Metro III Low-energy Rejected Landing and CFIT
Metro III Low-energy Rejected Landing and CFIT The Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) has issued a report on a fatal accident to Fairchild SA227-AC Metro III, C-GFWX, operated by Perimeter Aviation at Sanikiluaq, Nunavut, on the coast of Hudson Bay on 22 December 2012. The route from Winnipeg is normally operated by sister company Keewatin Air, but Perimeter were chartered to help catch-up a backlog due to poor weather. According to the TSB: Following an attempted visual approach to Runway 09, a non-precision non-directional beacon (NDB) Runway 27 approach was conducted. Visual contact with the runway environment was made and a circling for Runway 09 initiated. Visual contact with the Runway 09 environment was lost and a return to the Sanikiluaq NDB was executed. A second NDB Runway 27 approach was conducted with the intent to land on Runway 27. Visual contact with the runway environment was made after passing the missed approach point. Following a steep descent, a rejected landing was initiated at 20 to 50 feet above the runway. The final, tailwind, approach had been unstable. The TSB determined: …that the aircraft came in too high, too steep, and too fast, striking the ground 525 feet past the end of the runway after an unsuccessful attempt to reject the landing. The 2 crew and 6 adult passengers, secured by their seatbelts, suffered injuries ranging from minor to serious. A lap-held infant, not restrained by any device or seatbelt, was fatally injured. At a news conference on release of the report, investigators said inclement weather, poor visibility, fatigue and a departure from established protocols all played a part in the accident. As the company did not normally fly this route there had been problems obtaining approach plates and survival kits (which were to be borrowed from their sister company). These problems and a defective cargo door indication delayed departure. The TSB commented: The captain felt frustrated as a result of the pre-flight preparation issues, and it is evident from analysis of his speech that signs of frustration persisted after takeoff. The captain’s use of 43 expletives in conversation with the first officer (FO) during the non emergency, non stressful, 2-hour period preceding the occurrence, showed a rate of approximately 21.5 swear words per hour. This type of behaviour was seen as being out of character for the captain. They added that circadian rhythm, the long day and a 1.5 hours wake period in his previous nights sleep mean… …acute sleep disruption may have played a role in the captain’s behaviour during the flight by increasing the risk for fatigue and its associated performance decrements. Two recommendations were issued in relation to the carriage of infants. The airline issued a statement on their actions after the accident. TSB Causes and Contributory Factors The lack of required flight documents, such as instrument approach charts [NOTE: they had been inadvertently forgotten], compromised thoroughness and placed pressure on the captain to find a work-around solution during flight planning. It also negatively affected the crew’s situational awareness during the approaches at CYSK (Sanikiluaq). Weather conditions below published landing minima for the approach at the alternate airport CYGW (Kuujjuarapik) and insufficient fuel to make CYGL (La Grande Rivière) eliminated any favourable diversion options. The possibility of a successful landing at CYGW was considered unlikely and put pressure on the crew to land at CYSK (Sanikiluaq). Frustration, fatigue, and an increase in workload and...
