Wrong Deck Landings
Wrong Deck Landings Occasionally, offshore helicopters do land on the wrong offshore installation. On 26 August 2014 the media picked up an such an event that occurred a few days earlier involving a Sikorsky S-92A. So is it a big deal? Well, yes and no! There are good reasons to avoid landing on a deck that is not standing by for an arriving aircraft. These range from the lack of fire cover, the unknown pitch, roll and heave on vessels, cranes may be operating adding to the collision risk, radio silence procedures may be on force on the installation (e.g. when explosives charges are being prepared) and so on. Of course if the deck is open and expecting an aircraft, then there is the risk of a second helicopter, which is actually heading for the right deck! While landing on the wrong deck does increase risk, in practice, with many similar installations in close proximity and various human factor challenges, misidentifications do occur a few times every year in the UK sector alone. Each needs an appropriate investigation to identify any systemic improvements, but few in reality actually deserve press headlines. We are not in the position offer further informed comment on last week’s occurrence. We can however share the story of an investigation we conducted overseas after a wrong deck landing: Our oil and gas customer had two mobile jack-up drilling rigs on contract from the same drilling company, at different sites in the same field. Although a few miles apart, they were just a few degrees different in heading from the airport onshore. The rigs were of the same type. They were both painted in the drilling company’s standard colour scheme and had similar multi word names. The equally similar rig callsigns were listed one after the other in the database of the aircraft’s navigation system. Due to the wind direction that day, the approach was also in a direction that meant visibility of the rig and deck markings was dramatically reduced and the helideck crew would have had a limited view of the approach too. Consequently all the ingredients were in place for a simple programming error and confirmation bias… Our customer requested we review the air operator’s investigation when it was complete to ensure there was systemic, preventative learning. They were concerned because the ‘next deck’ was over the median line in a less than friendly neighbouring country, where a wrong deck landing would have been a major diplomatic incident! Perhaps an unintended consequence of this (large) customer taking an interest in the (small) helicopter operator, was that the operator’s investigation was swift and had emphasised ‘who’ made the errors not ‘why’. Consequently, the actions taken consisted of ‘warning letters’ being put in personnel files. Rather than review the operator’s investigation, we therefore had to start from scratch and persuade the operator to focus on WHY (not WHO) and therefore the systemic issues (internal to them and, with our help, externally). To their credit they did and reversed their earlier action, removing the warning letters. For more background, the Health & Safety Executive (HSE) published a research report in 2000. A valuable resource on investigating human error is The Field Guide to Understanding Human Error Paperback by Prof Sidney Dekker, which we highly recommend. UPDATE 27 May 2015: Controls against wrong deck landings (‘Threat 12’) are included in the new Flight...
read moreTaranis
Taranis The UK designed and built Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle (UCAV) demonstrator, the BAE Systems Taranis, first flew on 10 August 2013. Named after the Celtic god of thunder, this £185 million programme, involving BAE Systems, Rolls-Royce, GE Aviation Systems (formerly Smiths), QinetiQ and the Ministry of Defence (MOD). Powered by a modified Rolls-Royce Adour Mk951 turbofan, this Low Observable (LO) platform is the successor to studies that started as part of the Future Offensive Air System (FOAS) study in the mid-late 1990s. BAE Systems have released this interesting promotional video: The first flight was only publically announced six months after it occurred and even then the test site, widely believed to be Woomera, South Australia, was not revealed (UPDATE 11 Nov 2014: until an Australian statement). Woomera was the test site for BAE System’s earlier Mantis UAV demonstrator, which first flew at the Australian desert test range 21 October 2009. Further testing has taken place to demonstrate typical operational scenarios, with the flight test air data boom replaced by stealthy conformal air-data system. UPDATE: More details on the aerodynamic design challenges of Taranis were revealed in August 2014 issue of The Aeronautical Journal, the technical and research journal of the Royal Aeronautical Society (RAeS). More details were briefed at a 2016 RAeS lecture. Aerossurance has experience of UAS/UAV/RPAS design, test, certification and regulatory issues. For aviation advice you can trust, contact us at enquiries@aerossurance.com Follow us on LinkedIn and on Twitter @Aerossurance for our latest updates....
read moreVolcanic Ash…Déjà Vu All Over Again??
