Facebook Aquila Drone Accident: Gust Induced Structural Failure
Facebook Aquila 1A Drone Accident: Gust Induced Structural Failure On 28 June 2016, while making its first flight, the Facebook UK Aquila 1A unmanned aircraft, N565AQ (serial number F1501), experienced an inflight structural failure on final approach near Yuma, AZ. The damage was induced by wind gusts say investigators. The Facebook UK Aquila 1A UAS In 2014 Facebook bought small British company Ascenta for £12mn. The company, now part of Facebook UK, was developing innovative solar drone technology. At the end of June 2016, the first aircraft produced in their warehouse in Bridgewater, Somerset, UK was dismantled and shipped to Arizona for flight test. The four engined, solar-powered, trolley launched Aquila 1A Unmanned Air System (UAS), has over a 140 feet span but weights around 940lb. The vehicle has four Joby Motor electric motors and four Facebook UK propellers. It is intended to have a 90 day endurance and relay internet signals to remote locations as part of Facebook’s intenet.org project. VIDEO Google-owned Titan Aerospace, which is also developing a solar-powered UAS for similar purposes, suffered the loss of its Solara 50 prototype N950TA on 1 May 2015, again to a structural failure, but in that case due to an overspeed. The Safety Investigation The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) say in their investigation report: The flight launched in restricted airspace from [the US Army] Yuma Proving Ground‘s (YPG) Site 8 UAV runway. There were no anomalies noted during the 90-minute flight. Facebook say they received “piloting and other support” from the University of Alaska Fairbanks‘, Alaska Centre for Unmanned Aircraft Systems Integration (ACUASI). …at 0704, a simulated landing at 1,250 feet above sea level was performed to test the autoland feature of the autopilot. Autoland is the normal, and only, landing maneuver of the aircraft. The maneuver was executed normally, tracking the centerline and glidepath, and obeying the wave-off command. At the time of the simulated landing, the crew noted that the wind had increased above the intended test limit of 7 knots at flight altitude. At 0737, the crew commanded a landing to the designated landing site. During the final approach, the aircraft encountered an increasing amount of turbulence and wind speeds of up to 10 knots at the surface and 12 to 18 knots, as measured by the aircraft at flight altitude. The operators post-flight telemetry analysis showed that the aircraft experienced significant deviations in pitch, roll, and airspeed, consistent with turbulence during the final approach. At 0743, while on final approach at 20 feet above the ground, the right outboard wing experienced a structural failure with a downward deflection. Four seconds later, the aircraft impacted the ground at a groundspeed of 25 knots in an approximately wings-level attitude. The aircraft sustained substantial damage as a result of the impact and wing failure. As a result of the aircrafts design (skid landing gear, low-slung engines and propellers), the operator expected some damage during normal landings. The operators analysis of available data indicates that the structural failure was likely initiated by a wind gust that lofted the aircraft above the glidepath about 5 seconds prior to failure. The autopilot responded to this gust by lowering the nose of the aircraft to reestablish itself on the glidepath. The airspeed then increased to 28 KIAS from the normal 24 KIAS. As the aircraft descended back...
