Helicopter Wirestrike During Powerline Inspection
Helicopter Wirestrike During Powerline Inspection (HU369D, OH-HNX, Norway) On 21 June 2018 OH-HNX, a Hughes 369D (500D) helicopter of Heliwest hit a crossing power line 10 km NW of Grimstad, Norway while laser scanning a powerline. It cut all three conductors but was able to land safely with only minor damage. The Accident Investigation Board Norway (AIBN) say in their safety investigation report this was “very close to a total loss”. History of the Accident Flight Heliwest was contracted by Agder Energi Nett to inspect the condition of the power lines in the company’s 22 kV distribution network and the proximity of surrounding vegetation in the surrounding area. The company provides electricity to 199,000 customers and have 20,600 km of lines. Agder Energi Nett has a framework contract with two helicopter companies (assessed on a 50% cost / 50% other factor basis). The survey was to be conducted photographically and using laser scanning (LIDAR) with a crew of two (a pilot and a systems operator). The mapping equipment on board was calibrated with focus at a 45 m distance which necessitated long duration, high risk, low altitude operations. Heliwest specialises in supplying helicopter for the energy sector under EASA SPO rules and have extensive experience with this type of task. They were familiar with the conditions in Norway and had previously flown for both TrønderEnergi Nett and Hafslund Nett. OH-HNX arrived in Norway on 6 June 2018 and made its first inspection flight from Arendal Airport Gullknapp (ENGK) two days later. According to the AIBN: The evening before the accident occurred [20 June 2019], the crew planned the flight by e.g. drawing the power lines to be inspected the next day on a paper map. Due to a lapse, the crossing line in question with which the helicopter later collided, had not been registered or drawn on the map. The crew had only planned to fly one sortie on 21 June 2019 because they were going to fly back to their main base at Helsinki-Malmi that afternoon in connection with Midsummer’s Eve celebrations that evening. The crew were accommodated in Mandal, and on the morning of 21 June 2018: …they ate breakfast before driving approx. one hour and 20 minutes to Gullknapp, where they arrived at approx. 07:20. They then completed a pre-flight check on the helicopter, prepared the equipment and signed a dedicated checklist for line inspection flights prepared by Heliwest. This checklist contained multiple safety-related items, including the item “Daily risk analysis”. The helicopter took off at 08:45. It was flown by the commander in the left seat. Apart from the helicopter’s instruments, he used an iPad with the application Air Navigation Pro for general navigation. The systems operator was in the right seat. There was a navigation display in front of him to the left. The display used the software Vimap and showed a map with the power lines to be inspected. There was a large screen (main screen) in front and to the right of the systems operator which showed the results from the photography and scanning. When the accident occurred, there was a problem with the Vimap software to the effect that it was not possible to enter digital map information about crossing power lines. They also [therefore] had the paper map the crew had prepared the evening before. On this map they e.g. marked the lines they had documented. They...
read moreFatal B206L3 Cell Phone Discount Distracted CFIT
Fatal B206L3 Cell Phone Discount Distracted CFIT The US National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has reported on a Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT) accident involving Bell 206L3 N213TV, operated by what NTSB call WQRE TV 13 (but was actually KRQE) on 16 September 2017. The helicopter impacted open ranch land, near Ancho, New Mexico. There was a post impact fire. The pilot, the sole occupant, was fatally injured, and the helicopter destroyed. The helicopter had departed from Roswell International Air Center Airport (ROW), New Mexico at c1554 local time for Albuquerque International Sunport (ABQ), New Mexico. The NTSB say in a report released 8 July 2019: The pilot was conducting a return cross-country business flight in a helicopter. The reported winds at the time of the accident were light, and visibility was at least 10 miles. A Garmin Aera 796 GPS unit was found at the accident site. A review of the flight track from the GPS unit, revealed that the helicopter departure and northwest heading towards Albuquerque. The flight track was a straight line and started at a GPS altitude of 3,681 ft. For about the last 5 minutes of the flight track, the helicopter’s GPS altitude varied between 6,200 and 6,456 ft, the last recorded altitude. The ground elevation and surrounding terrain near the accident site varied between 6,000 and 6,400 ft; the elevation at the initial impact point was 6,330 ft. The last recorded data showed the helicopter about 1.5 nm from the accident site. The pilot’s mobile phone (US: cell phone) was recovered in the wreckage. A review of the [cell phone] records revealed that the pilot placed a call at 1607; the call lasted only 3 seconds. About 1612, the pilot repeated the telephone