Virgin Atlantic Engineers Trial Sony SmartWear
Virgin Atlantic Engineers Trial Sony SmartWear (AR & VR in Aviation & Aerospace) Virgin Atlantic engineers at London Heathrow have come to the scheduled end of a 2 month trial of Sony SmartWear equipment. The aim of this wearable technology is to aid communications between line maintenance engineers working remotely on aircraft and engineering support teams. The line engineers were kitted out with Sony’s SmartWatch 3 and SmartEyeglass Developer Edition SED-E1 devices, alongside a smartphone or tablet. At the start of the trial Sony said: Our SmartEyeglass Developer Edition SED-E1 will enable Virgin Atlantic to deliver rapid technical assistance by streaming real-time video directly from onsite engineers over to the technicians in the control room where they can view the content directly from the dedicated app. This will be supplemented by SmartWatch 3 acting as a non-stop activity log, providing runway bound engineers with on-the-go job allocations and detail changes whilst simultaneously providing managers with instant feedback on how they’re getting on. Virgin Atlantic commented: Using Sony’s SmartWear alongside a smart phone or tablet will remove paper from some engineering processes and reduce the journey times between an aircraft and technical control. This will enable the engineers and technicians to remain on the aircraft during turnarounds – helping to save valuable time, as well as make a significant contribution to our targets to reduce paper waste. https://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=Bx7O_h09HKA It will be interesting to see if wearable technology proved a benefit or a distraction in this trial. We are aware of similar trials at Easyjet with Epson Moverio BT-200 and of Japan Airlines testing Google Glass. Easyjet’s Head of Engineering and Maintenance Ian Davies commented: I have about fifty engineers monitoring everything going…every day but the most modern tool we’ve got to do that is a telephone and it comes down to snapshots and bits of conversations. So effectively we are solving problems semi-blind. We needed to be able to get eyes on the problem. You would not believe how useful it is for us to be able to see the problem. If someone calls me and says there’s a big dent in the side of the aircraft, how big is a big dent? Well you can see it straight away- literally within seconds I can say we’re in trouble or not. Engineers are generally techie and they like playing with new kit, especially if it promises to make their job quicker and easier. But they’re also critical and expect things to work, so although we have that play element of experimenting at the beginning we’re pretty ruthless. When we first started with the video camera we said the resolution isn’t good enough so we upped the resolution, we said we needed to control it remotely from this end and now we’re able to control to control the shutter from the central operations end and exactly what we’re able to see. IT consultancy Gartner predict that the entire wearable market will be worth $10 billion globally by 2016. UPDATE 23 July 2015: The Australian national research lab, CSIRO, are developing wearable solutions for aircraft maintenance too. It has licenced the Guardian Mentor Remote line to aerospace company TAE and is researching the technology for use in highly automated factory environments. GMR includes the capability to superimpose the ‘hands’ of a remote expert on the head up display to aid communication and...