read moreCHC FY2015 Results & Restructuring
CHC FY2015 Results & Restructuring On 29 June 2015 CHC Group (NYSE: HELI), the parent company of CHC Helicopter, reported on Fiscal Year 2015 (to end April 2015). The headlines are: Full-year revenue down 3% to $1.7 billion with a net loss of $795 million (compared to $1.78 billion and a net loss of $171 million in FY2014). Q4 revenue of $374 million and a net loss of $119 million (compared to $453 million and a net loss of $26 million in Q4 FY2014). Restructuring charge of $77 million booked in Q4 in response to the oil and gas industry downturn. Adjusted EBITDAR excluding special items down 2%. $320 million of long-term debt retired in FY2015; annualized interest expense reduced about $30 million. New $145 million asset-backed loan facility which it was stated will provide additional financial flexibility. Full year GAAP net loss per share of $11.17; adjusted EPS loss of $1.82. On 30 June 2015 the company staged an investor webcast with new CEO Karl Fessenden and outgoing CFO Joan Hooper and an accompanying presentation. The annual filing to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the 10K, is due later this week. Safety The 5 year rolling accident rate is 0.38 per 100k flying hours, unchanged since last year (see presentation page 4). A footnote states this data includes G-CHCN in 2012 and G-WNSB in 2013. While total flying hours in the period are not disclosed, based on recent SEC filings, CHC has been flying an average of about 160k FH per annum, so 0.38 equates to 3 accidents. There was also a ramp accident to VH-LAG in 2011. CHC has made what would, traditionally, have been a sensible choice and compared their performance to the last IOGP (formerly known as OGP) aviation report (1.8 per 100k FH for all offshore helicopters and 0.8 per 100k FH for twins). Unfortunately, while for many years IOGP produced annual reports on aviation accident rates in the oil and gas sector, the last IOGP report was published in 2009, and covers data up to the end of 2007. So their 5 year average covers the truly dreadful year of 2003 through to 2007 but nothing more recent. It is disappointing that current safety benchmark data is not currently available in the public domain. There is other data that could be used in comparison. For example from the Helicopter Safety Advisory Conference (HSAC) for the Gulf of Mexico, which we have discussed recently, where the accident rate for 2010-2014 was 1.22 per 100k FH and the dreadful UK performance of 1.62 per 100k FH from the Feb 2014 UK CAA CAP1145 report for 2008-2012 (combining flight hours from Annex C Table C6 and the 6 accidents from Appendix 1 to Annex C). However, neither is an ideal comparison baseline for a global helicopter company. CHC was a founder member of industry safety organisation HeliOffshore, along with Babcock, Bristow, ERA and PHI. HeliOffshore held their inaugural conference in May. Operational and Financial Data Aircraft availability (of operational aircraft not undergoing scheduled maintenance) has improved (page 8). In FY2014 it slowly increased from a poor 82% up to 90% and has been pretty consistent at around 94% in FY2015. CHC do not state what proportion of their fleet is operational. In early remarks there was positivity about the Operations Control Centre in Dallas and IT standardisation initiatives but also for a change so that...
read moreHelicopter Ops and Safety – Gulf Of Mexico 2014
Helicopter Ops and Safety – Gulf of Mexico 2014 The Helicopter Safety Advisory Conference (HSAC) has been publishing data on the Gulf of Mexico (‘GOM’) offshore helicopter fleet and its safety since 1995. Helicopter Operations: GOM Fleet Data They report that flying activity has remained “relatively constant” for the last several years, with just under 300k flying hours, using 415 helicopters, operated by 13 companies in 2014 (the big three are Bristow, ERA and PHI, with RLC strong in the single engine sector). However, flying hours, passenger numbers and flights have dropped by 11-12% over the last 5 years. The drop is even more significant since the peak of 2008 (30%, 28% and 40% respectively). The number of single engine helicopters continues a “slow decline”, down 14% since 2010, 26% since 2008 and 37% since 2005. In fact, in 2005, the single engine fleet was 424, more than the total for all types in the current GOM fleet. This perhaps is indicative of the economic decline in the small ageing coastal fields. The number of heavy twins (mainly Sikorsky S-92As and with a few Airbus Helicopters H225s) however has doubled in the last 5 years, trebled in the last 10 and increased 8.6 fold since 1997, as more deepwater exploration and production has occurred (as demonstrated by the last few seconds of the animated map below, a 2008 MMS report and a deepwater field status listing). Between 2013 and 2014 there was also a noticeable 21% drop in the number of medium twins. However flying hours dropped by just 3%, suggesting the GOM operators have retired many of the older aircraft, Sikorsky S-76As in particular, and are now achieving higher utilisation. In fact in 2014 the average utilisation was: Single engine – 590 flying