Gulf of Mexico Fatal Helicopter Accident (11 Jun 14)
Gulf of Mexico Fatal Helicopter Accident (11 Jun 14) A search has been called off for two people missing after a helicopter accident in the Gulf of Mexico (GOM) on 11 June 2014. It is reported that divers have located two bodies. According to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) preliminary report: N207MY BELL 206 ROTORCRAFT CRASHED IN THE WATER WHILE ON APPROACH TO AN OIL RIG PLATFORM, THE 2 PERSONS ON BOARD WERE FATALLY INJURED, 90 MILES FROM HOUMA, LA According to press reports, the Bell 206L4 helicopter, operated by Westwind Helicopters, was lost in the in South Timbalier Block 317 Block at 2:40 pm local time, with one pilot and one passenger on board. Its destination was a platform of Renaissance Offshore, bought in 2013 from Black Elk Energy. A Renaissance spokesperson said the helicopter went down between 150 and 200 yards from the platform where it was to pick up a mechanic and refuel. It appears the aircraft sank shortly after impact. The helicopter was reportedly contracted by Wood Group, although they had no personnel onboard. Westwind, based in in Santa Fe, Texas, is a relatively small operator, formed approximately 4 years ago. N207MY, a single engine helicopter, was manufactured in 2000. The Bell 206 is widely used by production management companies that are contracted to operate many small production platforms in the GOM. The number of single engine helicopters in use in the GOM continues a slow decline, while the number of medium and heavy twin engined helicopters continues to increase. UPDATE 1 June 2014: The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) preliminary report states: Visual meteorological conditions prevailed and company flight following was in effect. The flight departed an oil platform at 1409, and was en route to the South Tim Bailier 317 platform. A witness who was located on the oil platform reported that he heard the helicopter approach the platform. The helicopter was on a straight in approach to the platform, when the helicopter started to spin in a clockwise direction. The witness added that the helicopter spun 8-10 times, before the helicopter went silent and then dropped to the water. The helicopter sank and was recovered from about a depth of 380 feet of water. Examination of the helicopter showed extensive damage to the cabin. The tail boom had separated from the main fuselage and was recovered from the surface of the water. One of the main rotor blades, which had separated about four feet from the mast was not recovered. Several sections of the helicopter were not recovered, and included the landing skids, cabin door, and floor. For more details of this fatal B206 accident see: http://aviation-safety.net/wikibase/wiki.php?id=166878 http://www.uscgnews.com/go/doc/4007/2156594/ http://www.upstreamonline.com/live/article1365459.ece http://www.nola.com/traffic/index.ssf/2014/06/2_bodies_found_in_gulf_of_mexi.html UPDATE 26 July 2016: The NTSB have issued their final report: A witness, who was on the platform, saw the helicopter heading toward the platform. As the helicopter approached, it started to spin in a clockwise direction. The helicopter spun several times before it dropped to the water. Examination of the helicopter and rotor system did not reveal any preimpact abnormalities. Weather stations located about 26 and 48 miles from the accident site reported favorable conditions with relatively light wind. Given the lack of specific wind information for the accident location and the lack of information regarding the helicopter’s direction, speed, and altitude as it approached the platform, it could...