read moreCulture + Non Compliance + Mechanical Failures = DC3 Accident
Culture + Non Compliance + Mechanical Failures = DC-3 Accident (Buffalo Airways C-GWIR) The Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) recently issued a report on the forced landing of a 1942 Douglas DC-3 C-GWIR after an engine failure on 19 August 2013. The Buffalo Airways aircraft was operating a scheduled passenger flight between Yellowknife and Hay River within the Northwest Territories. Buffalo Airways has been the subject of the TV series Ice Pilots NWT. The Accident Moments after take-off a fire developed in the right engine. The crew turned back to the airfield but the aircraft struck a stand of trees and made a wheels up landing south of the airfield 5 minutes later. Fortuitously the 3 crew and 21 passengers were uninjured. Contemporary press reports with typically tabloid headlines: CBC and Northern Journal The Investigation – Mechanical Failures The TSB report that: The right engine number 1 cylinder failed during the take-off sequence due to a pre-existing fatigue crack, resulting in an engine fire. After the right propeller’s feathering mechanism was activated, the propeller never achieved a fully feathered condition likely due to a seized bearing in the feathering pump. The windmilling right propeller caused an increase in drag which, combined with the overweight condition, contributed to the aircraft’s inability to maintain altitude, and the aircraft collided with terrain short of the runway. The TSB were not able to identify the source of the cylinder fatigue crack due to post failure damage and do not comment on adequacy of the maintenance programme. The Investigation – Operational Failures Aerossurance has recently reported on another Canadian accident where a propulsion system malfunction resulted in an accident after, in that case, an inappropriate crew response. The difference in this accident was that inappropriate actions had occurred before the engine failure, in relation to aircraft loading and performance calculations (and the lack thereof). The TSB report that: The company procedure for maintaining accurate weight and balance data on its fleet by using calculations was ineffective. Inconsistencies between the weight and balance report at the last weighing in 1990 with subsequent amendments did not reflect actual aircraft configuration… …a complete and accurate weight and balance report was not calculated prior to takeoff. As such, the crew would not be able to determine accurately the aircraft’s performance capabilities during a normal takeoff. Additionally, the company did not have the capability to demonstrate how its aircraft could meet the CARs net take-off flight path (NTOFP) performance requirements, despite stating this requirement within its operations manual. This put the safety of flights at risk. On this flight: Using the applicable standard passenger weights as prescribed by the Company Operations Manual (COM), the data from the OFP and the actual cargo weight, the operational take-off weight for the occurrence flight was determined to have been 27 435 pounds, 1235 pounds over the [maximum certified take-off weight] MCTOW. Not surprisingly, as demonstrated by an 1994 Australian DC-3 accident, in this overloaded condition, with powerplant malfunctions, climb performance was seriously degraded. Three months ago Aerossurance wrote about another loading related accident, involving a Pilatus PC-12: Wait to Weight & Balance – Lessons from a Loss of Control The Investigation – Regulatory Oversight, SMS and Culture Buffalo Airways had been required by Canadian regulations to have a Safety Management System since 2005, however the regulator, Transport Canada (TC), is reported to have only conducted their first SMS assessment at the operator...
read moreHelideck, Helicopter and Other Specialist Training Facilities
Helideck, Helicopter and Other Specialist Training Facilities Safety training specialists Falck Nutec (now RelyOn Nutec) have installed an ex-Royal Navy AgustaWestland Lynx HAS3 at their Aberdeen training facility on their helideck training mock-up. This aids the training of Helideck Landing Officers (HLOs) and Helideck Assistants (HDAs) on their OPITIO approved training courses. This replaced a rather more basic former Lynx AH7. A similar Lynx is in place at Stockton-On tees, with a refuelling system: Falck, one of a number providing such training, also uses a Airbus Helicopters H225 mock-up at the Fire Training Group facility on the other side of Aberdeen Airport. At Survivex: ThinkDefence report that Lutra Associates and Oxford Specialist Coachbuilders have delivered one Merlin and one Puma escape trainer under a £200,000 UK Ministry of Defence (MOD) contract. The units are containerised for easy transport to, for example, barracks and infantry training areas. In September 2014 Dytecna delivered a trailer mounted Emergency Exit Jettison (EEJ) training rig to the National Police Air Service (NPAS). It can replicate the emergency exits of the three aircraft types currently in the NPAS fleet: Airbus Helicopters EC135s and EC145s and the MD Helicopters MD902. On its delivery, Head of Compliance and Safety for NPAS, Dave Taylor, said: Before safety training like this was carried out using real aircraft meaning issues of damage, loss of availability of the aircraft when being used for training and staff time to operate it. The rig can be moved on a trailer and… it will be going to every NPAS base across England and Wales as a part of a rolling training programme so that staff can carry out mandatory safety training in the physical operation of emergency