Shocking Accident: Two Workers Electrocuted During HESLO
Shocking Accident: Two Workers Electrocuted During HESLO (Helitrans Pyrinees Airbus AS350B2 EC-MVV) On 20 November 2018 Airbus Helicopters AS350B2 EC-MVV Helitrans Pyrinees was engaged in a Helicopter External Sling Load Operation (HESLO) connected with the construction of an electrical power line when the load contacted a live electrical cable, resulting in the electrocution and serious injury of two ground personnel. The Accident Flight The Spanish Comisión de Investigación de Accidentes e Incidentes de Aviación Civil (CIAIAC) explain in their safety investigation report (issued in February 2020) that Endesa Distribucion Electrica, had contracted to Sistem Melesur Energia to upgrade a 25 kV overhead line in the Ribera d’Urgellet municipality in the Pyrenees, replacing the old pylons. In turn, they had chartered the Helitrans Pyrinees helicopter to support the transport of concrete for the tower foundations. The helicopter left the La Seu d’Urgell airport at 09:55 for the material staging point about 11 km away, where a 22 m polyester sling with a hook to transport a concrete bucket to the site of a new pylon, 530 m away. The location was mountainous and adjacent to the existing tower, which was still in service. The towers were just 64 cm apart at the closest point and 125 cm apart at the most distant point. The pilot was highly experienced with a total of 10,650 hours of experience, 9,000 on type. The helicopter lifted the bucket at the staging site and then proceeded to the work site. Once it was past the existing power line, it descended while turning left to reach the unloading point… The helicopter hovered perpendicular to the power line, some 12 m above it, leaving a safety buffer between the sling and the power line to keep the sling from breaching the danger zone of the power line. Once the bucket was close to the ground, two operators on the ground unloaded the concrete by actuating the associated mechanism. The concrete was then poured in the foundation for the new tower. Once the concrete was unloaded, the helicopter climbed again and moved backward to gain enough altitude to clear the existing line, and then proceeded to the staging area. After pouring the initial batch of concrete, which lasted until about 11:05, the activity was stopped for a break and also to refuel the helicopter. At around 11:40, the aircraft took off once more to resume the activity. [In] his statement, the pilot noted that when the work began, the weather conditions were good, and that they worsened over the course of the day. In fact, they had discussed stopping, but since there were buckets full of concrete, and they had never before been left full, they decided to continue. It was drizzling at the time of the accident. After several rotations, all of them to the same concrete unloading point, and with the aircraft in place to unload a new batch, the pilot noticed a spark and a flashover. At the same time, he saw that the two operators who were handling the concrete bucket…fell to the ground. The pilot immediately flew to the staging area where, after placing down the concrete bucket and unhooking the sling, he picked up company personnel who could help the two operators on the ground. The two workers were hospitalised with serious injuries. The sling and bucket were found to be scorched but the helicopter was undamaged. The...
read moreSAR AS365N3 Flying Control Disconnect: BFU Investigation
Search and Rescue (SAR) AS365N3 Flying Control Disconnect (BFU Investigation: Northern HeliCopter D-HNHA) On 1 June 2020 Northern HeliCopter Search and Rescue (SAR) Airbus Helicopters AS365N3 D-HNHA was involved in a serious incident at St. Peter-Ording Airfield in Schleswig-Holstein, Germany after a disconnect in the flight control system occurred. The Serious Incident During take-off the helicopter entered a nose-up attitude, the tail contacted the ground and the helicopter touched-down hard according to the German Federal Bureau of Aircraft Accident Investigation (BFU). In their preliminary investigation report (UPDATE and a final report issued in June 2021) the BFU explain that the four person crew were tasked to conduct a SAR