read moreRapid Progress with a Category A EBS
Rapid Progress with a Category A EBS One of the most urgent initiatives currently underway in UK offshore helicopter safety is the introduction of Category A Emergency Breathing Systems (EBS). Progress was discussed at Oil & Gas UK’s annual aviation seminar in Aberdeen on 4 June 2014. Oil & Gas UK is the organisation that represents the entire UK offshore industry. Specialist aviation advisors Aerossurance are a member of Oil & Gas UK. In 2013, the UK Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) issued CAP1034 which reported on the experimental work performed in the development of a technical standard for EBS and two draft technical standards. This work followed on from CAA Paper 2003/13, study of the development and implementation of the various forms EBS, and is being presented to the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) helicopter ditching Rule Making Task RMT.0120 working group. The most capable Class A technical standard is for a system that could be deployed underwater after a sudden, unexpected immersion (effectively a water impact rather than a capsize after a deliberate ditching). Following the CAA Review, which resulted in the CAP1145 report published 20 February 2014, the CAA has reversed its position and are now to require Category A EBS (unless the helicopter a ‘side floating capability’ – something researched but not yet trialled on any helicopter). The current combined lifejacket and hybrid re-breather Emergency Breathing System, the LAPP Jacket was introduced around 10 years ago as an industry initiative, at a time when CAA declined to make EBS a mandatory requirement. The LAPP Jacket, would have needed modification to meet Category A. So a decision was taken to take the opportunity to develop a new lifejacket / EBS combination. At the recent seminar the Oil & Gas UK led activity to introduce the new lifejacket and Category A EBS was discussed. Interestingly despite some relatively arbitrary and tight regulatory deadlines posed in CAP1145, a decision was made NOT to give the working group a specific date target. Instead the focus was on getting the design and implementation RIGHT. Due to close liaison between all the stakeholders involved, a design activity that normally would have taken in the order of 2 years is likely to be achieved in closer to 6 months, illustrating the true value of working in partnership. The new dual chamber Mk 50 lifejacket, from UK company Survitec, is to be approved by EASA and the EBS is to be approved by CAA in accordance with the Category A specification in CAP1034. The EBS is a Compressed Air EBS (CA-EBS) with a pressurised P-STASS (Passenger – Short Term Air Supply System) style gas bottle mounted on the right hand side of the Mk50 Lifejacket (a personal locator beacon can be fitted to the left hand side of the Mk50 Lifejacket). P-STASS is widely used by the military and by Fire & Rescue Service Maritime Incident Response Groups. Based on feedback from trials, a decision was made to use a plain oval tube for the CA-EBS rather than a more traditional diver style mouth piece. The nose clip, always a fiddly feature of the LAPP Jacket, appears to have been massively improved by being more rigidly attached to the mouth piece. The certification documentation was expected to be submitted within days of the seminar. Oil & Gas UK have already funded production of long-lead items. It was emphasised that practical training with...
read moreAAIB Report on the Ditchings of EC225 G-REDW 10 May 2012 & G-CHCN 22 Oct 2012
AAIB Report on the Ditchings of EC225 G-REDW 10 May 2012 & G-CHCN 22 Oct 2012 The UK Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB) have published their combined report into the two Eurocopter EC225 helicopter ditchings in the North Sea in 2012: ….the crews of G-REDW and G-CHCN experienced a loss of main rotor gearbox oil pressure, which required them to activate the emergency lubrication system. This system uses a mixture of glycol and water to provide 30 minutes of alternative cooling and lubrication. Both helicopters should have been able to fly to the nearest airport; however, shortly after the system had activated, a warning illuminated indicating that the emergency lubrication system had failed. This required the crews to ditch their helicopters immediately in the North Sea. Both ditchings were successful and the crew and passengers evacuated into the helicopter’s liferafts before being rescued. There were no serious injuries. The loss of oil pressure on both helicopters was caused by a failure of the bevel gear vertical shaft in the main rotor gearbox, which drives the oil pumps. The shafts had failed as result of a circumferential fatigue crack in the area where the two parts of the shaft are welded together. The emergency lubrication system operated in both cases, but the system warning light illuminated as a result of an incompatibility between the helicopter wiring and the pressure switches. This meant the warning light would always illuminate after the crew activated the emergency lubrication system. Ten safety recommendations have been made by AAIB. In addition, the helicopter manufacturer and other organisations have initiated a number of safety actions as a result of this investigation. Oil & Gas UK commented: We are aware that the parties to which the relevant recommendations have been directed have been actively involved in the compilation of this report, and have been taking action. We welcome it, and the progress that has already been made towards addressing these recommendations, such as the redesign, approval and introduction of a replacement vertical shaft. Airbus Helicopters has been very open and engaged with industry and workforce representatives throughout the whole investigation into the underlying causes of these incidents, and this high level of engagement has been hugely welcomed. While the physical causes of the shaft crack and the EMLUBE switch failure have been briefed and debated extensively, perhaps more so than almost any recent other accident after a noticeably extensive investigation and multi-party effort, this report contains lots of further detail, including on emergency checklists, the crash position indicator and liferafts. For further background: http://oilandgasuk.co.uk/helicopter-safety-steering-group-circulates-fact-sheet-following-g-chcn-ditching/ http://www.ec225news.com/site/en/ref/Investigation,-Solutions-&-Approvals_32.html Airbus Helicopters gave a commendably frank and enlightening reflective presentation on some of the lessons in 2014. UPDATE 20 October 2014: 50 aircraft have now been retrofitted. Note: The EC225 is also now known as the H225. UPDATE 9 May 2020: Ungreased Japanese AS332L Tail Rotor Fatally Failed UPDATE 17 September 2022: Canadian B212 Crash: A Defective Production Process UPDATE 10 December 2022: Main Rotor Blade Certification Anomaly in Fatal Canadian Accident UPDATE 20 July 2024: Night CHC HEMS BK117 Loss of Control UPDATE 20 December 2024: 29 Seconds to Impact: A Fatal Night Offshore Approach in the Irish Sea UPDATE 8 February 2025: S-76D Loss of Control on Approach to an Indian Drilling Rig UPDATE 25 May 2025: CHC Sikorsky S-92A Seat Slide Surprise(s) Aerossurance has extensive helicopter safety, airworthiness, operations, survivability and accident analysis experience. For aviation...