exits. UPDATE 14 September 2016: Helideck Safety Alerts: Refuelling Hoses and Obstructions UPDATE 24 January 2017: At Mount Pearl in Canada Falck have introduced an S-92A refuelling rig. UPDATE 31 January 2017: A mobile propane-fuelled fire-fighting training rig was recently used at Fort Polk, OK. UPDATE 11 May 2017: Aberdeen Airport has commissioned a new S-92A fire simulator: UPDATE 30 March 2018: CHC has opened a new hoist training facility in Den Helder (video). CHC say: The facility, located within CHC’s Den Helder base, has been designed to resemble a Leonardo AW139 cabin and can also be used to simulate Helicopter Hoist Operations (HHO) conditions from an AW169. The one-day Helicopter Hoist Operations course, with an optional second day on the aircraft, is designed to offer theory and practice to between four to six candidates. Feedback from launch customers, including a major global oil and gas super operator major, has been very positive. UPDATE 10 July 2019: Survivex have now added a retired Airbus AS365 to their training helideck in Aberdeen. UPDATE 15 July 2019: Capital Air Ambulance have introduced a King Air air ambulance cabin simulator. Other Helideck Safety Resources Helideck Safety Alerts: Refuelling Hoses and Obstructions NTSB Recommendations on Offshore Gas Venting Mind the Handrail! – Walk-to-Work Helideck Hazard Passive Fire-Retarding Helideck Designs US BSEE Helideck A-NPR / Bell 430 Tail Strike Troublesome Tiedowns Wrong Deck Landings FOD and an AS350B3 Accident Landing on a Yacht in Bergen Aerossurance regularly assists oil and gas companies and vessel operators review and update their helideck procedures and adverse weather policies, examine helideck structural integrity issues and provide independent assurance of helideck readiness. Aerossurance has extensive helicopter safety, offshore helicopter operations, mergency service, helideck and aviation safety analysis experience. For practical aviation advice you can trust, contact us at: enquiries@aerossurance.com Follow us on LinkedIn and on Twitter @Aerossurance for our latest updates. ...
read moreMetro III: Propulsion System Malfunction + Inappropriate Crew Response
Metro III: Propulsion System Malfunction + Inappropriate Crew Response (PSM+ICR) The Transportation Board of Canada (TSB) recently issued a report into the fatal loss on 10 November 2013 of a Fairchild SA-227 Metro III at Red Lake, Ontario. The aircraft, C-FFVN, was operated by Bearskin Airlines. Both pilots and three of the five passengers were killed in the accident. The accident featured what a 1998 AIA/AECMA study termed a Propulsion System Malfunction + Inappropriate Crew Response (PSM+ICR). The Accident According to the TSB: The landing checklist was completed and, at 1827:06, the crew advised Kenora FSS that they were 5 nautical miles (nm) on final approach for Runway 26 at the Red Lake Airport. At 1828, at approximately 500 feet above ground level (agl) and approximately 1.4 nm from the runway, the crew noted an aircraft malfunction but did not immediately identify the nature of it. Maximum power was applied to one or both engines, and the landing gear was initially selected up and then re-selected down before it could fully retract. The crew declared an emergency with Kenora FSS and unsuccessfully attempted to initiate a climb. Shortly afterwards, the aircraft veered and rolled to the left, descended, and struck trees with its left wing. The aircraft continued through the trees and struck a series of hydro lines that ran parallel to Ontario Highway 125… The initial contact with the trees and hydro lines arrested the aircraft’s speed and descent rate, and attenuated the force of the impact with the edge of the roadway. The aircraft cartwheeled down a slope which further reduced the force of the impact to the occupants in the rear of the aircraft. When the aircraft came to rest, the fuselage was broken in half forward of the overwing emergency exits and the front half of the aircraft was on fire. The 406 MHz emergency locator transmitter did not activate during the accident. The Investigation On examination of the engine, Honeywell, manufacturer of the TPE331-11U-612G engine, concluded that a first-stage turbine blade of the left hand engine failed because of high-cycle fatigue as a result of the following factors: Substandard porosity of the turbine blade material which resulted in inadequate fatigue capability and the creation a favourable location for crack initiation. A minor increase in the mean stress in the blade fir tree region due to blade platform contact. Stator burn-through which resulted in an uneven vibration on the first-stage turbine wheel assembly and heat stress on the turbine blades. The TSB agreed and also found was that: As a result of the blade failure, the left engine continued to operate but experienced a near-total loss of power at approximately 500 feet above ground level, on final approach to Runway 26 at the Red Lake Airport. The crew were unable to identify the nature of the engine malfunction, which prevented them from taking timely and appropriate action to control the aircraft. The nature of the engine malfunction resulted in the left propeller being at a very low blade angle, which, together with the landing configuration of the aircraft, resulted in the aircraft being in an increasingly high drag and asymmetric state. When the aircraft’s speed reduced below minimum control speed (Vmc), the crew lost control at an altitude from which a recovery was not possible. In their analysis the TSB say: The loss of power and drop in N1 speed to 98% would have commanded the left engine propeller governor...