read moreReversing the Trend: Offshore Safety in Norway
Reversing the Trend: Offshore Safety in Norway Recently a small envelope with an A5 booklet and pen dropped through the Aerossurance letter box. The booklet was the latest in the Petroleum Safety Authority (PSA) of Norway‘s Dialogue series, entitled Reversing the Trend. The PSA say that safety “trends are moving in the wrong direction in a number of areas”. They say that: The past two years have been characterised by serious incidents and challenges. Two years, roughly, is the length of the recent drop in oil prices. The rise in incidents offshore has prompted the Labour and Social Affairs Minister, Anniken Hauglie, to launch a working group to produce a white paper, on offshore safety, expected in October 2017, saying: We have seen several examples of incidents where we believe questions need to be asked. Given our current situation, it is perhaps more important than ever that the parties collaborate to find good solutions and that the people who are most directly affected are heard from when discussing how to cut costs without compromising safety. I therefore think that…the time is right to prepare a white paper. The CEO of Norwegian oil company Statoil has recently denied there is any connection between cost-cutting and safety concerns after a series of incidents in a matter of weeks (including a fire, two gas leaks and a well control incident) despite HSE job cuts. Though currently light on detail, ‘Reversing the Trend’ will have a high priority with the PSA and industry in 2017 they say, with both short term quick wins and longer term efforts. The pen was part of the booklet’s emphasis that ‘Norway’s safety history is written every day’, with sections of the booklet for readers to complete sections to describe what their organisation will contribute. Not only are we always fascinated by safety matters at Aerossurance, but we do like a good safety promotion gimmick so we read on! The PSA have a triple focus: Collaboration Robustness Standardisation These are three good focus areas and we look forward to seeing this initiative develop. Professor Per Morten Schiefloe at the Department of Sociology and Political Science at the Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU) says: In Norway, we have lived in a sheltered environment, feeling that nothing will ever go wrong here. However, incidents in recent years have shown that we too are vulnerable. We are therefore witnessing a social trend where organisations that do not seem very vulnerable to hazards are also beginning to give more thought to safety. UPDATE 9 January 2017: It is reported that a fire on the Odfjell Drilling Deepsea Atlantic semi-submersible drilling rig while it was working for Statoil on the on the Johan Sverdrup field on 4 January 2017 is under investigation: It was initially extinguished but flared up again but the situation was brought under control around an hour later. UPDATE 21 January 2017: A new Statoil safety report on two incidents in 2016 reveals that operational and maintenance oversight could be stronger. They specifically discuss a well control incident on the Songa Endurance in the Troll field and a gas leak at the Mongstad isomerization plant. On the well control incident: Statoil’s internal investigation defines the incident to have a high degree of seriousness, and concludes that at worst it could have led to loss of life if the safety equipment had failed to function as intended, or if the gas...
read morePlanning for Mass Evacuations
Planning for Mass Evacuations It is vital for companies operating in the less stable of overseas locations to have pre-arranged evacuation arrangements in place. Mass evacuations have occurred in a range of countries in recent years after political instability, civil unrest, terrorist attacks and armed conflict, but also after natural disasters and epidemics. Outsourcing the planning to a charter broker is not a robust solution. It is essential these preparations involve the right security, safety and logistics expertise in order to consider all the potential obstacles and risks. The Security Committee of the International Oil and Gas Producers Association (IOGP) has published ‘Country Evacuation Planning Guidelines’ (IOGP report, No. 472). They say: The trigger for evacuation could be due to a gradual deterioration in conditions. This allows for companies to conduct a gradual departure. A sudden deterioration, however, might mean that people might have to remain where they are while the situation is assessed and then respond accordingly. The report includes sections on “operation concepts, threat levels, crisis command centres, communications, training and briefing, reception arrangements and post-crisis reviews”. Aerossurance can bring essential aviation expertise to your emergency response and crisis planning and support a number of IOGP members. To get independent advice you can trust, contact: enquiries@aerossurance.com Follow us on LinkedIn and on Twitter @Aerossurance for our latest updates....