read moreOffshore Helicopter Confidence Building – Oil & Gas UK’s 2014 Aviation Seminar
Offshore Helicopter Confidence Building – Oil & Gas UK’s 2014 Aviation Seminar The critical importance of rebuilding confidence in helicopter transport was the theme for Oil & Gas UK’s annual aviation seminar in Aberdeen on 4 June 2014. Oil & Gas UK is the organisation that represents the entire UK offshore industry and Aerossurance is a member of Oil & Gas UK. Chris Allen, Petrofac’s Group Director for Safety and Step Change Helicopter Safety Steering Group (HSSG) representative on the new Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) Offshore Helicopter Safety Action Group opened the seminar. He emphasised that not only do helicopter operations need to be safe but they need to be perceived as safe, hence the focus of this seminar was one of building confidence. He emphasised that confidence is something that has to be earned. Chris Allen highlighted the advances since he made his first offshore flight in an S-61 in 1985, commenting that though they had survival suits, there was a risk of burn holes in the suits as smoking onboard was still allowed! He also commented on the safety advances in new helicopter types becoming available and how the industry must not only demand improvements but also be prepared to implement them. He made the point, echoed by other speakers such as John Taylor of union UNITE, that although survivability matters are important, the prime focus needs to be on keeping aircraft flying safely. Addressing ‘the right hand side of the bowtie‘ can only increase confidence in the ability to escape and survive after an accident. Actions on the ‘left hand side’ increases confidence in completing the flight accident free. Aerossurance was reminded of a cartoon presented at a Royal Aeronautical Society (RAeS) conference on Flight Safety in 1991 that was intended to show the results of over focusing on the ‘right hand side’. The CAA stated that ‘recent accidents are serious cause of concern’ and, perhaps tellingly, that they left the CAA with what they called ‘no option but to act’. It was also conceded that the CAA Review, which resulted in the CAP1145 report (‘Safety review of offshore public transport helicopter operations in support of the exploitation of oil and gas’) and its 61 actions and recommendations, was done hurriedly. Those CAA comments suggested to some in the audience a ‘knee jerk reaction’ ‘after being off the pace’ on offshore helicopters (as other participants put it). It was also revealed there was specific direction NOT to consult other stakeholders on the report before publication. In many ways that is an odd admission, as CAA has made great play of one action, that of creating a Norwegian style, collaborative ‘forum’ for offshore helicopter safety. Some of the CAP1145 timescales were denounced as ‘ill thought out’ by John Taylor of UNITE in his presentation. Several participants pointed out other CAA ‘actions and recommendations’ in CAP1145 that were already in-hand by EASA and industry. Hopefully now the report has been published there will now be a greater focus on working in partnership to improve safety. The CAA described the resulting Offshore Helicopter Safety Action Group, its two sub-groups and their relationship with the CAA. The OHSAG has met ‘a couple of times’ and it was explained that the minutes will be made public (minutes from the first meeting on 20 March 2014 are currently on the CAA web site)....
