Antarctic Helicopter Accidents
Antarctic Helicopter Accidents The Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) has just issued a report into an accident involving an Airbus Helicopters AS350B2 VH-HRQ of Helicopter Resources, supporting polar exploration in Antarctica on 1 December 2013. We look at that and also Antarctic accidents involving 1 French and 3 German helicopters. Australian Accident – History of the Flight The helicopter was one of a pair returning from Cape Darnley to Davis Station, the most southerly station operated by the Australian Antarctic Division, having refuelled at a fuel cache en route on the Amery ice shelf. It had one pilot and two passengers aboard. According to the ATSB: As a result of a rapid reduction in visual cues, the pilot of [ZH-]HRQ maintained about 150 ft above ground level. The pilots of both helicopters discussed the reduced surface definition and loss of visible horizon along their flight path and elected to return to the fuel cache until the weather improved. During the turn back to the fuel cache, HRQ descended and impacted the ice shelf. The pilot and two passengers were seriously injured and the helicopter destroyed. The second helicopter landed near-by but bad weather prevented recovering the casualties for 20 hours. Temperatures was around -8 degrees Celsius. Australian Accident – Analysis The ATSB believe that, after initiating the right turn back to the fuel cache, the pilot probably became spatially disoriented and thus didn’t detect the decent, commenting: Factors contributing to the disorientation included a loss of visual cues as a result of the change in weather conditions, and a breakdown of the pilot’s scan of his flight instruments, resulting in collision with terrain. When interviewed by the press, the ATSB’s Chief Commissioner Martin Dolan said the pilot was faced with a challenging situation: The basic cause was a loss of situational awareness by the pilot in conditions where there was no visible horizon, so essentially a white-out, and [he turned] to try and get back to a safe position but in the course of that the helicopter collided with terrain. In those situations there’s a very high workload on pilots, you’ve got a combination of checking externally to see what’s happened, to respond to a situation where the visibly has suddenly dropped, and there’s a range of things you also need to check internally in terms of the management of the aircraft. The aircraft was approved in Australia for Day and Night VFR operations but was not equipped with an autopilot, nor was one required by local regulation. The ATSB had previously reported on an accident involving an AS355, chartered by a TV company, during Night VFR operation were the lack of an autopilot was contributory. The pilot was experienced (4800 hours+) but had completed just eight hours of instrument flying in an AS350. Doran commented: That’s a comparatively low number of hours and so the lack of instrument flight would have been a potential contributor here. ATSB note in their report: The operator had recognised the hazards associated with flight in Antarctic conditions and had implemented turn-backs/night training to addresses the associated risk. This training was conducted using flight instruments to maintain height in the turn. On the accident flight, a timely decision by the pilot to reference both the flight instruments and the clear horizon to the right, rather than flying by visual reference only, would most likely...
read moreHappy Birthday – 1 Year of News and Comment
Happy Birthday – 1 Year of News and Comment from Aerossurance One year today we published the first article in our News and Comment series. Our very first article was: Offshore Helicopter Accident Ghana 8 May 2014 & The Importance of Emergency Response. We were keen to emphasise the importance of emergency response provision, especially at remote operating sites. As always we strive to update our stories with new information and in October 2014 we added otherwise little-publicised details released by the accident commission. Over the past year we have published 190 original articles which we hope our readers have enjoyed and found of use. Certainly we have been gratified by regular positive feedback, which have confirmed that topical, fact-rich, opinion-lite articles with good links to public domain sources are appreciated. We post links to all our original content on our corporate LinkedIn page, so if you have comments on our articles please share them. On the same page we also share other carefully selected safety, aviation and oil & gas news and links. The mix is eclectic but we hope that if we find them of interest you will too! So now we can do a countdown of Aerossurance’s 10 most popular stories: Number 10: James Reason’s 12 Principles of Error Management Twelve sound principles that are always worth revisiting. Number 9: Helicopter Ditching Limitations Topical not only because of European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) rule making team on offshore survivability but also due to the UK Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) the CAP1145 report published 20 February 2014 and this year’s CAP1243, Offshore Helicopter Review Progress Report (which have influenced a number of our stories). Never underestimate the power of the sea: Number 8: Breaking the Chain: X-31 Lessons Learned Dramatic flight test video and frank discussion of the lessons learnt