mission on what was their second flight of the day: During a shortened procedure, known as Scramble Take-off, the engines were started and the helicopter taxied to runway 07. Among the items omitted in this shortened procedure are hydraulic control checks. According to…the Pilot in Command (PIC), the co-pilot in the right-hand seat, who was also Pilot Flying (PF) during taxi, noticed that the pitch control’s position was unusually far forward and the helicopter needed an exceptional amount of thrust and still taxied slowly. Since there were no warning lights (limit light, caution or warning) and the rotor disc was in “normal” position, they therefore assumed a grinding wheel brake or being wrong about it [i.e. that this was normal] since they had recently been flying a different helicopter type. Once they had reached runway 07, at about 1547 the PF increased thrust and the helicopter began to hover. It immediately began to pitch up, impacted the ground with the tail and touched down hard with the main landing gear. The crew were uninjured, but the helicopter was ‘”slightly damaged”. Subsequently, the crew determined that forward and backward control inputs via the pitch control did not have any effect on the rotor disc’s position. The engines were shut down while still on the runway. The helicopter was towed back to the operator’s ramp. …the asphalt runway only showed scrub marks of the tail skid. The tail skid, which consisted of composite material, was torn and the metal protection at the end showed scrub marks. There were also isolated scrub marks on the lower tail fin fairing. The Safety Investigation During the subsequent check in the hangar the crew determined that the connection of the left actuator to the swashplate was missing. The missing bolt, two washers, and one crown nut were found on the gear box compartment below. The…actuators are located directly underneath the stationary part of the swashplate. Each working piston of the actuators is fitted with a ball head. A 60 mm x 8 mm threaded bole serves as axis and connection with the swashplate. The bolt is kept in position with a nylon stop crown nut [i.e. castle-headed nyloc nut] and cotter pin. The associated cotter pin was not found. The investigators also noted that the bolt was lubricated. The BFU show a Maintenance Manual illustration that is marked with a torque range and a ‘no lubrication’ symbol. The bolt and the nyloc nut showed traces of wear. The thread on bolt and washer did not show any visible damage. The thread pitches were partially contaminated. When the nyloc nut was twisted on to the bolt it was possible to do so without any effort for the first 3.5 turns. The subsequent 4 turns, until...
read moreAir Ambulance Helicopter Fell From Kathmandu Hospital Helipad (Video)
Air Ambulance Helicopter Fell From Kathmandu Hospital Helipad (Simirik Air Airbus AS350B2 9N-ALR, 30 June 2018) On 30 June 2018 Airbus AS350B2 9N-ALR of Simrik Air, fell from the helipad on top of the 12-storey Grande International Hospital, Kathmandu, Nepal, ending on the hospital roof c3 m below. The helicopter had arrived to collect a patient and medical personnel for a patient transfer flight. The aircraft appears to have lost yaw control while rotors running after landing. The pilot, the sole occupant, received minor injuries. We will update this article when an accident investigation report is published. UPDATE 8 December 2020: NTSB on LA A109S Rooftop Hospital Helipad Landing Accident UPDATE 29 May 2021: Air Ambulance B407 Hospital Helipad Deck Edge Tail Strike During Shallow Approach UPDATE 21 August 2021: Air Methods AS350B3 Night CFIT in Snow UPDATE 23 December 2021: Air Methods AS350B3 Air Ambulance Tucson Tail Strike UPDATE 29 April 2022: US Air Ambulance Helicopter Hospital Heliport Tail Strike UPDATE 21 January 2023: After Landing this HEMS Helicopter Suddenly Started to Slide Towards it’s Hangar… Aerossurance has extensive air safety, flight operations, SAR, HEMS, HESLO, airworthiness, human factors, aviation regulation and safety analysis experience. For practical aviation advice you can trust, contact us at: enquiries@aerossurance.com Follow us on LinkedIn and on Twitter @Aerossurance for our latest...
