EC135P2+ Air Ambulance Fatal Accident Mississippi 10 March 2025
EC135P2+ Air Ambulance Fatal Accident Mississippi 10 March 2025 (Med-Trans AirCare 3 N835CS) On 10 March 2025 Airbus Helicopters EC135P2+ air ambulance N835CS, operated by Med-Trans Corporation (part of Global Medical Response) as AirCare 3, was destroyed in an accident near Canton, Mississippi. The pilot (who had 10,644 hours total time), the flight paramedic and flight nurse were fatally injured. The US National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) issued a preliminary report on 4 April 2025. The Accident Flight – Preliminary Details The helicopter was repositioning day VFR to its home base, Golden Triangle Regional Airport (GTR), Columbus, Mississippi, after transporting a patient to the St Dominic-Jackson Memorial Hospital Heliport (MS46), Jackson, Mississippi. According to the NTSB: A preliminary review of automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B) data showed the helicopter departed from MS46 and began to climb to the northeast. The helicopter flew over the Ross R. Barnett Reservoir, and the flightpath remained south of the Natchez Trace Parkway. The helicopter eventually reached an altitude of about 2,500 ft above mean sea level (msl). Shortly after the helicopter flew over the Pearl River State Wildlife Management Area, it began to descend. Shortly after the helicopter flew over the Pearl River State Wildlife Management Area, it began to descend. About halfway through the descent, the flight nurse transmitted over the radio to the UMMC MED-COM, “we’ve got a major problem, we are having an emergency landing in a field right now, ops are not good, controls are giving us a lot of trouble, coming in fast.” No further radio transmissions were recorded from the helicopter from either the UMMC MEDCOM or ATC. During the descent, the helicopter turned to the north. It impacted multiple trees just to the south of a flat grass field 1/4 mile southwest of the Turcotte Fish Hatchery. There was a postimpact fire that burned for about 3 hours, due to the remote location. The Turcotte Fish Hatchery manager was inside his truck near the hatchery ponds at the time, 700 yards from the accident site: He heard a “boom” or an “explosion,” which is what first drew his attention to the helicopter. He looked toward the hatchery and saw the helicopter while it was airborne. He…could not recall hearing any engine sound after the “boom,” and the helicopter sound was not noticeable to him. The helicopter… …did not change course and was pointed straight at him before it turned north and descended “at a pretty good rate.” It appeared to him that the pilot was “having trouble controlling” the helicopter. The witness reported that he did not see any smoke or fire from the helicopter. The helicopter was… …descending at a pretty good rate, which he estimated as a 40° to 45° descent angle. He said the helicopter’s estimated nose down attitude was about 30°. He said there was “a little wobble” of the nose from left to right. The helicopter was rolling “just a little bit.” He said the time from the “boom” to helicopter’s impact with the ground spanned no more than about 15 seconds. NTSB report that the helicopter had undergone its most recent inspection 2.7 flying hours before the accident. The NTSB do not comment on what inspection this was. A review of data on FlightAware indicated that the aircraft was on the ground at Key...
read moreUK CAA HOFO ACAS Rulemaking 2025 & a 2004 Tornado / AS332L Airprox
UK CAA HOFO ACAS Rulemaking 2025 & a 2004 Tornado / AS332L Airprox UK CAA Rulemaking 2025 The UK Civil Aviation Authority (UK CAA) has recently consulted on a general update to the Air Operating Regulations for offshore helicopters (Subpart K: Helicopter Offshore Operations). This included introduction of Aircraft Collision Avoidance System (ACAS) requirements. The UK CAA wrote that: An internal CAA study produced in 2005 cited flight in uncontrolled airspace and mixing of civilian and military air traffic as two of the single largest factors associated with risk bearing Airproxes (during the 2001-2004 study period). The majority of offshore helicopter operations take place off the north-east coast of the UK where both of these factors prevail. It is therefore proposed to add a requirement for ACAS II to the Air Operating Regulations in order to reduce the risk of MAC… Wording similar to the CAT.IDE.A.155 requirement for aeroplanes will be [sic] proposed for addition to SPA.HOFO.160 (new para. (d)) in order to ‘future proof’ the requirement. A two-year period is proposed to allow time for all aircraft to be upgraded and to allow the costs to be spread. In their consultation, UK CAA note: Following a high profile very near miss between a military aircraft and an offshore helicopter in February 2004, all helicopters currently used for UK offshore operations are voluntarily equipped with ACAS, mostly ACAS II. Some aircraft are equipped with ACAS I, about half of which are already scheduled to be upgraded to ACAS II. We will examine that 2004 incident next. RAF Tornado