make this NASA accident worth close attention. Number 7: Accident Report: Fatal Police Helicopter Double Engine Flameout Over City Centre While returning from a routine patrol over a crowded city both engines flamed out on a police helicopter. Due to the helicopter’s low altitude and the congested environment the aircraft crashed into buildings with multiple fatalities. We examine at the accident investigator’s final report and highlight the value of studying accidents internationally. You might have assumed was the tragic accident in Glasgow, UK, 29 November 2013. In fact it was an AgustaWestland A109K2 JA11PC of the Shizuoka Prefectural Police in Shizuoka City on 3 May 2005. Number 6: NTSB Report on 2013 S-76 Tail Rotor Blade Loss The US National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) reported on a fatal Sikorsky S-76A++ accident. During a post-maintenance check flight of avionics 2 tail rotor blades separated and the TGB began to disintegrate. All 3 POB died. Number 5: Heli-Expo 2015 Photo Report Back in March we had a very fruitful week in Orlando. We had a series of stakeholder meetings on the Flight Safety Foundation (FSF) Basic Aviation Risk Standard Offshore Helicopter Operations (BARSOHO) project, got to renew our IS-BAO audit qualifications, met up with friends and colleagues both new and old, and walked the floor the HAI Heli-Expo. UPDATE 27 May 2015: BARSOHO is launched. This article covered the unveiling of the visually stunning Airbus Helicopters H160, AW announcing a platform development agreement for the AW609 TiltRotor with Bristow Group, certification of the 7t AW139, Sikorsky recognising Bristow Helicopters’ (then) upcoming launch of the new UK search and rescue (SAR) contract and...
read moreMaintenance Human Factors: The Next Generation
Maintenance Human Factors: The Next Generation On 12 May 2015 at Cranfield University, the Royal Aeronautical Society (RAeS) discussed Human Factors in Engineering – the Next Generation. Aerossurance is pleased to have sponsored this thought provoking RAeS Human Factors Group: Engineering event. While the seminar was intended to connect the new generation of aerospace professionals and experienced HF practitioners, it posed a deeper question: Do we need a new generation approach to maintenance human factors too? In his opening address Cranfield University’s Professor Dave King (a former Chief Inspector of Air Accidents with the UK Air Accidents Investigation Branch [AAIB]) talked about a generation of attention on maintenance HF incidents since the infamous BAC-111 window failure in 1990. This was by no means the first accident investigation were maintenance HF issues were examined. However, that accident (and a structural failure to a Boeing 737-200 in Hawaii in 1988) mark the beginning of a period were the human factors aspects of a number of high profile maintenance related accidents and serious incidents were examined in detail. These investigations went beyond the outdated idea that ‘error is a cause’ to a more searching examination of the circumstances why error was a consequence. Professor King however made the point that a generation on, similar occurrences were still repeating. Consequently he highlighted that as well as thinking about the next generation in the industry we also need to think about a next generation approach to human factors in engineering. For example, the UK Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) has commented that: Human Factors training alone is not considered sufficient to minimise maintenance error. Most of the [contributing factors] can be attributed to the safety culture and associated behaviours of the organisation. The RAeS Human Factors Group: Engineering also discussed preliminary results from an online survey. The feedback to date suggested a need to: Share data better across the industry. Integrate HF more fully into Safety Management Systems. Get better at actually implementing improvements. At the time of writing this short survey is still currently open so you can still have your say. The following case study considers Professor King’s question, using some material presented in other sessions of the seminar. Engine Cowling Case Study – Background In one presentation during the seminar, Easyjet talked about an incident when an engine fan cowling was lost from an Airbus A320 departing from Milan in August 2003 and their response. UPDATE 11 December 2016: ANSV Report on EasyJet A320 Cowling Loss: Maintenance Human Factors Cowlings have been lost from a wide range of aircraft types (for example Airbus A330, ATR72, Boeing 717, Boeing 737, Bombardier CRJ, Embraer 195 and McDonnell Douglas DC-8). However, remarkably there had been over 30 previous cases on the A320 family (both CFM56 and V2500 engines). In fact just three months prior to the Easyjet occurrence, a British Airways A319 suffered a double cowling loss at London Heathrow. AAIB had previously reported on an occurrence in 2000 (at that time the 8th on the A320 family) and made a number of recommendations. A week after the BA event AAIB issued a further recommendation in a Special Bulletin: Safety Recommendation 2013-011: It is recommended that Airbus formally notifies operators of A320-family aircraft of the fan cowl door loss event on A319 G-EUOE on 24 May 2013, and reiterates the importance of verifying that the fan cowl doors are latched prior to flight by visually checking the position of the...