read moreBP’s Unmanned First in USA
BP’s Unmanned First in USA BP have commenced the first commercial use of an Unmanned Air Systems (UAS) over land in the US. Contractor AeroVironment performed the first flight for BP in Alaska on 8 June 2014 under a ‘Certificate of Waiver’ approval from the US Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). While commercial UAS are in use in other countries this is a major first in the US, where the FAA have been facing massive criticism for dragging their heels on regulating commercial UAS use. The UAS in question is a 6.1kg, battery powered, fixed wing AeroVironment Puma AE (All Environment). The Puma AE is operated by a crew of two and can operated out to a radius of 15kms with an endurance up to 3.5 hours. It is in US military service as the RQ-20A. BP Exploration (Alaska) Inc plan to survey pipelines, roads and equipment in and around Prudhoe Bay, Alaska. The company defined its mapping needs for the remote Alaska North Slope last year and issued a request for information in June 2013 to multiple geographic information system (GIS), manned and unmanned aircraft systems companies, selecting AeroVironment for the a proof of concept demonstration. For this contract the Puma AE will be equipped with either a custom integrated LiDAR (Light Detection and Ranging) or its standard electro-optical and infrared sensor payload. Tim Conver, AeroVironment CEO said: Thanks to the FAA’s rigorous, safety-focused certification process for UAS, BP and AeroVironment have launched a safer, better and more cost-effective solution for managing critical infrastructure and resources. BP’s forward-thinking embrace of UAS technology enabled AeroVironment to deliver a comprehensive approach for generating, processing and converting data collected by portable UAS into actionable information that provides tangible economic and operational advantages. Integrated into BP’s routine operations, this new solution is now helping BP manage its extensive Prudhoe Bay field operations in a way that enhances safety, protects the environment, improves productivity and accomplishes activities never before possible. It is reported that: In one application, surveying the 200 miles of roadways built to support North Slope activities is critical to the effective operation of the Prudhoe Bay field. Drill rigs that traverse the roadways span up to 28 feet wide, 132 feet long and weigh up to 3.5 million pounds, with a driver at each end. The highly accurate LiDAR-produced maps delivered by AeroVironment’s Puma AE, along with precision GPS guidance systems, assist drivers in keeping moving drill rigs centered on the roadways, even in low visibility conditions. In 2013 FAA issued restricted category aircraft type (RCAT) certificates for Puma AE and a the larger Insitu ScanEagle for use over water only. The ScanEagle trials, for ConocoPhillips as part of a whale watching project in the Chukchi Sea, were of limited success as the vehicle ditched after its second flight. More Details Watch a video of the Puma AE here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LrdlUwGXQqI FAA press release: http://www.faa.gov/news/press_releases/news_story.cfm?newsId=16354 AeroVironment press release: http://www.avinc.com/resources/press_release/bp-and-aerovironment-launch-first-faa-approved-commercial-unmanned-aircraft UPDATE November 2014: BP has since issued this article, primarily on operations in Alaska, which noted that: Elsewhere, UAVs are helping BP’s exploration team to produce cost-effective 3D models of onshore outcrops in Azerbaijan. At its site in Hull, UK, the unmanned Cyberhawk ‘octocopter’ has helped to assess the integrity of a 100-metre (330-foot) cooling tower, removing the need for scaffolding and people working at height. Aerossurance has experience in UAS going back to...
read moreNTSB: “Going Above and Beyond in Helicopter Safety”
NTSB’s Christopher Hart Visiting the NMSP (Credit: NTSB) NTSB: “Going Above and Beyond in Helicopter Safety” Christopher Hart, Acting Chairman of the United States National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), has published an article on a recent visit to the New Mexico State Police (NMSP). In 2009 the NMSP’s Special Operation Aircraft Section lost A109E N606SP in a fatal accident taking off from a remote, mountainous landing site in dark (moonless) night, windy, instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) during a search and rescue (SAR) mission. The NTSB report noted that: Contributing to the accident were an organizational culture that prioritized mission execution over aviation safety and the pilot’s fatigue, self-induced pressure to conduct the flight, and situational stress. Also contributing to the accident were deficiencies in the NMSP aviation section’s safety-related policies, including lack of a requirement for a risk assessment at any point during the mission; inadequate pilot staffing; lack of an effective fatigue management program for pilots; and inadequate procedures and equipment to ensure effective communication between airborne and ground personnel during search and rescue missions. The safety issues discussed in this report include the pilot’s decision-making, flight and duty times and rest periods, NMSP staffing, safety management system programs and risk assessments, communications between the NMSP pilots and volunteer search and rescue organization personnel, instrument flying, and flight-following equipment. The Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association (AOPA) have produced an excellent video on this accident: Clearly this was an accident investigation that looked deeply at systemic organisational issues and touched on some of the