On 18 August 2014 the Icelandic Met Office (IMO) upgraded the aviation colour code for the Baroarbunga volcano to ‘Orange’ which means that, ‘The volcano shows heightened or escalating unrest with increased potential of eruption’. UPDATE: On 23 August 2014, the morning after this article was published, it was raised to ‘Red’ (‘Eruption is forecast to be imminent with significant emission of ash into the atmosphere likely’), initially stating that there were signs of a sub-glacial eruption but now stating this is on the basis they cannot rule out an eruption. There remain different views on the current situation but seismic events continue (see live updates). While local earthquakes continue the IMO state there are no signs of ongoing volcanic activity, but many will remember the Eyjafjallajökull (E15) volcano disruption of 2010. The European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) has issued a Safety Information Bulletin. The UK Military Aviation Authority (MAA) has issued a Regulatory Notice. The Icelandic Coast Guard has brought their Bombardier Dash 8 Q300 maritime surveillance aircraft (delivered by Field in 2009) back from an EU deployment in the Mediterranean to provide airborne monitoring. The UK Met Office now have an asset they didn’t have in 2010, the Met Office Civil Contingency Aircraft (MOCCA). A pressurised, piston engined Cessna 421C, MOCCA can fly safely into worse ash conditions than a turbine powered aircraft to better map dispersion of ash or smoke from environmental disasters such as the 2005 Buncefield oil depot fire. The necessary modifications were designed by Cranfield Aerospace, and the aircraft operated by special mission specialists DO Systems. Meanwhile, easyJet has been trialling the Norwegian AVOID sensors system for use on their Airbus aircraft (which included generating their own asj cloud), however this equipment is not likely to be in-service until 2015. See David Learmouth’s comments in his Flight International blog here. UPDATE: In this article he also expands on the roles of the European Aviation Crisis Co-ordination Cell (EACCC) was set up following the 2010 event. As Aerossurance has reported previously, the oil and gas industry has also been working on its resilience planning to cope with aviation disruptions for any reason. Europe is now better prepared and will have better data to make sound judgements compared to 2010. For more background see this Institution of Mechanical Engineers (IMechE) paper and this Royal Aeronautical Society (RAeS) paper. Rolls-Royce and Airbus, among others, presented to the British Air Transport Association (BATA) at a seminar in October 2013: Rolls-Royce presentation – note page 7, an assessment of volcanic risk worldwide Airbus presentation If you don’t have a pet volcanologist on tap(!) and want to explore the issues raised, contact us at enquiries@aerossurance.com Follow us on LinkedIn for our latest...
read moreCommanders: Flying or Monitoring?
Commanders: Flying or Monitoring? At a recent Royal Aeronautical Society Conference, one of the speakers, Colin Milne of BALPA, highlighted that in a number of past UK large helicopter accidents involving Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT) or Loss of Control (LOC) the Commander was the Pilot Flying rather than the Pilot Monitoring. While there are circumstances where this is appropriate, for example when the wind direction suits a helideck approach flown from the Commander’s position, as the conference summary points out: …this was contrary to the practice in the airlines where the more experienced pilot assumed the monitoring role – ready to advise corrections or, in extremis, to take control. This also eliminates any reticence a monitoring pilot may have due to the authority gradient in the cockpit. The five accidents quoted were: G-BEON Sikorsky S-61N, British Airways Helicopters, in the sea near St Mary’s Aerodrome, Isles of Scilly on 16 July 1983, 20 fatalities (AAIB Report) – a routine passenger flight from Penzance to the Isles of Scilly – the only non-oil & gas accident cited G-TIGH Aerospatiale AS332L, Bristow Helicopters, the Shell Cormorant Alpha platform, East Shetland Basin on 14 March 1992, 11 fatalities (AAIB Report) G-BLUN Aerospatiale SA365N, CHC, near the Centrica North Morecambe gas platform, Morecambe Bay on 27 December 2006, 7 fatalities (AAIB Report) – strictly in this accident control was transferred to the Commander moments before the accident G-REDU Eurocopter EC225, Bond Offshore Helicopters, near the BP Eastern Trough Area Project (ETAP) Central Production Facility Platform in the North Sea on 18 February 2009, no fatalities (AAIB Report) G-WNSB Eurocopter AS332L2, CHC, 1.5 nm west of Sumburgh Airport, Shetland Islands on 23 August 2013, 4 fatalities (AAIB Special Bulletins) The first anniversary of the G-WNSB accident is on Saturday 23 August 2014. To mark the anniversary, the UK Oil and Gas Chaplaincy and Step Change in Safety have created a memorial film which includes a short Act of Remembrance. Step Change in Safety’s Les Linklater reflects on that accident here. Milne also