read moreToo Extreme: Fatal Sky Combat Ace EA300 Aerobatic Accident
Too Extreme: Fatal Sky Combat Ace EA300 Aerobatic Accident (N414MT) On 21 October 2017 Extra EA 300/L N414MT of California Extreme Adventures, doing business as Sky Combat Ace (SCA), impacted the ground near El Capitan Reservoir, near Four Corners, California. The pilot and passenger were fatal injured, the aircraft destroyed and a brush fire triggered. The aircraft had departed Gillespie Field (SEE), El Cajon, San Diego, California in visual meteorological conditions 15 minutes earlier. TV news video Sky Combat Ace The US National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) explain in their safety investigation report (issued 13 July 2020) that this flight was classified as a Part 91 instructional flight but: SCA’s website described itself as an “extreme aviation attraction,” providing a series of aviation-related experiences, which it described as including aerobatics, air combat, and flight training. The accident flight was a 25-minute “Top Gun” experience… SCA provided flights to its passengers by operating as a flight school under the auspices of 14 CFR Part 61 and using flight instructors to provide training. Review of the SCA presence on multiple social media platforms revealed that it both presented itself and was categorized in the “tour” category. SCA are certainly popular looking at their TripAdvisor reviews. One pilot, who was initially the director of training and then director of flight operations, stated that, of about 2,000 customers he had flown for SCA, about 12 to 15 were pilots looking to receive targeted flight training for either upset recovery or a tailwheel endorsements. The other pilot stated that of the 500 customers he had flown, about 6 were pilots seeking tailwheel endorsement training and the others were customers seeking “experience” missions. On arrival customers who had booked a flight experience were required to sign a “Participant Agreement Release and Assumption of Risk” waiver and take part in a briefing session. It’s not clear if they were done in this order. The Accident Flight The pilot, who had been hired by SCA in May 2017, had flown around 4290 flying hours in total, 113 in the EA300. The day before he had flown as a commercial passenger to SCA’s Henderson (HND), Nevada base. He slept on the couch in at SCA’s the crew accommodation (all the beds were taken). The NTSB say that: About 1000 on the morning of the accident, the pilot flew a customer on a group combat mission from HND in an Extra 300 airplane. He then flew back to the SEE facility in the accident airplane with the company’s director of marketing. The accident flight was his third flight of the day. The passenger…had had flown with SCA on a similar flight in December 2015 out of SCA’s HND location. NTSB note that: The airplane had g limitations in the aerobatic category of +/-10 g. This limit was only allowed with one person onboard, at a MTOW of 1,808 lbs. In a two-person configuration, the limits were +/-8 g at 1,918 lbs MTOW and +/-6 g at 2,095 lbs MTOW. …the airplane’s weight on the accident flight would have been about 2,061 lbs. According to the president of SCA, g-forces are limited to 6 g with passengers onboard, and airspeed is limited to 180 knots. However, (emphasis added): The “Standards and Syllabus” stated that, in order to minimize wear and tear on the aircraft, all aerobatic flights would “strive” to remain at or...
read moreNTSB Investigation into AW139 Bahamas Night Take Off Accident
NTSB Investigation into AW139 Bahamas Night Take Off Accident (Chris Cline’s Challenger Management AW139 N32CC near Big Grand Cay) On 4 July 2019 at about 0153 Local Time, Leonardo Helicopters AW139 N32CC of Challenger Management LLC, was destroyed when it impacted the Atlantic Ocean, shortly after take off on a Part 91 ‘personal flight’, near Big Grand Cay, Abaco, Bahamas. The 7 persons on board, including US coal billionaire Chris Cline, were killed. Cline took coal mining firm Foresight Energy public in 2014, and sold a controlling stake in 2015 for $1.4 billion. Safety Investigation The investigation was initially under the jurisdiction of the Air Accident Investigation Department (AAID) of the Bahamas. AAID requested delegation of the accident investigation to the US National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), which the NTSB accepted on 9 July 2019. The US NTSB has to date only issued a preliminary report but on 19 August 2020 opened their online public docket. This contains 571 pages of factual evidence (a mix of raw data and working group factual reports), with official no analysis. The NTSB’s so called ‘Probable Cause’ is yet to be determined. We have reviewed and summarised the key public docket documents below. History of the Flight The NTSB explain that: Dark night visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time and an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan was filed for a flight from Walker’s Cay Airport (MYAW), Walker’s Cay, Bahamas, to Fort Lauderdale/Hollywood International Airport (FLL), Fort Lauderdale, Florida. The flight however departed from a private, unapproved helipad on Big Grand Clay in ‘black-hole‘ conditions. These conditions “typically occur over water or over dark, featureless terrain where the only visual stimuli are lights located on and/or near the airport or landing zone”. The island had been owned by Cline since mid-2015 and currently valued at US$29 million. The Island Manager stated to NTSB that Cline had intended to develop the site into a resort “to target big Fortune 500 companies to bring their Board of Directors or employees” and had initiated a construction programme. Cline regularly visited via the AW139, his C208 floatplane or by vessel (the oddly named ‘Dirty Mines‘). Cline, with family and friend had been on the island for a break to celebrate the US public holiday, his daughter and her friend’s college graduation and Cline’s 61st birthday (on 5 July). Sometime very late on 3 July Cline’s daughter and a friend had fallen ill. When asked about their illness the manager replied “he was not sure of the reason, but they were groggy and unresponsive, but their heart was still beating [sic].” The NTSB’s line of questioning indicate they suspect the cause of their illness but it is not otherwise discussed. Cline requested that the helicopter fly in from Fort Lauderdale to convey them to hospital. There appears to have been no liaison with Bahamas ATC for the flight and no liaison with any medical professional is recorded in the public docket before the flight was arranged, although a doctor is mentioned in the cockpit voice recording of the rotors running turnaround. The need for an ambulance to meet the aircraft triggered a crew discussion too about needing to arrange for customs clearance, which appears not to have been considered previously. The NTSB analysis will no doubt examine the flight in relation to local regulations too. The aircraft arrived and was loaded rotors running c 0130-0145. ...