major risk management issues that are relevant to all SAR, HEMS (Helicopter Emergency Medical Service) and similar missions. After the accident NTSB directed three recommendations to the Governor of the State of New Mexico: Require the New Mexico Department of Public Safety to bring its aviation section policies and operations into conformance with industry standards, such as those established by the Airborne Law Enforcement Association. (A-11-53) Require the New Mexico Department of Public Safety to develop and implement a comprehensive fatigue management program for the New Mexico State Police (NMSP) aviation section pilots that, at a minimum, requires NMSP to provide its pilots with protected rest periods and defines pilot rest (in a manner consistent with 14 Code of Federal Regulations Section 91.1057) and ensures adequate pilot staffing levels and aircraft hours of availability consistent with the pilot rest requirements. (A-11-54) Revise or reinforce New Mexico State Police (NMSP) search and rescue (SAR) policies to ensure direct communication between NMSP aviation units and SAR ground teams and field personnel during a SAR mission. (A-11-55) In his article, Hart explains that the unit went further and also pursued: personal locater beacons for each crew member, Spider Tracks upgrade, Garmin Pilot Pro used with iPad, flight vests with signaling devices and survival gear, environmental equipment upgrade, survival kits, enhanced flight following with New Mexico State Police districts, flight supervision/coordination between commanders, terrain avoidance upgrade, ALEA and other formal safety training, enhanced mission planning and detailed mission briefing, new risk management procedures, crew endurance/management, an aviation safety training program, aircraft section standard operating procedures, tactical flight officer program, and improved coordination with ground assets. Hart concludes: After an accident, a strong response like the New Mexico State Police’s helps to prevent a recurrence. And by learning from the robust measures that the...
read moreEASA Annual Safety Review 2013 Published
EASA Annual Safety Review 2013 Published The European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) Annual Safety Review for 2013 is now available at: http://easa.europa.eu/system/files/dfu/199751_EASA_ASR_2013.pdf In 2013, there were 18 accidents involving EASA Member State operated Commercial Air Transport aeroplanes. EASA Executive Director Patrick Ky commented: In 2013 there was no fatal accident in commercial air transport aeroplanes in the EASA Member States. Since 2007, there has been a marked decrease in the number of accidents and in the number of persons injured. This consistent trend indicates there is firm improvement in safety. However, we should never overlook that maintaining safety requires vigilance, as a single fatal accident can stop or even reverse this positive trend. The 32 EASA Member States (the 28 European Union Member States plus Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland) now have a lower scheduled commercial air transport fatal accident rate per million flights (1.8) than any other region (which range from 1.9 for North America to 38.3 for Africa). In 2013 there were 7 commercial air transport helicopters accidents, of which 3 were fatal. The most common type of helicopter accident was “loss of control in flight”. Over the past 10 years the onshore sector have been responsible for 77% of the helicopter commercial air transport fatalities. Aerial work accidents in 2013 were 12% lower for aeroplanes and 24% lower for helicopters than the annual averages for 2002-2011. However, while there was a 35% reduction in the number of aerial work aeroplane fatal accidents aerial work helicopter fatal accident numbers decreased by only 2%. The top 3 operation types in fixed wing aerial work fatal accidents were fire-fighting, aerial survey and photography operations. For helicopters the top 3 were construction, ‘other’ and photography operations. The number of accidents involving General Aviation light aircraft in 2013 has decreased by 10% when compared with the average annual GA accidents for 2008-2012, with a 16% reduction in fatal accidents. On occurrence reporting generally, EASA report that: At the end of 2013 there was a total of 800,614 occurrences in the ECR [the European Central Repository]. In the early years of the ECR, between 2006 and 2009, there was a steady increase in the number of occurrences that was made available by the Member States. Since 2009 the number of occurrences has begun to stablise in the range of 80,000 to 95,000 occurrences per year. This indicates the Member States are uploading data more routinely. EASA also note: The pooling of such a large number of occurrences in a single database highlights the importance of the ECR as a usable resource that is available to EASA and the Member States in their analysis. The ECR provides a far greater amount of information than would available to any single Member State alone. The challenge is to continually improve the quality of the data provided by the Member States so that the ECR is able to provide enough detailed information to support the decision making process in its own right without the need to refer to other data or information sources. UPDATE 20 October 2015: We cover the issue of the 2014 review. UPDATE 2 July 2016: We examine the 2016 EASA Annual Safety Report. UPDATE 19 June 2017: EASA Annual Safety Review 2017 Published Aerossurance has extensive air safety, risk, accident analysis and regulation experience. For practical aviation advice you can trust, contact us at: enquiries@aerossurance.com Follow us on LinkedIn and on...