discussed the need for: common operating procedures understanding the Type Certificate Holder’s design philosophy sharing lead customer experiences agreeing common procedures incorporating those procedures for all training providers mandating those procedures. These are matters currently being examined as part of the Joint Operators Review (JOR), which was discussed at Oil & Gas UK’s recent Aviation Seminar. Monitoring Background In 2013 the RAeS ran a specific conference on monitoring. One account of that is here and another here. UK CAA have also set up a microsite ‘Making Monitoring Matter’. Airbus presented their thoughts on monitoring to the European Society of Air Safety Investigators (ESASI) in April 2014. UPDATE 13 November 2014: The Flight Safety Foundation (FSF) issued a study A Practical Guide for Improving Flight Path Monitoring, the final report of the Active Pilot Monitoring Working Group. The working group was created to address the issue of aviation incidents with ineffective monitoring as a factor. Meanwhile the CAA have issued a series of Crew Resource Management (CRM) videos. These include one that features a reconstruction of a helicopter incident where a malfunction forced the crew to divert to an unfamiliar airfield. Autopilot mode confusion during the glideslope capture results in loss of control a breakdown in collective situation awareness. UPDATE 18 September 2016: AAIB: Human Factors and the Identification of Flight Control Malfunctions Aerossurance is an Aberdeen based aviation consultancy. For...
read moreEmbraer ERJ 170 FMS Error & Fatigue
Embraer ERJ 170 FMS Error & Fatigue An error programming the Flight Management System (FMS) on a flight to a zinc mine in the Northern Territory has been highlighted by the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB). ATSB reports that Embraer ERJ170 VH-ANO, operated by Airnorth, was flying from Darwin to the Glencore McArthur River Mine, Northern Territory on 10 January 2013. Shortly after passing navigational waypoint SNOOD, 125nm north-west of McArthur River Mine, the aircraft’s flight path started diverging from its planned track. Air traffic control detected this, advised the crew. The aircraft landed safely at Arthur River Mine. ATSB report that: …while updating the aircraft’s flight management system for the descent into McArthur River Mine, the crew unintentionally omitted entering an intended navigational waypoint that was located 25nm north-west of McArthur River Mine. This omission resulted in the aircraft’s autopilot tracking the aircraft direct to the initial approach fix instead of first tracking to the intended waypoint. The crew’s crosschecking processes were not effective in identifying the data input error. ATSB explain that: The omission of the 25nm waypoint when entering data into the Multifunctional Control Display Unit (MCDU) was almost certainly a skill-based error. Omitting a step in a task is one of the most common types of human error (Reason 2002). There was insufficient information to determine if the omission on this occasion was due to a slip (error of execution) or a lapse (error of memory). A range of conditions may have increased the likelihood of the crew not initially detecting the data input error on this occasion. These included: The crew had flown the sector many times before without any similar problems, and probably had a high degree of expectancy that the programming task had been completed successfully. The crew’s focus of attention was probably on the approach being used, which is something that can vary, rather than the 25nm waypoint, which is always the same. Similarly, when the captain conducted the approach briefing, the focus appeared to be on the approach rather than the flight path to the start of the approach. The waypoint check when passing SNOOD was done soon after updating the FMS flight plan. This may have resulted in the crew having a high level of confidence at that time of the correctness of the waypoints. If there had been a longer delay before passing the next waypoint there may have been an increased level of vigilance associated with the waypoint check. Fatigue / Alertness ATSB also found that, the crew had restricted sleep in the previous 24 hours and so were probably experiencing a level of fatigue that is known to have an effect on human performance and alertness. While the operator’s rostering was consistent with regulations, the ATSB say there were limited processes in place to proactively minimise the risk of fatigue, reporting that: Airnorth advised that since the occurrence, the number of E170 flight crew has been augmented, increasing its rostering flexibility. Furthermore, due to schedule changes, the operator no longer used any roster pattern that resulted in planned rosters with flight crews receiving less than 10 hours time off duty overnight. Although not in response to this occurrence, the Civil Aviation Safety Authority has released revised fatigue management and flight and duty time requirements in Civil Aviation Order (CAO) 48.1 Instrument 2013. These new requirements either require operators to...
