Emergency S-76D Landing Due to Fumes
Emergency Sikorsky S-76D Landing Due to Fumes (Air Ambulance N761AF of Arkansas Children’s Hospital) The US National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has recently (5 Oct 2021) opened the public docket on an accident that occurred to Sikorsky S-76D air ambulance N761AF of Arkansas Children’s Hospital on 15 May 2019. The helicopter received substantial damage after an event that occurred in the cruise flight near Morrilton, Arkansas. None of the 6 occupants were injured. NTSB have since issued their probable cause so we have updated the article below. The Accident Flight The NTSB safety investigation report explains that 43 minutes into the flight the pilot experienced fumes in the cockpit. He turned off the environmental control system and commenced a descent. He recounted that: Within approximately 10 seconds, system visual and aural warnings indicated smoke within the aft baggage compartment so I initiated an emergency descent and landing to the [Morrilton Municipal] KBDQ airport declaring an emergency…[and]…requesting crash/fire/rescue from the town managing KBDQ be dispatch to the uncontrolled airport. I alerted the Arkansas Children’s Hospital communications center of the situation and made a landing and shutdown at KBDQ without further complication. The Safety Investigation The NTSB explain that… …examination of the helicopter by a FAA inspector revealed that the exhaust duct from the No. 2 engine was disconnected and not in its seated position. Exhaust from the No. 2 engine entered the compartment containing the tail rotor drive shaft and resulted in heat damage to drive shaft and surrounding areas. The exhaust ducts are attached using two bolts secured at 110 ft-lbs of pressure. Upon inspection of the No. 1 engine, as well as the operator’s second helicopter, all bolts were found partially disengaged and not tightened to the specified torque value. Lock wire is not required to be applied to these fasteners. The NTSB concluded that: The maintenance history of these components was not determined, but given the available information, it is likely that they were improperly secured, which resulted in their loosening and subsequently allowed the exhaust duct to become unseated. NTSB Probable Cause The improper securing of the exhaust duct bolts, which resulted in the duct becoming unseated and substantial heat damage to the tail rotor drive shaft. While this doesn’t explain why, the NTSB have classified this accident: Aircraft Fasteners – Incorrect service/maintenance Aircraft (general) – Incorrect service/maintenance Personnel issues (general) – Maintenance personnel Another Exhaust Duct Accident – A More Dramatic Outcome (Agusta A109A G-DNHI, 9 October 2006) The UK Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB) report that Agusta A109A G-DNHI was also in the cruise when… …an engine exhaust duct separated from the helicopter and struck the tail rotor assembly, causing the tail rotor gearbox to also separate. After an initial yaw to the right, the pilot regained limited control. However, a further sudden yaw, possibly associated with a partial structural failure of the upper vertical stabiliser, prompted an immediate autorotative descent, which culminated in a successful forced landing. The investigation established that a [Mormon / U-band] clamp attaching an exhaust duct to the left engine had failed, due to stress corrosion cracking, allowing the duct to disconnect from the engine. Two AAIB safety recommendations were raised. Safety Resources The European Safety Promotion Network Rotorcraft (ESPN-R) has a helicopter safety discussion group on LinkedIn. You may also find these Aerossurance articles of interest: Ungreased Japanese AS332L Tail Rotor...
