Fatal Biplane/Helicopter Mid Air Collision in Spain, 30 December 2017
Fatal Biplane/Helicopter Mid Air Collision in Spain, 30 December 2017 On 30 December 2017 a collision occurred at Mutxamel (Alicante) aerodrome involving Bell 412SP helicopter EC-MMC and CASA 1131 Bucker Bü 131 Jungmann biplane N1950M. The Spanish accident investigation agency, the CIAIAC, explain in their safety investigation report that: The helicopter, operated by Babcock, was returning to the aerodrome after taking part in firefighting activities, while the biplane was on a private flight in the vicinity of the airport. According to the helicopter pilot he made position reports on the aerodrome frequency on several occasions and notified that he was on final approach to runway 30 at the uncontrolled airfield without having received any communication from any other aircraft. During the final approach, the rear of the helicopter was impacted, causing it to lose its tail rotor. As a result, the helicopter destabilized, although the crew managed to make an emergency landing in a level attitude and a clockwise yaw motion [from c 10m]. The biplane lost its right wings upon impacting the helicopter, as a result of which the pilot lost control of the aircraft, which crashed into the ground in an inverted position. The [biplane] pilot died after the accident as a result of the injuries sustained. The crew of the helicopter made an emergency landing and of its ten occupants, two were slightly injured. The rest were uninjured. According to the CIAIAC: The most likely cause of the accident was the failure of the pilot of the Bücker to detect the helicopter while on final approach to runway 30 at the Mutxamel aerodrome. The biplane was further back and in a higher position in the approach to land on the same runway. The investigators say the following factors contributed to the accident: The non-use of communications by the pilot of the Bücker; The failure by the pilot of the Bücker to fly the aerodrome pattern and flying acrobatic manoeuvres in the pattern Other Mid Air Collision (MAC) Safety Resources Aerossurance has previously published: Military Mid Air Collisions Military Airprox in Sweden North Sea S-92A Helicopter Airprox Feb 2017 Mid Air Collision Typhoon & Learjet 35 French TV Helicopter Accident in Argentina USMC CH-53E Readiness Crisis and Mid Air Collision Catastrophe Avoiding Mid Air Collisions: 5 Seconds to Impact AAIB Highlight Electronic Conspicuity and the Limitations of See and Avoid after Mid Air Collision a UK accident where a light single fixed wing aircraft descended into a helicopter. UPDATE 2 February 2019: A319 / Cougar Airprox at MRS: ATC Busy, Failed Transponder and Helicopter Filtered From Radar UPDATE 16 February 2019: Merlin Night Airprox: Systemic Issues UPDATE 12 May 2019: Alaskan Mid Air Collision at Non-Tower Controlled Airfield UPDATE 14 August 2021: Alpine MAC ANSV Report: Ascending AS350B3 and Descending Jodel D.140E Collided Over Glacier UPDATE 18 June 2022: Limitations of See and Avoid: Four Die in HEMS Helicopter / PA-28 Mid Air Collision Also: UPDATE 25 January 2019: Airbus Helicopters AS350B3 I-EDIC engaged in heli-skiing and Jodel D.140E Mousquetaire IV F-PMGV collided in mid air over the Rutor Glacier in Italy. Eight of the nine persons on board the two aircraft died. UPDATE 2 May 2019: TSB Canada report on a Piper PA-42 Cheyenne III and a Cessna 150. UPDATE 20 May 2019: US Army C-27/USAF C-130 Night MAC 1 December 2014: The Investigation attributed the collision to a lack of visual scan by both crews, over reliance on TCAS and complacency despite the...