hours (average 20 minute sector length) Light twin – 441 flying hours (average 17 minute sector length) Medium twin – 794 flying hours (average 38 minute sector length) Heavy twin – 805 flying hours (average 36 minute sector length) The medium / heavy twin usage per aircraft is approximately 20% less that the average for the UK North Sea fleet. Helicopter Safety GOM There were just two accidents in 2014 using NTSB data (one fatal, with two fatalities). There were however also two ditchings in 2014, both due to loss of engine power. These were not recorded as accidents by the NTSB (as would have been the case in most other countries). Consequently, according to HSAC: The 2014 accident rate was 0.68 per 100k flying hours (or more correctly 1.35 counting all four occurrences) compared to a 31-year annual average accident rate of 1.74. The 2014 fatal accident rate was 0.34 per 100k flying hours compared to a 31-year annual average accident rate of 0.44. We covered the fatal accident last year in more detail. UPDATE 17 February 2016: Having completed a study of the US HEMS safety record we have also plotted HSAC data (including all ditchings as accidents), first back to the start of the start of the International Helicopter Safety Team (IHST) in 2006: Although there is year on year variability, no long term improvement is evident (and while the 3 year rolling average accident rate has dropped in recent years, the 3 year rolling average fatal accident rate has climbed). If we look over the full span that HSAC published data: Here a rise of accidents (but not fatal accidents) from the mid 1990s is evident, peaking in 2003, before...
read moreB767 Engine Fire – Ignition from Misrouted / Chaffed Cables
B767 Engine Fire – Ignition from Misrouted / Chaffed Cables The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) have reported on an engine fire that occurred on 11 July 2014 when: …Boeing B-767-332, registration number N139DL, operated by Delta Air Lines (DAL)… powered by two General Electric (GE) CF6-80A2 turbofan engines, experienced a left engine (No. 1) fire during climb at about flight level (FL) 190 (19,000 feet) from Los Angeles International Airport (LAX), Los Angles, California. The crew performed the appropriate fire drills and made a successful overweight landing at LAX. The Investigation Examination of the engine revealed that the fire damage was concentrated under the engine heatshield from about the 6:00 o’clock position to the 8:30 o’clock position (aft looking forward) and forward of the accessory gearbox. The fire and thermal distress included melted and consumed electric wire insulation, melted and consumed accessory gearbox fire loop isolators, melted and consumed tubing P-clamps, exposed electric wire conductors, and soot deposits. A fuel leak was detected from the integrated drive generator (IDG) fuel/oil heat exchanger main housing, which is located below the engine heatshield. Cracks were identified where the inner core was brazed to the main housing. Additionally: Removal of the IDG power feeder cables revealed evidence of chaffing and arc burn; this damage was not related to the fire damage that was observed overall as a result of the actual fire. .. the accessory drive lube and scavenge pump pressure (supply) line support bracket…exhibited evidence of melted material consistent with an arc burn. The location of the arc burn on the bracket was in-line with the arc burn observed in the IDG power feeder cables. The NTSB also note: …the IDG power feeder cables (below the engine heatshield) were not tight and straight along their support bracket but exhibited slack and dangling below the support bracket. …there should be no slack in the IDG cables; instead the cables should run straight and tight along its support bracket and gently bend upward towards the cutout hole in the engine heatshield. …the IDG power feeder cables also exhibited a considerable amount of orange tape to bundle all the cables together. This excessive slack in the IDG power feeder cables created the situation where the cables could get pinched/wedged between the inside of the thrust reverse cowl and the accessory drive lube and scavenge pump pressure (supply) line support bracket when the thrust cowl is closed and latched creating the environment for the IDG power feeder cables to chaff against the support bracket. They also observed that: The excessive amount of tape used on the IDG power feeder cables suggests that maintenance personnel may have noticed this chaffing and added extra tape without realizing that the chaffing was caused from the thrust reverser pressing the IDG power feeder cables against the bracket or that the slack was contributing to the chaffing. Conclusions The NTSB determined the Probable Cause was: The combination of fuel leaking from the integrated drive generator (IDG) fuel/oil heat exchanger and the coincident arcing of the IDG power feeder cables that ignited the leaking fuel. Contributing to the ignition of the fuel was the misrouting of the IDG power feeder cables, which resulted in chaffed cables that exposed the electrical wire that contacted a metal bracket, creating an arc. Safety Action Based...