read moreHeliOffshore Inaugural Conference 2015
HeliOffshore Inaugural Conference 2015 HeliOffshore held its inaugural conference 9-10 May 2015 in Lisbon. HeliOffshore, launched in October 2014, is the new industry association for organisations with an interest in working together on safety in offshore helicopter transport. Over 150 people attended the event, including CEOs and COOs from operators and helicopter manufacturers and four representatives from oil and gas companies. As a HeliOffshore member, Aerossurance was pleased to participate in this event in which wide commitment to safety through collaboration was evident. Introduction HeliOffshore, founded by the 5 largest players in offshore helicopter operations (Babcock, Bristow, CHC, ERA and PHI), now has over 50 members, including 25 helicopter operators flying in over 30 countries, with 1,200 aircraft, transporting 4.5 million passengers per annum. Chairman of HeliOffshore, Bill Chiles, welcomed the participants: HeliOffshore is already helping to further improve safety and share best practice around the globe. While the industry will continue to compete vigorously on commercial issues, we are putting competition aside to collaborate on safety. In an opening panel session with HeliOffshore, the CEOs of Airbus Helicopters and Heli-Union and representatives of BP and Shell, there was broad agreement that the safe return of passengers and crew is the primary goal. It was also noted that while crises result in close cooperation it is essential to build the trust for close routine collaboration on safety. Leadership The first discussion topic was on the importance of leadership. When the audience were asked to vote electronically on where the greatest opportunities are for safety improvement, 10% voted for systems and processes, 17% for technology and 74% for culture. Significantly safety culture is one area that the offshore helicopter community has been particularly attentive to for some time (e.g.: Beyond SMS – May 2008). The concept of aiming for zero accidents was also discussed. It was said that: “Good is not good enough. Zero is the only defensible target”. Working Together HeliOffshore Chief Executive Officer Gretchen Haskins then lead a session on ‘working together’. This included an overview of 6 current workstreams, which were introduced by reference to a bow-tie, developed by Aerossurance, for the soon to be issued Flight Safety Foundation (FSF) Basic Aviation Risk Standard Offshore Helicopter Operations (BARSOHO). UPDATE 27 May 2015: BARSOHO is launched. UPDATE 1 February 2017: BARSOHO Version 3 is now fully aligned with the HeliOffshore Safety Performance Model, released in 2016. Five of the workstreams were inherited from the Babcock/Bristow/CHC Joint Operators Review (launched in 2013) and the one on HUMS was inherited from HeliOffshore’s predecessor the European Helicopter Operators’ Committee (EHOC): Automation (which includes establishing the automation philosophies of each manufacturer, the introduction of the first offshore Flight Crew Operating Manual [FCOM] and Evidence Based Training) Operational Performance Monitoring (which includes Line Orientated Safety Audits [LOSA] and research into pilot scan techniques) Flight Path Monitoring (which includes Helicopter Terrain Awareness Warning System [HTAWS] algorithms, Loss of Control identification and recovery and a study of Wrong Deck Landings) Application of Health and Usage Monitoring (over 21 meetings, representatives of 8 organisations have been defining best practice for HUMS) Information Exchange (focusing on sharing safety data, leading and lagging indicators and trend analysis) Operational Standards (including three themes: a) customer operational differences [in discussion IOGP stated that their Aircraft Management Guidelines are to be ‘simplified’), b) survivability standards and c) customer audits) In particular two research programmes are currently being supported. One is...
