anchor-handling tow supply vessel Aiviq. They had departed Captains Bay near Unalaska, Alaska, 10 days earlier for the Seattle, Washington for maintenance and repairs. The NTSB determined that the probable cause was: Shell’s inadequate assessment of the risk for its planned tow of the Kulluk, resulting in implementation of a tow plan insufficient to mitigate that risk. UPDATE 1 September 2017: The Danish MAIB have published their report on the loss of two supply vessels being towed for breaking. The...
read moreRetreating Blade Stall Incident: HEMS BK117B2 VH-VSA
Retreating Blade Stall Incident: HEMS BK117B2 VH-VSA During a patient transfer in Australia, an Emergency Medical Service Airbus Helicopters BK 117 dropped 4,000 ft after a loss of control in the cruise. The recently issued Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) investigation report highlights the phenomena of retreating blade stall. The Incident On 15 February 2013, BK117B2 VH-VSA, operated by Australian Helicopters, was conducting a trauma patient recovery flight from Port Pirie to Adelaide Hospitals in South Australia. On board were the pilot, a crewman, two medical personnel and one patient. On reaching the cruise altitude of 5,000 ft, light to moderate turbulence and a tailwind of about 15 kts were noted, while at a cruise speed of 115 kts (5 kts below the never exceed speed). Shortly after, the helicopter suffered a violent, uncommand, nose-up pitch and rolled left before descending. ATSB report: The pilot instinctively applied full forward cyclic control, but using both hands given the severity of the pitch-up, in an attempt to regain control but was unable to arrest the continuing nose-up pitch. At about 70° nose-up the helicopter rolled left through approximately 120° and commenced a steep descent. On seeing the ground through the windscreen, the pilot applied full rearward cyclic, which resulted in the helicopter pulling out of its now near vertical nose-down attitude and levelling off at about 1,000 ft (about 800 ft above ground level). No injuries were reported and the helicopter sustained minor damage the horizontal stabiliser end plates. These were struck by the main rotor blades, which themselves were undamaged. The ATSB found no mechanical or system faults that would explain the incident. ATSB Analysis In their analysis ATSB comment: The helicopter was close to the maximum take-off weight and its centre of gravity close to the rear limit of the allowable envelope at the time of the occurrence. The helicopter’s cabin configuration and the number of people on board increased the zero fuel weight so that the maximum fuel load for the flight was limited to 390 kg. In consideration of the available fuel, the pilot selected an initial cruise altitude of 5,000 ft and remained below the cloud base in visual flight conditions. The selected cruise speed of 115 kt was close to the calculated never exceed speed (VNE) for the conditions of 120 kt. In combination, the high all-up weight and speed required greater collective pitch, or main rotor blade angle. This placed the blades closer to their stalling angle of attack. The cruise altitude of 5,000 ft resulted in operation at a moderately high density altitude and in areas of moderate turbulence. These conditions, coupled with the effect of the already-discussed high all-up weight are known to be conducive to the onset of retreating blade stall at high speed. The uncommanded nose-up pitch and subsequent roll in the direction of the retreating blade indicated that retreating blade stall took place. The pilot’s instinctive attempt to lower the nose with cyclic, rather than the correct action of lowering the collective to reduce the blade angles and therefore angle of attack, would have worsened the stall and delayed recovery. The subsequent ability to recover from the left roll and descent by applying rear cyclic, which also increases the angle of attack, indicated that the helicopter was no longer experiencing retreating blade stall. In the event, the...
read moreAW139 Global Fleet Passes 1 Million Hour Milestone
AW139 Global Fleet Passes 1 Million Hour Milestone AgustaWestland has announced that its popular medium helicopter, the AW139, has now achieved 1 million hours of service experience since it entered service in 2003. The AW139 fleet leader has now flown more than 9,300 hours, so another milestone is likely to be passed this autumn. AW reports that 650 AW139s are in service, with an order backlog over another 120. The type has 200 customers in over 60 nations. AW claim a 56% share of the medium helicopter market in the last five years. In April 2014 it was announced that that CHC had flown more that 100,000 hours on the type. Gulf Helicopters and Weststar Aviation Services have both achieved more than 50,000 flying hours. In that period, according to Aviation Safety Network, there have been six confirmed fatal accidents (only one, in Brazil, with an apparent airworthiness cause). Interestingly 3 involved SAR operations. UPDATE 11 Oct 2015: See our article on the G-LBAL accident. Date Reg Operator Fatalities Location 02-JUN-2008 A6-BBB Abu Dhabi Aviation 6 off Abu Dhabi, UAE 21-JAN-2010 EC-KYR Salvamento Marítimo (INAER) (SAR) 3 Mediterranean Sea, off Almería, Spain 23-FEB-2011 516 South Korean Coast Guard (SAR) 5 ca 93 km W of Jeju, S Korea 17-AUG-2011 G-110011 Beijing Municipal Public Security Bureau (SAR) 4 Miyun, Beijing, China 19-AUG-2011 PR-SEK Senior Táxi Aéreo 4 Campos Basin, off Macaé, Brazil 13-MAR-2014 G-LBAL Haughey Air 4 Near Gillingham, Norfolk, UK UPDATE 22 December 2017: The AW139 fleet globally has now exceeded 2 million hours. With the AW139 fleet leader having exceeded 12,000 hours, nearly 900 units are today in service out of over 1000 ordered by more than 300 customers in 80 countries. The second million was achieved in only 2.5 years. Aerossurance has first hand experience of the AW139 and its operation and extensive air safety, helicopter design, airworthiness, operations and accident analysis experience. For aviation advice you can trust, contact us at: enquiries@aerossurance.com Follow us on LinkedIn and on Twitter @Aerossurance for our latest...