read moreGazelle Caught Out Jumping a Fence
Gazelle Caught Out Jumping a Fence (N505HA) On 5 September 2018, a privately owned Airbus Helicopters (formerly Aérospatiale) SA341G Gazelle N505HA crashed while hovering at Kortrijk-Wevelgem International Airport (KJK/EBKT) near Wevelgem, Belgium. The Accident The Belgian Air Accident Investigation Unit (AAIU) explain in their safety investigation report, issued on 22 June 2021, that: On the day of the accident, the pilot wanted to bring 3 friends for a lunch in Valenciennes (France). The helicopter was parked between two hangars located landside approximately 86 m north of the airfield perimeter, which is delineated by a 1.8 m high fence. The Gazelle main rotor diameter is 10.5 m (D value is 12). After the pre-flight inspection and the boarding of the passengers, the helicopter took off vertically to an altitude of 25 ft AGL, a little higher than the roof of the hangars. At the end of the vertical climb, when the pilot slightly pushed on the cyclic to gently move forwards, he felt twice a yaw movement of the helicopter and, after a quick check on the instrument panel, he noticed that the red ALARM warning light was on. He immediately lowered the collective pitch control and pushed the cyclic control further forwards to gain some forward velocity, before flaring and trying to land the helicopter on the grass area bordering the airport fence. A witness…heard the characteristic sound of an engine surge (a loud bang) before the helicopter moved down. The helicopter landed very hard on the grass strip between the circulation road and the airport fence, breaking the skids upon impact and causing significant belly damage. One blade of the main rotor hit one of the fence poles and sent it 50 m away, on the runway. The helicopter finally came to rest on its left side with the engine still running. The pilot shut down the engine, closing the fuel shut off valve. Despite a significant loss of fuel through the vent lines of the fuel tank, there was no post-crash fire. Three occupants were uninjured and one had only minor injuries. The Belgian AAIU Safety Investigation: The Engine Surge The helicopter was technically in good working condition, airworthy with no technical condition having directly caused the crash. The pilot-owner stated that he had washed the helicopter exterior the day before the crash. However, the engine’s air intake was found to be particularly dirty. To start up the engine, the pilot moved the FFC lever forward, but the lever was not latched in the notch during take-off. The slight friction between the FFC lever and the panel, and the extinguishing of the red ‘ALARM’ warning light, may have influenced the pilot from moving fully forward and latching the lever. The pilot was probably not aware of the crucial importance of latching the lever… The improper setting of the fuel flow control (FFC) lever and the dirty airpath of the engine air intake would have eroded the surge margin of the engine. When transitioning from the hover to forward flight…the engine compressor surged. The light tailwind and the rotor downwash hitting the surrounding buildings and so disturbing the airflow may have been a contributing factor. The AAIU note that: Moving the helicopter from the hover in ground effect (HIGE) to forward flight demands the most power during take-off. To avoid a compressor surge, the Flight Manual therefore instructs to slightly increase...
read moreFrench Cougar Crashed After Entering VRS When Coming into Hover
French ALAT Cougar Crashed After Entering VRS When Coming into Hover On 15 April 2020, a French Army ALAT (Army Light Aviation) Airbus Cougar NG AS332M1e 2336 of the 5th Combat Helicopter Regiment (5e RHC), based in Pau, was destroyed during a hoist training flight northeast of Tarbes. Two occupants died, two were seriously injured and three suffered minor injuries. History of the Flight Investigators of the BEA-Etat (BEA-E) explain in their safety investigation report, issued in French only on 20 September 2021, that the student pilot has just 77 flight hours on Cougar and 592 hours in total. He was a former Puma pilot who started his conversion onto the Cougar in November 2019. The instructor pilot had 2,060 hours on type and 3,251 hours in total. The crew had completed the hoist training and the instructor pilot had commenced an emergency drill exercise involving a simulated failure of two alternators while hovering. The BEA-E explain that the instructor intended to demonstrate that after a double alternator failure the helicopter would need to accelerate forwards as a peculiarity of the Cougar is that N1 is restricted to 85% after a double alternator failure. They note that no double alternator failure had ever occurred in reality on the ALAT Cougar fleet and there was no formalised emergency procedure for this event, yet this emergency exercise was a common one within the ALAT Cougar community. The investigators also note that the student pilot was now manually flying the helicopter, while the autopilot had been coupled for the earlier exercises. Main rotor pitch reduced, the aircraft lost altitude and crashed vertically in a field with a slight nose-up attitude. Just before impact, in ground effect, the rotor became effective again and the helicopter briefly returned to a hover. This occurred with very high torque that resulted in a loss of directional control and during this the helicopter yawed and tipped on to its right hand side. There was a post crash fire, believed to have been due to hydraulic fluid leaking onto hot engine components after the firewall suffered impact damage. As is all too common in helicopter accidents the Emergency Locator Transmitter (ELT) did not signal as the wiring to the antenna was severed. Survivability was adversely affected because: Only one in seven crew members wore a flight suit. Army culture favours the wearing of combat fatigues, including in flight. These fatigues were not flame retardant. Furthermore only the flight crew were seated in crashworthy seats. Injuries to the flight engineer were also consistent with being unstrapped, a necessity to reach some controls. The BEA-E Safety Investigation The helicopter was not equipped with any crash-protected flight recorders (although the ALAT Cougar fleet is expected to have these in incorporated in the future). The embodiment had been delayed because an audio mixer component had become obsolescent. The helicopter was fitted with SIT-ALAT (French Army Light Aviation Terminal Information System) which provides a moving map display and saves GPS data. Unfortunately this unit was destroyed in the fire. A reconstruction of the trajectory was however possible with the assistance of specialists iwiation Gmbh. The flight path was reconstructed based on eyewitness video information (although trees obscured the decent). Just prior to coming into the hover the helicopter was at c 300 ft AGL, at a heading of 310º. The witness video shows that the helicopter is moving at a ground speed of 47 kt. This means the crew...