read moreUK AAIB Report on Two Ground Collisions
UK AAIB Report on Two Ground Collisions In their May 2015 Bulletin the UK Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB) published two separate reports of night-time collisions between aircraft and obstacles on the apron / ramp last winter. Both highlight factors that can increase risk. Collision 1 The AAIB report that after refuelling at Newquay Airport on 31 December 2014, the pilot of an Capital Air Ambulance Beech King Air 200, G-KVIP, commenced taxying to depart. The right propeller struck mobile airfield barrier system (MABS) equipment. As well as propeller damage, the aircraft also suffered damage to the right main landing gear door and the right side of the nose. The AAIB conclude: The position of the bowser during refuelling probably obstructed the pilot’s view of the MABS whilst he was carrying out his external inspection. Also, the structure of the aircraft probably partially or completely obstructed his view of the MABS from his seated position in the left pilot’s seat. Unaware of the MABS he did not select his taxi route to avoid it and the right propeller struck the MABS panel, detachment of which caused the other damage to the aircraft. Collision 2 The AAIB report that after engine start at Coventry Airport on 15 January 2015, the crew of West Atlantic cargo British Aerospace ATP G-BTPC gave the ground crew the signal to remove wheel chocks. When they were removed, the aircraft moved forward and collided with a ground power unit. After the accident the flight crew realised that the parking brake was not set. The AAIB comment that: The commander noted that there had been an expectation that the parking brake would have been set to on when the crew first arrived at the aircraft. The parking brake was not an item on the turnaround checklist which the crew had carried out earlier, although it was an item on the pre-start checklist which had therefore not been carried out correctly. The commander also observed that the signal to remove the chocks was given before the GPU had been moved clear of the aircraft. Although the flight crew had not felt rushed, the commander believed that they had been under a time pressure due to the imminent airport closure [it was 0145 and the airfield was due to shut at 0200], and that this had been a contributory factor. Safety Resources UPDATE 7 May 2017: Ground Collision Under Pressure: Challenger vs ATV: 1-0 UPDATE 17 July 2017: S-92A Collision with Obstacle while Taxying UPDATE 16 May 2021: Cessna 208B Collides with C172 after Distraction Aerossurance has extensive air safety, operations, airworthiness, human factors, aviation regulation and safety analysis experience. For practical aviation advice you can trust, contact us at: enquiries@aerossurance.com Follow us on LinkedIn and on Twitter @Aerossurance for our latest...
read moreReady Salted ATR72 and WP-3D
Ready Salted ATR72 and WP-3D The Irish Air Accident Investigation Unit (AAIU) have reported on a serious incident involving Aer Arann (later Stobart Air) ATR72-212A, EI-REL on 2 January 2014. The findings are highly relevant not only to fixed wing aircraft operating at moderate altitudes over the sea but also offshore helicopter operators. The ATR72… ….carried out a go-around from its first approach to Runway (RWY) 25 at Cork Airport (EICK) in stormy weather, due to a significant increase in indicated airspeed on short final. The aircraft then positioned under radar control for a second approach to the same runway. Its track brought it south of EICK, close to the coast and at times over the sea. During this time, a thick layer of sea salt formed on the front windscreens, obscuring the Flight Crew’s forward visibility. As it was not possible to acquire the necessary visual references for landing, a second go-around was flown. …the Flight Crew showed good airmanship and crew resource management (CRM) in seeking to fly to areas of shower activity which were visible on their weather radar. They were facilitated in this by ATC and they found areas of moisture which, although not active enough to completely clear the windscreen, did clear a small area of the windscreen on the Commander’s side. The Commander was then able to commence a third approach to RWY 25, using the visual cues which she could see through this small gap in the salt residue. At the time, the First Officer still had no visual reference. As they approached EICK, a shower passed over the airport, which assisted in clearing the windscreen and they were able to carry out a normal landing. The ATR72 has windscreen wipers but no wash system. The AAIU report that further inquires: … revealed an occurrence in 2007 in which a NOAA Lockheed WP-3D turboprop aircraft involved in the study of near-surface wind speeds over the North Atlantic Ocean some 500 nautical miles (nm) east of St John’s, Newfoundland lost power on three of its four engines. The aircraft was operating primarily at altitudes of around 2,500 – 3,000 ft in very high wind speeds (85 to 95 kts) in the on-station area. As the aircraft was unable to maintain altitude on the power of only one engine, it began a descent at a rate of about 700 feet per minute. The crew carried out the restart procedure for the No. 1 engine, at which time the aircraft passed through an area of liquid precipitation for less than 60 seconds. The engine restart was successful and subsequently the crew were able to restart No. 3 and No. 4 engines and the aircraft recovered safely to St. John’s. An investigation report published by NOAA (Mishap Investigation Report 01-07) found that salt accretion on the compressor stator and rotor vanes of the engines during the incident flight was considered a causal factor in this occurrence. It is noteworthy that the Report mentions the fact that, on landing, the crew had “very limited visibility through the windshield.” NOAA then requested assistance of the US Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) to better understand the meteorological conditions involved. The NRL subsequently published Report NRL/MR/7540-07-9080: There is very little collected data on sea salt aerosol particles in high wind conditions, and much of the data at moderate...