read moreBristow 60
Bristow Celebrates 60 Years On 24 June 2015 Bristow celebrated being 60 years old. That was the anniversary of the incorporation of Bristow Helicopters Limited in 1955 by its founder Alan Bristow. The company has picked out some highlights of the company history: Alan Bristow formed Bristow Helicopters in 1955 after securing a contract to supply helicopter crews for Shell Oil Co. in the Persian Gulf. Bristow, a renowned aviator, led the company until 1985 and stayed involved until his death in 2009 at the age of 85. Bristow was on the scene from the first days of oil production in the North Sea. It was a pioneer on many aircraft types and an early advocate of safety and helicopter pilot training, establishing a major training facility at Redhill, England in 1960. Bristow began operations in Aberdeen, Scotland in 1967. Bristow began operations in Africa began operations in Africa in 1960 by acquiring Fison-Airwork, a crop-spraying company that also supported some of the first oil exploration work in Nigeria. Bristow continues to maintain a strong business presence in Nigeria, operating from six bases that mostly serve the offshore energy industry. Operations in the U.S. can be traced back to the launch of Offshore Logistics in 1969. As it grew over the decades, the company eventually purchased a 49-percent stake in Bristow Aviation Holdings Ltd. in 1996 to expand its operations into the North Sea. Offshore Logistics moved its headquarters to Houston in 2005 and took on the Bristow name in 2006. In 1971, Bristow began civilian search and rescue (SAR) services in the U.K. After a hiatus, it resumed serving the Maritime and Coastguard Agency in 1983 and most recently won a 10-year contract to provide SAR service across the country from 10 bases. Bristow also has SAR operations in Australia, Canada, Norway, Russia and Trinidad. In 2006, under the direction of then-President and CEO William Chiles, the company was rebranded as Bristow Group, creating a single brand under which the entire company would operate. The company also established its Core Values of safety, quality and excellence, integrity and teamwork, and its Code of Business Integrity, both of which remain in force today. Bristow launched its industry-leading Target Zero safety program in 2007. Target Zero is a long-term strategy to develop a culture of safety at all levels of the company and it remains the underpinning of Bristow’s successful safety culture today. Also in 2007, Bristow acquired Florida-based Helicopter Adventures Inc. and renamed it Bristow Academy with the mission to fulfil the company’s need for top-quality pilots as well as train pilots for other applications. The Bristow Group fleet is now over 500 aircraft worldwide. Flight International covered the company’s 25 anniversary with a special feature and interview with ‘the old man’. Perhaps unsurprisingly, as Bristow was known for having robust views, Flight International nervously felt obliged to offer a right to reply to a number of other organisations! Many other stories can be found in Alan Bristow – Helicopter Pioneer, completed just a week before he passed away. Bristow had previously formed his first company, Air Whaling in 1953 (not earlier as suggested in his Daily Telegraph obituary). This explains why, perhaps confusingly, the 50th anniversary was celebrated in 2003! See also Leading from the Front Bristow Helicopters: The First 50 Years. Trivia The company...