read moreB206B Freewheel Accidents in Sweden & Canada
B206B Freewheel Accidents in Sweden & Canada Bell 206B registration SE-HOM, operated by Fiskflyg, was engaged in a periodic Operator Proficiency Check in the vicinity of Porjus in Sweden on 8 November 2012, when an accident occurred. The Swedish Accident Investigation Board (Statens Haverikommission [SHK]) published their final report on 3 July 2014. They reported: Shortly after touchdown the helicopter began to vibrate and a heavy scraping sound was heard accompanied by vibrations of a frequency corresponding to the rotor speed. The vibrations continued when the main rotor speed decreased and they then increased sharply, after which the entire main rotor separated from the helicopter and ended up about 10 metres to the left of the helicopter. The helicopter remained upright with no injuries to the two occupants. The SHK concluded that: … the mast had failed due to torsional overload. Furthermore a contaminant was found in the oil system which supplies the free wheel assembly with lubricant. The contaminant was found in a designed restrictor in the oil system. The failed lubrication resulted in a free wheel malfunction. SHK went on to report: It is likely that the free wheel released as intended during previous autorotations, but did not engage when the free turbine speed was to meet the rotor speed at the same time as the rotor geared down. If the speed of the free turbine was significantly higher than that of the rotor when the sprags engaged, possibly faster than normal, an additional dynamic moment arose. The energy that was stored up in the engine and transmission was braked by the inertia of the main rotor, whereby the moment on the mast exceeded the fracture strength. The 1.4 x 4.2 mm debris in the restrictor was considered to be routine ‘build debris’, from when the gear box had last been opened for maintenance, namely: …sealant material that has been used between the cover and the transmission housing. Hence the SHK concluded that: The accident was caused by the design of the freewheel’s lubrication system allowing a contaminant of a size that can occur in a Part-145 shop to block the oil flow to the freewheel. Previous Accident in Canada On 10 January 2013, the Canadian Transportation Safety Board (TSB) reported on very similar, 13 September 2011 accident, to a Wisk-Air operated Bell 206B, C-GDPE. During a training flight: …the student pilot entered a practice 180° autorotation to a planned power recovery. When the student initiated the power recovery, the rotor rpm decreased. The instructor took control and completed an autorotation. The low-rotor-warning horn activated and remained on during the autorotation. The helicopter landed firmly yet not hard enough to activate the emergency locator transmitter. The rotor then struck the tail boom and the mast separated just below the rotor head. The helicopter was then shut down and the crew exited without injuries. While in this case the main rotor remained attached, damage was still very evident: The pitch links were wrapped around the mast in a counter-clockwise direction as viewed from above. The pitch links had failed at the upper end at a point coincident with the end of the internal threads. The main rotor mast had failed below the main rotor attachment splines. In the Canadian case the freewheel lubrication blockage was due to corrosion debris. TSB explain that: The main-rotor transmission oil lubricates the...
read moreDeployable Flight Data Recorders
Deployable Flight Data Recorders The Flight Safety Foundation (FSF) has come out in favour of deployable Flight Data Recorders (FDRs), i.e. a means to deploy a floating capsule containing an FDR from an aircraft with its own Emergency Locator Transmitter. This would then preserve the flight data and provide an automatic ELT independent of the aircraft. The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) is considering the idea for a proposed amendment to ICAO Annex 6. FSF President and CEO Jon Beatty said: Deployable Flight Data Recorders have been around for decades and are in use by the military and in many helicopters. We have the technological capability and with several high profile events, including Air France 447 and Malaysia 370, there is clearly the need for a better way to retrieve the flight data information immediately following an accident. The FSF published several articles about deployable flight data recorders in August 2009 and in April 2012. One example, by DRS, is on use on the Boeing F-18. While Automatically Deployable ELTs (ADELTs) have been widely fitted to offshore helicopters, they have not had a stunning service experience however as the UK Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) recently reported in CAP1144. Alternatively, the FSF proposes that data is ‘deployed virtually’ through a triggered transmission when it is recognised an aircraft is in an unrecoverable state. The FSF advocates these methods to supplement the existing FDRs. The European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) has been progressing a number of allied initiatives to improve the ability locate the existing fixed FDRs, which resulted in an Agency Opinion in May, as part of the legislative process. UPDATE: On 15 September 2014, the US National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) issued the preliminary agenda for a for one-day forum, titled ‘Emerging Flight Data and Locator Technology’, which will be held at the NTSB in Washington on 7 October 2014. UPDATE: The presentations are available here. Aerossurance is an Aberdeen based aviation consultancy, with extensive experience of aviation safety and survivability matters. For aviation advice you can trust, contact us at: enquiries@aerossurance.com Follow us on LinkedIn and on Twitter @Aerossurance for our latest...
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