read moreVirgin Atlantic Engineers Trial Sony SmartWear
Virgin Atlantic Engineers Trial Sony SmartWear (AR & VR in Aviation & Aerospace) Virgin Atlantic engineers at London Heathrow have come to the scheduled end of a 2 month trial of Sony SmartWear equipment. The aim of this wearable technology is to aid communications between line maintenance engineers working remotely on aircraft and engineering support teams. The line engineers were kitted out with Sony’s SmartWatch 3 and SmartEyeglass Developer Edition SED-E1 devices, alongside a smartphone or tablet. At the start of the trial Sony said: Our SmartEyeglass Developer Edition SED-E1 will enable Virgin Atlantic to deliver rapid technical assistance by streaming real-time video directly from onsite engineers over to the technicians in the control room where they can view the content directly from the dedicated app. This will be supplemented by SmartWatch 3 acting as a non-stop activity log, providing runway bound engineers with on-the-go job allocations and detail changes whilst simultaneously providing managers with instant feedback on how they’re getting on. Virgin Atlantic commented: Using Sony’s SmartWear alongside a smart phone or tablet will remove paper from some engineering processes and reduce the journey times between an aircraft and technical control. This will enable the engineers and technicians to remain on the aircraft during turnarounds – helping to save valuable time, as well as make a significant contribution to our targets to reduce paper waste. https://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=Bx7O_h09HKA It will be interesting to see if wearable technology proved a benefit or a distraction in this trial. We are aware of similar trials at Easyjet with Epson Moverio BT-200 and of Japan Airlines testing Google Glass. Easyjet’s Head of Engineering and Maintenance Ian Davies commented: I have about fifty engineers monitoring everything going…every day but the most modern tool we’ve got to do that is a telephone and it comes down to snapshots and bits of conversations. So effectively we are solving problems semi-blind. We needed to be able to get eyes on the problem. You would not believe how useful it is for us to be able to see the problem. If someone calls me and says there’s a big dent in the side of the aircraft, how big is a big dent? Well you can see it straight away- literally within seconds I can say we’re in trouble or not. Engineers are generally techie and they like playing with new kit, especially if it promises to make their job quicker and easier. But they’re also critical and expect things to work, so although we have that play element of experimenting at the beginning we’re pretty ruthless. When we first started with the video camera we said the resolution isn’t good enough so we upped the resolution, we said we needed to control it remotely from this end and now we’re able to control to control the shutter from the central operations end and exactly what we’re able to see. IT consultancy Gartner predict that the entire wearable market will be worth $10 billion globally by 2016. UPDATE 23 July 2015: The Australian national research lab, CSIRO, are developing wearable solutions for aircraft maintenance too. It has licenced the Guardian Mentor Remote line to aerospace company TAE and is researching the technology for use in highly automated factory environments. GMR includes the capability to superimpose the ‘hands’ of a remote expert on the head up display to aid communication and...