F3 / Bristow AS332L Airprox 5 February 2004 The UK Airprox Board (UKAB) published its analysis of this incident: The RAF Panavia Tornado F3 from RAF Leuchars was tasked as the target aircraft in an exercise and “required to simulate an aircraft flying a 20nm square search pattern between 250-1000ft asl” for two other Tornadoes. The fighter’s… …AI [Airborne Interception] radar [GEC AI.24 Foxhunter] was serviceable and they were squawking with Mode C selected on. They were receiving an Air Defence Information Service (ADIS) from the Control and Reporting Centre (CRC) at RAF Neatishead, Norfolk. The surface wind was westerly at about 35kt, with the 2000ft wind registering at 50kt; the weather was slightly hazy at low level with an in-flight visibility of about 8km and no cloud to affect the flight. The Bristow AS332L was returning to Aberdeen in VMC along the Helicopter Main Route (HMR) 117 from the Auk A installation (then operated by Shell) in the Central North Sea at 09:07. They were receiving a NATS offshore Flight Information Service (FIS) and were squawking the assigned code with Mode C. The helicopter was en route at 1000 ft rather than the more usual 2000 ft because of a 55 knot headwind, as they were entitled to do in Class G airspace. Neither aircraft was equipped with any form of ACAS. Both were operating in uncontrolled Class G airspace, and beyond radar cover at that time (multilateration was not introduced until 2010). Neither NATS nor Neatishead were aware of the other traffic, undermining their ability to provide a useful information service. After about 20 nm on the HMR and approaching 119 nm range from the ADN [Aberdeen North] VOR at 125kt with the autopilot engaged, when the helicopter crew… …suddenly became aware...
read moreAS365 Crewman Dragged from Boat During SAR Training
AS365 Crewman Dragged from Boat During SAR Training (Western Australia Police Air Wing Airbus AS365N3 VH‑WPX) On 29 September 2020 Western Australia Police Air Wing Airbus AS365N3 VH‑WPX was conducting SAR training exercises near Swanbourne, Western Australia. While conducting an exercise with a small vessel, a rescue crewman attached to the hoist cable was pulled overboard and dragged through the water. The crewman was recovered uninjured. The Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) issued their safety investigation report on 22 September 2021. The Day’s Training & Incident Flight The crew commenced duty at 07:00 Local Time at their Jandakot base. They departed at 09:33 for a staging area at Rous Head, Fremantle, landing at about 09:50. The crew for the exercises comprised of the pilot, four tactical flight officers (TFOs) and one TFO instructor. It involved the TFOs rotating through the roles of winch operator, rescue crewman and diver. They conducted the first training exercise of the day at a nearby beach. The following exercises involved training with the 40 ft volunteer rescue vessel, Stacy Hall c 1-2 km offshore Swanbourne. The aim was to conduct an initial vessel winching Operator Proficiency Check for one TFO and recency flights for two other crewmembers. At the time of this incident the three key crew members were: The pilot: joined the Australian Army as a Blackhawk pilot in 2008 and then the WA Police in Sept 2019. They had 3,566 flying hours of experience, 320 on type. The hoist operator: who had served in the WA Police Air Wing since 2010, and had 1,596 hours of experience, including 110 cycles of water winching. The rescue crewman: who been with the Air Wing as a helicopter crewman since mid 2018 and had 864 hours, including 74 cycles as a rescue crewman. The weather was overcast with clear visibility. The temperature was about 19°C with wind from the north‑west at 21 km/h (11 kt) gusting to 30 km/h (16 kt). Sea state was forecast to increase to 1.5 to 2 m during the morning. After the first training it was decided only to conduct further operational recency training for the already qualified TFOs due to the sea state. At 11:31, they departed from Rous Head for the third training sortie. During a dummy run to the vessel the winch operator observed that the Stacy Hall was bouncing in the waves, so the crew requested…course and speed changes. …as the rescue crewman was winched clear of the deck, they swung towards the canopy on the forward end of the deck and required the use of their arms to fend off…with the winch operator commenting to the crew that the sequence ‘…was pretty hairy’. Further hoist training with the vessel and a helocast (free drop) / wet hoisting recovery exercise were conducted without issue, before a further return to Rous Head. This suggests relatively low concern about the sea state. At 12:10 the helicopter departed to rendezvous with the Stacy Hall 1-2 km off Swanbourne for the fourth exercise. After take-off, the crew completed fly‑away checks, pre-landing checks, pilot brief and winch checks. The pilot brief confirmed the crew would undertake two hoist cycles to the vessel, which would be travelling on a course of 300° at a speed of 12 kt. The helicopter approached the Stacy Hall and...