read moreFatal B1900C Accident: NTSB Safety Recommendation on PT6A To Error-Proof the Beta Arm
Fatal B1900C YV1674 Accident: NTSB Safety Recommendation on PT6A To Error-Proof the Beta Arm On 11 February 2015 Venezuelan Beechcraft 1900C YV1674 of Aeropanamericano was destroyed in a crash and post-crash fire shortly after takeoff from Miami Executive Airport (KTMB), Florida, during a ferry flight after routine maintenance. All 4 occupants died. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) issued their safety investigation report after determining the probable cause was: The left engine propeller’s uncommanded travel to the feathered position during takeoff for reasons that could not be determined due to impact damage. Contributing to the accident was the flight crew’s failure to establish a coordinated climb once the left engine was shut down and the left propeller was in the feathered position. NTSB note that: On February 9, 2015, the left engine propeller was removed for overhaul and replaced with another overhauled propeller. The accident flight was the first flight after the overhauled propeller was installed on the left engine. During an interview, the aviation maintenance technician (AMT) that removed and replaced the left engine propeller stated that the pilots reported problems with the left engine propeller on February 7, 2015. Specifically, the pilots reported that the propeller was not achieving the correct power setting or pitch angle. The AMT further stated that he completed the propeller removal and replacement in about 6 hours, which was normal. He followed the airplane maintenance manual and only needed to disconnect the beta arm to perform the work. Concerning there was no independent inspection: The AMT subsequently checked his own work and concluded with an operational check of power and performance, which included verifying correct power settings and corresponding blade angles. NTSB issued safety recommendations (A-16-053 and A-16-054) to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and Pratt & Whitney Canada (PWC) which are: …are intended to prevent the incorrect installation of the reversing lever (beta arm) and related components in PT6A engines, which can cause the propeller to transition uncommanded to feather in flight. They are derived from investigations in which the beta arm or related components were found incorrectly positioned. The PT6A beta arm provides propeller blade angle feedback to the beta valve. The NTSB… found four events in which the incorrect position of the beta arm in a PT6A engine was noted and that occurred within 100 flight hours after maintenance of the beta arm or related components. These were: Accident: Cessna 208B Caravan N974FE which made a force landing to a field in NY State on 26 April 2001, 5 flying hours after the installation of the beta arm. The pilot was uninjured. Accident: Air Tractor AT-502 HL5105 which was destroyed in a force landing in Korea on 13 June 2013. The pilot was uninjured. Incident: TSB Canada ID A141A0053 (no further data is supplied) Incident: FAA report ID WP27201402461 (no further data is supplied) Although not connected with the cause of the accident (pilot incapacitation)… …In a fifth event (NTSB case number ERA15FA297 [Piper PA46 N819TB on 7 August 2015]), the investigation found that the guide pin had been installed backward, which allowed the beta arm to be free-floating, that is, neither above nor below the guide pin (figure [below] shows the installation on the engine involved in this accident). The NTSB is aware that one operator has welded a tab to the top of guide pins to make it physically impossible to incorrectly install the beta arm over the pin...
read moreANSV Report on EasyJet A320 Fan Cowl Door Loss: Maintenance Human Factors
ANSV Report on EasyJet A320 Fan Cowl Door Loss: Maintenance Human Factors Italy’s Agenzia Nazionale per la Sicurezza del Volo (ANSV) has released its investigation report (in Italian) into the loss of both No 1Engine Fan Cowl Doors from a CFM56 powered EasyJet Airbus A320 G-EZTC on take-off at Milan-Malpensa Airport on 12 August 2013. The aircraft made a safe but overweight landing 17 minutes later, with some secondary damage to the fuselage and vertical stabiliser from debris impacts.. We had previous discussed the series of incidents with the Airbus A320 family cowlings and planned design improvements, in these articles: Maintenance Human Factors: The Next Generation, in which EasyJet discussed some of their actions after the Milan event A319 Double Cowling Loss and Fire – AAIB Report involving British Airways IAE V2500s powered A319, G-EUOE, at London Heathrow on 24 May 2013 (less than 3 months before the Milan event) A319 Double Cowling Loss and Fire – AAIB Safety Recommendation Update We will not however cover the design issues further in this article. Remarkably this was the 36th case of a fan cowl loss on the A320 family (14 on CFM56s and 22 on V2500s) since 1992. Aviation Safety Network records suggest 7 more occurrence since. ANSV Investigation After the British Airways event, Easyjet had issued various publications including a Notice to Crews and an Engineering Technical Instruction and had required an independent inspection after dual fan cowl opening. EasyJet used a maintenance organisation at Milian with a German