read moreFuel Starvation During Powerline HESLO
Fuel Starvation During Powerline HESLO (Haverfield Aviation Hughes 369D/500D N9159F) On 25 April 2020 Hughes 369D (aka 500D) N9159F of Haverfield Aviation, was substantially damaged in an accident near Pylesville, Maryland. This occurred while conducting a Part 133 helicopter external sling load operation (HESLO) at a power line work site. The pilot was uninjured. The Accident Flight The US National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) safety investigation report, published on 15 July 2021, explains that the 34-year-old pilot had 12549 hours total flight time, 8736 on type. While… …he was performing human external cargo (HEC) long line operations, he heard on the radio that ground personnel were having difficulty moving a conductor power linenearby. He proceeded to the landing zone, which was about 300 to 400 ft from the area requiring assistance, and dropped off the HEC. Then, while hovering, he picked up a conductor hook via the long line (with assistance from ground personnel) and continued to the area that needed support. This was a change in category of load, to what the FAA defined as a Class C operations (“a jettisonable external load where a portion of the load remains in contact with land or water”). [A]fter the hook was attached to the conductor wire, he began maneuvering for about 10 to 15 seconds to move the wire a short distance laterally, as a crane was supporting the weight of the wire. [W]hile maneuvering, he applied “slight aft and up pressure” to move the conductor wire and there was no lateral banking. He believed the pitch attitude during the maneuvering was about 5° to 10° nose up. After the conductor wire was moved to the desired area, the pilot maneuvered to remove the hook from the wire, but before the hook was free, the helicopter entered a left yaw and the engine began “spooling down.” The pilot…subsequently heard the “engine out alarm” and entered an autorotation by “slamming the collective down.” The…loss of engine power occurred about 150 ft above ground level (agl) and [the pilot] immediately pulled the ‘belly band’ release lever—one of two levers needed to release the long line. A belly band is secondary retention method used by the operator for HEC operations to provide redundancy in the event of an inadvertent release of the cargo hook while carrying a human load. The pilot explained that “removing the belly band constantly throughout the day for human vs non-human line operations could lead to an installation error” and so it “normally remains installed throughout a day’s work, regardless of whether a person is on [the] line”. To release the belly band, the pilot would need to pull an estimated 8 to 12 inches. The handle is located near the pilots left hand, and the pilot would need to remove their left hand from the collective to pull the handle the 8-12 inches. The pilot stated that he did not have sufficient time to pull the second (mechanical release) lever on the cyclic control to release the long line. Significantly: He reported that as part of his recurrent training, he routinely practiced autorotation’s, but had never practiced an autorotation while also having to pull the belly band handle and the main cable emergency release. As the helicopter entered the flare, the pilot pulled the collective up to complete the autorotative landing, but the long line, which remained attached to the helicopter and conductor wire, became taut and caused the helicopter to roll onto its left side. The main...