read moreScottish Court Orders Release of Sumburgh Helicopter CVFDR
Scottish Court Orders Release of Sumburgh Helicopter CVFDR A Scottish Court has ordered that the UK Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB) release the combined Cockpit Voice and Flight Data Recorder (CVFDR) from a fatal 2013 AS332L2 Super Puma offshore helicopter accident at Sumburgh to prosecutors, who will use the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) to “provide an expert opinion on the performance of the flight crew…during the accident flight”. In his judgement in the Court of Sessions in Edinburgh, Lord Jones stated that this would not form a precedent but that: …there is no doubt that the Lord Advocate’s investigation into the circumstances of the death of each of those who perished in this case is both in the public interest and in the interests of justice. The Accident On 23 August 2013 AS332L2 Super Puma G-WNSB impacted the sea on approach to Sumburgh Airport in the Shetland Islands. The CHC helicopter, chartered by Total, was making a 2 sector flight to Aberdeen from the Borgsten Dolphin drilling rig. The helicopter capsized and four passengers died, the first fatalities in a survivable water impact of a helicopter on the UK Continental Shelf since the Cormorant Alpha accident in 1992. This accident was at least partially responsible for triggered a number of initiatives and reports including: The Joint Operators Review (JOR) review and the formation of HeliOffshore. A CAA Review, which resulted in the CAP1145 report (‘Safety review of offshore public transport helicopter operations in support of the exploitation of oil and gas’). A House of Commons Transport Committee report on offshore helicopter safety. The AAIB have yet to issue their final report but they have issued three Special Bulletins: S6/2013 dated 5 Sept 2013 (basic initial information) S7/2013 dated 18 Oct 2013 (covered an overview of the evidence gathered, including an FDR trace, plus a recommendation on airport sea rescue capability) S1/2014 dated 23 Jan 2014 (contained a recommendation related to passenger briefing on emergency breathing systems) Legal Background Although part of the United Kingdom, Scotland has its own legal system, with distinct legal and organisational differences to the other UK jurisdictions. The Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service (COPFS), headed by the Lord Advocate, are the Scottish prosecution service. In Scotland, the local Procurator Fiscal can direct police investigations, though normally this only occurs in large and complex cases. They are also “responsible for the investigation of the circumstances of a death in Scotland which is sudden, suspicious or unexplained, has occurred in circumstances such as to give rise to serious public concern, or has resulted from an accident while the person who has died was in the course of his or her employment” (in accordance with the Fatal Accidents and Sudden Deaths Inquiry (Scotland) Act 1976). In April 2013 all the regional Scottish police services were merged into one national service, Police Scotland, second only to London’s Metropolitan Police in size in the UK. A fatal accident involving a helicopter operated on charter to Police Scotland is currently under investigation by the AAIB. That aircraft was not fitted with either a CVR or FDR, nor was it required to be by regulation or contract. Both COPFS and Police Scotland report to the Scottish Government. The AAIB investigate aviation accidents to improve aviation and not to apportion blame or liability. A Memorandum of Understanding exists between the AAIB, the Marine Accidents Investigation Branch (MAIB), the COPFS and the Association of Chief Police Officers in Scotland (which ceased to exist...
read moreUAS View of Lomond Offshore Installation
UAS View of Lomond Offshore Installation Stunning ‘drone’* footage of the BG Group Lomond installation in the Central North Sea has been uploaded to YouTube by Gary Hay. Alongside the platform, joined by a ‘bridge’, is the semi-submersible accommodation vessel Borgholm Dolphin, hence the helideck on Lomond is marked as closed due to the infringement of the 210° sector (see CAP437). The weather and the accommodation vessel indicate this was filmed during the TAR season – the annual summer maintenance Turnaround period. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=v3B9lKJ7ATA&feature=player_detailpage The video shows the great potential for remote inspection using unmanned systems. The UK Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) guidance on UAS operation is CAP 722 (Unmanned Aircraft System Operations in UK Airspace – Guidance). The operator of this UAS is not identified in the video, however BG Group has used Sky-Futures previously. Other companies in the offshore inspection sector include Cyber-Hawk, who have just completed their 10,000th commercial flight. We recently discussed a less welcome use of an unmanned system in the US: Firefighters Turn Hose on Drone * In an alphabet soup of acronyms Drones are more correctly referred to as Unmanned Air Systems (UAS) or Remotely Piloted Air Systems (RPAS). Aerossurance can bring experience in unmanned systems back to 1994 to your projects. For aviation advice you can trust, contact us at: enquiries@aerossurance.com Follow us on LinkedIn and on Twitter @Aerossurance for our latest...