read moreCulture + Non Compliance + Mechanical Failures = DC3 Accident
Culture + Non Compliance + Mechanical Failures = DC-3 Accident (Buffalo Airways C-GWIR) The Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) recently issued a report on the forced landing of a 1942 Douglas DC-3 C-GWIR after an engine failure on 19 August 2013. The Buffalo Airways aircraft was operating a scheduled passenger flight between Yellowknife and Hay River within the Northwest Territories. Buffalo Airways has been the subject of the TV series Ice Pilots NWT. The Accident Moments after take-off a fire developed in the right engine. The crew turned back to the airfield but the aircraft struck a stand of trees and made a wheels up landing south of the airfield 5 minutes later. Fortuitously the 3 crew and 21 passengers were uninjured. Contemporary press reports with typically tabloid headlines: CBC and Northern Journal The Investigation – Mechanical Failures The TSB report that: The right engine number 1 cylinder failed during the take-off sequence due to a pre-existing fatigue crack, resulting in an engine fire. After the right propeller’s feathering mechanism was activated, the propeller never achieved a fully feathered condition likely due to a seized bearing in the feathering pump. The windmilling right propeller caused an increase in drag which, combined with the overweight condition, contributed to the aircraft’s inability to maintain altitude, and the aircraft collided with terrain short of the runway. The TSB were not able to identify the source of the cylinder fatigue crack due to post failure damage and do not comment on adequacy of the maintenance programme. The Investigation – Operational Failures Aerossurance has recently reported on another Canadian accident where a propulsion system malfunction resulted in an accident after, in that case, an inappropriate crew response. The difference in this accident was that inappropriate actions had occurred before the engine failure, in relation to aircraft loading and performance calculations (and the lack thereof). The TSB report that: The company procedure for maintaining accurate weight and balance data on its fleet by using calculations was ineffective. Inconsistencies between the weight and balance report at the last weighing in 1990 with subsequent amendments did not reflect actual aircraft configuration… …a complete and accurate weight and balance report was not calculated prior to takeoff. As such, the crew would not be able to determine accurately the aircraft’s performance capabilities during a normal takeoff. Additionally, the company did not have the capability to demonstrate how its aircraft could meet the CARs net take-off flight path (NTOFP) performance requirements, despite stating this requirement within its operations manual. This put the safety of flights at risk. On this flight: Using the applicable standard passenger weights as prescribed by the Company Operations Manual (COM), the data from the OFP and the actual cargo weight, the operational take-off weight for the occurrence flight was determined to have been 27 435 pounds, 1235 pounds over the [maximum certified take-off weight] MCTOW. Not surprisingly, as demonstrated by an 1994 Australian DC-3 accident, in this overloaded condition, with powerplant malfunctions, climb performance was seriously degraded. Three months ago Aerossurance wrote about another loading related accident, involving a Pilatus PC-12: Wait to Weight & Balance – Lessons from a Loss of Control The Investigation – Regulatory Oversight, SMS and Culture Buffalo Airways had been required by Canadian regulations to have a Safety Management System since 2005, however the regulator, Transport Canada (TC), is reported to have only conducted their first SMS assessment at the operator...
read moreHelideck, Helicopter and Other Specialist Training Facilities
Helideck, Helicopter and Other Specialist Training Facilities Safety training specialists Falck Nutec (now RelyOn Nutec) have installed an ex-Royal Navy AgustaWestland Lynx HAS3 at their Aberdeen training facility on their helideck training mock-up. This aids the training of Helideck Landing Officers (HLOs) and Helideck Assistants (HDAs) on their OPITIO approved training courses. This replaced a rather more basic former Lynx AH7. A similar Lynx is in place at Stockton-On tees, with a refuelling system: Falck, one of a number providing such training, also uses a Airbus Helicopters H225 mock-up at the Fire Training Group facility on the other side of Aberdeen Airport. At Survivex: ThinkDefence report that Lutra Associates and Oxford Specialist Coachbuilders have delivered one Merlin and one Puma escape trainer under a £200,000 UK Ministry of Defence (MOD) contract. The units are containerised for easy transport to, for example, barracks and infantry training areas. In September 2014 Dytecna delivered a trailer mounted Emergency Exit Jettison (EEJ) training rig to the National Police Air Service (NPAS). It can replicate the emergency exits of the three aircraft types currently in the NPAS fleet: Airbus Helicopters EC135s and EC145s and the MD Helicopters MD902. On its delivery, Head of Compliance and Safety for NPAS, Dave Taylor, said: Before safety training like this was carried out using real aircraft meaning issues of damage, loss of availability of the aircraft when being used for training and staff time to operate it. The rig can be moved on a trailer and… it will be going to every NPAS base across England and Wales as a part of a rolling training programme so that staff can carry out mandatory safety training in the physical operation of emergency exits. UPDATE 14 September 