read moreBrake Failure Causes PA-31 Runway Excursion During Taxi
Brake Failure Causes PA-31 Runway Excursion During Taxi (PR-RCS) On 22 February 2019 privately owned Piper PA-31-325 Navajo PR-RCS suffered a runway excursion when taxiing to the end of the runway at Londrina-14 Bis Airport in Brazil for what was to be its first flight in 7 months. The aircraft suffered substantial damage. The pilot, the sole occupant, as unharmed. The Accident The Brazilian accident investigation agency CENIPA issued their safety investigation report in Portuguese (only) on 21 July 2021. They explain that while some inspections and engine runs had been conducted prior to the return to service, there was no evidence in the maintenance records of any storage checks having been carried out. When the aircraft taxied out for take off… …about 300 meters from the threshold and with the aircraft at reduced speed, braking was started, which occurred normally up to 150 meters before the threshold, when the right brake began to show abnormalities. When trying to stop the aircraft, the right brake failed and the aircraft left the runway, falling into a ravine. CENIPA Safety Investigation In order to identify possible abnormalities in the braking system, some functional tests were carried out. Repeated movements were applied to the pedals of the pilot and co-pilot brakes of the right and left wheels of the main landing gear in order to pressurize the system and then a continuous force was applied. Seconds later, it was observed that the copilot’s right pedal began to give way, remaining a few centimeters in front of the left one , As a result, a visual inspection was carried out on the aircraft’s brake system, in order to detect possible brake fluid leaks, when a leak was found in the set of brakes on the right wheel. Thus, the right brake assembly brake piston assembly, PN 551 719 (Piper Parts Catalog, PA-31-325, Section IV, page 1J8, fig. 41, item 1) was removed [and] it was found that there was a leak in the lower piston, PN 755 838, piston (Piper Parts Catalog, PA-31-325, Section IV, page 1J8, fig. 41, item 3). The set of right brake pistons, brake assembly, PN 551 719, was removed and the pressure line to that set was plugged. Then, the brake activation test was performed. Again, repeated movements were performed on the pilot and co-pilot pedals of the right and left wheels of the main landing gear, followed by a continuous force. However, both the pilot and co-pilot pedals remained in the same position, thus eliminating the possibility of another system leak. Then, the set of right brake pistons, brake assembly, PN 551 719, was disassembled, when it was found that there were signs of wear (grooves) in the gasket PN 755 838, O ring (Piper Parts Catalog, PA-31-325 , Section IV, page 1J8 fig. 41, item 4). Wear was found on the inside of the lower piston housing, PN 753 968, cylinder – brake (Piper Parts Catalog, PA-31-325, Section IV, page 1J8, fig. 41, item 2). There was dirt accumulation on the oil at the bottom of the right brake piston assembly, brake assembly, PN 551 719 (Piper Parts Catalog, PA-31-325, Section IV, page 1J8, fig. 41, item 1). CENIPA Conclusions CENIPA determined that “the wear of the gasket and piston housing, and the accumulation of dirt and oil in the housing and lower piston of...
read moreA HEMS Helicopter Had a Lucky Escape During a NVIS Approach to its Home Base
A HEMS Helicopter Had a Lucky Escape During a NVIS Approach to its Home Base (Norsk Luftambulanse Airbus Helicopters EC135P3 LN-OOZ ) On 6 November 2020 a HEMS Airbus Helicopters EC135P3 (H145) LN-OOZ of Nordic Air Ambulance was damaged when it briefly contacted the ground after Inadvertent Entry into IMC (IIMC) while on approach to Ringsted, Denmark. The helicopter initiated a successful go-around and diverted to Slagelse Hospital. The Serious Incident Flight The Danish Accident Investigation Board (DAIB or Havarikommissionen for Civil Luftfart og Jernbane) promptly issued their safety investigation report on 22 June 2021. They explain that the Norwegian operator had conducted HEMS operations in Norway since 1977 and in Denmark since 2011. The Danish operation comprised of four bases, each with one EC135. Onboard were… …the commander (CDR) sitting in the right hand pilot seat, the HEMS technical crew member (TCM)/paramedic sitting in the left hand pilot seat and the medical doctor (MD) sitting in the right hand cabin seat. Both the CDR and the TCM had completed the operator’s initial and recurrent Night Vision Imaging System (NVIS) training. The CDR had 13,170 of flight experience, 1,728 hours on type and 320 using Night Vision Googles (NVGs). The TCM had flow 1,766 hours on the EC135 and had 290 hours experience with NVGs. They were working a 24-hour shift pattern. They had completed a tasking at Odense Hospital (EKOH) at 18:00. Because they had been on ‘active duty’ for more than the normal limit of 14 hours, they had requested a reserve crew be activated to take over at their home base at Ringsted (EKRS) on their return. Active duty is here defined from time of callout “until minimum one hour after block-on time”. If there were less than two hours between being on-block and the next callout, the entire time is counted as active duty. The EKRS has an Automatic Weather Observation Station (AWOS) which the crew checked online. At that time, the symbol presenting EKRS showed a grey square, which the flight crew interpreted as no weather information was available. The flight crew was not aware that if a grey square was tapped, available data for the location would be presented, alongside with slashed lines representing missing data. In fact, a partial AWOS failure had occurred least two days prior. The only means to identify the failure and initiate a repair was the duty crew. However… Due to fog and reduced visibility, the CDR was aware that the weather conditions at EKRK [Roskilde] were below VFR minima. While en route back to EKRS they were asked… …if they could respond to a medical emergency in the outskirts of Slagelse. In accordance with the operator’s procedures… ….the flight crew had after an internal consultation accepted the extra HEMS mission and the subsequent flight to EKRS. [They] landed at 18:27 hrs at an industrial site in Slagelse, and attended the medical emergency. After about 30 minutes on site the medical emergency was dealt with and the crew prepared to return to EKRS. The flight crew used NVG during the departure from Slagelse, and the helicopter climbed to 1200 ft above mean sea level (amsl) towards EKRS. The flight crew went “NVG Off” (swung their helmet mounted NVG upwards to allow unaided vision)… En route to EKRS, the crew observed sporadic fog and fog patches close to the ground towards the south, while weather conditions were clear towards the north. The TCM went “NVG On” approximately 10 nautical...
