Loss of Sikorsky S-76C+ 5N-BQG of Eastwind Off Nigeria 24 October 2024
On 24 October 2024 Sikorsky S-76C+ 5N-BQG of Eastwind cashed in the sea southeast of Eket, Nigeria at 11:25 in daylight. All 8 occupants perished.
Wreckage of Eastwind Sikorsky S-76C+ 5N-BQG (Credit: NSIB)
The Nigerian Safety Investigation Bureau (NSIB) published their preliminary report on 17 December 2024.
The Aircraft
Eastwind Aviation Logistics Services Limited is an operator based in Ikeja, Lagos. It has a Nigeria Civil Aviation Authority (NCAA) air operator certificate (AOC). It operated one helicopter, 5N-BQG. This S-76C+ had been imported from the US in 2012 where it had been an executive aircraft for a financial services firm. The NCAA describe its history in Nigeria as follows:
At the time of the accident the aircraft had flown just 2783 hours and 5921 cycles since built in 1998.
The aircraft had a Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) but not was not fitted with a Flight Data Recorder (FDR), despite that being a regulatory requirement. NSIB has consequently issued Safety Recommendation 2024-049:
Nigeria Civil Aviation Authority should ensure strict compliance to the Nigerian Civil Aviation Regulations (Nig. CARs) 2023 part 7.8.2.2(q) which requires that all helicopters with a maximum takeoff mass over 3175 kg and up to 7000 kg to be fitted with a Flight Data Recorder (FDR).
NSIB do not comment on what offshore modifications this former executive helicopter had.
The Radalt was deferred six days earlier on 18 October 2024. The Flight Safety Foundation (FSF) Basic Aviation Risk Standard for Offshore Helicopter Operations (BARSOHO) states in Control 4.4:
The radio altimeter must be serviceable for any flight at night or conducted under IFR (even if deferrable in the regulatory approved MEL).
For reference the IOGP Report 690 Recommended Practices do not have a recommendation on radalt serviceability as its left to individual customers to agree a contracted Minimum Departure Standard (MDS) with the operator (690-5/1) ‘if applicable’.
The Accident Flight
The helicopter had departed the Port Harcourt NAF Base (DNPM) at 10:47 enroute to the Nuim Antan, a Floating Production Storage and Offloading (FPSO) vessel of Nigerian National Petroleum Company (NNPC). On board were two pilots and 6 passengers, one of whom was an Eastwind engineer.
The Aircraft Commander had 4687 hours of experience, 3972 on type and was Pilot Flying (PF). The Co-pilot had 1719 hours, 1411 on type and Pilot Monitoring (PM). In 2014 Aerossurance published the article: Commanders: Flying or Monitoring?
Their 90/28/7 day and 24 hour flight times were identical, suggesting they had been rostered to fly together repeatedly for 3 months (consistent with a small, single aircraft operator).
The Meteorological conditions from FPSO Nuim Antan Helideck report were as follows:
Based on their CVR analysis NSIB report that:
- At 11:07:46 h, Nuim Antan contacted 5N-BQG and asked them to repeat their Estimated Time of Arrival (ETA). The flight crew of 5N-BQG relayed their ETA to Nuim Antan at 11:30 h [sic]. Nuim Antan relayed up-take payload…of 1318 Lbs, which was acknowledged by 5N-BQG.
At 11:08:27 h, 5N-BQG requested the current weather information at Nuim Antan and was asked to stand by. - At 11:08:48 h, Weather information was relayed to 5N-BQG as Wind 180°/08 kts, visibility five miles, cloud one thousand two hundred, temperature 27° C and QNH 1015 hPa with an approaching cloud from the East bearing an easterly direction which was acknowledged by the flight crew of 5N-BQG.
- At 11:10:29 h, There was a brief discussion between the PM and the PF in which the PM said Sir, it’s that weather that I was telling you about that was building up. The PM then asked the PF whether he was comfortable with the earlier payload of 1318 Lbs at Nuim Antan, which the PF did not acknowledge. The PM continued with the conversation by asking the PF Are you hearing me, Sir, to which the PF replied sternly, I can hear you standby which the PM acknowledged.