read moreB737 Speed Decay, Automation and Distraction
B737 Speed Decay, Automation and Distraction The Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) have reported on a serious incident involving Virgin Australia Boeing 737-800, VH-VUR on 7 November 2014. The aircraft was climbing out of Adelaide and the crew used Vertical Navigation (VNAV) autopilot mode, selecting level change (LVL CHG) mode at FL250. The aircraft continued to climb at 280 KIAS and as designed the autopilot changed from maintaining a fixed indicated airspeed to a fixed Mach Number at FL265. That Mach Number was M0.69 (280 KIAS at FL265). The aircraft continued to climb to FL390 when the captain noticed that the indicated airspeed had decayed to the minimum manoeuvring speed (216 KIAS). The crew initiated an acceleration to M0.77. The aircraft continued for a safe landing at Brisbane without further incident. ATSB report that: The captain recalled that LVL CHG mode may have been selected to manage continued climb through a layer of turbulence. The crew intended to re-select VNAV mode when LVL CHG mode was no longer required, but inadvertently overlooked that selection. They also say: During the operator’s investigation into the incident, the crew commented that a number of distractions may have contributed to the incident. The crew commented that sun glare was particularly problematic – the glare was directly through the windscreen for the duration of the climb. The crew also commented that they may also have been distracted by air traffic control and cabin-related communication requirements, and other air traffic in their vicinity. Additionally, both pilots consumed breakfast during the climb (at separate times), which may have provided a source of distraction. The ATSB issued a report, Dangerous Distractions, in 2005 which concluded: …the findings have shown that distractions have the potential to significantly threaten flight safety across all sections of the industry and during all phases of flight. Clearly, strategies to minimise pilot distraction need to be developed and designed with particular attention to the operations being undertaken. On this incident the ATSB comment: During the operator’s investigation into the incident, the crew commented that a number of distractions may have contributed to the incident. The crew commented that sun glare was particularly problematic – the glare was directly through the windscreen for the duration of the climb. The crew also commented that they may also have been distracted by air traffic control and cabin-related communication requirements, and other air traffic in their vicinity. Additionally, both pilots consumed breakfast during the climb (at separate times), which may have provided a source of distraction.” In 2010, the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) issued a Safety Information Bulletin on the subject of Flight Deck Automation Policy – Mode Awareness and Energy State Management. UPDATE 17 April 2016: C-130J Control Restriction Accident, Jalalabad UPDATE 18 September 2016: AAIB: Human Factors and the Identification of Flight Control Malfunctions UPDATE 8 July 2018: Distracted B1900C Wheels Up Landing in the Bahamas UPDATE 13 January 2019: Human Factors of the Selection of Parking Brake Instead of Speed Brake During a Hectic Approach (ERJ145 at Runway Excursion at Bristol) UPDATE 10 July 2019: Fatal B206L3 Cell Phone Discount Distracted CFIT UPDATE 16 January 2021: UK CAA have issued this infographic on distraction: Aerossurance has extensive air safety, human factors, flight operations and safety investigation experience. For aviation advice you can trust, contact us at: enquiries@aerossurance.com Follow us on LinkedIn and on Twitter @Aerossurance for our latest...