read moreSchweizer 269C Destroyed after Missed AD
Schweizer 269C (S300C) Destroyed after Missed AD (N3625Z) On 16 August 2018 a privately operated Schweizer 269C (aka 300C) helicopter, N3625Z, was destroyed in a post-crash fire after an autorotation accident near Kindred, North Dakota. The pilot escaped uninjured. The Accident Flight The US National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) explain in their safety investigation report, published on 24 August 2021, that the pilot (a 72-year-old doctor, with 4,089 of total flight time, 930 on type) had “purchased the helicopter in 2000, and that he passed his FAA private pilot checkride in 2001”. On the day of the accident he: ….departed Hector International Airport (FAR), Fargo, North Dakota, earlier in the morning and flew to McLeod, North Dakota, to pick-up a friend who lived on a nearby farm. [The pilot] completed an uneventful local flight with the passenger before departing…about 1015 CDT by himself for the return flight to FAR. Fifteen minutes into the flight, while cruising at 1,000 ft AGL, he: …heard a loud “snap” followed by a quick yaw of the helicopter. He immediately pushed the cyclic control forward and lowered the collective. He observed a “split needle” indication. The throttle still controlled engine speed; however, the main rotor speed did not respond to his throttle changes. He stated that the engine continued to run normally. He noted that he still had directional control through the antitorque pedals. [The pilot] immediately entered an autorotation and made one revolution while he located a suitable landing area. He maneuvered the helicopter to a nearby wheat field for landing. He estimated that the wheat crop was between 2-3 ft high. In an interview with an FAA Inspector the piloted reportedly stated “he “messed up” the autorotation because he was out of practice and had never done this maneuver to the ground before”. [The pilot] stated that the helicopter landed level on its skids, but it still had forward ground speed that caused the helicopter to briefly pitch nose-up. The helicopter subsequently pitched down before it slowly rolled over onto its right side. [T]he engine continued to run after impact, and he shut down the engine by moving the mixture control to the idle cutoff position. After the accident, he was able to exit the helicopter unaided and without injury. [The pilot] stated that he observed smoke from the right side of the helicopter (possibly near the damaged right fuel tank) and that the helicopter caught on fire after a few minutes. The Safety Investigation The FAA inspector reported that: After examining several transmission parts on scene, I found that the lower coupling drive shaft was missing all of its forward splines. The splines gave the appearance of being smeared off due to severe friction or heat. Inspection of the aircraft’s records revealed that: Records review indicated that [Airworthiness Directive] AD 93-17-13, had been complied with 5 September 2013, approximately 127 hours prior to the accident. was noted that the mechanic had signed off AD 93-17-13 with a simple entry, “Complied with AD. No defects”. This AD requires the disassembly of the lower coupling drive shaft assembly to facilitate visual inspection and lubrication every 300 flying hours. The FAA inspector speculated that: This sign off would indicate the mechanic may not have actually performed the steps required by the AD as the mechanic must reference the “method of compliance”. It is not clear why the FAA dismissed the simpler explanation that...