- At 11:11:36 h, the PF instructed the PM to inform Nuim Antan about the decision to reduce the earlier payload given to them from 1318 Lbs to 1300 Lbs, which the PM acknowledged.
- At 11:11:40 h, the PM contacted Nuim Antan and relayed the information about the decision to reduce 18 Lbs from the up-take payload at Nuim Antan, which was acknowledged.
- At 11:12:25 h, Nuim Antan informed 5N-BQG that the two wind socks were down, which was acknowledged. The PF then remarked, “Zero Socks.”
- At 11:12:41 h, Nuim Antan reported having light shower on deck and promised to revert to the flight crew of 5N-BQG if the weather further deteriorated, which was acknowledged by 5N-BQG.
- At 11:17:24 h, The PF asked the PM to set the course. The PM said, Descending call approach, and the PF replied in the affirmative. This was followed by a radio call. All stations on one three one six five Quebec golf is ehh showing ah one four miles northwest of the Nuim Antan landing in five minutes next call lifting which Nuim Antan acknowledged. The PM asked the PF about descending, and the PF replied by instructing the PM to wait for a moment, which was acknowledged.
- At 11:18:00 h, the PF made a remark, Okay, descend. The PM asked the PF whether 200 ft/min vertical speed was okay, and the PF replied in the affirmative.
The crew then became increasingly focused on the threat of weather:
- At 11:18:55 h, the PF started to show concern in a brief discussion with the PM regarding the weather information earlier given to them as incorrect. The PF then instructed the PM to call the Nuim Antan. The PM immediately contacted the Nuim Antan and requested the prevailing wind direction, which was acknowledged.
- At 11:19:25 h, The PF expressed concern about the wind tending towards 240° in a northerly direction, and the PM concurred.
- At 11:19:45 h, Wind information was relayed by Nuim Antan as 045°/10kts, which was acknowledged.
- At 11:20:41 h, the PF made a remark about the weather: Eight miles broken, you can’t see nothing. The PM replied, Sir, confirm we are not diverting from here, which was not acknowledged by the PF.
- At 11:21:48 h, The PM called out altitude captured, which the PF acknowledged.
The Commander decided to divert back to the NAF Base:
- At 11:22:41 h, the PF instructed the PM to set the altitude to 2000 ft, initiate a climb, disengage Airspeed hold, and engage altitude pre-select again to 2000 ft so that they could return to DNPM, which the PM acknowledged in the affirmative.
- At 11:23:32 h, the PM made a remark about the weather. He said, It’s a light shower, followed by a sarcastic chuckle. The PF made a remark, Climb, Climb, Climb, to which the PM replied, We are climbing, eh. The PM advised the PF that the only way to climb was to engage airspeed mode and use the collective.
- At 11:23:45 h, the PM further advised the PF, Hold there, left pedal put left pedal Okay. The PM then suggested to the PF whether the vertical speed (rate of climb) could be increased to 300 ft/min, which the PF acknowledged in the affirmative, Yeah, increase it. At 11:24:52 h, the PM remarked, This thing is not working… This was followed by an aural warning from the aircraft, Bank angle, Bank angle, which was the last recorded data on the CVR.
The aircraft crashed into the Atlantic Ocean and disintegrated. The crash occurred in the ocean about 1.4 km from NNPC FPSO (Nuim Antan). The main wreckage was found at Coordinates 04°13’37” N 008°19’22” E at a depth of 42 m.
While approaching the crash area, fuel was observed on the surface water. Helicopter debris and some personal belongings of the flight crew and passengers were scattered all over the area.
Some life vests and three bodies were recovered from the crash area. Some of the bodies recovered had inflated life vests on them.
The Search and recovery operation continued day and night for 14 days. It was characterised by violent oceanic currents and waves, heavy rains, and strong winds.
..three bodies, including the flight crew and one passenger, are yet to be found.
NSIB Safety Investigation
The Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) was recovered from the seabed at the accident site on 8 November 2024, the 13th day after the accident. Upon recovery, the CVR was immersed in fresh water in a container and transported to the flight recorder laboratory of the National Transportation Safety Board NTSB)…for readout and analysis. The last 31 minutes of the CVR recording were successfully downloaded.