read moreUS Part 5 SMS Progress
US Part 5 Safety Management System Progress (June 2015) US Part 121 air carriers now have less than 3 months to submit their Part 5 Safety Management System (SMS) implementation plans to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). Of course the more proactive US Part 121 operators have already introduced an SMS. After a long rule-making process, the final rule was issued in March 2015 requiring: …each air carrier operating under 14 CFR part 121 to develop and implement a safety management system (SMS) to improve the safety of its aviation-related activities. During rulemaking the FAA clarified that this only related to their Part 121 aviation activities and not those conducted under any other approval (such as Part 145). It should be noted that the FAA has chosen not to require other organisations, in particular Part 135 operators, to implement an SMS (an omission we expect to regularly feature in future air accident reports). The FAA estimated that the rule applies to around 90 operators (30 of whom employ more than 1,500 people). In their Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA), the FAA estimate the cost of implementation will be $135 million (in 2010 $) over 10 years and give estimated benefits (using $8.9mn per life) of between $104 million and $242 million over the same period. They note that: The FAA’s Office of Accident Investigation and Prevention identified 123 accidents involving part 121 air carriers from fiscal year (FY) 2001 through FY 2010 for which identified causal factors could have been mitigated if air carriers had implemented an SMS to identify hazards in their operations and developed methods to control the risk. Part 5 is structured as follows: Subpart A—General 5.1 Applicability. 5.3 General requirements. 5.5 Definitions. Subpart B—Safety Policy 5.21 Safety policy. 5.23 Safety accountability and authority. 5.25 Designation and responsibilities of required safety management personnel. 5.27 Coordination of emergency response planning. Subpart C—Safety Risk Management 5.51 Applicability. 5.53 System analysis and hazard identification. 5.55 Safety risk assessment and control. Subpart D—Safety Assurance 5.71 Safety performance monitoring and measurement. 5.73 Safety performance assessment. 5.75 Continuous improvement. Subpart E—Safety Promotion 5.91 Competencies and training. 5.93 Safety communication. Subpart F—SMS Documentation and Recordkeeping 5.95 SMS documentation. 5.97 SMS records. See also AC120-92B, reissued in January: This advisory circular (AC) provides information for Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) part 121 air carriers that are required to implement Safety Management Systems (SMS) based on 14 CFR part 5. Specifically, this document provides a description of regulatory requirements, guidance, and methods of developing and implementing an SMS. This AC may also be used by other aviation service providers interested in voluntarily developing an SMS based on the requirements in part 5. FAA also chose not to reflect the ICAO Annex 6 standard of Flight Data Analysis Programme (FDAP) aka Flight Data Monitoring (FDM) aka Flight Operations Quality Assurance (FOQA) in the rule. They give the excuse that smaller operators with older (more difficult to modify) aircraft would not be able to afford it. However they provide no economic justification. We do however have past concerns that the FAA’s fondest for fines may undermine that implementation. Prof Sidney Dekker comments on the danger that an SMS can become a “self-referential system”: a system that just exists for itself and is a sponge for data but one from which intelligence never...
read moreFirefighters Turn Hose on Drone
Firefighters Turn Hose on Drone With the continued popularity and sales of camera equipped ‘drones’* it was probably inevitable that this would happen, but one drone operator John Thompson got more than he bargained for while filming a house fire on 4 June 2015 in the US. The firemen turned the hose on the drone… The ‘attack’ happens at about 12 mins. Perhaps surprisingly the drone is able to continue operating. The use of such vehicles in and around emergency sites has caused concern to first responders and air operators previously, particular as police, air ambulance, SAR and fire fighting helicopters could be operating in their vicinity. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5Aj0BJi9Hcg&feature=player_embedded At another fire in March 2015, a news gathering helicopter spotted a drone flying above another news helicopter and filmed the drone and ultimately tracked the operator to their home. In the US Know Before You Fly is an education campaign founded by the Association for Unmanned Vehicle Systems International (AUVSI), the Academy of Model Aeronautics (AMA), and the Small UAV Coalition in partnership with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). Its aim is to educate prospective users about the safe and responsible operation of UAS. The UK Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) has issued this video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=A6uU1LTdI8M&feature=player_embedded * In an alphabet soup of acronyms Drones may be referred to as Unmanned Air Systems (UAS), Remotely Piloted Air Systems (RPAS), Small Unmanned Aircraft (SUMA) or model aircraft depending on their size and local regulations & custom… UPDATE 17 October 2016: EASA Issue Drone Safety Risk Portfolio and Analysis UPDATE 9 January 2017: We also discuss the risk to manned helicopters of drone strikes. With UAS experience going back to the mid 1990s Aerossurance can provide expert advice on aviation safety, UAS and aviation regulation. For practical aviation advice you can trust, contact us at: enquiries@aerossurance.com Follow us on LinkedIn and on Twitter @Aerossurance for our latest updates. ...
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