EASA Part-145 maintenance approval. Prior to the cowling loss a 63 year old Licensed Aircraft Engineer (LAE) with 42 years of experience had been tasked with investigating a report of an interphone interference that was occurring at No 1 engine start up. It was suspected this might be due to a malfunction of an interphone socket at the No 1 engine. The LAE opened the cowl to check if it could be accessed (but without making a Tech Log entry). He then called a colleague for advice. The colleague advised an alternative way to access the interphone component. The cowling however remained unlatched. The ANSV comment there was no particular urgency on doing the task but postulate that the high temperature (30ºC) may have effected human performance. The LAE also finished the task near the end of the fourth 12 hour (03:30 to 15:30) shift in a 4 day on, 4 day off shift pattern, which the ANSV postulate may have resulted in fatigue. The ANSV suggest there was no evidence that the LAE took any technical data with him when working on the aircraft (though it is not clear if the LAE was actually asked what was being used). The opening of the cowl to investigate the interphone component access is said to have resulted in breeching some of the procedural defences. The ANSV comment that the LAE was likely focused on the interphone task and comment on the lack of an error-proof cowl design. This would certainly account for why after the telephone conversation the cowlings were forgotten about (the ANSV classify this as a ‘lapse’). The flight crew also did not spot the cowling was open as the Commander’s inspection was not “performed in compliance with the operator’s standard operating procedures” according to the ANSV, though the Tech Log entry for the interphone task would not have focused extra attention on the cowling. There is also a suggestion that the Commander may also have been affected by the heat, 2 hours of prior exercise and...
read moreFatal Wire Strike on Take Off from Communications Site
Fatal Wire Strike on Take Off from Communications Site The Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) have released their report on a helicopter that departed a microwave communication site and fatally struck one of the microwave tower guy wires. The lack of effective risk assessment and landing site data jumps out in their report as does a casual approach to some pre-flight preparation. There are key survivability lessons too. On 30 July 2015, Airbus Helicopters AS350BA C-GBPS operated by Canadian Helicopters (CHL): …had been flown to [the Moliak] remote microwave tower site approximately 5 nautical miles west-southwest of Rigolet, Newfoundland and Labrador, with a pilot and 2 passengers on board. At about 1609 Atlantic Daylight Time, the helicopter lifted off from the helipad at the tower site and struck a tower guy wire with the main rotor. The helicopter struck the ground and settled on its upper right side. One passenger sustained fatal injuries, the pilot sustained serious injuries, and the other passenger sustained minor injuries. The Circumstances of the Accident The TSB say: The passengers were a Bell Aliant employee and a contractor. The pilot had flown with these passengers often and they had been working together at other tower sites on the previous 3 days. The pilot had worked at CHL since 2005 and often flew to microwave tower sites, including the Moliak site. The pilot was familiar with its layout. The last time the pilot had flown to the Moliak site was 18 December 2014. The flight departed from CHL’s base at the Happy Valley–Goose Bay Airport at 1333 [Local Time] and arrived at the Moliak site about an hour later. The helicopter was landed facing north on the site’s raised helipad. The passengers then carried out the site maintenance for about 1.5 hours while the pilot rested in the site radio building. Once the work was completed, the passengers advised the pilot, who began preparing for the return flight. The pilot noted that the wind was light and from the north. The pilot helped the passengers load their tools and equipment onto the helicopter. Some cargo was placed on the cabin floor behind the left front seat; the left side of the rear split-bench seat had been folded up for this purpose [inconsistent with CAR 602.86(1) for stowage]. The pilot began the helicopter start-up procedure, completed the pre-takeoff checks, and confirmed that all doors were latched and that all occupants had their seatbelts fastened. The standard safety briefing was not conducted on the day of the occurrence [inconsistent with CAR 703.39(1)]. The pilot visually scanned the area to the left of the helicopter, was interrupted briefly by a non-operational communication made by a passenger, and then continued to scan to the right of the helicopter to ensure that the area was clear for takeoff. The pilot did not note the outer guy wires and did not include them in his departure plan. At about 1609, the pilot lifted off and began intentionally moving forward. The helicopter was just clear of the helipad and about 2 metres above downward-sloping terrain, when the contractor touched the pilot’s left shoulder. The pilot’s attention was drawn left and he then saw the tower guy wires in front and to the left of the helicopter. As the pilot moved the cyclic control aft and to...