call, which was to a car rental agency, this time the call lasted for 1 minute and 47 seconds. The clerk reported that she remembered the call well, and that she knew the pilot, because he often rented a car from the agency. The reason for the call was [the pilot] wanted to insure he was going to get a special rate for his rental that day. They had a special deal…if he put less than 75 miles on a car. He also called to let her know [where] the car was parked… She added that she could not tell that he was in a helicopter but that he seemed “busy or distracted.” She added that, as they were talking about a future rental and was in “mid-sentence,” when the call was disconnected. NTSB Probable Cause The pilot’s distraction by a cell phone during a low-altitude flight, which resulted in controlled flight into terrain. Similar Occurrence The Irish Accident Investigation Unit (AAIU) reported on a non-fatal accident involving Enstrom 280FX N531TJ on 16 July 2018. Whilst carrying out practice exercises near Carrahane Strand, Co. Kerry, the Pilot, who was the sole occupant of the Enstrom 280FX helicopter, landed briefly for a break. The landing surface was soft, wet, sand. The skids of the helicopter had touched down lightly prior to it rolling over on to its left-hand side. The helicopter was substantially damaged. The Pilot was uninjured. While the helicopter was touching down, the Pilot’s mobile telephone had rung. The phone contained software for navigation and flight planning but the pilot told the AAIU he would never use it...
read moreGripen Main Landing Gear Damaged During Unstabalised Short Field Landing
Gripen Main Landing Gear Damaged During Unstabalised Short Field Landing On 13 June 2018 a a Swedish Air Force Saab JAS 39 Gripen attempted a short-runway landing at Piteå Airfield during a military exercise. The approach was however unstabalised and the aircraft touched down hard and one main landing gear was damaged. The pilot aborted the landing and returned to Luleå/Kallax. The Swedish Accident Investigation Board (the Statens Haverikommission [SHK]) say in their safety investigation report (published in Swedish) that: The hard touch down was caused by a too steep approach angle, tailwind and low speed before setting. The damage…was due to an overload…caused by a too high rate of descend in relation to the aircraft mass in combination with a high nose-up attitude at touch down. The damage components included a burst tyre, the right MLG side-stay locking mechanism, actuator and adjacent structure. Investigators found that at a number of landings on the first day of the exercise were “very close to the runway edge”, by which they appear to mean the runway end. Background Bas 90 (Flygbassystem 90, Air Base System 90) was dispersed operating base concept used by the Swedish Air Force during the Cold War. Bas 90 was developed during the 1970s and 1980s from the earlier Bas 60 concept and involves runways and taxiways that coincided with local roads . The concept influenced the Gripen’s design (along with maintenance simplicity to suit a conscript level of experience, working at these dispersed sites). While the earlier Saab JA37 Viggen had reverse thrust for short field landings, the Gripen featured nose wheel braking and its effectiveness would be further enhanced by foreplane down force. The Airfield Piteå however was a civilian general aviation airfield and marked differently to a BAS90 site. They SHK comment: Piteå Airport [sic]…had not been used previously for short-runway landings. It does not have a military classification and differs in execution from the military classified runways previously practised against, among other things, in length and placement of the threshold markings. The threshold marking at Piteå Airport was located 39.5 metres from the runway edge, which differs significantly from the short-runways previously used [typically 200 metres at a BAS90 site]. A site reconnaissance had been conducted but “without an established method” and so “vital information was not communicated to the squadron’s pilots”. SHK Conclusions The incident was caused by the landing being completed despite the fact that the approach was not stabilized and that it ended with a too steep approach angle. Contributing facts were the absence of clear criteria for abort landing in case the flight was not stabilized at a certain point during the approach. SHK Safety Recommendations The SHK recommended the Armed Forces: Introduce clear criteria for when a short-runway landing should normally be aborted. (RM 2019:01 R1) Develop and establish a method for producing decision-making documentation for the use of short-runways and runways that are not militarily classified, in order to ensure that conditions relevant to the security [safety] on such runways are discovered and that information about them is conveyed to the air operations. (RM 2019:01 R2) Other Safety Resources Military Airprox in Sweden A near mid air collision between a Swedish Gripen and Norwegian F-16 during the 2015 Arctic Fighter Meet. The aircraft were ~ 30m apart in cloud. Swedish Special Forces SPIES and Military SMS Safety lessons from a serious incident during a Swedish Special Forces trial of Special Patrol Insertion and Extraction...