read moreUK MAA to Integrate EMAR-21 into MRPs
UK MAA to Integrate EMAR-21 into MRPs (Updated: RA 5800 Series Issued August 2016) The UK Military Aviation Authority (MAA) have issued a Regulatory Notice outlining its plans to integrate EMAR-21 (the European Military Airworthiness Requirement Part 21) into the MAA Regulatory Publications (MRP) Design and Modification Engineering (DME) 5000 series. When the MRPs were first issued in 2011, the 5000 series was mostly derived from Defence Standard (DEFSTAN) 05-123. However since 2008 the European Defence Agency (EDA) had been sponsoring the development of a European military requirements broadly equivalent to the civil European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) Part 21 regulations. The UK (both MAA and industry) has been actively engaged in this activity which is seen as having great benefit for future defence procurement projects and should allow design organisations working on both civil and military projects to have more common procedures. EDA is not a rulemaking body like EASA, so the EMARs are not regulations but are simply harmonised requirements. It is the responsibility of each EDA Member State to implement these requirements into their own national military airworthiness regulations. Following preparations that have been underway since April 2013 (involving the MAA, ADS and DE&S Airworthiness Team [DAT]), the MAA have decided to introduce a 5800 series to incorporate EMAR-21, though some existing Regulatory Articles will be retained where they cover material beyond the scope of EMAR-21. An important and welcome development is the planned formal introduction of privileges for design organisations. A programme of briefings is planned, acknowledging that this will be a major change from the DEFSTAN 05-123 based approach. An MAA Notice of Proposed Amendment (NPA) process, in the first quarter of 2015 after the EDA’s Member States have approved the EMAR-21 AMC this autumn. UPDATE 1: The MAA have now issued this NPA on “RA 3100 / 4820 / 4954 / 5101 – Standardization of MAA Approval Policy and Recognition of EASA Part 21 Subpart J Approval”. UPDATE 2: The MAA have also issued a Regulatory Instruction on Invoking Specific Privileges UPDATE 3: MAA/NPA/15/12 was issued on 4 June 2015. As part of the NPA, the MAA has proposed the UK Military Type Certificate Holder (MTCH) shall be the air system Type Airworthiness Authority (TAA) within DE&S. UPDATE 4: There was a further, smaller, second round of of consultation with NPA 16/06 issued on 15 March 2016 on RAs 5212, RA 5219, RA 5401, RA 5502 and RA 5820. UPDATE 5: On 25 August 2016, almost exactly two years after we first discussed this topic online, the MAA issue the following package of Notice of Approved Amendments (NAAs): NAA 16/20: The Design Modification Engineering (DME) RA 5000 Series has undergone a major review, a significant part of which has been to develop the new RA 5800 series based on EMAR 21 Subparts. The RA 5000 Series is henceforth retitled as the Type Airworthiness Engineering (TAE) RA 5000 Series. Note that the RA 5600 and RA 5700 series have not been subject to this review. NAA 16/21: Required to amend RA 5002 and the 5600 and 5700 sub-series to reflect the change in title of the main 5000 series… There are also amendments to cross-references to reflect the re-brigading of the main 5000 series RAs. No changes have been made to the technical content of any of the subject RAs. NAA 16/22: The whole RA has been amended to reflect the improved definition of the responsibilities of the Design Organization (DO) and Co-ordinating Design...