read moreUK CAA to Review IFR Ops Outside of Controlled Airspace
UK CAA to Review IFR Ops Outside of Controlled Airspace The UK Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) has announced it plans an enhanced review of Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) flying outside of controlled airspace. This is in response to a UK Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB) recommendation in their final report on a serious incident involving a chartered executive Sikorsky S-76C++ G-WIWI in East Sussex on3 May 2012: Safety Recommendation 2014-35: It is recommended that the Civil Aviation Authority review the regulations that permit a helicopter engaged in public transport operations to descend below MSA for the purpose of landing, when flying in instrument meteorological conditions but not on a published approach procedure. The review will be “broader and deeper” than originally planned based on feedback from the British Helicopter Association and an unnamed on-going accident investigation (most likely AgustaWestland AW139 G-LBAL, which crashed on a night take off in Norfolk in March 2014 UPDATE 11 Oct 2015: We discuss the AAIB report on that accident here: Fatal Night-time UK AW139 Accident Highlights Business Aviation Safety Lessons). In the S-76C++ serious incident the helicopter descended towards tree tops after a discontinued night approach to a private landing site. The occurrence gained tabloid press attention because Sir Paul McCartney was aboard. In their report AAIB concluded: The descent from above the minimum safe altitude was conducted in reduced visibility and low cloud conditions into an area with limited visual references. The helicopter was therefore brought close to terrain in an environment in which situational awareness could become degraded easily. The decision to execute an orbit around the landing site, in the circumstances pertaining, further increased the chances of situational awareness becoming degraded, whilst the helicopter was at low height above unlit and undulating terrain. In the course of the orbit, the commander became spatially disorientated and the helicopter descended towards the tops of trees. Although the EGPWS issued warnings that the helicopter was approaching contact with the ground, the flight crew were not aware of these warnings. The CAA review will be ‘multi-disciplinary’ and currently only may involve industry. It is due to report in October 2015. Aerossurance recently covered two Night Time HEMS Accidents in the US in March 2013. For expert advice on helicopter safety, operations and accident analysis, contact: enquiries@aerossurance.com Follow us on LinkedIn and on Twitter @Aerossurance for our latest updates. ...
read moreWhat Leaks in Vegas Stays in Vegas – A320 Hydraulic Failure
What Leaks in Vegas Stays in Vegas – A320 Hydraulic Failure The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has recently issued a report on a Airbus A320 hydraulic failure incident. On 17 June 2012, a JetBlue Airways A320-232, N552JB, experienced a loss of two of its three hydraulic systems after departure from Las Vegas McCarran International Airport. This incident is interesting because of the failure modes and effects, automation, crew workload and Service Bulletin assessment issues. The Flight Before departure an inoperative slat flap control system (SFCS) number 2 flap channel was legitimately deferred in accordance with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) approved Minimum Equipment List. The NTSB report that: During landing gear retraction after takeoff, the Green hydraulic system on the airplane lost pressure, and the flight warning computer detected a flight control flaps system fault followed by a reservoir overheat condition for the Yellow hydraulic system 2 minutes later. The Blue hydraulic system was unaffected. However: Normal inhibition of alerts and warnings from the flight warning computer prevented notification of the faults to the flight crew until the airplane was climbing out of 1,500 above ground level. The crew subsequently experienced a period of high workload as they received multiple aural and visual warnings on the flight deck. At this point: The captain, who was the pilot flying, transferred airplane control to the first officer and began to accomplish the abnormal procedures that were displayed on the electronic centralized aircraft monitor. These procedures included turning off the engine-driven pumps for both the Green and Yellow hydraulic systems and the power transfer unit (PTU) which can mechanically exchange power between the Green and Yellow systems. This resulted in: Low pressure in the Yellow hydraulic system (leaving only the Blue hydraulic system with useable pressure) Reversion to the alternate flight control law with reduced flight envelope protections (most critically, stall protection) Autopilot and autothrust disconnection. The NTSB report that: The crew attempted to raise the flaps from position 1 (the takeoff position) to 0, but the flaps remained at position 1 because the loss of the Green