read moreDisorientated Dive into Lake Erie
Disorientated Dive into Lake Erie On 29 December 2016 Cessna 525C (Citation CJ4) N614SB of Maverick Air, was destroyed when it impacted Lake Erie shortly after a night takeoff from runway 24R at the Burke Lakefront Airport (BKL), Cleveland, Ohio. The pilot and five passengers died. History of the Accident Flight According to the US National Transportation Board (NTSB), safety investigation report: The airplane entered a right turn shortly after takeoff and proceeded out over a large lake. Dark night visual conditions prevailed at the airport; however, the airplane entered instrument conditions shortly after takeoff. The airplane climb rate exceeded 6,000 fpm during the initial climb and it subsequently continued through the assigned altitude of 2,000 ft mean sea level. The flight director provided alerts before the airplane reached the assigned altitude and again after it had passed through it. The bank angle increased to about 62 degrees and the pitch attitude decreased to about 15 degrees nose down, as the airplane continued through the assigned heading. The bank angle ultimately decreased to about 25 degrees. During the subsequent descent, the airspeed and descent rate reached about 300 knots and 6,000 fpm, respectively. The enhanced ground proximity warning system (EGPWS) provided both “bank angle” and “sink rate” alerts to the pilot, followed by seven “pull up” warnings. The aircraft impacted Lake Erie. Analysis The NSTB hypothesise that: It is likely that the pilot attempted to engage the autopilot after takeoff as he had been trained. However, based on the flight profile, the autopilot was not engaged. This implied that the pilot failed to confirm autopilot engagement via an indication on the primary flight display (PFD). The PFD annunciation was the only indication of autopilot engagement. Inadequate flight instrument scanning during this time of elevated workload resulted in the pilot allowing the airplane to climb through the assigned altitude, to develop an overly steep bank angle, to continue through the assigned heading, and to ultimately enter a rapid descent without effective corrective action. A belief that the autopilot was engaged may have contributed to his lack of attention. The pilot had relatively low time on type having gained a type rating on three weeks earlier. The pilot subsequently completed a simulator-based recurrent training course at FlightSafety International on December 17, 2016. The pilot had accumulated a total of 56.5 hours in Cessna 525 airplanes. Of that time, 8.7 hours were as pilot-in-command which included the practical test. His most recent logged flight was on December 17 from Orlando International (MCO) to OSU. The pilot owned a Cessna 510 (Mustang) for about 2 years before purchasing the accident airplane. He had logged 372.9 hours total time in Cessna 510 airplanes. It is also possible that differences between the avionics panel layout on the accident airplane and the [C510] airplane he previously flew resulted in mode confusion and contributed to his failure to engage the autopilot. A comparison of the Cessna 525 systems and those of the airplane previously flown by the pilot, a Cessna 510, revealed that the autopilot engagement button on the Cessna 510 is located in a slightly different location on the Automatic Flight Control System (AFCS) panel. In the Cessna 510, autopilot engagement is indicated along the upper portion of the PFD similar to the accident airplane. In addition, an indicator...
read moreFinal Report Issued on 2008 B737 Bird Strike Accident in Rome
Final Report Issued on 2008 B737 Bird Strike Accident in Rome On 10 November 2008 Ryanair Boeing 737-8AS EI-DYG collided with a dense flock of starlings (typical mass 40-1o0 g) on short finals at Rome Ciampino. The Italian safety investigation agency, the ANSV, discuss this accident in a final report issued 20 December 2018. The crew spotted the birds and being aware of the relatively short 2207m runway, initiated a go-around around 100m from the threshold at approximately the same time as impacts occurred. The crew said these sounded like hailstone impacts. However, both engines were unable to deliver sufficient thrust, with N1 (fan speeds) dropping from 62% to 41%. The aircraft, with 172 persons on board, rapidly lost speed and height. The aircraft hit the ground about halfway down the runway, nose high in a near stall condition, on the main landing gear and the lower part of the rear fuselage. The left main landing gear collapsed and the left engine nacelle came into contact with the runway. There were 8 injuries, all minor. Investigators identified 86 bird impacts (on the radome, forward fuselage, wing leading edges, flaps undersides, engine nacelles and landing gear). While this damage would not have affected control of the aircraft, there was extensive bird debris on the stator and rotor blades of the CFM56-7B26/3 engines. Investigators identified 55 impact points on the number 1 engine fan and 30 on the number 2 engine fan. The fan blades themselves showed little damage. The investigators identified that both engines had repeatedly surged after the impacts, which they believed to have considerably exceeded those required for certification. ANSV Conclusions on Cause The accident has been caused by an unexpected loss of both engines thrust as a consequence of a massive bird strike, during the go-around manoeuvre. The loss of thrust has prevented the aircrew from performing a successful go around and has led the aircraft to an unstabilized runway contact. Contributory factors were: The inadequate effectiveness of bird control and dispersal measures put in place by the airport operator at the time of the accident; The captain decision to perform a go around, when the aircraft was at approximately 7 seconds from touchdown. This decision was significantly influenced by: The lack of instructions to flight crew concerning the most suitable procedures to adopt in the case of single or multiple bird strikes in the landing phase; The absence of specific training in the management, by the flight crew, of the “surprise” and “startle” effects in critical phases of the flight. They also explain that the elongated completion of the report was due to retirements and staff shortages. ANSV Safety Recommendations ANSV-12/1525-08/1/A/8 Addressees: EASA and FAA ANSV recommends to provide flight crews with guidelines and/or operational and training procedures, based on a careful assessment of the risks associated with the conduct of the aircraft in approach in case of birds encounter or single/multiple bird strikes. These guidelines should include the following topics: to discuss bird strike risks during take-off and approach briefings when operating at airports with known or expected bird activity; in case of single/multiple bird strikes in the final approach phase, if landing is assured, it is preferable to land maintaining the lowest engine power setting possible rather than carrying out a go-around procedure (in case of birds ingestion, especially a massive one, the engines damages can be greater at...