read moreTail Rotor Lightning Strip Damages AW139 Main Rotor
Tail Rotor Lightning Strip Damages AW139 Main Rotor On 7 April 2016 Leonardo Helicopters AW139 N639NA, operated by Chevron USA as a Part 91 ‘business flight’ sustained damage to a Main Rotor Blade (MRB) tip while flying over the Gulf of Mexico. The flight was from South Lafourche (GAO), Louisiana, to an offshore installation in the Gulf of Mexico and back. The aircraft landed safely will no injury to any of the 9 persons on board. The US National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) classified this occurrence as an accident, primarily due to the MRB damage (we detail the legal definition below). They explain in their safety investigation report issued on 25 June 2019: …during the flight the crew felt a slight vibration of the tail rotor. After landing at GAO during a post flight inspection, one of the tail rotor blade (TRB) erosion shield extensions, commonly known as a lightning strip (LS), was missing… ….and only its side tabs remained attached to the blade. The MRB damage was also detected. The Safety Investigation The accident was reported to the NTSB 32 days after it occurred for reasons not detailed. The separated LS was identified as part number (p/n) 3G6410L00152 that was manufactured in electroplated nickel. Chevron reported that as a normal maintenance practice, an LS would be installed as a brand new part or as an “on-condition” item that had been installed at the discretion of the company maintenance personnel after the component was inspected and determined to be in airworthy condition. The LS are unserialised and their lives are not tracked. Chevron reported that the associated tail rotor blade (TRB) was received new from Leonardo on May 22, 2015, without an LS installed. On January 30, 2016, the white TRB was removed and replaced due to wear on the main erosion shield from contact with the LS. The same LS [as on the previous blade] was reinstalled on the replacement white TRB. From February 26, 2016, to April 6, 2016 the helicopter accumulated 129.1 flight hours with the new TRB installed. During that time, 34 daily serviceability checklist inspections were completed and no discrepancies applicable to the LS on the white TRB (or any other TRB) were noted. After the occurrence Chevron completed a fleet check and added a daly 10X magnifying glass inspection of area as containment actions. Once the TRB was returned to Leonardo, they… …performed a failure analysis on the remaining portion of the LS, using a scanning electron microscope (SEM), which revealed the presence of microcavity spots or porosity on the surface of the fractured section. Leonardo concluded that the microcavities were a direct result of the electroplating manufacturing process. In [the image above] the area circled in yellow is the microcavity, the red dashes indicate the crack initiation, and the blue arrows indicate the direction of the fatigue crack propagation. It then propagated further from its origin (circled in red). Finite element modelling (FEM) of an exemplar LS was completed to determine the expected inflight stress values, to include the influence of the centrifugal force and the bending moment due to the deformation of the TRB under beam bending loads. The simulation showed that the maximum stress values in the crack initiation area were considerably lower than the fatigue limit specified for the electroplated nickel material. The FEM model considered the...
read moreWake Turbulence Diamond DA62 Accident in Dubai
Wake Turbulence Diamond DA62 Accident in Dubai (G-MDME of Flight Calibration Services) UPDATED 1 June 2020 with Final Report On 20 June 2019 the the Air Accident Investigation Sector (AAIS) of the UAE General Civil Aviation Authority (GCAA) released their preliminary report into the loss on 16 May 2019 of Diamond DA62 G-MDME of Flight Calibration Services Ltd (FCSL) at Dubai International Airport. The aircraft, with 4 persons on board, was flying approaches to runway 30L as part of a ground lighting calibration linked to runway refurbishment. Dubai has two parallel runways, 12R/30L and 12L/30R. The distance between the runway centerlines is approximately 380 meters. These flights were conducted under visual flight rules (VFR), with air traffic communicating with the DA62 on a separate frequency. The investigators say that: The prevailing meteorological conditions at the time of the Accident were fine with ceiling and visibility ok (CAVOK). Low level winds were recorded at 1,000 ft with a speed of 6 kt from 020 degrees, and a speed of 11 kt from 010 degrees at 1,500 ft. Sunset on 16 May 2019 in Dubai was at 1857 At 1929, the Aircraft entered the final to runway 30L for the tenth approach, following a Thai Airways Airbus A350-900, which was flying the approach to the parallel runway 30R. The Airbus was approximately 3.7 nautical miles (nm) ahead of the DA62. When the DA62 levelled off after turning onto final at an altitude of approximately 1,100 feet (ft) and at an airspeed of approximately 130 knots (kt), it rolled slightly but was recovered after nine seconds. Seven seconds later, the [DA62] abruptly rolled to the left until it became inverted and it then entered a steep dive. The aircraft impacted the ground approximately 3.5 nm from the runway 30L threshold. …the Aircraft