read moreFatal Mi-8 Loss of Control – Inflight and Water Impact off Svalbard
Fatal Mi-8AMT Loss of Control – Inflight and Water Impact off Svalbard (RA-22312 of Convers Avia) On 26 October 2017 Mil Mi-8AMT RA-22312 operated by Convers Avia JSC for the Trust Arktikugol coal mining company, impacted the water of Isfjorden, Svalbard. All 8 persons onboard died in the 2°C Arctic waters in an accident that highlights why survivability measures are crucial. From 1961 more than 17000 Mi-8s have been produced making the 13 t helicopter the world’s most produced helicopter type. According to the Svalbard Treaty of 1920, Norway has sovereignty over the Svalbard Archipelago. Signatories of the treaty have the right to exploit the natural resources on the archipelago. The Russian company Trust Arktikugol started mining activities in Barentsburg in 1932. Convers Avia, formed in 1995, is based inTver, NW of Moscow and has a fleet of around 30 helicopters. They received permission in 2011 from the Civil Aviation Authority Norway (CAA-N) to provide helicopter services on behalf of Trust Arktikugol, replacing GazAvia (formerly Spark +), who had suffered an accident in 2008. While Norway is an EASA Member State, EASA rules are not applied to Svalbard, which is outside the EU/EFTA European Economic Area (EEA). The Accident Flight The Accident Investigation Board Norway (AIBN) explain in their safety investigation report that the First Officer was the Pilot Flying and RA-22312 took off from Pyramiden at 14:43:19. They had flown the reverse routing 3.5 hours earlier. The landing site at their destination, Heerodden (also known as Kapp Heer), was built during the 1970s, it is in Class G airspace, approximately 25 m above sea level and 100-150 m from shoreline. It is equipped with a Non-Directional Beacon (NDB), which was operational on the day of the accident and an automatic meteorological station measuring temperature, relative humidity, pressure, wind speed and direction. The day and night minimas for takeoffs and landings were: 450 m visibility vertically, and 5000 m visibility horizontally. Convers Avia helicopter operations on Svalbard are based on visual flight rules (VFR). Both pilots on the RA-22312 were approved for VFR flights only. The helicopter was not equipped with Ground Proximity Warning System (GPWS). According to Convers Avia was this the reason for the limitation on instrument flying given by the Russian Aviation Authority. At 14:46:58 the Heerodden tower officer contacted RA-22312 and informed about the weather conditions at the heliport, where there were snow showers, horizontal visibility 1000 meters and vertical visibility 100 to 120 meters. RA-22312 confirmed this information. At 14:50:01 the Commander requested activation of the “anti-icing system”, whereupon the flight engineer informed that the “anti-icing system” was in “auto mode”. The Commander then requested that all “anti-icing” should be switched on. At 14:54:29 they reported to ATC passing reporting point Bravo and would report next at Alpha. 14:57:10 RA-22312 started the approach to Heerodden and initiated descent from an altitude of approximately 235 meters. At 14:58:59, from an altitude of 145 meters, and with a speed of approximately 200 km/h, RA-22312 climbed back to approximately 200 meters’ altitude. The approach to Heerodden then continued at 200 to 215 meters’ altitude with heading 225 degrees and a somewhat varying speed of between 190 and 210 km/h. 20 km from Barentsburg, at 15:01:22, the First Officer alerted the Commander that they were about to pass “reporting point Alpha”. The Commander then contacted Longyearbyen tower. He reported that RA22312 was “abeam Alpha” and that the next position report would be 5...