read moreFirefighting Bucket Snags Trees During Autorotation
Firefighting Bucket Snags Trees During Autorotation (Valhalla Helicopters Bell 205 C-GRUV) On 19 July 2023, Valhalla Helicopters Bell 205A-1 C-GRUV crashed while conducting firefighting in northern Alberta. The pilot died of his injuries. The Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) published their safety investigation report on 27 February 2025. The Accident Flight At 1803 Local Time, 9 minutes after being tasked, the helicopter departed Haig Lake firebase, Alberta, on a VFR flight to a forest fire located approximately 15 NM northeast of Peace River Aerodrome Alberta. The helicopter had an empty firefighting bucket, a1230 l SEI Industries Bambi Bucket BB2732, on a 150-foot longline. The pilot had 8711 flying hours total time, 3286 on type and a further 2048 on the B212. The helicopter was powered by an Ozark Aeroworks (formerly Honeywell) T5317B. Very shortly after departure, after reaching 1400 ft AGL, the helicopter experienced an engine failure. The helicopter began a 180° turn to the right, to a heading of approximately 025° magnetic, during which it continued to lose altitude. The helicopter then experienced a complete loss of engine power and the pilot began to autorotate into a section of muskeg to the west of his current location. During the subsequent autorotation the water bucket became entangled in trees. The helicopter consequently impacted the ground in a nose-down, left-banked attitude. The main rotor struck the tail boom. The damage indicated low rotor rpm at the time of impact. There was no post-impact fire. The pilot survived the initial impact and was able to egress from the helicopter but later died of his injuries. The Safety Investigation The helicopter was not equipped with a flight data recorder or a cockpit voice recorder. Neither were required by regulation. The helicopter’s Garmin GPSMAP 496 provided the investigation with information about its flight path. A teardown of the T53 engine determined that a failure of the engine air diffuser’s No. 2 bearing support cone brazing resulted in the compressor rotor making contact with the power shaft, resulting in a high level of damage and vibration. The failure of the brazing was due to an undetermined manufacturing defect that created a localized stress concentration that, over time, resulted in the progressive failure of the braze bond. The helicopter was equipped with an Onboard Systems keeperless cargo hook kit rated for loads up to 5000 lbs. Investigators found the longline wrapped around treetops in the vicinity of the impact site. The snagged water bucket resulted in forward momentum being translated to a circular acceleration vector toward the ground, increasing the helicopter’s rate of descent. To counteract this, the pilot likely pulled aft on the cyclic and increased the collective to arrest the descent. With the engine no longer producing power, these actions would have led to a decay in main rotor rpm in the final moments of flight. The main rotor blades slowed to the point that the main rotor rpm would not have been recoverable. As the main rotor slowed, the retreating blade (left side) would have stalled, causing a roll to the left and a pitch forward in the final seconds before impact. For unknown reasons, the pilot did not jettison the external load using either the electrical or the manual release methods at the beginning of the autorotation. The pilot could have...