read moreCockpit Tensions and an Automated CFIT Accident
Cockpit Tensions and an Automated CFIT Accident The German accident investigation agency, the BFU, have recent published their report into the fatal Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT) of Cessna 501 Citation I/SP N452TS on 12 January 2014. During the flight from Shoreham, UK, to Trier-Fohren, the privately owned, US registered business jet collided in fog with a trees and an electricity pylon during a VFR approach. It impacted the ground about 2 NM from the threshold of runway 22 at Trier-Fohren. The four occupants were all killed. The crew had chosen to press on under Visual Flight Rules (VFR) in poor visibility, is believed to made a VNAV selection error and there are reported to have been ‘tensions’ amongst the crew, as the Pilot in Command (PIC) allegedly wanted to terminate the co-pilot on return to Germany. Pre-Flight Planning The take-off from Shoreham had been brought forward by about 4 hours, for reasons the BFU were unable to determine. The Commander did have a discussion with the Flugleiter (the person required under German regulation to provide aerodrome information service to pilots at uncontrolled aerodromes) at the Trier-Fohren airfield on the morning of the accident at c1010 hrs. During the call the arrival of the airplane had been announced for 1230 hrs. The Flugleiter had informed the PIC about the severe fog prevailing at the airfield. He had also told him that, if at all, he expected visibility would increase after 1330 or 1400 hrs. After the phone conversation the Flugleiter assumed, that the airplane would fly to another airport. Weather was adequate at other local airports and family members of the occupants expected them to fly to an alternate airfield. While contracted flight planning information had been accessed the day before: …on the day of the accident, prior to departure, neither of the pilots accessed the flight plan data with the prevailing weather information on the server of the service provider. The reasons could not be determined. The statements of the handling agent and the video recordings at the aerodrome of departure did not indicate that either of the pilots had accessed any weather data prior to take-off. The Accident Flight The recordings of the radio communications show that at the beginning of the flight the co-pilot conducted them, including the initial contact with Langen Radar approximately 14 minutes prior to the accident. However: The PIC then acknowledged the clearance the controller issued about five minutes later to fly to the destination airport and descent to 5,000 ft AMSL. He requested the controller to issue the change of flight rules clearance with the words: “… standing by for cancelling IFR”. It could not be determined at what point the decision was made to fly to Trier-Fohren Airfield after all. The BFU is of the opinion, that at the time of the PIC’s request the decision had already been made because for an approach to Luxembourg Airport or FrankfurtHahn Airport a change of flight rules from IFR to VFR would not have been necessary. The BFU comment that as the aircraft lacked: … a CVR or FDR the options of the investigation were limited. Thus motivation, decision making process, and cooperation of the two pilots cannot be clearly understood. They also say that: …not at any time did the crew enquire about the prevailing weather conditions in TrierFohren, Frankfurt-Hahn or Luxembourg. The BFU does not understand why the pilots never established radio contact with Trier-Fohren Airfield. Therefore,...