read moreAir Ambulance Forced Landing: Fuel and Switch Errors Plus CRM Breakdown
Air Ambulance Forced Landing: Fuel and Switch Errors Plus CRM Breakdown (Eaglemed King Air C90A N1551C) On 14 February 2017 Beechcraft King Air C90A N1551C, an air ambulance operated by Eaglemed, was substantially damaged during a precautionary landing following a loss of power on one engine near Rattan, Oklahoma. The single pilot and two medical personnel aboard were uninjured. The Accident Flight The pilot, a 72-year-old male with 22000 flying hours total experience and 400 on type, was phoned at 0710 by the night shift pilot (who was rostered to be on duty to 1000) and asked to come in early to do a patient transfer flight from Idabel, Oklahoma to Paris, Texas. The US National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) explain in their safety investigation report (issued 10 August 2020) that the aircraft departed McAlester, Oklahoma for Idabel at 0806, but don’t discuss the flight planning or pre-flight. The pilot stated that the engine start and airplane power-up were normal. The engine ice vanes were lowered, and the de-icing system was activated as required for ground operations. The ice vanes were subsequently raised before takeoff. Takeoff and climb out were routine, and he subsequently leveled off the airplane at 7,000 ft. mean sea level (msl). The air traffic controller informed him of “heavy rain showers” near the destination airport and he “put the ice vanes down.” Shortly afterward, the airplane experienced two “quick” electrical power fluctuation; “everything went away and then came back.” “Seconds later the entire [electrical] system failed.” Due to the associated loss of navigation capability while operating in instrument meteorological conditions, the pilot set a general course for better weather conditions based upon the preflight weather briefing. During the attempt to find a suitable hole in the clouds to descend through under visual conditions, the left engine lost power. The pilot ultimately located a field through the cloud cover and executed a single engine precautionary landing [at 1145]. The nose landing gear collapsed, and the airplane sustained substantial damage to the right engine mount and firewall. NTSB Safety Investigation In post-accident examination: The three-position Ignition and Engine Start/Starter Only switches on the cockpit instrument panel were in the ON position. The Engine Anti-Ice switches were in the ON position. The left- and right-wing fuel tanks did not contain any visible fuel. The left nacelle fuel tank did not contain any visible fuel. The right nacelle fuel tank appeared to contain about one quart of fuel. During interviews the pilot and medical crew described a remarkable lack of communication and coordination… The pilot reported that the medical crew became apprehensive as the emergency transpired. On three occasions, as the pilot maneuvered the airplane attempting to locate a hole in the clouds to descend, the medical crew member in the co-pilot seat grabbed the control wheel to keep the pilot from banking the airplane. He subsequently relinquished the control wheel as directed by the pilot. The medical crew attempted to locate the airplane by using cellphones to coordinate with the operator’s operations center or by using the cellphone GPS capability. However, these efforts resulted in multiple course adjustments and ultimately failed to encounter visual meteorological conditions before fuel exhaustion on the left engine. The medical personnel say pilot was “making some aggressive banks and turns”, being “unresponsive” and refused to turn around to McAlester, Oklahoma. The pilot accused the medical personnel of panicking, failure to divulge critical information...