impacted the ground at an elevation of approximately 130 ft while travelling at high speed in the direction opposite to the direction of flight, on a heading of approximately 100 degrees. All four persons onboard the Aircraft sustained fatal injuries…[and]…the aircraft was destroyed by impact forces and the subsequent fire. The Safety Investigation The 406 MHz Emergency Locator Transmitter (ELT) installation was damaged in the impact, with the antenna and electrical cables severed from the unit. Consequently, no signals were detected from it. Aircraft of the size of the 7 seat DA62 are not required to be fitted with Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) or Flight Data Recorder (FDR). The investigators state that at a meeting with the airport before the calibration flights commenced, it was agreed that: The DA62 would apply own separation to other arriving aircraft to the parallel runway 30R while operating under VFR, which meant that ATC would not be responsible for providing wake turbulence separation. The investigators reviewed the airport radar data: Observations of previous approaches during the same calibration flight indicated that the DA62 consistently followed preceding traffic on approach to the parallel runway 30R at distances which were below the specified minimum separation, and less than the distances discussed during the pre-departure meeting. The radar monitor recording indicated that there was an air traffic control (ATC) inconsistency in advising the DA62 of the expected occurrence of hazards caused by wake turbulence from traffic on approach to the parallel runway 30R. Based on these observations, the Investigation believes that there is sufficient reason to...
read morePremature A319 Evacuation With Engines Running
Premature A319 Evacuation With Engines Running On 3 August 2018 CSA Czech Airlines Airbus A319-112 OK-PET was about to depart Helsinki-Vantaa Airport with 135 passengers and 5 crew on board. The Finnish Safety Investigation Authority (SIAF, the Onnettomuustutkintakeskus) describe in their investigation report that: As the aircraft was taxiing towards the runway, passengers and cabin attendants detected smoke inside the cabin. The purser reported this to the captain by interphone, who then stopped the aircraft on the taxiway. The situation surprised [the flight crew] because there was no smoke on the flight deck, nor had the aircraft’s systems generated any notifications. The Captain believed the smoke originated from the cargo compartment. A moment later the purser asked the captain for permission to evacuate the aircraft. …the captain tried to act quickly and failed to complete the procedures in the order of the evacuation checklist. For example: …the captain activated the evacuation signal even though the engines were still running. The cabin crew initiated the evacuation. Furthermore: The captain did not make an evacuation announcement and, therefore, not everyone recognised what the evacuation signal meant. Some passengers thought that it was a normal deplaning. During the evacuation some passengers rushed past slower-moving passengers and children were trampled over. Also, the carry-on luggage that some passengers took along slowed down the evacuation. The evacuation was done using emergency slides at four cabin doors. In the beginning of the evacuation the engines were still running, which put the first passengers who deplaned through the front doors in danger of being ingested into a running engine. It was not possible to use the emergency slides at the rear doors while the engines were still running. During the evacuation 26 passengers sustained minor injuries. Their injuries were mild, caused by the congestion in the aisle and from using the emergency slides. Since the passengers were not gathered together, most of them remained in the vicinity of the aircraft. Some of them ran onto the grassy area between the aircraft and RWY 15/33. At this stage, when no-one was controlling them, they could have entered the active runway. The shift supervisor of airport rescue service, upon arrival [after c 8 minutes], took control of the passengers and told them to gather at a safe area. Air navigation service provider ANS Finland stated that “while, in theory, it was possible for the passengers to enter runway 15, it was highly unlikely because of the difficult terrain and the physical distance”. Safety Investigation Investigators found the origin of the smoke was a seized Air Cycle Machine (ACM) bearing. The ACM is part of the aircraft’s air conditioning system. When the unit failed, it generated smoke which was ducted through the air conditioning system into the cabin. The running time on the piece of equipment was 28067 hours, including 14047 starts. The ACM bearing and the subsequent generation of smoke has occurred before in the A320 family fleet. For example: UK AAIB investigation into a smoke event to EasyJet A319-111, G-EZIM at Isle of Man Airport, 31 March 2017. Safety Analysis and Conclusions SIAF developed an AcciMap that summarises their analysis: The SIAF conclusions were: In training the captain issues the command to evacuate and, therefore, evacuation initiated by the cabin crew had not been practiced. Conclusion: Evacuations initiated by the cabin crew are not normally practiced in commercial air...