read moreInadequate Maintenance at a USAF Depot Featured in Fatal USMC KC-130T Accident
Inadequate Propeller Maintenance at a USAF Depot Featured in Fatal USMC KC-130T Yanky 72 Accident Maintenance issues at a US Air Force (USAF) depot featured in the loss of US Marine Corps (USMC) Reserve Lockheed KC-130T Hercules 165000 (callsign Yanky 72) and 16 lives when a propeller blade failed in flight over Itta Bena, Mississippi on 10 July 2017. The USMC Command Investigation determined that the accident was due to: …an inflight departure of the number four blade from the number two propeller. This propeller blade (P2B4) liberated while the aircraft was flying at a cruise altitude of 20,000 feet. This liberation of P2B4 is the first known occurrence of a circumferential fatigue crack initiating from a radial crack which had not grown to pass fully through to the outer diameter blade shank wall of a propeller produced by UTC Aerospace Systems (UTAS). [The liberated blade] sliced through the left (port) side of the fuselage, and impacted the interior of the right (starboard) side… This impact caused the skin of the aircraft to separate along the starboard side. The energy transferred from P2B4’s impact through the structure of the airframe also caused an overload condition of propeller three’s drive shaft. This resulted in its associated reduction gearbox assembly (RGA) failing and the separation of propeller three from the aircraft. Propeller three then momentarily embedded into the upper right section of the fuselage. After which, it continued over the aft starboard section of the fuselage and impacted the starboard horizontal stabilizer separating a significant portion of the stabilizer from the aircraft. As a result, the fuselage “explosively disintegrated into multiple pieces” says the investigation. Post-mishap analysis of P2B4 revealed that a circumferential fatigue crack in the blade caused the fracture and liberation. This fatigue crack propagated from a radial crack which originated from intergranular cracking (IGC) and corrosion pitting. This intergranular radial crack in P2B4 had grown to a total of 2.7 inches in length along the interior taper bore of the blade, extending 1.25 inches beyond the bushing. The radial crack had grown outward through 64 percent of the shank wall section until it was 0.45 inches from the outer diameter at the time P2B4 liberated on 10 July 2017. When the circumferential fatigue crack reached critical length the remainder of the blade shank structure failed in overload… The analysis also revealed the presence of anodize coating within the band of corrosion pitting and intergranular cracking on the blade near the origin of the crack. This finding proves that the band of corrosion pitting and intergranular cracking was present and not removed during the last overhaul of P2B4 at Warner Robins Air Logistics Complex (WR-ALC) in the fall of 2011. The investigation concluded that the failure to remediate the corrosion pitting and intergranular cracking was due to deficiencies in the propeller blade overhaul process at WR-ALC which existed in 2011 and continued up until the shutdown of the WR-ALC propeller blade overhaul process in the fall of 2017. In fact 12 of the 16 propeller blades on the accident aircraft “were determined to have: corrosion that existed at the time of their last overhaul at WR-ALC”. A US Navy (USN) engineering team conducted a ‘process audit’ of the WR-ALC propeller blade repair facility in August 2017. Their report concluded the US Navy requirements for propeller overhaul are different from the USAF requirements. The team...