read moreDynamic Rollover During HESLO at Gusty Mountain Site
Dynamic Rollover During HESLO at Gusty Mountain Site (Helitrans Airbus AS350B3e / H125 LN-OFQ) The Norwegian Safety Investigation Authority (NSIA) has issued its safety investigation report on a helicopter accident that occurred near Skjelbreitjørna, Sandnes, Rogaland, Norway on 6 April 2020. It involved Airbus Helicopters AS350B3e / H125 LN-OFQ of Helitrans, one of two Helitrans AS350s conducting Helicopter External Sling Load Operations (HESLO) to support construction of a 420 kV power transmission line for power utility Statnett. The Accident Flight The NSIA report that the first tasks of the day for the pilot of LN-OFQ was to move a container weighing just under 1,100 kg from the rig area C42 near pylon 161 to pylon 151. A 15 m longline was attached to the cargo hook under the helicopter. A 6 m line extension was attached to the longline, which in turn was attached to a lifting yoke for the 2 m high container. This meant the helicopter had to climb to a height above ground level of approximately 24 m to be able to lift the container off the ground. The pilot (aged 38, with 3,228 total flight experience, 1,758 on type) had… …trained as a helicopter pilot in the USA during the period 2008 to 2010. In the USA, he flew Robinson R22 and R44 and worked as an instructor for a period. He returned to Norway and completed his conversion training to obtain a Norwegian commercial helicopter pilot licence (CPL(H)) in 2011. He started working at Helitrans the same year and was permanently employed from 2013. The pilot took off at 08:39. The helicopter carried 35% fuel (c 190 l / 150 kg). En route to pylon 151, the pilot noted that there was a strong southeasterly wind. After depositing the load and landing alongside the pilot realised that while he had navigated to pylon 151 on the line under construction, the load was actually intended for pylon 151 on an existing 132 kV power transmission line about 10 NM further to the northeast, on the eastern side of the Høgsfjord. While rotors running he… …called the client Dalekovod using his mobile phone to clear up the misunderstanding. The commander said he was in doubt as to whether he could fly the helicopter across the Høgsfjord in the prevailing winds. He then called a colleague in rig area C32, approximately 2 NM east of the helicopter. They discussed the wind conditions. Following an assessment, the commander decided to fly the helicopter over to his colleague in rig area C32 and see how the conditions developed. Positively: The commander has explained to the NSIA that he felt no pressure from the client when he made the decision to move the container. For him, it was only natural to bring it to an easily accessible place and not leave it by pylon 151. After almost 7 minutes on the ground, the pilot entered a low hover with the load to the front and right of the helicopter. He then turned anti-clockwise “ensuring that the line was getting taut in view down below on his right-hand side”. The NSIA note that data from the Appareo Vision 1000 lightweight video and flight data recorder fitted aided the investigation and showed that: …the helicopter started rolling to the left, at the same time as the nose started to pitch up. The commander moved the cyclic stick forward and to the right to counteract this movement, but the movement continued. When the helicopter had rolled 11.6 degrees to the left and with an upward nose angle...
read moreDitching after Blade Strike During HESLO from a Ship
Ditching after Blade Strike During HESLO from a Ship (B206-L1 N1422D Alaska) On 16 July 2020 Bell 206L-1 N1432D (MSN 45741) of Egli Air Haul was damaged in a collision with the mast of the Research Vessel Steadfast and then ditched while conducting a Helicopter External Sling Load Operation (HESLO). The Circumstances of the Accident The accident occurred near Augustine Island, Cook Inlet, Alaska, according to the US National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) safety investigation report published on 20 August 2021. While the NTSB summary is disappointingly brief, the pilot’s account gives excellent detail and context. The 68-year-old pilot, who had a vast 26,995 hours of flying experience (26,769 in command, 14185 in rotorcraft in total, 14060 in command of rotorcraft and 521 on type), described that after arrival onboard the vessel the day before: I conducted a thorough helicopter safety briefing with all the personnel on board the boat. We discussed tail rotor and main rotor precautions and safety, location and operation of emergency equipment, seat belt and door operation and use. We discussed procedures for securing the helicopter to the deck using ratchet straps. We also briefed regarding sling load procedures and safety. The 33 m Steadfast is a converted 1973 Bering Sea crab fishing vessel. The helideck surface is approximately 13 m by 8.5 m. The D-value of a B206L-1 is 12.9 m so this is a sub-1D deck. During the sling load safety briefing, the Boat Engineer asked me how long my helicopter longline was. I told him “50 feet”. He asked me if it was long enough. I asked him how tall the boat mast was. He said he did not know. Nobody else on the boat knew how high it was, either. I looked up at the top of the mast from where I was standing on the helideck, judged that it was less than 50 feet, and said to the group that I thought the 50-foot line would be long enough. We completed the sling load safety briefing, covered aircraft refuelling procedures, and began preparing for the work that lay ahead for all of us. Then after dinner, I flew a couple of personnel loads (all internal loads only) and we did some work on Augustine Island and Mount St. Augustine Volcano. We ended our day without incident. On the next day: I flew one work crew off the boat out to a volcano seismic monitoring site [AC59]…[then]…took off with the longline attached to the helicopter belly hook and flew to the boat. As the boat crew was accomplishing the hovering hookup, I was observing the highest point of the boat mast was below the helicopter, so I felt that the longline would in fact be long enough. I flew the first load off the helideck to AC59, where the ground crew unhooked the load. Then I flew a second crew from the boat to Lagoon Camp (LGCP) on Augustine Island where they would spend the day receiving and handling construction materials I would be sling loading off the boat to them throughout the day. l anticipated it would require around 20 sling loads to move all the lumber and materials coming off the boat. At LGCP I shut down the helicopter. The pilot familiarised himself with the work site, set up a drum-stock refuelling station and had lunch. At around 13:30 I commenced sling load operations to LGCP....