A Spectrum analysis of the latter portions of the CVR recording has also been conducted for NSIB by NTSB. No results are provided in the preliminary report.
NSIB plan to do the following:
- Download and Analysis of the Full Authority Digital Engine Control (FADEC).
- Download and Analysis of Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning System (EGPWS).
- Disassembly/tear-down of the main rotor assembly and gearbox.
- Disassembly/tear-down of both Engines.
- Simulation of the flight conditions.
Among their findings were that:
- The flight crew used non-standard phraseology throughout the flight.
- There were no standard callouts for the various phases of the flight.
- No dew point data was reported in the weather information passed to 5N-BQG on the day of the occurrence.
They also report that the aircraft’s Certificate of Insurance was only valid until 7 March 2024.
In contrast to what the crew were told NSIB state that:
The status of the navigational aids on the FPSO Nuim Antan on the day of the occurrence was as follows: Wind Socks -“Serviceable”
Aerossurance will update this article when more information is released.
Look out on our website for a case study on a fatal spatial disorientation during a go-around offshore to be issued on Friday 20 December 2024.
Safety Resources
The European Safety Promotion Network Rotorcraft (ESPN-R) has a helicopter safety discussion group on LinkedIn. You may also find these Aerossurance articles of interest:
- North Sea Helicopter Struck Sea After LOC-I on Approach During Night Shuttling
- Loss of Control, Twice, by Offshore Helicopter off Nova Scotia
- Offshore Night Near Miss: Marine Pilot Transfer Unintended Descent
- Technology Friend or Foe – Automation in Offshore Helicopter Operations and Aerossurance Marks RAeS 150th Anniversary by Sponsoring Rotorcraft Automation Conference
- AAIB Report on 2013 Sumburgh Helicopter Accident
- SAR Helicopter Loss of Control at Night: ATSB Report
- NTSB Investigation into AW139 Bahamas Night Take Off Accident
- Night Offshore Training AS365N3 Accident in India 2015
- BFU Investigate S-76B Descending to 20ft at 40 kts En Route in Poor Visibility
- Review of “The impact of human factors on pilots’ safety behavior in offshore aviation – Brazil”
- HEMS S-76C+ Night Approach LOC-I Incident
- NH90 Caribbean Loss of Control – Inflight, Water Impact and Survivability Issues
- Helideck Heave Ho!
- 2009 Newfoundland S-92A C-GZCH Accident: A Failure of Design and Certification
- ADA AW139 A6-AWN Ditching off UAE, 29 April 2017: Final Report
- Night Offshore Windfarm HEMS Winch Training CFIT
- NTSB Report on Bizarre 2012 US S-76B Ditching
- Sikorsky S-92A Loss of Tail Rotor Control Events
- S-92A Emergency Landing: MGB Oil Checklist Recommendation
- Loss of Bell 412 off Brazil Remains Unexplained
- RLC B407 Reverses into Sister Ship at GOM Heliport
- CAP1145 Helicopter Water Impact Survivability Statistics – A Critique
- Hong Kong Harbour AW139 Ditching – HKCAD Report Issued
- Dramatic Malaysian S-76C 2013 Ditching Video
- In-Flight Flying Control Failure: Indonesian Sikorsky S-76C+ PK-FUP
- Safety Lessons from a Fatal Helicopter Bird Strike: Sikorsky S-76C++ N748P, 4 January 2009
- Wrong Deck Landings
- Offshore Helicopter Emergency Response
- inded by Light, Spanish Customs AS365 Crashed During Night-time Hot Pursuit
- BK117 Offshore Medevac CFIT & Survivability Issues
- SAR AW139 LOC-I During Positioning Flight
- Night Offshore Take-Off Loss of Control Incident
- Night Offshore Helicopter Approach Water Impact
- UPDATE 20 December 2024: 29 Seconds to Impact: A Fatal Night Offshore Approach in the Irish Sea
HeliOffshore has recently issued the fourth iteration of its offshore helicopter Flight Path Management (FPM) recommended practice:
This contains extensive relevant recommendations:
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