read moreB777 in Autoland Mode Left Runway When Another Aircraft Interfered With the Localiser Signal
B777 in Autoland Mode Left Runway When Another Aircraft Interfered With the Localiser Signal (9V-SWQ, SIA) Boeing 777-312ER 9V-SWQ of Singapore Airlines was flying from Manchester to Munich on 3 November 2011. Shortly after touch-down in Munich the aircraft veered to the left and went off the runway, before veering right and coming to a stop on the grass to the other side next to the runway. In their safety investigation report, published 85 months after the occurrence, German safety investigation body, the BFU, explain that: …the co-pilot was initially Pilot Flying (PF) during the flight Manchester – Munich. Based on the latest weather information at Munich, visibility 2,000 m, cloud base 300 ft, the Pilot in Command (PIC) decided to assume the role of PF, as the SOPs (FCOM/NORMAL PROCEDURES/OPERATION) of the operator required, and the co-pilot became Pilot Monitoring (PM). The PIC decided to conduct an automatic approach and autoland. A BAE 146-RJ85 taxied along taxiway B4 to runway 08R as the B 777 was about 2.9 NM ahead of the runway threshold 08R and 3.4 NM behind the BAE 146-RJ85 when it received take-off clearance. As the B 777 was about 50 ft above the runway in the flare phase the airplane began to slowly bank left up to 3.5°. As the B 777 flew above the runway threshold 08R, the BAE 146-RJ85 was in front of the localizer antenna and interfered with the localizer signal. The PIC called out: “Okay, flaps twenty.” At approximately 420 m beyond the runway threshold the airplane touched down with the left main landing gear and 132 kt (KIAS). At that time the Auto Flight System (AFS) switched to rollout mode. The autopilot was still engaged as the airplane moved toward the left runway edge and veered off the runway with a speed of 123 kt (KIAS) about 944 m beyond the threshold in the area of taxiway B4. For about 400 m the airplane rolled through the grass north of runway 08R in a slightly curved right hand turn. The largest lateral deviation from the runway was reached at about 1,242 m beyond the threshold; speed was 109 kt KIAS. Because of the system design the autopilot disengaged due to crew inputs via the rudder pedals. The airplane turned right by about 40°, re-entered the runway close to the intersection with taxiway B6, about 1,566 m beyond the threshold. The aircraft crossed the runway with a heading of about 120°. Speed was still 71 kt KIAS. The airplane veered off the runway again, turned left by about 40°, and came to a stop in the grass south of and parallel to runway 08R. There were no injuries or apparent aircraft damage. The crew stated that during the approach and the landing there were no indications as to malfunctions or system failures. The PIC stated he had tried to initiate a goaround procedure by pushing the TO/GA buttons on the thrust levers and thereby triggering the go-around mode once it had been noticed that the airplane banked to the left. But the airplane did not respond. At the same time he retracted the ground spoilers manually which had automatically been deployed at the time of the touchdown. The BFU say: The crew did not inform the approach controller of their intention to conduct an automatic...
read moreSeason’s Greetings from Aerossurance
Aerossurance sends its Season’s Greetings to all its customers, partners, suppliers, colleagues and friends. We also wish you all a safe and prosperous 2019! For aviation advice you can trust, contact Aerossurance at: enquiries@aerossurance.com Follow us on LinkedIn and on Twitter @Aerossurance for our latest...