read morePassenger Struck by Tail Rotor While Unloading at a Hunting Camp
Passenger Struck by Tail Rotor While Unloading at a Hunting Camp (Heli Explore Airbus AS350BA C-GWMO) On 21 April 2024, Airbus AS350BA C-GWMO of Heli Explore Inc, was conducting a series of VFR flights from Attawapiskat Airport, Ontario. These were to various hunting camps in support of the annual ‘Goose Break‘ hunt. A passenger fatality occurred unload after the 9th flight of the day. The Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) published their safety investigation report on 12 February 2025. The Accident Flight The helicopter had picked up one passenger at Attawapiskat Airport for Camp 17 on Akimiski Island, Nunavut, 15 minutes flying away. The passenger had participated in the loading of the helicopter, under the supervision of a maintenance engineer. Hunting equipment was being carried in panniers and pods on either side of the helicopter. The pilot landed facing the northeast, where he could see the trail leading to the camp. He left the engine running and rotors turning and his hands remained on the controls. This technique was often used during ground handling (passenger and cargo loading and off loading) to allow for a swift reaction if the helicopter were to shift or become unstable on the landing area. An individual on a snowmobile towing a sled arrived to help unload the helicopter. He waited off to the left side of the helicopter, in view of the pilot, until the pilot gave a signal that he could move closer. The pilot told the passenger he could get out of the helicopter and signalled to the snowmobile driver that he could approach the helicopter. The snowmobile and sled were parked near the external cargo basket on the left side, facing the same direction as the helicopter, where it remained throughout the occurrence. The passenger exited the helicopter and began unloading cargo from the left hand side with the snowmobile driver. As the passenger completed unloading the cargo pod, the snowmobile driver walked around the front of the helicopter to unload the right-side pod. Crucially: Once the passenger emptied the cargo pod, he secured its door and started walking toward the tail of the helicopter. The snowmobile driver saw that the passenger was approaching the back of the helicopter, and tried to warn him by yelling and gesturing for him to stay away from the back of the helicopter. The passenger continued along the left side of the tail boom toward the back of the helicopter, past 4 antennas mounted below the tail boom, and past the left-side horizontal stabilizer. He then ducked under the tail boom, aft of the horizontal stabilizer, but forward of the tail’s vertical fin. As he crossed to the right side, he was struck by the spinning tail rotor and was fatally injured. The impact caused the tail rotor and most of the tail rotor gearbox to detach from the helicopter. Safety Investigation In previous years at Attawapiskat, a person employed by Heli Explore Inc arranged passenger bookings and provided safety briefings to passengers. This documented that passengers had received a safety briefing, helped as some passengers only spoke Cree and “helped speed up the process of moving many passengers to the various camps”. However in 2024… …a new individual from the community was selected to arrange the passenger bookings in Attawapiskat. This individual...
read moreS-76D Loss of Control on Approach to an Indian Drilling Rig
Pawan Hans Sikorsky S-76D Loss of Control on Approach to an Indian Drilling Rig (VT-PWI) On 28 June 2022 Pawan Hans Sikorsky S-76D VT-PWI, contracted by ONGC, impacted the sea on approach to the Sagar Kiran jack-up drilling rig in the Arabian Sea. The helicopter capsized and while all 9 occupants egressed the helicopter, four passengers died in the water before they were rescued. Two passengers suffered serious injuries. Another passenger and the two flight crew escaped with minor injuries. The Indian Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau (AAIB) published their safety investigation report in August 2023. ONGC, Pawan Hans and the Introduction of the S-76D in India State owned ONGC is the largest oil and gas company in India. As is also common in Mexico and Brazil, the state oil company is the main customer for offshore helicopters in their domestic market. Pawan Hans (PHL) was formed in 1985. ONGC owns 49% of the company, with the Government of India holding the majority stake. The Government has made 4 attempts to sell off their stake in the last 8 years. Privately owned competitors to Pawan Hans include Global Vectra and Heligo. Pawan Hans operated 44 helicopters of 7 helicopter types at the time of the accident. Offshore operations were their largest operating sector. For many years the Airbus AS365 family had been their prime offshore type, with 31 in their fleet in 2022. According to the in the AAIB report: ONGC…had put the criteria that aircraft being made available for operations should not be more than 7 years old [presumably for the commencement of new tenders]. Pawan Hans was not in a position to meet the customer demand without induction of newer aircraft in its fleet. Thereby, PHL’s top management decided to go for induction of new helicopters through leasing option. An attempt to lease S-76D and S-76C++ helicopters from a leasing company was made earlier but could not fructify. Hence, alternate leasing options were explored and PHL processed for leasing seven S-76D helicopters with planned induction in 2019-2020. These aircraft, formerly operated by Thai Aviation Services, were being replaced by Leonardo AW139s. After disruptions and delays owing to Covid-19, a master lease agreement was signed with lessor in October 2020. Pawan Hans was required to comply with provisions contained in the Air Operators Certification Procedure CAP 3400 for induction of new helicopter in its fleet. Pawan Hans submitted request for pre-application meeting to [Directorate General of Civil Aviation] DGCA on 10 Nov 2020. Pawan Hans thus became the only operator of the S-76D in India. The aircraft was leased to Pawan Hans by Milestone Aviation company Vertical Aviation No1 Ltd though to 17 February 2028. The aircraft arrived at Pawan Hans on 26 Aug 2021 in disassembled condition. Aircraft had 4636:42 hrs at the time of delivery to Pawan Hans. Aircraft was assembled and ground run was carried out on 23 Oct 2021. The test flight for issue of ARC was carried out on 11 Jan 2022, and Certificate of Airworthiness and ARC was issued by DGCA on 28 Mar 2022. Pawan Hans has a Safety Management System (SMS), accepted by DGAC. Pawan Hans hadidentified various risk mitigations for the S-76D introduction, including: Experienced offshore S-76D TREs/TRIs were to be recruited S-76D offshore experienced PICs will be hired/deployed in initial stages Existing...