read moreRegulator Missed the Chance to Intervene Before Fatal Tour Accident say TAIC
Regulator Missed the Chance to Intervene Before Fatal Tour Accident say TAIC On 21 November 2015 Airbus Helicopters AS350BA ZK-HKU, of Fox and Franz Heli Services. was conducting scenic flights out of the operator’s base near Fox Glacier town. Heavy rain had caused the cancellation or postponement of several flights, but after a shorter flight to the lower part of Fox Glacier (also known as Te Moeka o Tuawe) the 28 year old pilot decided that the weather had improved enough to conduct a flight to the head of the Fox Glacier valley. At 0945 the helicopter departed for a 20-minute flight with seven people on board (the pilot, two Australian tourists and 4 from the UK) . The flight was reported overdue at 1015. The wreckage was subsequently located on the glacier just below Chancellor Shelf (which is about 5,600 feet above sea level). There were no survivors. The helicopter was destroyed. The New Zealand Transport Accident Investigation Commission (TAIC) say in their accident report that physical evidence indicated that “the helicopter hit the ice in a relatively level attitude with a very high rate of descent” and “relatively high forward speed”. There were indications that main rotor speed hap drooped. The helicopter was not equipped with the instruments necessary for safe flight in low or no visibility, and the pilot was not trained for instrument flying. Passenger photos and a webcam at the company base showed the flight had departed Fox Glacier town in light rain and overcast conditions, with some low cloud. The flight encountered heavy rain later on. Approaching Chancellor Shelf there was low cloud just above with some cloud spilling down the mountain. The helicopter had landed on Chancellor Shelf and the passengers had got out to walk in the snow. It was snowing at the time and cloud was coming and going in the general area. The lower valley was partly visible in one view, which suggested a visibility greater than the minimum 1,500 m required for visual flight rules. In other directions the flat light allowed little or no distinction between the surface and the cloud. There was no recorded evidence of the helicopter’s flight path after it departed Chancellor Shelf…unusual for tourists on a scenic flight. It suggests that the visual conditions might not have been ideal for photography. The aircraft took off from Chancellor Shelf at an estimated 47 kg over weight, having departed the operator’s base 65 kg overweight. In addition: The tail rotor hydraulic servo was due for overhaul at 13,741 airframe hours. On 24 April 2015 the contracted maintenance organisation had extended the servo replacement to 13,921 hours [i.e. by 160 hours], as allowed by the Civil Aviation Rules and the approved maintenance programme. The helicopter had accrued 13,959 flight hours as at 19 November 2015… [so] the servo had remained in service for 38 hours beyond…the maximum flight hours permitted before overhaul… TAIC note that these facts were unlikely to have been factors in the accident. The overweight operation and component over run might suggest weaknesses in the operator’s organisation however. The Operator’s Organisation Formed in 1986, the Alpine Adventures company owned by JP Scott (also trading as Fox and Franz Heli Services, Tekapo Helicopters and Makarora Helicopters) had “a fleet of 13 helicopters and employed nine full-time pilots, four part-time pilots and 24 ground staff.” At the time of this accident the operator had one of the...