read moreUSAF Engine Shop in “Disarray” with a “Method of the Madness”: F-16CM Engine Fire
USAF Engine Shop in “Disarray” with a “Method of the Madness”: F-16CM Engine Fire USAF Lockheed Martin F-16CM 92-3883 suffered a General Electric F110-129 engine fire on departure from Misawa Air Base, Japan on 20 February 2018. The resulting USAF Accident Investigation Board (AIB) investigation report describes organisational weaknesses in a USAF engine maintenance facility and the latent defect of an obsolete part incorrectly fitted 6 years earlier. History of the Flight The AIB explain that: The mishap flight (MF) consisted of two F-16CM aircraft. The mishap pilot (MP) departed runway (RWY) 28, fifteen seconds after the mishap lead pilot (MLP). Shortly after the afterburner takeoff, Misawa air traffic controllers informed the MP and the mishap lead pilot (MLP) that the MP had a large flame coming from the aft section of the MP’s aircraft. The MLP also contacted the MP regarding the fire. During the MP’s ascent, he noticed an unexpected decay in his airspeed and climb rate. The MP took a right turn back towards RWY 28, and when unable to maintain airspeed or altitude, the MP jettisoned his stores (external fuel tanks) in accordance with F-16CM critical actions procedures. The two jettisoned fuel tanks landed off-base in Lake Ogawara… The tanks contained approximately 300 gallons each at the time they were jettisoned. The Crash Survivable Flight Data Recorder (CSFDR) indicated the total weight of two tanks with JP-8 was 896 pounds. Following the jettison, the MA regained some airspeed and achieved a better climb rate to get into a position to land. The MP landed on RWY 28, and accomplished the emergency engine shutdown and emergency ground egress critical action procedures. There were no injuries resulting from the mishap. The engine damage and loss of external fuel tanks resulted in a loss (calculated with absurd precision) of $987,545.57. The Investigation The investigation concluded that the cause of the accident was an obsolete turbine frame forward fairing that fractured, causing the engine to ‘overheat’, and resulting in significant damage to parts of the engine. This fairing is made up of three titanium segments that line the forward outer section of the turbine frame. In 2007 an order had been issued that “dictated replacement across the fleet by August 2010 of this susceptible fairing, along with its attaching hardware” after operators “began experiencing excessive wear, cracking and, in a few cases, failure of the turbine frame forward fairing”. This engine had been fitted with the later standard in 2010, however during a subsequent engine shop visit in 2012: …maintenance personnel ordered and installed an obsolete part, a turbine frame forward fairing, years after it was replaced by a forward fairing made of stronger material and design. The logistics system then delivered the obsolete forward fairing. Maintenance personnel installed the obsolete forward fairing on the mishap engine (ME) using the updated version of the bracket hardware. The obsolete forward fairing’s weaker material, along with wear from the mismatched [bracket] hardware, ultimately caused the forward fairing to fracture during takeoff. Once fractured, a piece of the forward fairing lifted and blocked the cooling flow of air around the engine, causing the area near the blockage to overheat and catch fire. Since the obsolete titanium fairings were new at the time of installation, they would have accumulated 760 flying hours on the day of the mishap. The AIB President further found by a preponderance of the evidence that maintenance...
read moreBFU Investigate S-76B Descending to 20ft at 40 kts En Route in Poor Visibility
BFU Investigate S-76B D-HHNH Descending to 20ft at 40 kts En Route in Poor Visibility The German safety investigation body, the BFU, is investigating a serious incident that occurred to Sikorsky S-76B D-HHNH of Heli Service International on 23 October 2017. UPDATED 22 November 2019 after issue of the final report. History of the Flight In an interim report they describe that the flight was on a return to Emden from the DolWin Alpha High Voltade Direct Current (HVDC) platform in the North Sea, which helps transit power from offshore wind farms ashore. At 0842 hrs the helicopter took off now with four persons on board [2 crew. 2 passengers] for the return flight…[and]…climbed to 2,000 ft AMSL which remained the same up until right abeam of Borkum Island. At 0854 hrs the flight crew established radio contact with the Flugleiter at [the uncontrolled] Emden Airfield and requested information regarding the prevailing weather conditions. They were told: “Right now it is raining, cloud base few one thousand, overcast thousand five hundred and wind south-west 10 to 15 gusts 20 kt, QNH 1,010 and visibility here visual reference point 2.5 to 3 km.” At 0857 hrs the crew informed Bremen Radar of passing way-point JUIST. However: Before reaching way-point JUIST the helicopter began to descend. The descent ended in low altitude with reduced speed near the coast line. Then the helicopter climbed again to about 500 ft AMSL and continued the flight to Emden. At 0901 hrs the crew again requested information regarding the prevailing weather at Emden Airfield. They were told: “Right now it has decreased a little bit few seven hundred, broken one thousand, overcast one thousand eight hundred, the rain is gradually slowing down”. The aircraft landed safely at 0911 