read moreFlight Safety Foundation Wins Award for its Basic Aviation Risk Standard (BARS) Program
The Flight Safety Foundation’s Basic Aviation Risk Standard (BARS) initiative to improve aviation safety in the mining and resources sector has been recognised by Australasian Institute of Mining and Metallurgy (AusIMM). The BARS Program was designed to evaluate aircraft operators competing for contracts to carry mining company personnel or undertake specialist aerial work. The aircraft supporting these activities range from small single engine helicopters to commercial airliners, in a variety of challenging environments. According to the Flight Safety Foundation: With aviation being one of the resource sector’s most critical risks, and one that is frequently contracted out to external suppliers, the Foundation identified a need for a universal safety standard for the sector. BARS was developed in conjunction with the resources sector and is a consensus-based industry standard consisting of: A risk-based standard, now at Version 5 An auditing program, that has now completed over 250 audits A range of aviation safety training programs A global safety data analysis and sharing program. So far 28 aviation customers have joined the BARS Program, with the membership spreading outside the mining sector. Through the BARSoft database, member customers are able to view the reports of aircraft operators audited to the BAR Standard. This results in a reduction of audit costs and a reduction in the number of audits on each operator. AusIMM noted the BARS Program raised the level of minimum acceptable standards for aircraft operations worldwide. BARS Program managing director Greg Marshall received AusIMM’s Jim Torlach Health and Safety Award on behalf of the Flight Safety Foundation. Greg Marshall commented: We’re really proud to accept this award from the mining industry and are encouraged in knowing that the program is internationally respected and is helping to improve aviation safety. Under our program aviation suppliers work to comply with one standard – not with the multiple and varying safety standards and protocols that existed previously. Mining companies can be assured their aviation suppliers meet the exacting standards required of the BARS Program. Aerossurance is an aviation consultancy with a proven track record in safety, operations, airworthiness, regulations, contracts and tenders: enquiries@aerossurance.com Follow us on LinkedIn for our latest...
read morePerformance Based Regulation – EASA A-NPA & UK CAA Seminar
Performance Based Regulation (PBR) – EASA A-NPA & UK CAA Seminar EASA A-NPA On 23 May 2014 the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) issued an Advanced – Notice of Proposed Amendment (A-NPA) on aviation regulation in Europe and potential updates to Regulation (EC) No 216/2008 (the so called EASA Basic Regulation). The A-NPA is open for comment until 15 August 2014: http://easa.europa.eu/document-library/notices-of-proposed-amendment/npa-2014-12 The A-NPA addresses seven areas of potential change: A performance-based, integrated approach to safety (in line with the International Civil Aviation Organisation’s thinking), Updating the EASA’s safety remit (e.g. being more proportionate to General Aviation, potentially including regulating ground handling and maintaining a central repository of licences and approvals), Extending the EASA’s remit beyond safety (e.g. security, environmental protection, wider involvement in Single European Skies, a greater aviation policy coordination role and potentially an EU central aircraft register) Optimising the use of available resources (allowing Member States to transfer tasks to EASA), Ensuring an adequate and stable EASA funding (raising various alternatives to the current mix of 1/3 EU funding and 2/3 from fees from certain sectors on industry), Further integration of aviation aspects (potentially towards a one tier regulator), and Aviation regulation beyond the EASA’s facets (essentially a question: ‘Is there anything else’ EASA should do?’). The European Commission commentary on the A-NPA is here: http://ec.europa.eu/transport/modes/air/consultations/2014-aviation-safety_en.htm There are many aspects of the A-NPA that will drive passionate comment, as no doubt the authors intended, particularly as some of the concepts mirror the wider debate on European politics. This article will focus on the first of the potential changes discussed, the concept of a performance based approach to regulation, which is a more fundamental issue of safety regulation policy. EASA ran a conference on this very subject 18 months ago: http://easa.europa.eu/conferences/pbo/ EASA observe that, traditionally: … the safety regulatory approach has been mainly reactive to lessons learnt from accidents, serious incidents, or from oversight activities. This approach employs a prescriptive, compliance-based system addressing the different aviation domains. and The rapid increase of traffic