read morePilot Goose(d) Surprised and Crashed
Pilot Goose(d) Surprised and Crashed (MD369E N1601Y) On 3 September 2018 private MD Helicopters 369E N1601Y was substantially damaged and the pilot seriously injured in an accident near Orchard Lake, Michigan. The US National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) explain in their factual report (issued only at the end of May 2020) that the pilot, an 87-year-old male former engineering company executive with 3600 hours total flight time… …was planning a short flight in the local area. The helicopter was stationed on a wheeled helicopter transportation dolly at his private heliport. The helicopter departed from the dolly and came to an in-ground effect hover. As the pilot was maneuvering the helicopter to the right of the dolly at a hover, a flock of Canada Geese (Branta canadensis) “came flying into the front and right” of the helicopter. Canada Geese are what can be legitimately referred to as ‘large flockers’… That’s because they are typically around 8 lb (3.6 kg), so will above the certification requirements for all but larger Part 25 airliners, but they also often fly in V-shaped formations, or ‘skeins’, that provide aerodynamic efficiency but can result in multiple bird strikes. While traditionally migratory, they are a species that increasingly live in and around urban areas, golf courses and parks with water features being especially popular with Canada Geese. Indeed the pilot’s private landing site, referred to grandly as a ‘private heliport‘ by the NTSB was located about 350 ft (107 m) south of Upper Straits Lake. The pilot reported he remembered “quickly moving” the helicopter back to the right to avoid the birds, and that it was the last action he could recollect until after the impact when the helicopter was laying on its side. The helicopter came to rest on its left side on a flat grass field in front of the heliport, with the main rotor blades separated from the main rotor hub and the tail rotor gearbox separated from the tailboom. Emergency services personnel extracted the pilot from the wreckage. The pilot sustained serious injuries to his head and body. A review of the pilot’s medical records by the NTSB found the left side of the pilot’s face and the right side of the pilot’s head sustained impact injuries from the accident sequence. The pilot was not wearing a flight helmet during the accident flight, nor was he required to do so. The NTSB investigator-in-charge proposed to the manufacturer’s air safety department about producing and distributing educational guidance encouraging pilots to wear a flight helmet and the manufacturer agreed. MD Helicopters Operational Safety Notice OSN2019-002 Aviation Life Support Equipment – Flight Helmets was created and released to the public in April 2019. UPDATE 15 September 2020: NTSB Probable Cause The pilot’s failure to maintain helicopter control and terrain clearance while in a hover after performing an evasive maneuver to avoid wildlife. The ‘Heliport’ The NTSB also reveal photographs of this private landing site. Noticeable is the proximity (c 15 ft / 5 m from the centre of the pad) of power lines, which would have reduced the pilot’s ability to manoeuvre during the encounter with birds. Safety Resources Impromptu Landing – Unseen Cable Fatal Wisconsin Wire Strike When Robinson R44 Repositions to Refuel A Try and See Catastrophe: R44 Accident in Norway in Bad Weather Fatal R44 Loss of Control Accident: Overweight and Out of Balance R44 Force...
read moreAmbulance / Air Ambulance Collision
Ambulance / Air Ambulance Collision (Air Methods Bell 407GX N450AM) On 3 March 2019, at about 0013 Local Time, helicopter air ambulance Bell 407GX N450AM, operated by Air Methods Corp (doing business as Black Hills Life Flight), was damaged by a ground ambulance while rotors running after landing at the village of Union Center, South Dakota to pick up a patient. The Accident and Investigation The US National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) explain in their safety investigation report (issued 10 August 2020) that: After landing, the pilot rolled the engine throttle to idle and briefed the…[medical personnel]…that they were clear to depart the helicopter. About 20 seconds into the “cool down” process the ground ambulance drove towards the helicopter and subsequently the main rotor blades impacted the top of the ambulance. The flight paramedic was thrown to the ground during the collision. The main rotor blades, tail boom, and fuselage sustained substantial damage. The ground ambulance driver saw the crew open the doors and get out of the helicopter, so he moved the ambulance forward to get closer to the helicopter. The ground ambulance driver stated that he did not realize “that the helicopter blades were still rotating.” Air Methods confirmed that the ambulance driver had received their training. A review of that training indicated that ground personnel are not to approach the aircraft until the blades had stopped rotation. The training also indicated that ground vehicle lights should be turned off while the helicopter is landing. An excerpt from the Air Methods General Operations Manual stated that ground personnel will not [sic] come beneath the rotor disk until directed to do so by the pilot in command; the pilot will use appropriate hand signals to do so. NTSB Probable Cause The ambulance driver’s failure to see the helicopter’s rotating main