hydraulic system and subsequent loss of the remaining flap control computer channel resulted in the flaps being inoperable. The crew entered a holding pattern at 12,000 feet. With two inoperative hydraulic systems and the flap fault, the required landing distance was 11,000 feet. The captain recognized that the Yellow hydraulic system reservoir was no longer overheating and so was able to restore the Yellow system, which reduced the required landing distance to about 8,500 feet. Concerned about the high landing speed and the inability to raise the gear if they did need to go-around the crew remained in a holding pattern to burn fuel and made a safe landing 3 hours 35 minutes after takeoff. The Investigation A leak was found in the Green hydraulic system. The right main landing gear door retraction flexible pipe had failed due to a kink and collapsed sidewall. The NTSB note that: An article in the June 2007 issue of Safety First, Airbus’ safety magazine… described a scenario in which a leak in the Green hydraulic system results in that system’s loss of fluid, which can lead to the loss of the Yellow hydraulic system. As the hydraulic pressure decreases and reaches a 500 psi differential between the Green and Yellow system, the PTU, by design, automatically activates and operates at maximum speed in an effort...
read moreUS HEMS “Delays & Oversight Challenges” – IG Report
US Helicopter Emergency Medical Service (HEMS) “Delays & Oversight Challenges” – Inspector General Report We recently published an article on two March 2015 night-time US HEMS accidents. This month the US Department of Transportation’s Inspector General has released a report entitled: Delays in Meeting Statutory Requirements and Oversight Challenges Reduce FAA’s Opportunities To Enhance HEMS Safety The Office of Inspector General works within the DoT to “promote effectiveness and head off, or stop, waste, fraud and abuse in departmental programs”. They say: The Helicopter Emergency Medical Services (HEMS) industry safely transports over 400,000 patients in the United States each year, frequently in challenging conditions, including night flight, poor weather, low visibility, and landing at unfamiliar accident sites. The industry has grown significantly in the last few decades, with more than 1,500 specialized air medical helicopters used by 75 different companies in 2014. As the industry has grown, so has the number of accidents, and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and Congress continue to seek ways to enhance safety in the HEMS industry. FAA issued a final HEMS rule in February 2014, and Congress passed the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 (FMRA). In light of these efforts, the Ranking Member of the House Aviation Subcommittee requested that we review FAA’s progress in improving air ambulance safety. They go on: While FAA’s recently issued HEMS rule is a good first step toward realizing FMRA goals, continued delays in finalizing the remaining congressional mandates affect FAA’s ability to focus its accident reduction efforts and limit the effectiveness of safety initiatives. Additionally, until FAA updates key oversight policies and obtains meaningful safety data to analyze for trends, it will not be well positioned to effectively oversee a rapidly expanding HEMS industry. In particular: FAA met or partially met three of the six major FMRA safety requirements for HEMS operators but has not completed the remaining three requirements involving safety data collection. Specifically, FAA completed a night vision goggle study, issued a HEMS rule implementing new operational procedures and additional equipment requirements, and initiated a second HEMS rule requiring improved training standards and additional safety equipment for crews and passengers. While FAA completed the requirements for both rules, the first rule was nearly 2 years late, and neither rule has been fully implemented. Therefore, the industry is not yet benefitting from the rules’ provisions. Additionally, FAA did not complete the remaining three requirements for collecting, storing, and reporting HEMS-specific operations data. FAA has issued a notice to the industry that it will require operators to report operational data; however it did not meet the February 2013 congressionally mandated deadline to start this action. Therefore, FAA is currently not in the position to report its data gathering efforts to Congress, though it was required to do so starting in February 2014. Continued delays in meeting statutory deadlines will postpone enhancements needed to improve safety in the HEMS industry. The IG has made five recommendations to the FAA: 1. Develop helicopter-specific accident reduction goals and communicate them in FAA planning documents and business plans. 2. Expand the criteria for dedicated certificate management teams and use of SEP [Surveillance and Evaluation Program] for HEMS operators with 20 to 24 aircraft [note – currently only used for operators with >25]. 3. Conduct a workforce assessment that includes a determination of whether:...