read moreERJ175 NLG Uplock Spring Production Defect
ERJ175 NLG Uplock Spring Production Defect On 4 December 2016 Embraer ERJ170-200LR (ERJ175) N161SY, operated by SkyWest Airlines for United Express, experienced a Nose Landing Gear (NLG) collapse during rollout when landing at the San Antonio (KSAT), Texas. History of the Incident Flight The US National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) report that: …after departure from the George Bush Intercontinental Airport (KIAH), Houston, Texas the crew heard a loud “thud/pop” just aft of the flight deck. Because no warnings or indications were displayed on the flight deck, the crew decided to proceed to [their destination, Monterrey (MMTY) Mexico]. When the landing gear was extended on approach, the crew received warning indications regarding the landing gear position and a “LDG GEAR LEVER DISAGREE” message. The crew declared a missed approach, retracted the landing gear per the quick reference handbook (QRH) procedures, and elected to divert to KSAT. Upon entering US airspace, the crew declared an emergency and performed a flyby of the control tower to verify landing gear position. The tower confirmed that the gear appeared to be in the down position. After touchdown on runway 4, during the landing rollout the nose gear retracted, without command, as the aircraft slowed to a stop. The crew and passengers evacuated the aircraft from the aft cabin doors via the evacuation slides. One minor [evacuation] injury was reported by a passenger…. The airplane sustained minor damage. Safety Investigation The NLG downlock springs were removed and shipped to the NTSB Materials lab…The right NLG downlock spring was received intact. The left NLG downlock spring was received in two separate pieces. The NLG downlock spring separated in the ninth coil from the lower end due to progressive crack formation. No evidence of overstress was observed. During a visual inspection, external surfaces of the downlock spring wire had small openings, which resulted in surface roughness measurements that were above the allowable limit set by Embraer. Cross-sections prepared through multiple downlock spring coils along the length of the spring showed intergranular cracking at the openings. The openings and cracking were associated with white etching microstructure of the wire that was consistent with retained austenite, while the base material of the coils had microstructure consistent with martensite, as specified. The amount of retained austenite in a circumferential surface layer of the downlock spring coils was above the allowable limit specified by Embraer per AMS 5678. Two spring pieces (an end segment and a ring segment) were documented using radiographic images. The computed tomography (CT) slice images were examined, processed, and analyzed by the NTSB to evaluate the components. The results of the CT imaging were inconclusive in locating crack location in the spring segments. The manufacturer provided information to the NTSB regarding additional NLG and MLG downlock springs that failed during operations. The spring from this incident was the only one which resulted in an uncommanded gear retraction on landing. Manufacturing records for the incident spring were reviewed and compared with other events. The manufacturer identified a suspect batch of raw material for the springs, common to multiple events and springs with higher than allowable amounts of retained austenite. The aircraft manufacturer performed multiple quality audits throughout the supply chain for the spring manufacturing process and shared the results with the investigative team. NTSB Probable Cause A failure of the nose landing gear...
read moreTroublesome Tiedowns: The Sequel
Troublesome Tiedowns: The Sequel On 2 May 2018, float-equipped Robinson R22 helicopter N923SM of Helicopter Academy LLC was in cruise at 80 knots and 800 ft about half a mile off Panama City Beach, Florida, when it slowly started losing airspeed. The pilot, the sole occupant, pushed the cyclic control forward until he reached the forward stop, but the airspeed continued to decrease and the helicopter began to lose altitude. Another helicopter was flying in formation during this positioning flight and observed N923SM’s speed drop to from 80 to 30 knots in about 15 seconds. The helicopter ultimately impacted the water tail boom first. The helicopter rolled inverted after being struck by waves almost immediately and the pilot clung to the floats until rescued with minor injuries. Safety Investigation The US National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) say in their safety investigation report: Postaccident examination of the helicopter revealed that the main rotor blades were deformed, the fuselage was substantially damaged, and the tail boom was partially separated. Further, the ropes used to tie down the helicopter’s main rotor blades were found wrapped around the rotor head swashplate and pitch control rods. They explain that: Before the flight, the pilot conducted a preflight inspection of the helicopter, which would have included removing the rotor blade tie-down ropes and associated socks that cover the rotor blade tips and storing them under the cockpit seat. However, because the ropes were found wrapped around the swashplate and pitch control rods, it is likely that the tie-down ropes were not properly removed and secured and, at some point during the flight, became entangled with the swashplate and pitch control rods, which prevented the pilot from being able to effectively control the pitch of the helicopter. There are no written procedures for tie down ropes and storage procedures. Its taught verbally. …the pilot removed the tie down ropes and thought he placed them under the left cockpit seat storage container. He was not distracted and does not remember placing the tie downs anywhere else. The flight was without doors, so any loose items could have departed the aircraft. …the pilot held a commercial pilot certificate with a rating for rotorcraft-helicopter as well as a flight instructor certificate with a rating for rotorcraft-helicopter. The pilot reported 467.7 total hours of flight experience [all in the R22]. NTSB Probable Cause The pilot’s failure to properly remove and secure the tie-down ropes during the preflight inspection, which resulted in the ropes becoming entangled in the rotor head swashplate and pitch control rods during flight and the subsequent loss of pitch control. Safety Resources We have previously discussed Troublesome Tiedowns: On 21 October 2015 Bell 206B N1060C attempted a take-off from Fishing Vessel Majestic Sun off Christmas Island, Kiribati in the Pacific for a fish spotting flight, but a tie down remained attached. On 30 October 2015, N420PH, a Bell 407 of PHI, lost most of one rotor blade in an accident on an offshore installation in the Gulf of Mexico. We have also discussed debris being lost from aircraft: Tool Bag Takes Out Tail Rotor: Fatal AS350B2 Accident, Tweed, ON The adequacy of pre-flight inspections was a factor in these previous occurrences we have discussed: When Habits Kill – Canadian MD500 Accident EC120 Forgotten Walkaround Fuel Exhaustion Causes Emergency Landing Flawed Post-Flight and Pre-Flight Inspections Miss Propeller Damage UPDATE 10 July 2019: Fatal B206L3 Cell Phone Discount Distracted CFIT UPDATE 25 April 2020: Fatal R44 Loss of Control...