read moreHelicopter Ditching Limitations
Helicopter Ditching Limitations The European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) is proposing introducing Emergency Floatation System ditching limitations into Rotorcraft Flight Manuals (RFMs) and that these are then a limitation for operations. This is in broad alignment with a UK CAA Safety Directive effective 1 September 2014. On 30 May 2014 EASA issued a Proposed Airworthiness Directive (PAD) for public comment. That PAD (14-089) focused on EU helicopter Type Certificate Holders (TCHs). On 4 August 2014 EASA issued a PAD (14-130) to address non-EU TCHs. These will support European rulemaking on offshore helicopter operations (on which EASA published the Comment Response Document on 15 August 2014). EASA note that in accordance with “Paragraph 4.a of the Essential Requirements for air operations, aircraft must be operated within their certification limits”. UPDATE 28 August 2014: Airworthiness Directives have now been issued for EU and non-EU designed helicopters. The ADs introduce a limitation in the RFMs based on the Sea State that the ditching performance (i.e. the water entry and floatation stability) the helicopter has been certified to. Some more recent helicopters do include this information, but the ADs ensure consistent data in all RFMs. EFS are certificated against airworthiness standards (for large helicopters EASA CS-29 and US FAA FAR-29) that require demonstrating helicopter ditching performance under “reasonably probable water conditions”. What is “reasonably probable” of course depends on the operating environment. With the growth of offshore helicopter operations in hostile environments, such as the North Sea, Norwegian Sea and North Atlantic, increasingly what is “reasonably probable” is more severe than assumed when this rule was first drafted. Unfortunately, the advisory material defined “reasonably probable” as “at least sea state 4” and in a number of cases Sea State 4 is all the EFS has been substantiated to. More recent designs have tended to have demonstrated higher performance levels, mindful that the oil and gas market for large helicopters is substantial. EASA have chosen to continue to use the World Meteorological Organisation (WMO) scale of Sea State, although also stating the associated wave height range. According to the WMO: The sea state basically specifies wave height. Wave height depends on local winds but on remote winds also (swell). As far as weather observation is concerned, while sea state reporting remains a legal international practice, with modern in situ observing techniques we try to avoid using sea state or Beaufort scale as we prefer direct readings from appropriate instruments… Swell is created by winds as much as a hundred miles away or more, is relatively unidirectional and results in wavelengths of a hundred meters or more and wave periods of 9 seconds or more. The distance the winds travelled to create swell is known as the fetch. Local winds create more varied waves, with shorter wavelengths and periods. Depending on the local geography and weather conditions, waves can be created by different combinations of local winds and swell. So for example in the Southern North Sea, fetch is limited by the adjacent land masses and waves are predominately driven by local winds. West of Shetland, in the Atlantic, the fetch is great and swell predominates. The WMO Sea State definitions are as follows (Sea State / Description / Wave Height in metres): 0 Calm (glassy) 0 1 Calm (rippled) 0 – 0.1 2 Smooth (wavelets) 0.1 – 0.5 3 Slight 0.5 – 1.25 4 Moderate 1.25 – 2.5 5 Rough 2.5 – 4 6 Very rough 4 – 6 7 High 6...