read moreTwo Rescuers Fell When Hoist Cable Damaged After a Loss of Hover Reference
Two Rescuers Fell When Hoist Cable Damaged After a Loss of Hover Reference (Australian Helicopters Bell 412 VH‑EMZ) On 9 November 2009 Australian Helicopters Bell 412 VH‑EMZ was involved in a hosting accident that left two crew members seriously injured. The Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) issued their safety investigation report on 21 January 2011. Preparations for the Medevac Flight The helicopter, call sign ‘Rescue 700’, based at Horn Island Aerodrome, Queensland was tasked to rendezvous with a 281m container ship Maersk Duffield located about 132 km west of Horn Island. The flight was to medevac an ill crew member to hospital. On board were to be four crew: On board the helicopter were the pilot, who was seated in the front right seat; an air crew officer (ACO), who was seated in the front left seat; and a rescue crew officer (RCO) and paramedic, who were seated in the rear cabin. The ACO “generally occupied the front left seat and relocated into the rear cabin” when required to operate the hoist. The RCO’s role was to accompany the paramedic during hoisting. The pilot had c 8000 hours of flying experience, 2000 on type in command. The ACO had 7 years of experience with about about 690 hours of operational experience, but just 25 hoist sorties of which only 8 had been involved ships. No experience details were provided for the RCO or paramedic. Before departure, the crew had been advised that the patient would need to be hoisted from the ship’s forecastle. This area was ahead of the 16.2 m high forward mast with c 8-9 m horizontal clearance. The crew were provided with photos. The decision to undertake the winch to the forecastle was made by the master. The other options available for consideration were the ship’s bridge wings, the monkey island; or the top of the containers on the deck. The bridge wings and monkey island were considered unsuitable because of the number of aerials and other obstructions present, and the height of the containers above the deck meant that they were not accessible by the ship’s crew. While awaiting the arrival of the paramedic, the pilots AO and RCO developed a plan. They would… …request the ship to manoeuvre to provide a relative wind that was about 30° off the starboard side in order to provide the pilot with a visual reference of the ship. [In] order to reduce the overall time required to conduct the retrieval, the RCO suggested that he and the paramedic be winched together directly onto the forecastle. The suitability of the plan was to be confirmed on arrival overhead. The Accident Flight The helicopter departed Horn Island at 15:00 local time, arriving on scene at about 15:38. The pilot conducted a number of orbits of the ship to assess the proposed winching area and the relative wind via smoke from the ship’s funnel. Following that reconnaissance, the pilot requested that the ship’s master change the ship’s heading and reduce speed in order to obtain the originally planned relative wind. There was no restriction to the manoeuvring of the ship in preparation for the winch. While the ship altered its heading, the helicopter conducted a final orbit and the crew confirmed they were were ready to commence hoisting. The ship’s master...