read moreCS-27 and CS-29 Amendment 4 Issued
CS-27 and CS-29 Amendment 4 Issued The European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) has issued Amendment 4 to the Certification Standards for large (CS-29) and small (CS-27) rotorcraft. CS-29 Amendment 4 Large Rotorcraft Agency Decision 2016/025/R on CS-29 Amendment 4 is the result on a rule making process that involved 4 rule making tasks (RMT.0119 (27&29.003), RMT.0134 (27&29.029), RMT.0223 (MDM.024) and RMT.0364 (MDM.089)) and 4 Notices of Proposed Amendment (NPA 2013-21, NPA 2013-04, NPA 2014-16 and NPA 2011-17): CS-29 Amendment 4 introduces the following changes: It introduces provisions on HIRF (CS 29.1317) and lightning (CS 29.1316) to replace previous JAA ‘interim policies’ that have been applied as Special Conditions. EASA say that these “will better reflect existing certification practice” and note that “AMC material associated with these new rules has previously been published by EASA in AMC-20 (the General AMC for Airworthiness of Products, Parts and Appliances) in AMC 20-136 and AMC 20-158 . It also introduces a provisions on volcanic ash (CS 29.1593). EASA says “this will ensure that design organisations undertake an assessment of their product’s susceptibility to volcanic cloud hazards as part of type-certification, and establish limitations and/or information for their safe operation”. It amends the Acceptable Means of Compliance AMC 29.351 on yawing conditions to reflect certification experience and to ensure a consistent and safe approach to establishing structural substantiation. It formally adopts FAA Advisory Circular AC 29-2C Change 4 (published by FAA in May 2014). EASA note that “most changes adopted in this AC were previously developed jointly by FAA and EASA however some minor differences remain”. These are discussed in the Explanatory Note. The FAA have issued two further Changes since. CS-27 Amendment 4 Small Rotorcraft Agency Decision 2016/024/R on CS-27 Amendment 4 followed a parallel rule making path and resulted in similar changes except of course it adopted AC 27-1B Change 4 (published by FAA in May 2014, which is now at Change 7), with the caveat of certain minor differences again. Aerossurance’s Andy Evans is delighted to have been invited to present on Rotor and Transmission Safety at the 10th EASA Rotorcraft Symposium on 6th December 2016, the first to be held in the new EASA offices. Aerossurance has extensive air safety, certification, design assurance, airworthiness and regulatory experience. For aviation advice you can trust, contact us at: enquiries@aerossurance.com Follow us on LinkedIn and on Twitter @Aerossurance for our latest...
read moreATR72 Control Problems in Severe Icing, Norway, 14 November 2016
ATR72 Control Problems in Severe Icing, Norway, 14 November 2016 The Accident Investigation Board Norway (AIBN – the Statens Havarikommisjon for Transport [SHT] in Norwegian) has opened an investigation into this serious incident. As the northern winter develops investigation is a reminder of the possible seasonal weather related threats. On Monday 14 November 2016, Scandinavian Airlines Flight SK4144, ATR-72-212A (ATR72-500), OY-JZC, operated by Danish airline Jettime, was en route from Bergen to Ålesund when it “experienced control problems after the flight had encountered severe icing”. AIBN say the aircraft: …was climbing towards the planned cruise altitude 17 000 ft, when it became unable to continue the climb due to severe icing at approximately 15 000 ft. This in spite of the aircraft anti- and deicing systems being activated. The crew decided to head towards the coastline, partly in order to escape the icing conditions, and partly to avoid flying over the mountainous terrain below. Just after having initiated the turn, the crew experienced problems controlling the airplane, which banked uncontrollably and lost significant altitude. The crew regained control of the airplane and got out of the icing area. The ice on the airframe disappeared, and the flight continued along a more westerly track than originally planned. The airplane subsequently landed normally at Ålesund Airport, Vigra. Both the French and the Danish national accident investigation authorities have appointed Accredited Representatives who, together with advisors from ATR, will assist the Accident Investigation Board Norway with the investigation. We will return to this Serious Incident as information emerges from the investigation. In unrelated news: Jet Time has discontinued its cargo and ACMI business units for SAS Scandinavian Airlines in an effort to save the carrier. As a result, 278 positions will be cut, reducing staff by 35% over the next nine months. According to a Nov. 29 statement, Jet Time will phase out the two business units in 2017. [CEO Jørgen] Holme said the company wants to return to Jet Time’s original core business—charter flights—which paved the way for the airline’s initial success. “The cargo and ATR 72 ACMI businesses have created too much complexity for Jet Time, and they are the direct reason why the airline has in past years operated with a deficit”. Jet Time is a Danish-owned airline that was established in 2006. Over the years it has become the largest Danish carrier with an annual turnover of more than DKK 1.7 billion ($243 million) and more than 700 employees. UPDATE 10 September 2020: NSIA Final Report The AIBN, since renamed the Norwegian Safety Investigation Authority (NSIA) has published their final report and a video: The AIBN is of the opinion that the control loss was the result of insufficient planning and inappropriate decisions en route, such as the attempt to climb above the icing conditions despite degraded aircraft performance as well as use of the autopilot in altitude hold mode. Recovery of control of the aircraft may have been impeded by the commander’s initial response, pulling the control wheel back as the stick shaker activated. The commander is likely to have become startled when the aircraft stick shaker activated and the autopilot automatically deactivated, while the aircraft banked sharply, pitching its nose down. He may consequently have pulled on control wheel as the result of a temporary startle effect. Another factor that contributed...