2016: Helideck Safety Alerts: Refuelling Hoses and Obstructions UPDATE 24 January 2017: At Mount Pearl in Canada Falck have introduced an S-92A refuelling rig. UPDATE 31 January 2017: A mobile propane-fuelled fire-fighting training rig was recently used at Fort Polk, OK. UPDATE 11 May 2017: Aberdeen Airport has commissioned a new S-92A fire simulator: UPDATE 30 March 2018: CHC has opened a new hoist training facility in Den Helder (video). CHC say: The facility, located within CHC’s Den Helder base, has been designed to resemble a Leonardo AW139 cabin and can also be used to simulate Helicopter Hoist Operations (HHO) conditions from an AW169. The one-day Helicopter Hoist Operations course, with an optional second day on the aircraft, is designed to offer theory and practice to between four to six candidates. Feedback from launch customers, including a major global oil and gas super operator major, has been very positive. UPDATE 10 July 2019: Survivex have now added a retired Airbus AS365 to their training helideck in Aberdeen. UPDATE 15 July 2019: Capital Air Ambulance have introduced a King Air air ambulance cabin simulator. Other Helideck Safety Resources Helideck Safety Alerts: Refuelling Hoses and Obstructions NTSB Recommendations on Offshore Gas Venting Mind the Handrail! – Walk-to-Work Helideck Hazard Passive Fire-Retarding Helideck Designs US BSEE Helideck A-NPR / Bell 430 Tail Strike Troublesome Tiedowns Wrong Deck Landings FOD and an AS350B3 Accident Landing on a Yacht in Bergen Aerossurance regularly assists oil and gas companies and vessel operators review and update their helideck procedures and adverse weather policies, examine helideck structural integrity issues and provide independent assurance of helideck readiness. Aerossurance has extensive helicopter safety, offshore helicopter operations, mergency service, helideck and aviation safety analysis experience. For practical aviation advice you can trust, contact us at: enquiries@aerossurance.com Follow us on LinkedIn and on Twitter @Aerossurance for our latest updates. ...
read moreMetro III: Propulsion System Malfunction + Inappropriate Crew Response
Metro III: Propulsion System Malfunction + Inappropriate Crew Response (PSM+ICR) The Transportation Board of Canada (TSB) recently issued a report into the fatal loss on 10 November 2013 of a Fairchild SA-227 Metro III at Red Lake, Ontario. The aircraft, C-FFVN, was operated by Bearskin Airlines. Both pilots and three of the five passengers were killed in the accident. The accident featured what a 1998 AIA/AECMA study termed a Propulsion System Malfunction + Inappropriate Crew Response (PSM+ICR). The Accident According to the TSB: The landing checklist was completed and, at 1827:06, the crew advised Kenora FSS that they were 5 nautical miles (nm) on final approach for Runway 26 at the Red Lake Airport. At 1828, at approximately 500 feet above ground level (agl) and approximately 1.4 nm from the runway, the crew noted an aircraft malfunction but did not immediately identify the nature of it. Maximum power was applied to one or both engines, and the landing gear was initially selected up and then re-selected down before it could fully retract. The crew declared an emergency with Kenora FSS and unsuccessfully attempted to initiate a climb. Shortly afterwards, the aircraft veered and rolled to the left, descended, and struck trees with its left wing. The aircraft continued through the trees and struck a series of hydro lines that ran parallel to Ontario Highway 125… The initial contact with the trees and hydro lines arrested the aircraft’s speed and descent rate, and attenuated the force of the impact with the edge of the roadway. The aircraft cartwheeled down a slope which further reduced the force of the impact to the occupants in the rear of the aircraft. When the aircraft came to rest, the fuselage was broken in half forward of the overwing emergency exits and the front half of the aircraft was on fire. The 406 MHz emergency locator transmitter did not activate during the accident. The Investigation On examination of the engine, Honeywell, manufacturer of the TPE331-11U-612G engine, concluded that a first-stage turbine blade of the left hand engine failed because of high-cycle fatigue as a result of the following factors: Substandard porosity of the turbine blade material which resulted in inadequate fatigue capability and the creation a favourable location for crack initiation. A minor increase in the mean stress in the blade fir tree region due to blade platform contact. Stator burn-through which resulted in an uneven vibration on the first-stage turbine wheel assembly and heat stress on the turbine blades. The TSB agreed and also found was that: As a result of the blade failure, the left engine continued to operate but experienced a near-total loss of power at approximately 500 feet above ground level, on final approach to Runway 26 at the Red Lake Airport. The crew were unable to identify the nature of the engine malfunction, which prevented them from taking timely and appropriate action to control the aircraft. The nature of the engine malfunction resulted in the left propeller being at a very low blade angle, which, together with the landing configuration of the aircraft, resulted in the aircraft being in an increasingly high drag and asymmetric state. When the aircraft’s speed reduced below minimum control speed (Vmc), the crew lost control at an altitude from which a recovery was not possible. In their analysis the TSB say: The loss of power and drop in N1 speed to 98% would have commanded the left engine propeller governor...
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