read moreWindward’s Wayward Rain Pants Down an H500: Loose Article Hazards
Windward’s Wayward Rain Pants Down a Hughes H500 in Hawaii (N690WA): Loose Article Hazards On 20 February 2024 Windward Aviation Hughes 500 (369D) N690WA made a forced landing on Maui, Hawaii after a loss of tail rotor drive. The helicopter was charted by the National Parks Service (NPS). On 2 December 2024 the US National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) issued their final report. NTSB explain that: The pilot reported that after landing at a remote landing zone (LZ) to pick up a single passenger, the passenger loaded their gear in the aft right seat and secured it with a seatbelt. The pilot sat in the front left seat. The helicopter was being operated ‘open door’. While enroute, the occupants heard a “loud and violent bang”, helicopter yawed to the right and vibrations ensued. The pilot looked back at the tail rotor, saw it was spinning freely, and confirmed the tail rotor drive train had failed. The pilot decided to perform an autorotation into an open field in the Palikea flats area of the Haleakalā National Park. He told the NTSB: I rolled the throttle back to idle when it was confirmed I could reach a desired spot. I was unsure of how level the flats were and the area is known to be muddy/boggy. I decided it would be best to have as little ground run as possible so I tried to slow the bird in the flare as much as possible. I leveled out and pulled but didn’t have a whole lot of energy. I first contacted slightly aft left. rocked forward a little and settled into a final resting spot with no visible run on: making it feel like a bounce and settle or like a rough hovering auto – I guess would be the best way to describe it. After this skillful landing, which resulted in no injuries or further aircraft damage, the pilot examined the aircraft. The Tail Rotor Drive Shaft was severed: There was impact damage visible on the horizontal stabiliser: It was noticed that the passenger’s rain pants were missing from the aft right seat, where they had been secured to a back pack along side a strimmer and other equipment, with external load equipment left stowed unrestrained on the floor. It was concluded the clothing had… …exited the helicopter and impacted the tail rotor resulting in substantial damage to the fuselage, tail boom, horizontal stabilizer and tail rotor assembly and gearbox. The NTSB Probable Cause was: The pilot’s failure to ensure the passenger’s gear was properly secured before departure. The NTSB make no safety recommendations but has previously issued a safety alert All Secure, All Clear – Be vigilant regarding accountability and security of items (SA-26) However the NPS’s own safety investigation decided that… …doors on should be the standard configuration for helicopter operations. Exceptions to the standard configuration should be included in the appropriate operational risk assessments, briefed, and approved at the appropriate levels. Risk mitigation factors for doors off should address policies and procedures for the proper security of personnel and equipment, and if necessary, the requirement for secondary restraints. Open door air tour passenger flights were challenged after a fatal 2018 accident in the East River, NY: FlyNYON knew of safety concerns before fatal doors-off flight (see also: FlyNYON legal saga comes...
read moreKorean SAR S-76B Mountain Rescue Accident 2020
Korean SAR S-76B Mountain Rescue Accident 2020 (HL9646) On 1 May 2020 SAR Sikorsky S-76B HL9646 of Sejin Aviation crashed on Mount Jirisan, South Korea, while undertaking a mountain rescue tasking. One casualty being hoisted, a climber who had suffered a heart attack,, and another climber on the mountainside below were both killed. The five crew of the helicopter suffered minor injures. The helicopter was under contract to Gyeongsangnam-do Province Fire Department, from September 2019 to February 2022 as a stopgap awaiting the delivery of new helicopters. The Korean Aviation and Railway Accident Investigation Board (ARAIB) safety investigation report was published on 16 December 2024 (in Korean only). The Accident Flight The accident timeline is as follows: 11:28: HL9646 took off from the Gyeongsangnam-do Fire Aviation Rescue and Paramedic Unit. 11:42: The crew commenced a search of the mountains between Cheonwangbong and Beopgye Temple, at an altitude of approximately 5,900–6,200 feet, to locate the casualty. Mount Jirisan is the highest mountain in mainland South Korea. However, due numbers of hikers in the area, the casualty’s location could not be identified until the third orbit of the area. 11:50: HL9646 attempted it’s first approach to the casualty, but aborted due to strong crosswinds. 11:54: The crew arrived at the site for a second attempt from a different direction, and a two person rescue / paramedic team were successfully hosted to the casualty. Afterwards HL9646 moved away until requested to return. It moved into position, hovering approximately 5,935 feet above sea level and 30–35 feet above ground level. Outside Air Temperature was c15-16ºC (cISA+12). It appears one of the rescue / paramedic team was hoisted aboard first. 12:06: While hoisting the casualty, “the helicopter’s nose rotated to the right, and the aircraft shifted forward, descending unexpectedly”. The main rotor blades contacted the terrain below. Aircraft debris was scattered over a radius of about 15 m. The climber on the ground who was killed was struck by a rotor blade. Fir trees around the hiking trail, with a diameter of c 35 cm, prevented HL9646 from rolling down the steep slope. ARAIB Safety Investigation HL9646 did not have a flight data recorder (FDR), only a cockpit voice recorder (CVR). The wreckage was recovered using a Korea Forest Service S-64 Sky Crane. In interview, the Aircraft Commander (Pilot Flying) recalled that… …while the stretcher carrying the patient was being raised, [the helicopter] was hit by a vortex and sank. To prevent this, I increased the power, but the altitude did not recover, so I turned the aircraft nose to the right and made an emergency landing. The Co-pilot (Pilot Monitoring) recalled that: We approached the rescue site at about 5,700 feet, and the wind at that time was not strong at 5-6 knots. We hovered at an altitude of about 30-35 feet above the rescue site, and when the cardiac arrest patient rose to the middle, the aircraft lost power and felt like it was being pushed forward, and then it immediately started to sink. It rose slightly near the ground and then crashed. The hoist operator indicates that as the aircraft started to descend they tried to lower the patient to the ground. ARAIB highlight a range of factors that affect hover performance: In order to hover for mountain rescue or other missions, you...