read moreMilitary Airworthiness Conferences: EDA and DASA
Military Airworthiness Conferences: EDA and DASA Two recent conferences have been held on the topic of military airworthiness, in Europe and Australia. Both highlight the importance of the European Military Airworthiness Requirements (EMARs), both in Europe and beyond, and the value in going further and creating a more formal ‘JAA’ style arrangement. We discuss a few of the highlights below. EDA MAWA Conference In October 2016 there was the 8th annual conference, organised by the European Defence Agency (EDA) Military Airworthiness Authorities (MAWA) Forum. This event in Lisbon together 120 delegates from 28 EU and non-EU nations. In 2008 the EDA, an intergovernmental Agency of the European Council, created the MAWA Forum to help harmonise the airworthiness requirements and processes of the EDA’s 27 Participating Member States (all EU states except Denmark). The existing MAWA Task Forces that have been developing EMARS are to transition to Advisory Groups: Airworthiness Regulatory Advisory Group – April 2017 Design and Production Advisory Group – January 2017 Maintenance and Licensing Advisory Group – June 2017 MAWA document update progress in 2016 includes: MAWA Document Production and Approval Process Edition 1.1 EMAR 21 Edition including AMC and GM EMAD MFTP Edition 1.0 EMAR 145 Edition 1.2 incl. AMC and GM EMAR M AMC and GM in progress EMAR Forms Edition 2.1 EMACC update phase II – 2 out of 4 work packages will be delivered this year EMAD R Edition 2.0 The Military Aviation Authority of the Czech Republic commented that in setting up a multi-national helicopter training centre, the “EMAR[s] proved to be very good ‘toolbox’ for bilateral recognition”. In the context of the Eurofighter Typhoon, the UK Military Aviation Authority said: Reducing resources drive the need to work together. Need to build trust and respect. Not only among Regulators but also with Industry. Harmonised regulations are a great idea, but only if used in the same way. European industry industry association ASD further commented on the: Remarkable progress evidenced through achievement of Mutual Recognition as fundamental basis for successful implementation of EMAR21 on Eurofighter Typhoon nations. Meanwhile the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) discussed the range of military programmes they have and expect to be involved in: In addition there are many other military types, passenger transport and helicopter types in particular, that are simply civil certified aircraft purchased from the production line. EASA commented that: EASA has been a pioneer in identifying and utilising synergies between civil and military activities in several projects EASA involvement in military products and matters benefits both the EU industry and the end users (savings) The implementation of a Performance Based Environment is an opportunity for military In challenging times, civil-military cooperation is a key factor The Netherlands Military Aviation Authority discussed the challenges they faced applying EMAR-21 the the Airbus A330 based Multi Role Tanker and Transport Capability (MRTTC) project. MAA-NL has recently signed a new contract with ADSE for continued support. ASD asked a series of questions on the possible evolution of the MAWA Initiative: Is there scope for a true single European Military Airworthiness Organisation that co-exists with existing NMAAs? What could be its scope and which generic aspects of regulation could be proposed for a central organisation? Could the role of EDA include involvement in outlining a strategy leading up to the formation of a European Military Airworthiness Organisation under EDA/MAWA? As a first step could a central organisation have its powers enhanced particularly in the areas of...
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