hrs. The Aircraft Commander (PIC) had a total flying experience of 11,461 hours, of which 3,025 hours were on type. The First Officer (co-pilot) had 910 hours flying experience, of which 359 hours were on type. Investigation (Interim Report) The BFU examined the events leading to the period between 0957 and 0901 when the aircraft lost speed and altitude over the Wadden Sea, the tidal mud flats between the outer island and the mainland. …during the two legs (outbound and return) the co-pilot in the left-hand seat acted as Pilot Flying (PF) and the Pilot in Command (PIC) in the right-hand seat as Pilot Non Flying (PNF). After take-off from the converter station DOLWIN ALPHA the helicopter had been operated using the Flight Director (FD) coupled in the Upper Modes ALT and NAV. Between the way-points UTIRA and HW751 the FD had decoupled without reason. The two autopilots had changed from Attitude Retention (ATT) Mode to Stability Augmentation System (SAS) Mode. This resulted in the PF having to actively control the helicopter manually. Subsequently, the PNF tried to find and eliminate the cause for the FD failure. Both in vain. After they had enquired about the prevailing weather conditions at Emden Airfield they decided to reduce the flight altitude before reaching the coast line. During descent the helicopter had suddenly encountered heavy rain and significantly reduced visibility. At about 500 ft AMSL the co-pilot had handed over controls to the PIC. Notably: He had instructed the co-pilot to extend the landing gear because he wanted to be prepared for a possible off-field landing due to the unexpected bad weather. According to the Cockpit Voice...
read moreCRJ900 Skids Sideways Down Finnish Runway
CRJ900 Skids Sideways Down Finnish Runway On 25 October 2017, Bombardier CRJ900 EI-FPD of Cityjet was operating as Scandinavian Airlines (SAS) flight SK4236 from Stockholm, Sweden, to Turku, Finland, where it landed at 2024 local time. The Landing of Cityjet Bombardier CRJ900 EI-FPD at Turku After touchdown the aircraft did not decelerate as anticipated and entered a skid, drifting towards the right hand edge of the runway but with the nose pointing to the left of track. In their safety investigation report the Finnish Safety Investigation Authority (SIAF or Onnettomuustutkintakeskus) describe how: Approximately 1,200 m from touchdown, the skidding airplane began to veer to the right towards the edge of the paved area. It impacted and broke five runway edge lights. The minimum distance between the right mainwheel tires and the unpaved area was less than 0.5 m. The airplane then started to rotate to the left. When it was at right angles to the runway heading it was moving at 42 kt (78 km/h) groundspeed. It came to a halt next to the runway centerline 2,050 m from the initial touchdown point, having rotated 196° counter-clockwise from the initial direction of travel. The distance from the final position to the runway end was approximately 160 m. Analysis SIAF developed an AcciMap that summarises their analysis: SIAF Conclusions SIAF present 11 conclusions, each paired first with an observation: 1. Aerodrome maintenance decided to clear the runway after an arriving flight had landed and a departing flight had taken off. The decision was not reviewed even though weather was changing rapidly and continuous snowfall increased the thickness of the slush layer on the runway. Conclusion: Long-term runway maintenance planning is not possible under rapidly changing weather conditions. 2. The flight crew did not question the weather and runway condition data on which they based their decisions. The flight crew monitored wind data closely. Conclusion: Some time had passed from the preparation of the previous SNOWTAM. Personnel at the aerodrome knew that snowfall was intensifying. SNOWTAM reliability degrades fast under rapidly changing weather conditions. 3. The airplane was above the maximum performance limited landing weight on landing. Conclusion: The multi-step procedure required to determine the permitted landing weight using the tables provided for the purpose contributed to an error in weight calculations. 4. At Turku, only runway 26 is ILS-equipped. Conclusion: The flight crew elected to conduct a tailwind landing on runway 26 because they considered a runway 08 approach impossible due to the lack of ILS. Finland’s airports, with the exception of Helsinki-Vantaa, have ILS at one end of the runway only. 5. Landing was firm; therefore, weight on the right main landing gear lightened as the oleo leg extended after touchdown, the extension reaching a point where the airplane systems sensed an airborne condition. The thrust reverser system, although armed, was unavailable after touchdown. Conclusion: The flight crew was not familiar with reselecting the thrust reverser system in case of it being inhibited. 6. The airplane entered a hydroplaning condition at the moment of touchdown due to the high groundspeed and a slush deposit on the runway. Conclusion: Anticipating the possibility of hydroplaning enhances situational awareness and prepares for a necessary action if the airplane enters a hydroplaning condition. 7. Hydroplaning prevented the wheels from spinning up to a required speed and therefore the anti-skid system did not activate. The captain’s brake application, which was later augmented by simultaneous brake application by the first officer, resulted in the wheels remaining locked until the airplane came to a halt. Conclusion: The...