rotor blades in dark night conditions, which resulted in the ambulance’s inadvertent collision with the helicopter. Contributing to the accident was the ambulance driver’s failure to follow procedures when approaching the helicopter. A Drunken Prelude Bizarrely the very same helicopter was damaged while parked on the Regional Health Rapid City Hospital helipad in South Dakota on 3 August 2020. It was reported that a witness observed a car approaching the hospital helipad at 0340: The driver revved the engine and sped onto the pad before striking the tail end of a Black Hills Life Flight helicopter and driving away. Police found the suspect’s car a few minutes later thanks to a vehicle complaint. The car was driving on deflated tires along Sturgis Road. The car had damage to its roof and windshield, and it was clear to police that this was consistent with the helicopter’s damage. A 53-year-old male was arrested and later charged with: “driving under the influence (2nd), open container [of alcohol] in a motor vehicle, leaving the scene of an accident, and operating a vehicle on private property without permission”, but oddly not with damaging the air ambulance. Safety Resources The European Safety Promotion Network Rotorcraft (ESPN-R) has a helicopter safety discussion group on LinkedIn. Guidance on “Welcoming Helicopters” at emergency sites (in English and French). UPDATE 20 October 2021: A LifeFlight helicopter that was damaged on 18 October when it was struck by a slow-moving ambulance in Maine, US, could return to service by 20 October UPDATE 25 October 2021: Another HEMS/vehicle collision, which occurred to SAME MBB Bo 105CBS-4 LV-CVE at a toll plaza in Argentina on 23 April 2021, was captured on video: You may also...
read moreBoeing 737-800 Engine Nacelle Strike and Continued Operation
Boeing 737-800 Engine Nacelle Strike and Continued Operation (Virgin Australia VH-YIW) On 23 April 2016 Virgin Australia Boeing 737-8FE VH-YIW was operating from Auckland, New Zealand to Faleolo Airport, Apia, Samoa. Unbeknown to the crew, the right engine nacelle made contact with the runway during the landing and been damaged. The damage was not detected for several days. The Serious Incident Flight The Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) explain in their safety investigation report (issued 30 June 2020) that the aircraft was expected to depart on the return sector before the arrival of approaching Tropical Cyclone Amos (TC Amos). At 2100 Coordinated Universal Time [UTC].about seven and a half hours before the planned take-off, the operator’s cyclone management team (CMT) reviewed the weather information…and determined that the flight could continue with additional risk mitigation in place. Specifically, the aircraft was required to carry maximum fuel, to allow for 60 minutes’ holding fuel at Samoa and for possible diversion to an alternate landing at Nadi, Fiji. Furthermore, engineering coverage was required at Samoa, or an engineer had to be carried on board from Auckland. The captain had a total of about 10,000 flying hours experience, c6,000 on type. The first officer had about 5,300 hours, c1,100 were on type. Both had operated to Apia many times, including at night and in rain. The flight departed from Auckland at 0433. The captain was the pilot flying and the first officer was the pilot monitoring. During the flight, the crew sought and received regular weather updates from the operator’s flight following service (flight following). While planning for the descent, approach and landing, the crew decided they would not commence the descent until they had received a weather report from the aerodrome tower controller. The flight crew were only able to make contact by HF radio and based on the feedback received decided they would conduct one approach and if unsuccessful they would divert. During the approach, the crew reported observing heavy rainfall on the aircraft’s weather radar display. The crew also reported that the conditions were not as turbulent as previously expected. On approach to land, the crew established visual reference with runway 08 at about 700 ft above ground level, and continued the approach. The captain disconnected the autopilot at 260 ft and then inadvertently activated the take-off/go-around (TOGA) function. He immediately realised, corrected this action and then deactivated the auto throttle as originally planned. The weather conditions remained within the aircraft’s operating limitations, and were therefore suitable, during the approach and landing. The flight crew were required to maintain a stabilised approach from 1,000 ft above the aerodrome elevation until touchdown. If the approach became unstable during this segment, the crew were required to conduct the missed approach procedure. The operator’s flight procedures stated that…”should it become apparent that the aircraft will touch down significantly short of the touch down aiming point, or beyond the end of the touch down zone (1000 m/3000 ft from the threshold or first third of the runway, whichever is less), the pilot flying shall initiate a go-around”. After about 20 seconds of manual flying on final approach, the aircraft started to drift left. The aircraft touched down about six seconds later. During those six seconds, both flight crew became aware of the aircraft’s left drift and the captain manoeuvred the aircraft to return...
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