read moreHuman Factors in Engineering – the Next Generation (12 May 2015)
Human Factors in Engineering – the Next Generation Aerossurance is pleased to be one of the sponsors of a Royal Aeronautical Society (RAeS) Human Factors Group: Engineering conference on 12 May 2015 at Cranfield University entitled Human Factors in Engineering – the Next Generation: This one day conference aims to bring together industry professionals and a new generation of engineers and maintenance professionals to promote a common understanding of Human Factors. It will also highlight successful interventions in managing human factors related risks in engineering and maintenance. The conference aims to gain a closer connectivity between the new generation of aerospace professionals and experienced human factors practitioners, as well as a greater shared understanding of the impact of human factors The programme includes presentations from speakers from Cranfield University, the Civil Aviation Authority, the Royal Air Force, EasyJet and Rolls-Royce, plus two workshop sessions, each with a choice of 4 different topics. The event has been priced very reasonably with prices ranging from £100 for non-members to just £35 for students & apprentices (excluding VAT). With just 4 weeks to go book now to avoid missing out. Aerossurance has previously written about a number of engineering HF issues: Professor James Reason’s 12 Principles of Error Management How To Develop Your Organisation’s Safety Culture Fatal $16 Million Maintenance Errors Technical Records – Component Overrun Inadvertent Fire Bottle Discharge During Maintenance FOD Damages 737 Flying Controls For support on maintenance human factors, continuing airworthiness management and safety assurance, contact Aerossurance: enquiries@aerossurance.com Follow us on LinkedIn for our latest...
read morePsychological Screening of Flight Crew
Psychological Screening of Flight Crew The circumstances of the recent loss of Germanwings Airbus A320 D-AIPX in the French Alps on 24 March 2015 has thrown attention on how the mental health of pilots and others in safety critical positions is assessed. Tony Tyler, CEO of the airline trade body International Air Transport Association (IATA), said on Tuesday: The issue of psychological screening, psychological testing, the evaluation of the mental state of not only pilots but others in the safety value chain as it were, will no doubt be something that has to be considered.… There has been a lot of work done on health care requirements for the crew, but I think people will start looking at these issues now with fresh eyes. We need to draw all the knowledge that we currently have and consider what we need to do about it. Aviation Safety Network has recently published a list of commercial airline accidents and serious incidents where pilot suicide (intended or actual) is believed to have been a factor. While the probability of such an event remains low, they do have the potential to kill large numbers of people in the air and/or on the ground. The increase in the number of suspected cases involving airliners in the last three years is therefore particularly concerning. Of the 7,244 fatal aircraft accidents of all types in the United States from 1993 through 2012, 24 (all involving private aircraft) were the result of aircraft-assisted suicide, according to a study published in the journal Aviation, Space and Environmental Medicine in 2014. An earlier 2005 study examined US general aviation accidents between 1983-2003. During that time, 37 pilots either committed or attempted suicide by aircraft with 36 cases resulting in one or more fatality. In that study: 100% of the pilots were male and pretty equally balance between those aged <40 and >40 38% of the pilots had known psychiatric problems 40% of the suicides or attempts were linked to legal troubles 46%, were linked to domestic or social problems 24% of the cases involved alcohol 14% involved illicit drugs 24% involved aircraft taken illicitly. A 1998 study examined UK general aviation accidents between 1970 and 1996: A review was undertaken of 415 general aviation accidents. Three were definite cases of suicide and in another seven it seemed possible that the deceased had taken their own lives. Therefore, in the United Kingdom, suicide definitely accounts for 0.72% of general aviation accidents and possibly for more than 2.4%. The latter accords more closely with the findings from Germany than from the United States. Previous psychiatric or domestic problems and alcohol misuse are features of these cases. Aerobatics before the final impact is another frequent finding. A 1993 study in Germany concluded: Approximately 2-3% of all fatal air accidents may be attributed to suicide, and in many other accidents in aviation there are grounds for inferring that self-destructive or suicidal behaviour was involved. Narcissistic personality traits are of paramount importance for the choice of this suicide method. The lessons from private flying do not automatically read across to commercial aviation but Alpo Vuorio MD PhD, author of the 2014 study and an aviation specialist in occupational medicine at the Mehiläinen Airport Health Centre in Finland is quoted by Time magazine as saying: I really wish that we had some kind of deeper...