read moreAlaska B1900C Accident – Contributory ATC Errors
Alaska B1900C Accident – Contributory ATC Errors The US National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) identified contributory ATC errors when they issued their probable cause of a fatal Beechcraft B1900C Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT) accident in instrument meteorological conditions at Aleknagik, Alaska on 8 March 2013. The aircraft, N116AX, was operated by Alaska Central Express (Ace) Air Cargo. The air traffic controller cleared the airplane to fly directly to ‘ZEDAG’ the initial approach fix, stating, “maintain at or above 2,000” feet until established on a published segment of the approach. This was ambiguous and should have stated the aircraft should enter the terminal arrival area at or above 5,400 feet. The flight crewmembers repeated the clearance back to the controller as “maintain 2,000” feet until established, and they began descending. The controller did not notice the pilot’s incorrect readback. Shortly after, when at 2,200 feet, the pilot requested to enter the holding pattern while they checked on runway conditions on another frequency, and the controller cleared them to hold “as published.” The published minimum altitude for the hold in that location was 4,300 feet msl. The air traffic system did generate aural visual minimum safe altitude warnings for the controller but he did not intervene. The aircraft collided with rising terrain at 2,000 feet msl while flying in a wings-level attitude on the outbound leg of the holding pattern. The aircraft had three pieces of navigation equipment that should have provided visual and aural terrain warnings to the flight crew, but these were so damaged on impact their functionality could not be examined. The NTSB probable cause was determined to be: The flight crew’s failure to maintain terrain clearance, which resulted in controlled flight into terrain in instrument meteorological conditions. Contributing to the accident were the flight crew’s failure to correctly read back and interpret clearance altitudes issued by the air traffic controller, their failure to adhere to minimum altitudes depicted on the published instrument approach chart, and their failure to adhere to company checklists. Also contributing to the accident were the air traffic controller’s issuance of an ambiguous clearance to the flight crew, which resulted in the airplane’s premature descent, his failure to address the pilot’s incorrect read back of the assigned clearance altitudes, and his failure to monitor the flight and address the altitude violations and issue terrain-based safety alerts. Ace Air Cargo operate less than a handful of Beech 1900Cs. On 21 January 2010, one of their other Beech 1900Cs, N112AX, crashed in the ocean shortly after takeoff from Sand Point Airport, Alaska with the loss of its two crew. Only part of the wreckage was recovered and the probable cause was: An in-flight loss of control for an undetermined reason, which resulted in an uncontrolled descent. These aircraft were not fitted with cockpit voice recorders (CVRs) of flight data recorders (FDRs). Clint Johnson, the NTSB’s chief investigator in Alaska, says much about the crash that could be known never will be, due to their absence: One of the most frustrating things is that we don’t know what was going on in that cockpit. After the earlier accident the NTSB report that: According to Alaska Central Express management personnel, at the conclusion of the Sand Point accident investigation, the board of directors opted to voluntarily install cockpit image recording systems in all company-owned and operated aircraft; however, the airplane involved...
read moreExtreme Latitudes – Extra CFIT Risk
Extreme Latitudes – Extra CFIT Risk (RNoAF C-130J 5630 in Sweden and Kenn Borek Twin Otter C-GKBC in Antarctic) Two recent accident reports have highlighted a potential higher risk of Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT) at the extreme latitudes of the Arctic & Antarctic regions. That increased risk is not to do with the geography but with database limitations of some Terrain Awareness and Warning Systems (TAWS). The Accidents Lockheed Martin C-13oJ, 5630, operated by the Royal Norwegian Air Force, Mount Kebnekaise, Sweden, 15 March 2012: SHV Accident Report (ASN Database Entry) Viking DHC-6-300 Twin Otter, C-GKBC, operated by Kenn Borek Air, Mount Elizabeth, Antarctica, 23 January 2013: TSB Accident Report (ASN Database Entry) Arctic In the case of the Norwegian military C-130J that crashed in Sweden with the loss of 5 lives, the aircraft had two terrain databases. A commercial Honeywell database is used in ‘normal’ mode. However, ‘tactical’ mode can be selected for low flying. The tactical database uses higher resolution terrain data from the US National Geospatial Intelligence Agency. It however does not include data north of 60˚ N or south of 56˚ S. The Swedish Accident Investigation Authority (SHK) reported that at previous training: …information was given about the fact that they thus did not have coverage north of 60 degrees North, something which evoked a response as they normally flew in this area. This inconvenient limitation may also help to explain why: …the tactical