read moreHelicopter Tail Rotor Strike from Firefighting Bucket
Helicopter Tail Rotor Strike from Firefighting Bucket On 2 May 2017 Bell 206B3 N911GE, operated by the Marion County Sheriff’s Office as a public-use aircraft, sustained substantial damage during firefighting operations near Orange Springs, Florida. The pilot was seriously injured. The pilot was using an under slung Bambi Bucket and had completed between 25 and 30 drops on the fire. According to the US National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) safety investigation report: After refueling, he completed three or four additional drops and then filled and pulled the bucket from the water and immediately felt “a severely out of CG [center of gravity] condition to the right.” He assumed that the bucket cables were entangled in the right landing skid, so he released the water from the bucket. The condition persisted, so he rocked the helicopter to attempt to free the cable without success. He then released the cable with the cargo release button and heard the “clunk” sound typically heard when the bucket was released, but then he heard another “clunk.” The helicopter then began to spin violently and after 4-6 rotations crashed into the water. After the aircraft submerged, rolled right and came to rest the pilot “egressed through the left cockpit door and swam to the surface”. On reaching the surface he inflated his life jacket, swam to the water’s edge and used his personal mobile phone to call for help. The NTSB investigation revealed: …6-inch long cable marks on the right rear landing skid tube and a torsional fracture of the tail rotor short shaft. Based on the pilot’s statement, the cable marks likely occurred initially when a cable became entangled on the skid tube… After releasing the bucket the tail rotor shaft fractured when the cable or bucket contacted the tail rotor. Safety Resources Just today, 1 December 2018, a firefighting Kamov Ka-32T crashed in Korea with the loss of one life while uplifting water, though as seen in the library footage below, that was likely by a suction system. Other Ka-32s do use an under-slung bucket: A Flight Safety Foundation (FSF) report ‘External Loads, Powerplant Problems And Obstacles Challenge Pilots During Aerial Fire Fighting Operations’ reviewed US accident reports from 1974 to 1998. UPDATE 28 January 2019: The Bureau d’Enquêtes et d’Analyses (BEA) are investigating an accident in Reunion on 24 January where a Airbus Helicopters AS350B3e/H125 F-OFML appears to have suffered a tail rotor strike on its own under slung firefighting bucket. Also see our articles: Wayward Window: Fatal Loss of a Fire-Fighting Helicopter in NZ Firefighting Helicopter Wire Strike Keep Your Eyes on the Hook! Underslung External Load Safety EC120 Underslung Load Accident 26 September 2013 – Report Unexpected Load: AS350B3 USL / External Cargo Accident in Norway Unexpected Load: B407 USL / External Cargo Accident in PNG Load Lost Due to Misrigged Under Slung Load Control Cable Fatal Wire Strike on Take Off from Communications Site UPDATE 21 October 2018: Fallacy of ‘Training Out’ Error: Japanese AS332L1 Dropped Load UPDATE 20 December 2019: Helicopter External Sling Load Operation Occurrences in New Zealand UPDATE 30 May 2020: Fatal Wisonsin Wire Strike When Robinson R44 Repositions to Refuel UPDATE 28 June 2020: Maintenance Issues in Fire-Fighting S-61A Accident UPDATE 27 December 2020: Fire-Fighting AS350 Hydraulics Accident: Dormant Miswiring UPDATE 9 January 2021: Korean Kamov Ka-32T Fire-Fighting Water Impact and Underwater Egress Fatal Accident UPDATE 21 May 2021: Firefighting AW139 Loss of Control and Tree Impact UPDATE 16 October 2021: South Korean Fire-Fighting Helicopter Tail Rotor...
read more
Recent Comments