volume… encourages an even more proactive and even predictive system, thanks to the vast amount of data now available in…a digitalised world full of monitoring systems. This suggests the development of a full Performance-Based Environment (PBE) including, amongst others, the establishment of safety performance indicators and targets. While a performance based approach is not intended to replace the current regulatory system, it was inevitable that as more aviation organisations implement and mature their own Safety Management System, improvements would be made by the industry faster than the traditional, prescriptive rule-making system. While standardisation is still important in some areas, perhaps we will see more industry standards and less prescriptive regulation. UK CAA Seminar In the same week UK CAA staged a seminar for industry in Gatwick on their planned transition to Performance Based Regulation (PBR), which gave an insight to what this new approach will look like. Mark Swan (CAA Director, Safety & Airspace Regulation Group) explained that this involves “a more risk and performance-based approach…by building a picture of aviation safety performance across the total system”. In many ways it was clear from the CAA presentations that this transformation will require a major cultural shift in how individual regulators work. In crude terms it means less compliance focused ‘auditing’ and more ‘reviewing’ of effectiveness backed by good exchange...
read moreCanadian Mining Air Accident (Cessna 208B Caravan)
Canadian Mining Air Accident (Cessna 208B Caravan) In May 2014 the Canadian Transportation Safety Board (TSB) issued their report into a Loss of Control Inflight (LOC-I) accident to a Cessna 208B Caravan on 18 November 2012. The aircraft was on charter to a local mining company to transport employees the 310nm between Snow Lake and Winnipeg, Manitoba. The Flight The TSB report that: …shortly after take-off, the aircraft descended and struck the terrain in a wooded area approximately 0.9 nautical miles beyond the departure end of the runway. The pilot was fatally injured, and the 7 passengers sustained serious injuries. The aircraft was destroyed by impact forces, and a small fire ensued near the engine. Fortunately the fires was due to spilt engine oil which was quickly burnt off, so the fire extinguished. TSB state: The investigation concluded that the impact forces exceeded the crashworthy design limits of the aircraft. The buckling or compression of the subfloor structure, along with the flexing or movement of the instrument panel, and the collapsing and forward positioning of the pilot’s seat, reduced the livable space for the pilot to the degree that the accident was non-survivable. The front seat passenger was knocked unconscious, but likely survived [only] due to the aft-most positioning of that seat. Fortuitously the Emergency Locator Transmitter activated successfully and some passengers had mobile phone contact. Even so, despite an impact close to the airfield: Response to the site was delayed by approximately 3 hours, because of uncertainty as to the exact location of the site and difficulty in moving vehicles through the rocky and wooded terrain. The Pre-History Even 3 hours after the accident rime ice was found adhering to the leading edge of the vertical stabilizer. In fact the TSB note that: The weather conditions on the day before the accident were conducive to the accumulation of rime ice in cloud. The aircraft had an accumulation of rime ice on its wing and tail leading edges, left from the incoming flight to Snow Lake on the day before the accident. This implied to the TSB that the previous flight had been conducted Instrument Meteorological Conditions which were outside the operator’s approval (they were cleared for visual conditions only) and for which the pilot was not qualified (he had no Instrument Rating). Witnesses observed that: Although the pilot made an attempt to remove the ice before [the final] flight, a significant amount of it remained on the aircraft. No de-icing or anti-icing fluids were applied to the wing or horizontal stabilizer, and no tactile inspection of the upper wing or tail surfaces was observed. The ice on the leading edges of aircraft’s wings and tail would have reduced available lift, added extra weight, increased aerodynamic drag, and thereby reduced its take-off and climb performance, increased its stall speed, and impaired the protection afforded by its stall warning system, which is activated at a pre-set angle of attack based on a clean wing. TSB also note that on the day of the accident, the cloud ceiling was still lower, further increasing the chances of ice forming. Additionally the TSB identified another shortfall on the operator’s management (or ‘operational control’) of flights that increased risk even more: The aircraft’s gross weight at take-off exceeded the aircraft’s allowable gross weight in icing conditions of 8550...
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