databases in the Norwegian Air Force’s C-130Js have not been updated since the aircraft were delivered. For reasons that aren’t clear, the tactical mode was selected during the accident flight, a relatively high level transit to Sweden for an exercise. Consequently a “TAWS Void” caution was displayed, but these appears to have been mistaken as indicating the fact the aircraft was at the time considerably above the local terrain, rather than being outside database coverage. Unfortunately the route took the aircraft over the highest mountain in Sweden, which they struck just below the summit. The accident investigators comment: SHK cannot however eliminate the possibility that the pilots’ reliance on the automation of the J model’s “glass cockpit” in any way instilled the pilots an unconscious faith in the system’s capability to consistently provide the pilots with visual or audible feedback when e.g., flying above mountainous terrain, irrespective of their knowledge of the system. Similar issues of over-reliance on, over-confidence in, or misunderstanding of automated systems were discussed at a recent RAeS conference on automation in offshore helicopters. SHK go on: Overall, SHK finds that inadequate procedures adopted by the operator and lack of clarity in the system documentation and training have entailed potential short-comings in the crew’s knowledge of the system for ground collision avoidance. This coupled with the inadequacies in the system design may explain the crew’s use of TAWS Tactical despite the limitations north of 60° N. Antarctic In the case of an accident to a Canadian civil aircraft and loss of 3 lives while supporting scientific missions in Antarctica, the aircraft was equipped with a Sandel ST3400 TAWS and two Garmin GNS 430W navigation receivers. The Transport Safety Board (TSB) of Canada notes: The Sandel ST3400 TAWS unit [fitted] was certified to meet the new regulations’ Class B requirements, which include a forward-looking terrain avoidance (FLTA) mode. However: The database available for the ST3400 unit did not cover the area beyond 70°S latitude which meant that...
read moreObituary: Offshore Survival Pioneer Dr Joe Cross OBE
A pioneer in offshore survival, Dr Joe Cross OBE, died in Aberdeenshire on 27 July 2014. Dr Cross started as a naval safety equipment fitter in 1953 before rising to be a commissioned Royal Navy Officer. However it was in 1975 that he became Managing Director of the Robert Gordon’s Institute of Technology (RGIT) Survival Centre in Aberdeen. RGIT (the forerunner of the Robert Gordon University) started the centre with just two people at a crucial moment in the history of the North Sea oil industry. North Sea exploration has been steadily revealling large fields during the early part of the 1970s. These finds were in a harsh and demanding environment. However, the 1973 oil crisis and subsequent oil price increases, coupled with their location in a political stable region, made these fields suddenly practical. The first production was already starting in the UK sector in 1975 and construction of massive offshore installations was underway. Today, the ‘topside’ of installations are usually built and fitted out onshore and lifted into place nearly complete, but in the 1970s a vast workforce of construction workers were needed to assemble and fit out the superstructure on site. Consequently in the mid 1970s the use of helicopters to support the oil and gas industry was accelerating rapidly. As The Scotsman reported in their obituary: The centre developed a major training facility in Aberdeen with the first simulator teaching trainees how to escape from a helicopter under water. There was also a freefall lifeboat training facility in Dundee. In 1980 he founded the IASST, to share best practice in maritime survival training around the world. It was in 1978 that RGIT’s own School of Mechanical and Offshore Engineering designed the pioneering Helicopter Underwater Escape Training (HUET) simulator to give realistic training for Survival Centre. The Survival Centre was eventually spun-off and became part of Petrofac Training in 2004. Cross, who also served on the Defence Services Lifesaving Committee, was made an OBE in 1986, received an honorary MSc from the Council for National Academic Awards in 1991 and was made an honorary Doctor of Technology by Robert Gordon University in 1995, the year before he retired. The IASST (International Association for Safety and Survival Training) commented: Joe was the pioneer in safety training in UK that lead to the founding of IASST as he found many trainers world wide in need for assistance in starting safety training. For all those who knew Joe they will remember his fighting spirit and enthusiastic for safety training and trainers. He was also the centre of the attention with his good humour, jokes and inspiration. Dr Joe Coss OBE: Born: 9 November, 1934, in Liverpool. Died: 27 July, 2014, in Ballater, aged 79. Dr Cross moved home from Inverurie to Ballater just two days before he died and is survived by his wife Desna, children Martin, Greig, Desna and Samantha, 11 grandchildren and three great-grandchildren. Follow us on LinkedIn for our latest...
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