read moreWhen Red Bull Gives You More Than Wings…
When Red Bull Gives You More Than Wings… A database of US military aviation accidents and incidents complied by Military Times last year revealed an odd mishap. It resulted in website The War Zone submitting a Freedom of Information Act request. The response detailed how the co-pilot of a US Air Force (USAF) Beechcraft MC-12W Liberty King Air 350 10-006450 had reached for refreshment of a flight out of Hurlburt Field, FL on 5 June 2017 (probably on a training flight for US Special Operations Command [SOCOM]). While still holding the unopened 16oz (454ml) can of Red Bull it… …ruptured spilling fluid onto the center console. While the MCP used his shirt to absorb what he could… He subsequently shut down the mission system power… The crew discussed their options and decided to RTB [return to base]. The cost of this mishap: $113,675 (as 13 avionic Line Replaceable Units [LRUs] had to be replaced), making it a Class C Mishap based on cost. The War Zone comment: The aftermath might have earned them [i.e. the crew] some sort disciplinary action, but Air Force censors redacted the investigating officers’ findings, conclusions, and recommendations. Its odd that these sections were redacted but disciplinary action might well explain that. Its not clear if the USAF did any safety promotion activity after this event or if there was actually any prohibition in carrying and consuming canned drinks on-board. Spilt drinks have caused problems before: Fate is Almost the Hunter: United Airlines Pilot’s Spilt Coffee Helps Trigger False Terrorist Alert UPDATE 12 September 2019: Spilled coffee forces plane to divert over Atlantic (AAIB report) UPDATE 29 January 2020: A350 engine shutdown incidents linked to cockpit drink spills UPDATE 25 April 2020: Airbus develops anti-spill cover to protect A350 centre pedestal (an interim fix) UPDATE 4 September 2020: Airbus redesigns A350 control panel to resist liquid spillage Its not just drinks: We reported in June 2014 on a Royal Air Force (RAF) A330 Voyager ZZ333, that was involved in a loss of control (LOC-I) incident during a flight to Afghanistan in February 2014. The UK Military Aviation Authority (MAA) issued a preliminary report on 17 March 2014 that said investigators: …found evidence to link the movement of the seat to the movement of the side-stick, in the form of a Digital SLR camera obstruction which was in-front of the Captain’s left arm rest and behind the base of the Captain’s side-stick at the time of the event. Analysis of the camera has confirmed that it was being used in the three minutes leading up to the event. Furthermore, forensic analysis of damage to the body of the camera indicates that it experienced a significant compression against the base of the side-stick, consistent with having been jammed between the arm rest and the side-stick unit. The full Service Inquiry (SI) report has since been published. MC-12W Liberty Background The US Air Force (USAF) MC-12W Liberty programme was started in 2008 to field an immediate Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) capability for Iraq and Afghanistan and went from contract to first combat sortie in just 8 months, by modifying the KA350. These KA350s had the Rockwell Collins Pro Line 21 cockpit avionics system. The MC-12W programme was reportedly named ‘Project Liberty’ “as a homage to the World War II-era Liberty Ship programme” of mass produced merchantmen. The mission systems were integrated by L-3 Communications, with 22,000 man hours needed for each conversion. The first combat mission was undertaken in Iraq on 10 June 2009. The $1 billion MC-12W procurement was intended to...
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