read moreAW169 Update
AW169 Update Launched at Farnborough International 2010, the 4.5t AgustaWestland AW169 is progressing towards certification and entry-into-service which AW describes as being “in a few months’ time”. Currently orders for nearly 150 AW169’s have been placed by customers for a range of applications including corporate transport, air ambulance and law enforcement. Flight Test The four AW169 prototypes performed their maiden flights in May 2012, July 2012, November 2012 and January 2013 respectively. Certification had been expected in late 2014. As inevitable with new designs changes have been made during development flying. According to Flight International in October 2013: …modifications to the flight-test aircraft include the addition of a pair of fairings atop the engine cover aft of the main rotor mast. One of them – dubbed the “horse’s collar” – runs along the edge of the cover, while the second, a comb-shaped component, sits immediately aft of the mast. The fairings are designed to prevent tail shake through changing the path of the rotor wash. The exhaust ports have additionally been turned outboard by 10˚ to prevent overheating of a section of the AW169’s composite tail boom. This temperature anomaly manifested itself on the port side of the tail during lateral flights or with crosswinds in hot conditions, says the manufacturer. The third prototype, I-AWCG, was on show at the HAI Heli-Expo in Orlando in March 2015. It had arrived from Alaska where it had been undergoing cold weather trials. I-AWCG was put on show still with extensive flight test instrumentation (FTI). For example the tail boom was heavily strain gauged. Family AW are marketing the AW169, powered by two Pratt & Whitney Canada PW210A 1100shp turboshafts, as the smallest of a ‘family’ of similar designs, alongside the popular AW139 (now certified at 7t and with over 700 in service) and the 8.6t AW189, certified in 2014. AW claim the trio “share the same common cockpit concept and design philosophy”. https://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_detailpage&v=Jmdq7Pvf_CE The AW169 features three 10×8 inch Rockwell Collins displays with touchscreen controls. AW selected Rockwell Collins’ Helisure system in 2013 for a number of their product lines. Production AW169s will be produced both at Vergiate, Italy and at Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. The company’s Yeovil, UK plant is manufacturing a number of critical sub-assemblies for the AW169. Training On 31 March 2015, AgustaWestland announced the first AW169 Flight Training Device (FTD) had been certified. The certification, by a joint European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) and Italian Civil Aviation Authority (ENAC) team, is to FTD Level 2 as per CS-FSTD(H), the EASA certification specification for Helicopter Flight Simulation Training Devices. This AW169 FTD at AW’s Marchetti Training Academy in Sesto Calende, Italy, has been designed and built by AW and operated by Rotorsim, a joint venture between CAE and AW. AW say that: The AW169 FTD features an AgustaWestland developed flight dynamic model, avionics and aircraft software modelling, and a high performance visual system with 150 degree by 60 degree field-of-view 12 ft (3.66 m) dome display system. The FTD will provide effective training for pilots in the use of automated flight data systems and various flight procedures including situational awareness and decision making under normal, abnormal and emergency conditions. This device will allow for credits for IFR Training and for the majority of malfunctions and emergency scenarios. Roles In the offshore role the aircraft has a D-value of 14.7m, which puts it...
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