read moreAir Methods AS350B3 Night CFIT in Snow
Air Methods AS350B3 Night CFIT in Snow (N530H) On 26 October 2020 Air Methods Corp (AMC) helicopter air ambulance Airbus Helicopters AS350B3 N530H was destroyed when it suffered a Controlled Flight into Terrain (CFIT) 200 m from Whiskey Creek Airport, near Silver City, New Mexico. The aircraft came to rest just 8 m from a house. The pilot, the sole occupant, miraculously suffered only minor injuries. The US National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) issued their safety investigation report, issued 20 August 2021. The Accident Flight A storm was approaching, and the intent was to relocate the aircraft from the AMC base at Gila Regional Medical Center (6097 ft AMSL) to the near-by Whiskey Creek Airport (6126 ft AMSL) where AMC had a rented hangar. The accident flight departed at 23:34 local time. The pilot, who had flown 4200 hours, 1956 on type, stated that night Marginal Visual Flight Rules (MVFR) conditions prevailed (which implies a ceiling between 1,000-3,000 feet and/or 3 to 5 miles visibility). The pilot described how precipitation turned from rain to snow when approaching the airport. The flight followed Highway 180 and turned south towards the airport. On the turn to finals, there was an increase in precipitation, and a reduction in visibility. The aircraft impacted terrain in a level, or slightly nose-low attitude approximately 200 m NW of the airport, just 3 minutes after take-off. The Emergency Locator Transmitter (ELT) did not activate, a common failure. The nearest weather data was from Grant County Airport (5446 ft AMSL), 8 nm south of Whiskey Creek. Visibility was 7 miles and ceiling 1300 ft AGL (i.e. c 6750 ft AMSL) at the time of the accident. The NTSB Probable Cause The NTSB determined the probable cause to be: The pilot’s failure to maintain sufficient altitude above terrain while operating in reduced visibility due to snow showers. Strictly, this is simply a statement of the circumstances of the accident. Operator’s Recommendation to Repeat an Occurrence In the accident report form, AMC recommend: Avoid VFR flight in conditions below VFR weather minimums. Avoid VFR night flight in areas of no illumination or surface reference in poor visibility. Maintain an instrument cross-check when operating in areas of low illumination or low visibility. When encountering areas of deteriorating weather pilots should divert, abort, land or execute the IIMC recovery procedure in accordance with company guidance. But What About Flight Data Monitoring? There is no mention of any examination of flight data. The FAA changed Part 135 in 2017 so that helicopter air ambulance operators had to comply with a new Flight Data Monitoring (FDM) System requirement, FAR 135.607: After April 23, 2018, no person may operate a helicopter in air ambulance operations unless it is equipped with an approved flight data monitoring system capable of recording flight performance data. FAA AC 135-14B Helicopter Air Ambulance (HAA) Operations explains that: The FDMS should record digital or analog raw data, images, cockpit voice or ambient audio recordings or any combinations thereof which ideally yield at least the following flight information: • Location; • Altitude; • Heading; • Speeds (airspeed and groundspeed); • Pitch, yaw, and roll attitudes and rate of change; • Engine parameters; • Main rotor RPM; • Ambient acoustic data; • Radio ambient audio; and • Any other parameter the operator deems necessary (e.g., high definition video recording looking forward including instrument panel and forward cockpit windshield view, intercommunications system (intercom) between pilot and medical crew, communications with air traffic...
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