read moreStartled Shutdown: Fatal USAF E-11A Global Express PSM+ICR Accident
Startled Shutdown: Fatal USAF E-11A Global Express PSM+ICR Accident On 27 January 2020 a USAF Bombardier E-11A (Global Express) 11-9358 crashed in the Deh Yak district in Afghanistan, killing both pilots. The accident featured what a 1998 AIA/AECMA study termed a Propulsion System Malfunction + Inappropriate Crew Response (PSM+ICR). A USAF Accident Investigation Board (AIB) issued its investigation report in November 2020. A USAF AIB does not conduct a safety investigation (a separate Safety Investigation Board [SIB] is convened but its report is not released), instead as it explains: In accordance with AFI 51-307, Aerospace and Ground Accident Investigations, this accident investigation board conducted a legal investigation to inquire into all the facts and circumstances surrounding this Air Force aerospace accident, prepare a publicly-releasable report, and obtain and preserve all available evidence for use in litigation, claims, disciplinary action, and adverse administrative action. The Accident The aircraft was operated by the 430th Expeditionary Electronic Communications Squadron (430EECS) from Kandahar Airport as part of Operation Freedom’s Sentinel. It was equipped as a Battlefield Airborne Communications Node (BACN) communications-relay platform. The accident flight was both an operational BACN mission and Mission Qualification Training for the co-pilot. The aircraft commander, a Lt Colonel, was a current and qualified instructor and evaluator pilot in the E-11A. He had 4736.9 flying hours of experience, which 1053.3 hours on type. He had also flown the KC-10, RQ-4, MC-12 and T-1. The co-pilot had completed Global Express ground and flight training at CAE on 10 November 2019, and received his basic qualification in E-11A on 17 January 2020. He had completed his first two MQT flights in theatre. The AIB was told “he demonstrated knowledge of the aircraft systems, high situational awareness, asked great questions and was a great student.” He had a total of 1343.5 flying hours, 27.6 hours on type. He had previously flown the T-6 as an instructor and 127.4 hours in the B-1. The aircraft took off at 11:05 local time and entered an orbit just west of Kabul at 42,000 feet altitude at c 11:36. The flight was conducted under Visual Flight Rules (VFR). At 12:50, the crew was cleared by ATC to climb to 43,000 feet. The engine throttles were advanced and the crew initiated the climb with the autopilot. At 12:50:52, a fan blade of the left hand Rolls-Royce BR710 engine was released. Post-accident photographs suggest the blade failure was contained in the nacelle. This failure was accompanied by a bang, recorded by the CVR, which then stopped due to the g switch being activated by the out of balance vibration. This Fan Blade Off (FBO) event resulted in an immediate shutdown of that engine by the engine control system and display of a L FADEC FAIL caution initially. The left engine N1 dropped to 7.6% within five seconds of the FBO before spiking to an unrealistic 255.9%. Within seconds the aircraft autothrottles also disengaged automatically. The autopilot remained engaged however. Bank angles remained essentially constant, consistent with a circular orbit, and the aircraft descended from 42,300 to 41,000 feet. Ten seconds after the catastrophic engine failure, the crew retarded both throttles to 14º (the throttle lever range is from 0-40º) for one second, then slightly advancing the left throttle separately to 26º for one second, then retarding it to align with the...
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